Orthodox answers

[Cort Haus]

"I have gained this from philosophy: that I do without being commanded what others do only from fear of the law."- Aristotle

Or God, one might add.

[Elok]

Yes, but that's awfully glib, don't you think? In the absence of a transcendent aim, what is the final object of moral behavior, and how can that object remain unconditional (ie, how can morality be the highest imperative, and not merely one competing consideration among many)?

[loinburger]

The final object of moral behavior is generally the same for both theists and atheists - the theists who are moral solely because God commands it are either saints or (more often) monsters.

[Cort Haus]

Yes, but that's awfully glib, don't you think? In the absence of a transcendent aim, what is the final object of moral behavior, and how can that object remain unconditional (ie, how can morality be the highest imperative, and not merely one competing consideration among many)?

No, I don't think it's glib.

To be perfectly honest, I don't really understand about transcendent aims, final objects & their unconditionality, and whether they are competing considerations, so please excuse my stupidity and ignorance.

All I know is that "do as you would be done by" is simple, easy to understand and is a decent starting point at least for a morality. Some might see it extinguished by a blast of cold cynicism but I like to be more hopeful.

[Aeson]

Yes, but that's awfully glib, don't you think? In the absence of a transcendent aim, what is the final object of moral behavior, and how can that object remain unconditional (ie, how can morality be the highest imperative, and not merely one competing consideration among many)?

There are no actually transcendent aims, or non-theists can have the same "transcendent" type of aim just without a deity. In both cases (theist, non-theist) the "transcendent aim" is merely one competing consideration among many. Any of those competing factors could potentially be weighted so that it has the highest imperative.

[Lorizael]

All I know is that "do as you would be done by" is simple, easy to understand and is a decent starting point at least for a morality. Some might see it extinguished by a blast of cold cynicism but I like to be more hopeful.

It's a starting point for a morality only if morality is about making the world more awesome for humans/human-like things/stuff we care about for some reason. The disconnect is that although morality necessarily concerns what it is humans should do, there's no reason a priori why it should necessarily concern actions that affect humans. That's a major anthropocentric bias.

It's quite possible that morality is really about--that is, right and wrong and good and evil are defined in terms of--what puts the most oranges into the universe. You could make a strong argument for having a well-oiled human civilization if you want to pump out more oranges, but ultimately any concerns about humans are secondary to orange proliferation, and morality only concerns humans to the extent that humans are beings that can create and destroy oranges.

You might argue something along the lines of, well why should I give a flying flapdoodle about morality that doesn't concern the effects on humans? And the answer is, as I already stated, because morality is defined in terms of right and wrong, good and evil. It's the only thing you should care about if you should care about anything, and it doesn't matter one iota if the evolved psychology of hairless Earth primates happens not to have interests that align with what is actually true and important about the universe.

[Aeson]

There is nothing "important about the universe" other than what conscious observers (who so far have all be part of the universe) determine is important about the universe. And they can have very different takes on what that importance is. Without any sentience, without any individuals (past, present, future) to make assessments of the importance of the universe (in part or in totality, directly or indirectly) the universe might as well not exist.

[Lorizael]

Yes, I'm aware you believe that.

[Aeson]

Do you have an explanation as to how the universe has a value if there is no observer?

[Lorizael]

An external observer, or creator, could assign value to parts of the universe, and the logic of reality may be constructed in such a way that those values are objectively important. That said, I don't actually think in terms of any sort of entity or sentience doing this value-assigning. Rather, it is just possible that the supernatural (that is, beyond the universe) origin of reality (by which I mean the whole notion of the opposite of non-existence at all, not just the physical universe we happen to inhabit) may determine both (a) what kinds of universes can exist and (b) what's important about those kinds of universes.

[Lorizael]

Do you have an explanation as to how the universe has a value if there is no observer?

Better answer: Yes.

[ZEE]

I am deeply interested in this conversation as the outcome will no doubt change my entire worldview forevar!

[Lorizael]

Tangerines? No, you drooling nincompoop, I'm talking about regular oranges.

[Elok]

No, I don't think it's glib.

To be perfectly honest, I don't really understand about transcendent aims, final objects & their unconditionality, and whether they are competing considerations, so please excuse my stupidity and ignorance.

All I know is that "do as you would be done by" is simple, easy to understand and is a decent starting point at least for a morality. Some might see it extinguished by a blast of cold cynicism but I like to be more hopeful.

Put it this way: doing the right thing should be of the highest importance, and not overridden by any other considerations except when those considerations modify what "the right thing" is itself--right? That is, you don't say, "no buying and selling slaves, unless the profit margin is sufficiently high" or "no buying and selling slaves, unless it's something you're really good at"; the ban on that behavior would be considered absolute except in some situation where you could argue that slave trading is less evil than every alternative. Morality is the highest rule governing behavior, at least in theory.

Why do you have this overriding rule with no set object in mind? Because when you say, "not for fear of God," what I hear is, "you do [X] for a reason [which I may or may not consider absurdly unlikely, etc.], and I do [X] for no reason, so I'm better." Why is aimlessness a good thing in this specific situation, but (presumptively) no other? I don't think of it as fear of God whacking me with His divine ruler so much as putting the rules in a context where they have a set goal and purpose to work towards. Doing good just because you should do good, ultimately, is a mere tautology and justifies nothing. I think Lori is saying something roughly similar but in more sciencey terms.

[Aeson]

An external observer, or creator, could assign value to parts of the universe, and the logic of reality may be constructed in such a way that those values are objectively important.

External observer is still an observer.