You do not deserve to use that message icon. And only Pekka is allowed to call people racists for disagreeing with him.
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Well, I've calmed down now...you managed to get me good and PO'ed, so I took time to cool off. Now I find you're angry instead. Ngh. Anyway, sorry for flipping out. For future reference, though, quoting someone's post and giving a dry lecture to others about how that post demonstrates the inferiority of the poster and his or her culture/nationality is rather inflammatory. Next time you do it, don't be surprised if the target becomes testy. Or better still, don't do it again. It's rude.
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First im not delighted with Hillary's position. I am more interested in what these would be presidents intend to do after they are inaugurated, in January 2009.
Second, Hillary at least allows for flexibility depending not only on benchmarks, but on the actual security situation, etc. Which I think is a more appropriate POV.
Cite? I don't notice such a provision in her legislation. It seems to mandate redeployment within 90 days, i.e. basically Obama's position. I think you have to be squinting pretty damn hard to notice real differences between the two plans...
Third, I was simply asking about apparent contradictions in Obamas plan, as youve explained it.
Again, if Maliki doing the right things requires fewer troops, then I dont see why Obama would suggest putting in MORE troops after Maliki does the right things AFTER a withdrawl. It makes no sense
I tried to explain that last time. US troops are a short term stabilizing force, and the gamble is that with appropriate institutional changes and with a more favorable diplomatic environment, the violence would start to die down, taking away the need for US forces for much longer.
Im also not sure that Malike taking the right steps will automatically improve the security situation in Iraq - it will make it easier to improve, but seeing as both much (most?) of the Sunni insurgency
Why's that?
and major elements of the Shia militias are not motivated by getting a fair deal on these issues, they will still need to be beaten militarily. I see the political and military strategies as mutually reinforcing, not as opposed alternatives.
Umm... you're a military solution man now? So you don't care for the Kagan-Keane model? Crushing the enemy takes precedence over security?
Trying to "beat" the Mahdi Army has always struck me as the most fuitile thing we could possibly attempt to do...
There's a provision that's supposed to give wide lattitude to the regions to negotiate contracts. That might be the genesis of further confict. I suppose we'll see..."Beware of the man who works hard to learn something, learns it, and finds himself no wiser than before. He is full of murderous resentment of people who are ignorant without having come by their ignorance the hard way. "
-Bokonon
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Originally posted by Kuciwalker
Actually I thought you made a good showing there. Good writing and a stream of insults makes for good reading, like Laz's posts.
But I prefer to argue subjects I'm really interested in/have a position on, as opposed to loosing my cool and doing it for spite.
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Elok
If somebody is being a pompous ass to you, you have every right to return fire.
-Ariangrog want tank...Grog Want Tank... GROG WANT TANK!
The trick isn't to break some eggs to make an omelette, it's convincing the eggs to break themselves in order to aspire to omelettehood.
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Originally posted by Ramo
First im not delighted with Hillary's position. I am more interested in what these would be presidents intend to do after they are inaugurated, in January 2009.
Second, Hillary at least allows for flexibility depending not only on benchmarks, but on the actual security situation, etc. Which I think is a more appropriate POV.
Cite? I don't notice such a provision in her legislation. It seems to mandate redeployment within 90 days, i.e. basically Obama's position. I think you have to be squinting pretty damn hard to notice real differences between the two plans...
I havent read her legislation, but my impression has been that the 90 days is to withdraw SOME troops, and that there is no target date for complete withdrawl, in contrast to Obamas legislation.
Third, I was simply asking about apparent contradictions in Obamas plan, as youve explained it.
Again, if Maliki doing the right things requires fewer troops, then I dont see why Obama would suggest putting in MORE troops after Maliki does the right things AFTER a withdrawl. It makes no sense
I tried to explain that last time. US troops are a short term stabilizing force, and the gamble is that with appropriate institutional changes and with a more favorable diplomatic environment, the violence would start to die down, taking away the need for US forces for much longer.
Then I still dont understand why with those structures in place, and the need for US forces reduced, you would reinsert them later, which is what you earlier explained to me the Obama plan allows for.
Im also not sure that Malike taking the right steps will automatically improve the security situation in Iraq - it will make it easier to improve, but seeing as both much (most?) of the Sunni insurgency
Why's that?
Why wouldnt it automatically improve security? Because some part of the insurgency, and its never been clear how much, is actually composed of AQniks (both foreign and domestic), and Baathists and others who want to go back to complete Sunni control over Iraq. Those guys wont lay down their arms because of a compromise - they arent interested in a compromise, And there are some Sunnis who are fighting simply cause some Shiite killed a relation - and the revenge cycle doesnt stop just because the conditions that led to it stop. At best we get those guys, however many or few there are, who had actually taken up arms because they wanted a "fair deal" for the Sunnis to lay down their arms. And hopefully we get more cooperation in Sunni areas. We still have to beat the insurgency.
and major elements of the Shia militias are not motivated by getting a fair deal on these issues, they will still need to be beaten militarily. I see the political and military strategies as mutually reinforcing, not as opposed alternatives.
