Wolfowitz statement to the House National Security Commitee, September 1998.
"The United States is unable or unwilling to pursue a serious policy in Iraq, one that would aim at liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam's tyrannical grasp and free Iraq’s neighbors from Saddam’s murderous threats. Such a policy, but only such a policy, would gain real support from our friends in the region. And it might eventually even gain the respect of many of our critics who are able to see that Saddam inflicts horrendous suffering on the Iraqi people, but who see U.S. policy making that suffering worse through sanctions while doing nothing about Saddam.
Administration officials continue to claim that the only alternative to maintaining the unity of the UN Security Council is to send U.S. forces to Baghdad. That is wrong. As has been said repeatedly in letters and testimony to the President and the Congress by myself and other former defense officials, including two former secretaries of defense, and a former director of central intelligence, the key lies not in marching U.S. soldiers to Baghdad, but in helping the Iraqi people to liberate themselves from Saddam."
First in 1998 he was not advocating regime change by invasion, but by support for revolutuon.
Second, his rationales were not to demonstrate American power, but to end the threat to the region, end the sanctions, and to liberate the Iraqi people.
Now you may well believe that his motives were different, as I have my beliefs about Saddams connections to AQ. In neither case is there proof.
"The United States is unable or unwilling to pursue a serious policy in Iraq, one that would aim at liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam's tyrannical grasp and free Iraq’s neighbors from Saddam’s murderous threats. Such a policy, but only such a policy, would gain real support from our friends in the region. And it might eventually even gain the respect of many of our critics who are able to see that Saddam inflicts horrendous suffering on the Iraqi people, but who see U.S. policy making that suffering worse through sanctions while doing nothing about Saddam.
Administration officials continue to claim that the only alternative to maintaining the unity of the UN Security Council is to send U.S. forces to Baghdad. That is wrong. As has been said repeatedly in letters and testimony to the President and the Congress by myself and other former defense officials, including two former secretaries of defense, and a former director of central intelligence, the key lies not in marching U.S. soldiers to Baghdad, but in helping the Iraqi people to liberate themselves from Saddam."
First in 1998 he was not advocating regime change by invasion, but by support for revolutuon.
Second, his rationales were not to demonstrate American power, but to end the threat to the region, end the sanctions, and to liberate the Iraqi people.
Now you may well believe that his motives were different, as I have my beliefs about Saddams connections to AQ. In neither case is there proof.
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