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**GePap** · November 7, 2008, 14:16

I have the pleasure of interviewing people with similar conspiracies against them, though I doubt those people had access to computers and printers.

**Zkribbler** · November 7, 2008, 14:17

He claims George Bush is a time traveler and the grand Iman of voodoo witch doctors.

That explains a lot.

**KrazyHorse** · November 7, 2008, 14:20

Guerilla's in the Mist

Look out!

**Arrian** · November 7, 2008, 14:32

This guy is well-known for filing all sorts of stupid ****, from lawsuits to filings in ongoing cases he didn't start (and have nothing to do with him). It's his personal vendetta b/c they put him in jail.

-Arrian

edit: "they" being the justice system.

**SlowwHand** · November 7, 2008, 14:59

Comcast Cable. He makes some valid points.

**Darius871** · November 7, 2008, 15:33

I dealt with a similar pleading at work; basically the lady went through a four-page numerological rant taking a chain of loose associations between things like the Gettysburg Address' year and docket or district numbers, apparently using the "coincidences" to prove that the state of Kentucky was engaged in some vast conspiracy against her. Classic schizophrenia.

I don't have the pleadings any more, and they were really the only funny part, but here's an appeals case from the same character that slapped her with sanctions:

Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2008 WL 1108519 (Ky.App.)

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Patricia Sue SMALLWOOD, Appellant
v.
RIVER VALLEY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INC.; Kentucky Unemployment Commission; and Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Appellant.

No. 2007-CA-000728-MR.

April 11, 2008.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Action No. 06-CI-007464

OPINION

KELLER, Judge.

*1 In this employment action, Patricia Sue Smallwood, proceeding pro se, has appealed from the portion of the March 22, 2007, Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court imposing CR 11 sanctions against her and awarding attorney's fees to River Valley Behavioral Health, Inc. (River Valley). We affirm.

River Valley hired Smallwood as the Human Resources Manager at Hazelwood Center on March 30, 2005. Hazelwood Center is administered through the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Smallwood was terminated from her position on February 2, 2006, for gross insubordination, as well as several other problems noted in her performance. Smallwood's initial claim for unemployment benefits was denied in March 2006, as her insubordination disqualified her from receiving benefits. At a hearing contesting this determination, Smallwood disputed that her employer was River Valley, as listed on the unemployment documents, but rather, was Hazelwood Center. Accordingly, the Unemployment Insurance Commission (the Commission) entered an order on June 14, 2006, remanding the matter to the Division's tax audit branch to determine the correct employment relationship. The tax audit branch then issued an order on June 23, 2006, finding that Smallwood was an employee of River Valley for purposes of unemployment insurance. It is from this order that Smallwood initiated the circuit court action on August 23, 2006, naming River Valley, the Commission, and Hazelwood Center as defendants.

All of the defendants moved to dismiss Smallwood's suit, citing her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, her failure to verify her complaint, and the untimeliness of her purported appeal. Prior to the circuit court's ruling on these motions to dismiss, Smallwood attempted to amend her complaint to include claims for wrongful discharge and for retaliation for making a whistleblower report. Smallwood also filed motions for summary judgment and for partial summary judgment. In addition, Smallwood sought to compel the withdrawal of counsel for River Valley and the Cabinet, and moved for CR 11 sanctions against those attorneys. On December 1, 2006, the circuit court entered an Opinion and Order granting the defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that Smallwood failed to verify her complaint and failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Regarding the latter holding, the circuit court stated that Smallwood should have first sought review of the tax audit branch's June 23, 2006, order before the Commission, not the circuit court, and thus the matter was not ripe for judicial review. No appeal was taken from this Opinion and Order.

