on Nietzsche

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker
What is physicalism?

edit: it looks like materialism or reductionism. Is there some subtle difference here?

A name.

It's basically swappable with materialism in contemporary use, but people prefer to use it because it is a little bit more precise. Physicalism is the idea that only those things described by the science of physics exist.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism

Calling it "materialism" is less precise since it harks back to matter as a solid kind of "stuff". I guess if physicists discovered something that didn't fit well with common use of the term "matter", it would be misleading.

I'm guessing you think we just make up mathematics.

[Kuciwalker]

I think the mathematics we make up is strongly inspired by the mechanics governing the real world, and all evidence suggests that the mechanics governing the real world are fundamentally 'mathematical', i.e. they can be expressed elegantly in the mathematics we've already discovered.

IOW, it's a two-way street: our math comes from physics, but that's because physics seems to be based on math.

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker
I think the mathematics we make up is strongly inspired by the mechanics governing the real world, and all evidence suggests that the mechanics governing the real world are fundamentally 'mathematical', i.e. they can be expressed elegantly in the mathematics we've already discovered.

IOW, it's a two-way street: our math comes from physics, but that's because physics seems to be based on math.

So you're an Aristotelian then.

[Elok]

Originally posted by Agathon
You do know that the Cave is intended as an analogy rather than an argument, don't you? If you want arguments for Forms, you need to look elsewhere in the dialogues. Plato is absolutely clear why Forms must exist. The first reason is that they are needed to explain identity in difference. Following that, they explain why the world exhibits lawlike behaviour. Lastly, and most interestingly, he thinks that there cannot be knowledge unless there are Forms. He's quite clear about all of this, and he has reasonably good arguments for each position.

? So we need a world where everything exists only as a superlative of a single attribute (in other words, a completely unimaginable world) to explain our own? The reality we're born into and live in doesn't make sense except by another reality that turns all its rules upside down? How does that follow? I buy it when physicists say that sort of thing, because they can apparently use that knowledge to create useful things like MRI machines. But if there's a hole in your theory of existence that can only be filled by something totally counterintuitive, I'm going to need to see an application before I'll believe it.

And yes, I knew that the Cave was an allegory, not an argument as such.

I'm not a Platonist, but we can learn a lot from Plato and he is a far better thinker than he is given credit for (his gift is to be able to see very clearly the underlying nature of a problem. Only Wittgenstein is as good as he is in this regard IMHO.). In fact, if you make some of the assumptions that other thinkers make, Platonism makes much more sense than say, empiricism. I don't agree with Plato because I don't make the fundamental assumptions he does, but a lot of people who make those assumptions disagree with him, and in my view he has them over a barrel.

Could you list these assumptions (in the plainest English you can), please?

And don't assume that you can understand Plato simply by reading the dialogues. Understanding Plato is a process of filling in the gaps that the dialogues leave. He even goes to the trouble to tell us that this is what he's doing. Note that he writes dialogues, not treatises. Nothing that any character endorses in a dialogue can straightforwardly be attributed to Plato. That's why he has the characters make mistakes and say obviously stupid things. You are supposed to read between the lines to see what is really going on.

...okay, this style of argument strikes me as extremely fishy, comparable to people who find hidden "codes" in literature. It raises an obvious question: why didn't Plato simply say what he meant outright? Did it amuse him to leave riddles, enough to risk having his whole point lost on the reader? How do you know the "obviously stupid things" are not simple errors?

[DaShi]

Originally posted by Agathon


Sorry, I should have explained myself better.

Mathematical Platonism (with a capital p) is the interpretation of Plato, largely based on Aristotle's testimony, that claims Plato thought the Forms were numbers and hence reality is essentially mathematical (and Plato was thus a strong Pythagorean). This is why I was ribbing Kuci above. Most interpretations of Plato aren't strongly Pythagorean in that they don't claim the Forms are numbers.

