Originally posted by Ned
Uber, I once had a management training class that studied the movie the Bridge on the River Kwai. In the movie, the Brit commander was clearly superior to the Japanese commander in virtually everything except keeping the ultimate goal in mind. His job #1 was to assure that the bridge would fail. The Japanese commander's job #1 was to see that bridge was build on time. The Japanese commander succeeded and was the better manager.
If one wins battle after battle after battle and has temporary success but long term failure in extending the Emprie, there is no doubt that that person is a great General, just like the British commander, but in the final analysis, he is a failure as a conqueror.
Napoleon clearly was a great general. But he lost in the end. This places him on the same footing as Valens, the Athenians at Syracuse and, for that matter, Hannibal.
Uber, I once had a management training class that studied the movie the Bridge on the River Kwai. In the movie, the Brit commander was clearly superior to the Japanese commander in virtually everything except keeping the ultimate goal in mind. His job #1 was to assure that the bridge would fail. The Japanese commander's job #1 was to see that bridge was build on time. The Japanese commander succeeded and was the better manager.
If one wins battle after battle after battle and has temporary success but long term failure in extending the Emprie, there is no doubt that that person is a great General, just like the British commander, but in the final analysis, he is a failure as a conqueror.
Napoleon clearly was a great general. But he lost in the end. This places him on the same footing as Valens, the Athenians at Syracuse and, for that matter, Hannibal.
"If one wins battle after battle after battle and has temporary success but long term failure in extending the Emprie, there is no doubt that that person is a great General, just like the British commander, but in the final analysis, he is a failure as a conqueror." --- I'm not certain I see the correlation with Napoleon and the British commander. In the movie you referrenced the commander as being superior to the Japanese one in every respect. Well does that include a strategic mindset? Because I can tell you in that area Napoleon wasn't lacking. Napoleon was the greatest strategist ever. Hell, look strategy up in the dictionary and you'll find his picture. To reiterate, this British commander must've been superior to the Japanese one in materiel only. Also, you failed to specify the degree of superiority. The issue is nuanced and unfortunately you failed to provide the adequate analysis.
"Napoleon clearly was a great general. But he lost in the end. This places him on the same footing as Valens, the Athenians at Syracuse and, for that matter, Hannibal." --- This is blatant contradiction like I've ever seen any. You can't call Napoleon a "great general" then proceed to rank him alongside Valens. Napoleon was ultimately a loser, but overall a winner. He fought 12 major campaigns in his life and ended with a 7-5 record. Here are the campaigns he directed personally, along with a short description of what happened:
1.First Italian Campaign, 1796-97: Win. Napoleon continuously holds off and defeats larger Austrian armies. This campaign would be studied at military academies throughout the 19th century.
2.Egyptian Campaign, 1798-99: Loss. The French fight four land battles (Chobrakit, the Pyramids, Jaffa, and Aboukir) and win them all. Their naval disaster at Aboukir Bay, however, dooms the expedition. Napoleon sails back to France in the summer of 1799.
3.Second Italian Campaign, 1800: Win. Napoleon uberowns the Austrians at Marengo. One of the greatest campaigns in history.
4.Austrian Campaign, 1805: Win. Napoleon defeats the Russo-Austrian army at Austerlitz. End of Third Coalition.
5.Prussian Campaign, 1806: Win. Napoleon crushes the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt (won by Davout).
6.Polish Campaign, 1807: Win. Friedland...need I say more?
7.Spanish Campaign, 1808-09: Win. Napoleon invades Spain in November, 1808 and pwns the Spanish armies, forcing the British to withdraw from the Peninsula as well.
8.Danube Campaign, 1809: Win. Napoleon defeats Austria again. 4th time in 13 years....sigh....
9.Russian Campaign, 1812: Loss. 95,000 come out alive...this out of 600,000 that went in.
10.German Campaign, 1813: Loss. Leipzig....
11.French Campaign, 1814: Loss. Allies depose him...
12.Hundred Days Campaign, 1815: Loss. Waterloo ends his career permanently.
7-5...
I realize to gage his career this way is crude, but you've almost forced me to do it, just so I could dispel any thoughts clouding your mind about him being some sort of "loser". Conquest isn't necessarily about the win and the loss. Sometimes it's about the ideas, the dreams, the legacies, and the hopes. No era in history has left a larger print on war annals than the Napoleonic Era. The Corps system he helped institute would form the strategic building block for 19th and 20th century armies. In this sense, Napoleon's influence was longer than Alexander's, who watched 'from the grave' as just a century and a half after his death the prized phalanx system was eaten alive by the legion (although we can debate whether this was due to the strength of the legion or the incompetency of Macedonian commanders. For example, Pyrrhus utilized the phalanx system and constantly defeated Roman armies employing legions). Napoleon's concepts still endure, even though technology has dramatically altered the tactical side of warfare. Let me give you a rundown of post-Napoleonic military thinking: there were basically two schools (in the area I'm covering...don't get ideas here). Those that saw divided armies as opportunity, and those that saw them as liabilities. Napoleon saw them as an opportunity, and decades after his death in 1866, the Prussians, led by the legendary Moltke, trounced the Austrian armies through the very system of divided corps. And you see it even today: armies never move like they did in the 18th century as a singular unit; they are always spread out and intent on encircling.
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