Instead, on December 18, 2006, Smallwood filed a CR 60.02 motion for relief and requested a hearing. In her motion, Smallwood made outrageous accusations against the defendants and their respective attorneys that we shall not repeat in this opinion. Smallwood then filed a subsequent motion to withdraw her first CR 60.02 motion so that she could file a more detailed CR 60.02 motion. The defendants objected to the motions and requested CR 11 sanctions be imposed against Smallwood. Following oral argument, the circuit court entered an Opinion and Order on February 23, 2007, the pertinent parts of which we shall set out below:

*2 I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION PURSUANT TO CR 60.02:

In support of her motion, [Smallwood] persists in arguing the factual predicate for her claims, without addressing the procedural defects of her pleadings. This Court has found that, because [Smallwood] has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, this Court has [no] jurisdiction to hear her claims. This finding is further support[ed] by the fact that additional proceedings are set to take place before the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission on February 25, 2007. [Smallwood] has failed to persuade the Court that it has jurisdiction to act in this matter and her motion will be denied.

II. MOTIONS FOR CR 11 SANCTIONS:

CR 11 states in pertinent part that, “The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” The rule, using the mandatory “shall,” requires the Court to impose “appropriate sanctions” upon a finding of violations. Among those sanctions is the obligation to order the violating party or his attorney to “pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including reasonable attorney's fees.”

While [Smallwood] was repeatedly given the opportunity to address the CR 11 motions, she continued to use her time to address the issues presented by her myriad claims. Her sole defense appeared to be that the litigation has not been concluded as required by CR 11 and therefore, the Court could not rule upon the motions at this time. The Court's ruling as to the matter of [Smallwood's] motion for relief pursuant to CR 60.02 concludes the action and therefore, the Court is free to impose sanctions upon her.

In both of her CR 60.02 motions, filed on December 18, 2006 and January 2, 2007 respectively, [Smallwood] has made appalling allegations against not just the agencies involved, but the attorneys representing them. These parties have been accused of various criminal activities, including fraud. Her stated bases for doing so could have no merit with any reasonable jury or jurist. CR 11 sanctions are not only appropriate, but necessary where, as here, the reputation of attorneys has been so unjustifiably maligned.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED [Smallwood's] motion for relief pursuant to CR 60.02 is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motions for sanctions pursuant to CR 11 are GRANTED. Upon compliance with JRP 404, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and River Valley Behavioral Health, Inc. shall each recover their reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees incurred in defending against the CR 60.02 motions filed on December 18, 2006 and January 2, 2007. In addition, a fine of $100.00 for each motion is assessed against [Smallwood] and awarded to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and to River Valley Behavioral Health, Inc.

*3 IT IS ORDERED that the CR 60.02 motions filed on December 18, 2006 and January 2, 2007 shall be and are hereby stricken from the record.

This is a final and appealable Order and there is no just cause for delay.

No appeal was taken from this Opinion and Order.

In accordance with this Opinion and Order, River Valley filed a motion seeking $8,480 in attorney's fees. Smallwood objected to River Valley's motion and sought relief pursuant to CR 60.02 from the portion of the Opinion and Order awarding attorney's fees. In support, Smallwood cited the recent decision from the Commission's Appeals Branch, in which she was found not be insubordinate and thus was qualified to receive unemployment benefits.

On March 22, 2007, the circuit court entered an Opinion and Order ruling on Smallwood's CR 60.02 motion and River Valley's motion for attorney's fees. The circuit court held in pertinent part as follows:

I. [SMALLWOOD'S] MOTION PURSUANT TO CR 60.02:

The Commission's [February 27, 2007,] ruling [reversing the original determination as to Smallwood's proper employer] renders any appeal of its previous decision moot and the Court's original determination that it lacked jurisdiction over that matter is correct. However, this Court does have jurisdiction over its own orders and has the ability to punish reprehensible conduct taking place under the guise of legitimate legal action. This Court's ruling with regard to CR 11 sanctions is pursuant to this authority and has not been challenged in any meaningful way by [Smallwood].