Mathematical platonism (with a small p) is a contemporary position in the philosophy of mathematics, that numbers have mind-independent existence. It's a much more plausible and less lunatic theory than mathematical Platonism with a capital P. Platonists with a small p aren't committed to Platonic Forms or to anything other than mathematical realism.

I probably agree with Kuci, that mathematical platonism with a small p is incorrect, but I haven't made up my mind on mathematical Platonism as an interpretation of Plato, and in any case, one can be a Platonist or a mathematical Platonist for all sorts of other good reasons (none of which I subscribe to).

I see. Much clearer. Thanks.

[Elok]

Okay, I'm really scratching my head here. In effect you're saying Plato observed the world (fine), invented theories to describe/explain what he saw (fine), and when his theories did not fit what he saw, he assumed there was some other aspect to the world which he didn't see that would make his existing theories work (bass-ackwards). That's my problem with reason trying to buck the senses. Reason learned everything it knows from the senses, and we formulated all our rules of thumb (except perhaps those involving our own consciousness) based on sensory data. Reason contradicting the senses is like a puffed-up student who gets an A and decides he knows more than teacher.

"Circularity is a term we invented for a phenomenon or situation describing all points equidistant from a single point in two-dimensional space (three-dimensional if you include spheres). It occurs naturally with some regularity due to the utility of the shape for matter in obeying the laws of physics (or as a result of natural processes put into motion by the laws of physics), and in artificial things due to the utility of that shape for meeting various human needs. All water reacts the same way to stimuli because all water is in fact chemically identical, and the chemical makeup of a substance determines its behavior." How about that? It's probably not very well phrased, since I am neither scientist nor philosopher. But do I have a hidden assumption that makes that not work somehow?

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Elok
Okay, I'm really scratching my head here. In effect you're saying Plato observed the world (fine), invented theories to describe/explain what he saw (fine), and when his theories did not fit what he saw, he assumed there was some other aspect to the world which he didn't see that would make his existing theories work (bass-ackwards). That's my problem with reason trying to buck the senses. Reason learned everything it knows from the senses, and we formulated all our rules of thumb (except perhaps those involving our own consciousness) based on sensory data. Reason contradicting the senses is like a puffed-up student who gets an A and decides he knows more than teacher.

So you're a simple empiricist, then. Nothing Plato says makes any difference to what we perceive, since we don't perceive Forms. If experience tells you that things can share the same nature, then the question of what this nature is naturally arises. You don't have to believe in separate Forms. Aristotle didn't. He thought that form was in things.

"Circularity is a term we invented for a phenomenon or situation describing all points equidistant from a single point in two-dimensional space (three-dimensional if you include spheres).

I don't care about what we name it. I care about what it is. We could give it any name and it would remain what it is.

It occurs naturally with some regularity due to the utility of the shape for matter in obeying the laws of physics (or as a result of natural processes put into motion by the laws of physics), and in artificial things due to the utility of that shape for meeting various human needs.

What is "it"? Are you talking about circularity? Is it in all the circles or none of them? It's a simple question. If it is in one of them, then how can it be in the others?

All water reacts the same way to stimuli because all water is in fact chemically identical, and the chemical makeup of a substance determines its behavior."

So you are in effect saying that water has a "nature". When we talk about water in general, we aren't talking about some water, but about this nature. What is this nature that all pieces of water share? Where is it? How can it be one and many at the same time?

It doesn't have to be water. One could imagine a universe with only two particles in it, both having the same nature. That is enough for Plato to get his Forms argument going.

[Elok]

Originally posted by Agathon
So you're a simple empiricist, then. Nothing Plato says makes any difference to what we perceive, since we don't perceive Forms. If experience tells you that things can share the same nature, then the question of what this nature is naturally arises. You don't have to believe in separate Forms. Aristotle didn't. He thought that form was in things.

Which is why I generally like Aristotle better, despite his being more painful to read.