This Court found that, “In both of her CR 60.02 motions, filed on December 18, 2006 and January 2, 2007 respectively, [Smallwood] has made appalling allegations against not just the agencies involved, but the attorneys representing them. These parties have been accused of various criminal activities, including fraud. Her stated bases for so doing could have no merit with any reasonable jury or jurist. CR 11 sanctions are not only appropriate, but necessary where, as here, the reputation of attorneys has been so unjustifiably maligned.” The Court then directed the attorneys effected [sic] by [Smallwood's] conduct to supply appropriate documentation of their fees. They have done so and this Court finds those fees to be reasonable, particularly in light of the fact that [Smallwood] continues to engage in the same objectionable conduct, even after this Court's previous Order.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED [Smallwood's] motion for relief pursuant to CR 60.02 is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motions for attorney's fees filed on behalf of River Valley Behavioral Health, Inc. is GRANTED. River Valley Behavioral Health, Inc. shall recover of [Smallwood], the sum of $8,480.00

This is a final and appealable Order and there is no just cause for delay.

It is from the March 22, 2007, Opinion and Order that Smallwood has taken the present appeal.

Smallwood's brief is difficult to understand, but it appears that she is asserting that the circuit court improperly sanctioned her for the conduct of attorneys representing the defendants below, rather than sanctioning those attorneys. She then requests that those attorneys should each be sanctioned. In response, River Valley argues that Smallwood appealed from the wrong order in that she did not appeal from the initial order awarding CR 11 sanctions; that she did not establish that the amount of sanctions awarded was unreasonable; and that the award of CR 11 sanctions should in any event be upheld.FN1 We agree with River Valley; hence, we affirm.

*4 We shall begin our analysis by reciting the language of the applicable Civil Rule in this case, namely, CR 11:

Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by Rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The Court shall postpone ruling on any Rule 11 motions filed in the litigation until after entry of a final judgment.

In Clark Equipment Co., Inc. v. Bowman, 762 S.W.2d 417, 420-21 (Ky.App.1988), this Court addressed the imposition of CR 11 sanctions:

As a threshold matter, Rule 11 is not, as the appellant seemingly contends, a vehicle to obtain relief by one who has suffered damages by simple negligence in the filing of a lawsuit or by the filing of a meritless lawsuit. Historically successful litigants have had a remedy for the filing of meritless lawsuits in the nature of a countersuit for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. See C. Leibson, Legal Malpractice Cases: Special Problems in Identifying Issues of Law and Fact and in the Use of Expert Testimony, 75 Ky.L.J. 1, 25 (1986-87). To prevail in such a countersuit, one is required to prove, among other things, that the attorney, in filing the original suit, acted without probable cause and with malice. Raine v. Drasin, Ky., 621 S.W.2d 895, 899 (1981). The latter element can be inferred from lack of the first. Id.

Rule 11 was never intended to serve as an alternate remedy or as a substitute for those necessary elements to those various actions Justice Leibson refers to as “wrongful civil proceedings.” While it should be obvious, we want to make it clear that Rule 11 does not provide substantive rights to litigants but is a procedural rule designed to curb abusive conduct in the litigation process. Port Drum Co. v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir.1988); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp, 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3rd Cir.1987); Mihalik v. Pro Arts, Inc., 851 F.2d 790 (6th Cir.1988). It is intended for “exceptional circumstances.” Gaiardo, supra at 483. Thus, even if a case is meritless, Rule 11 has no application unless it is demonstrated that a “party or his lawyer has signed a paper in violation of the Rule.” National Association of Government Employees, Inc. v. National Federation of Federal Employees, 844 F .2d 216, 222 (5th Cir.1988).

**Darius871** · November 7, 2008, 15:34

continued:

*5 The test to be used by the trial court in considering a motion for sanctions is whether the attorney's conduct, at the time he or she signed the allegedly offending pleading or motion, was reasonable under the circumstances. Louisville Rent-A-Space v. Akai, Ky.App., 746 S.W.2d 85 (1988); Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir.1986). The Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee suggested that a trial court consider several factors in deciding whether an attorney breached his obligations under the rule:

"The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted. Thus, what constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as how much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper; whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar."