What is "it"? Are you talking about circularity? Is it in all the circles or none of them? It's a simple question. If it is in one of them, then how can it be in the others?

"It" is the property of circularity, yes. It's "in" all of them insofar as they all possess that property. There is no conflict here because it is a property, a common condition all circles share, not a concrete object that can only be in one place at a time. I can't understand why anyone would think characteristics would follow the same rules as physical objects.

So you are in effect saying that water has a "nature". When we talk about water in general, we aren't talking about some water, but about this nature. What is this nature that all pieces of water share? Where is it? How can it be one and many at the same time?

It doesn't have to be water. One could imagine a universe with only two particles in it, both having the same nature. That is enough for Plato to get his Forms argument going.

Do you, or did Plato, have any reason for believing the universe could or ought to work in any other fashion?

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Elok

"It" is the property of circularity, yes. It's "in" all of them insofar as they all possess that property. There is no conflict here because it is a property, a common condition all circles share, not a concrete object that can only be in one place at a time.

Plato would agree, which is why Forms aren't situated in space.

I can't understand why anyone would think characteristics would follow the same rules as physical objects.

He doesn't. Forms are immaterial for that very reason. But there are several reasons why he thinks the Form must be a substantial unity. One is that it is an object of thought. Another is that it is the ground of the possibility of generation of new material objects with that characteristic. For if there were no circles and no Form of Circle, then nothing could be a potential circle, because there would be nothing for it to potentially be, since circularity would not exist. Moreover, even if there were no material circles, we could still do mathematics.

Do you, or did Plato, have any reason for believing the universe could or ought to work in any other fashion?

The Theory of Forms is applicable to any possible material universe that works in any possible way. It's a metaphysical theory: it has no bearing on the results of physics.

We could go on like this forever. Platonists and Peripatetics did, and we haven't even touched the epistemological side yet.

[Perfection]

Originally posted by Elok
Okay, I'm really scratching my head here. In effect you're saying Plato observed the world (fine), invented theories to describe/explain what he saw (fine), and when his theories did not fit what he saw, he assumed there was some other aspect to the world which he didn't see that would make his existing theories work (bass-ackwards). That's my problem with reason trying to buck the senses. Reason learned everything it knows from the senses, and we formulated all our rules of thumb (except perhaps those involving our own consciousness) based on sensory data. Reason contradicting the senses is like a puffed-up student who gets an A and decides he knows more than teacher.

"Circularity is a term we invented for a phenomenon or situation describing all points equidistant from a single point in two-dimensional space (three-dimensional if you include spheres). It occurs naturally with some regularity due to the utility of the shape for matter in obeying the laws of physics (or as a result of natural processes put into motion by the laws of physics), and in artificial things due to the utility of that shape for meeting various human needs. All water reacts the same way to stimuli because all water is in fact chemically identical, and the chemical makeup of a substance determines its behavior." How about that? It's probably not very well phrased, since I am neither scientist nor philosopher. But do I have a hidden assumption that makes that not work somehow?

Hidden assumptions aren't ideal, but sometimes are the best way to put something into a coherant framework.

[Impaler[WrG]]

He doesn't. Forms are immaterial for that very reason. But there are several reasons why he thinks the Form must be a substantial unity.

Please Define "substantial unity"

One is that it is an object of thought. Another is that it is the ground of the possibility of generation of new material objects with that characteristic.

Their are numerous ways that material Circles are produced in nature and by man, it dose not seem logical that this single Form should act by so many different means and methods.

For if there were no circles and no Form of Circle, then nothing could be a potential circle, because there would be nothing for it to potentially be, since circularity would not exist. Moreover, even if there were no material circles, we could still do mathematics.

If by that you mean we could define mathematically what a Circle is without any material Circles as examples then I'd say we just created Circularity as a concept and that mental concept is unique to every individual, aka everyone has a local mental concept of Circle and these concepts will themselves will be subject to a little deviation as would any concept.

I'm personally more interested in WHY Platonic though is SOOOO prevalent and 'natural' for people. I think its a kind of projection onto the natural world. A big "Because I understand the world through mental concepts, the world is Made of mental concepts" tautology. 'Forms' are a way to project the ideas in your head out and into the world as its very underpinning, even the ideas of others must be the same ultimate 'root' ideas which naturally your mind has access too so your projecting your own mental concepts into everyone else mind as well. It all sounds so stunningly false and misguided to me it gives you that 'Matrix is all around you' feeling

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Impaler[WrG]

Please Define "substantial unity"

A thing that is numerically identical with itself and which is a substance. That is to say something like a man, and not his height or his colour.

Their are numerous ways that material Circles are produced in nature and by man, it dose not seem logical that this single Form should act by so many different means and methods.

Those are efficient causes. Plato isn't talking about efficient causation.

If by that you mean we could define mathematically what a Circle is without any material Circles as examples then I'd say we just created Circularity as a concept and that mental concept is unique to every individual, aka everyone has a local mental concept of Circle and these concepts will themselves will be subject to a little deviation as would any concept.

Then in what sense are we thinking about the same thing? What is the object of our thought? Thoughts have objects? Are you saying that the object is another thought? If that was true, everything would be a concept.

I'm personally more interested in WHY Platonic though is SOOOO prevalent and 'natural' for people. I think its a kind of projection onto the natural world. A big "Because I understand the world through mental concepts, the world is Made of mental concepts" tautology. 'Forms' are a way to project the ideas in your head out and into the world as its very underpinning, even the ideas of others must be the same ultimate 'root' ideas which naturally your mind has access too so your projecting your own mental concepts into everyone else mind as well. It all sounds so stunningly false and misguided to me it gives you that 'Matrix is all around you' feeling

That's one option. Like all explanations it has its own problems.

[Elok]

Yay, it's a philosopher-fight! By "we could go on like this forever," do you mean "eh, let's just agree to disagree" or something like that, Aggie?

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Elok
Yay, it's a philosopher-fight! By "we could go on like this forever," do you mean "eh, let's just agree to disagree" or something like that, Aggie?

No. I mean that the complexities and objections multiply. Aristotle has nearly 40 separate arguments against the Theory of Forms (and no-one has ever been a better arguer than him). Later Platonists have their own arguments.

The point is that it's a pretty well-defended theory. We may not in the end agree with it, but merely saying "that's crap" is inadequate. Frankly, it's a lot less stupid than the naive empiricism endorsed by many people.

We laugh at mediaeval people for having a blind faith in Christianity and failing to criticize what seem to us to be obviously unjustified beliefs. We are no different with respect to our shared cultural commitment to empiricism. What makes it even worse is that Plato had pointed out what was wrong with it a long time ago.

[Elok]

Originally posted by Agathon
No. I mean that the complexities and objections multiply. Aristotle has nearly 40 separate arguments against the Theory of Forms (and no-one has ever been a better arguer than him). Later Platonists have their own arguments.

The point is that it's a pretty well-defended theory. We may not in the end agree with it, but merely saying "that's crap" is inadequate. Frankly, it's a lot less stupid than the naive empiricism endorsed by many people.

We laugh at mediaeval people for having a blind faith in Christianity and failing to criticize what seem to us to be obviously unjustified beliefs. We are no different with respect to our shared cultural commitment to empiricism. What makes it even worse is that Plato had pointed out what was wrong with it a long time ago.

But if your defense is completely incomprehensible, it's not much of a defense. None of your objections make any sense to me. BK can summon thousands of arguments to the defense of any claim he makes, but that doesn't make far-right quasi-theocratic lunacy credible, because on close examination the vast majority of his arguments are bunk. I maintain that the same rule applies here. I'm honestly not trying to be rude here, I just don't know a polite way to say "nonsense."

If someone else reading this gets what Agathon's saying with these arguments and wishes to jump in and explain it to me, he/she should feel free.