Rule 11 does not prescribe a standard of review of rulings made pursuant thereto. We believe, however, that where sanctions have been denied, our review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. In Kentucky, trial courts are not required to make findings when ruling on motions, CR 52.01; but in certain circumstances, especially when granting relief, it is incumbent upon the trial court to make findings on matters raised by motion. See Burnett v. Burnett, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 330 (1974). Considering the punitive nature of sanctions and “the impact sanctions may have on a party or an attorney's career and personal well-being,” FN2 a trial court should not impose sanctions without a hearing and without rendering findings of fact. While some courts apply an across-the-board abuse of discretion standard of review to all Rule 11 rulings, e.g., Mihalik v. Pro Arts, Inc., supra at 793, we think where sanctions are imposed our role requires a multi-standard approach, that is, a clearly erroneous standard to the trial court's findings in support of sanctions, a de novo review of the legal conclusion that a violation occurred, and an abuse of discretion standard on the type and/or amount of sanctions imposed.FN3 See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir.1986); Brown v. Federation of State Medical Boards of U.S., 830 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir.1987).

In the present case, the issue as to whether the initial decision to impose CR 11 sanctions was proper is not before the Court. As pointed out by River Valley, Smallwood did not appeal from the Opinion and Order in which the circuit court actually decided that CR 11 sanctions were appropriate. Nevertheless, we hold that CR 11 sanctions were more than appropriate in this case. We note that the sanctions were specifically imposed based upon Smallwood's post-dismissal CR 60.02 filings, which either were completely unnecessary or patently outrageous in their accusations. Based upon our review of the record, the circuit court's findings supporting its conclusion that Smallwood committed a CR 11 violation are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Likewise, our de novo review of those findings confirm the propriety of the circuit court's decision to award CR 11 sanctions.

*6 We shall next turn to the amount of sanctions that were awarded, which is properly before this Court. The circuit court imposed a $100 sanction per filing for a total of $200 against Smallwood, and awarded those sanctions to the Cabinet and River Valley. More significantly, the circuit court awarded $8,480 in attorney's fees to River Valley. Pursuant to Clark Equipment Co., we review the type and amount of sanctions awarded for abuse of discretion. 762 S .W.2d at 421. In Jackson v. Law Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne and Taylor, 875 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6th Cir.1989), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the reasonableness of the sanction imposed, stating that, “once the district court determines that an attorney has violated Rule 11, the court has wide discretion in selecting the appropriate sanction.” However, the Court noted that “[t]he two goals of Rule 11 are deterrence and compensation. Of these two, deterrence is the principal goal.” Id. Because deterrence is the principal goal, “courts should impose the least severe sanction that is likely to deter.” Id. In addition, “the court must consider whether the party to receive the award has acted promptly to bring a violation of CR 11 to the court's attention.” Id. at 1230. Finally, the court “must make some inquiry concerning an attorney's ability to pay a monetary sanction.” Id.

In the present appeal, Smallwood does not in any way address the amount of sanctions awarded. Nor did she address the reasonableness of the attorney's fees requested while the motion was before the circuit court. Rather, she only argues here that the circuit court imposed CR 11 sanctions on the wrong party. However, in our view, the amount of sanctions imposed was reasonable under the circumstances of this case and was designed to effect deterrence. The affidavit attached to River Valley's motion for attorney's fees establishes that attorney Michele Henry expended a total of 42.4 hours defending River Valley solely against Smallwood's CR 60.02 motions. Our review of attorney Henry's billing records reveals thirty separate entries relating to litigation associated with just those two motions. These entries include reviewing multiple e-mail correspondence from Smallwood. Based upon our own review as well as Smallwood's failure to address the reasonableness of the sanctions imposed, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in either the type or amount of CR 11 sanctions imposed.FN4

FN4. We note that in a previous appeal, this Court upheld a $20, 000 CR 11 sanction imposed against Smallwood. Smallwood v. Res-Care, Inc., 1996-CA-002435-MR, 1996-CA-002502-MR, 1996-CA-003130-MR, as modified March 20, 1998.

For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson Circuit Court's March 22, 2007, Opinion and Order is affirmed.

**Tuberski** · November 8, 2008, 00:33

I'm suing you.

ACK!

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