Umm... you're a military solution man now? So you don't care for the Kagan-Keane model? Crushing the enemy takes precedence over security?
Bolding added for those who are having trouble with the small print.
Trying to "beat" the Mahdi Army has always struck me as the most fuitile thing we could possibly attempt to do...
If we need to stop the Mahdi Army from continuing its sectarian atrocities, and that will mean in large part attacking at least some elements of its structure. Doesnt have to mean (and probably shouldnt) trying to eliminate the whole group by attrition, but attacking leadership, financial assets, and esp those cells most implicated in atrocities, is part of the strategy. Thats how you achieve security in Baghdad, and make possible the political compromise. If Sadr decides to play as a politician in the new Iraq of course you let him,but if he continues to use sectarian violence to undermine the state, (though that will be more difficult if Maliki takes steps to eliminate extremist influence from ministries) you have to oppose that with force.
There's a provision that's supposed to give wide lattitude to the regions to negotiate contracts. That might be the genesis of further confict. I suppose we'll see...
The contracts will still be reviewed by a central body."A person cannot approach the divine by reaching beyond the human. To become human, is what this individual person, has been created for.” Martin Buber
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What I said was that neither J. Jackson or B. Obama were serious nationwide candidates before Time and Newsweek made them their cover stories for no reason
I fail to see why I should apologise for what someone else has said.
I hope he doesn't ask us and our government to apologise for slavery. But notice how the Hillary camp tried to use the Hannity/OReilly tactic of trying to create division? RENOUNCE your supporter's words or you lack virtue... He should have said, he'd give Geffen the money back if Hillary gave him back all the money he's given the Clintons.
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I havent read her legislation, but my impression has been that the 90 days is to withdraw SOME troops,
and that there is no target date for complete withdrawl, in contrast to Obamas legislation.
Then I still dont understand why with those structures in place, and the need for US forces reduced, you would reinsert them later, which is what you earlier explained to me the Obama plan allows for.
Because I don't expect anything to happen instantaneously...
Why wouldnt it automatically improve security?
If we need to stop the Mahdi Army from continuing its sectarian atrocities, and that will mean in large part attacking at least some elements of its structure. Doesnt have to mean (and probably shouldnt) trying to eliminate the whole group by attrition, but attacking leadership, financial assets, and esp those cells most implicated in atrocities, is part of the strategy. Thats how you achieve security in Baghdad, and make possible the political compromise. If Sadr decides to play as a politician in the new Iraq of course you let him,but if he continues to use sectarian violence to undermine the state, (though that will be more difficult if Maliki takes steps to eliminate extremist influence from ministries) you have to oppose that with force.
The contracts will still be reviewed by a central body.
Some Sunni groups fear that their less oil-rich areas could lose out when Iraq's potentially huge wealth is distributed. The ability of regions to sign their own contracts was bitterly argued for months by negotiators from Kurdistan, where there is deep distrust of Baghdad's politicians. Under the law, companies can deal with both the central Ministry of Oil, as well as regional entities. But that concession has provoked intense anxiety that Iraq could break apart, if some regions — or perhaps even powerful Shi'ite clans in southern Iraq — calculate that they can finance autonomous states from their massive oil deposits.
Was reading some bit about this Federal Oil and Gas Council. One columnist from the Asia Times sees it as a giveaway to big oil:
US's Iraq oil grab is a done deal
By Pepe Escobar
"By 2010 we will need [a further] 50 million barrels a day. The Middle East, with two-thirds of the oil and the lowest cost, is still where the prize lies." - US Vice President Dick Cheney, then Halliburton chief executive officer, London, autumn 1999
US President George W Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney might as well declare the Iraq war over and out. As far as they - and the humongous energy interests they defend - are concerned,
only now is the mission really accomplished. More than half a trillion dollars spent and perhaps half a million Iraqis killed have come down to this.
On Monday, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's cabinet in Baghdad approved the draft of the new Iraqi oil law. The government regards it as "a major national project". The key point of the law is that Iraq's immense oil wealth (115 billion barrels of proven reserves, third in the world after Saudi Arabia and Iran) will be under the iron rule of a fuzzy "Federal Oil and Gas Council" boasting "a panel of oil experts from inside and outside Iraq". That is, nothing less than predominantly US Big Oil executives.
The law represents no less than institutionalized raping and pillaging of Iraq's oil wealth. It represents the death knell of nationalized (from 1972 to 1975) Iraqi resources, now replaced by production sharing agreements (PSAs) - which translate into savage privatization and monster profit rates of up to 75% for (basically US) Big Oil. Sixty-five of Iraq's roughly 80 oilfields already known will be offered for Big Oil to exploit. As if this were not enough, the law reduces in practice the role of Baghdad to a minimum. Oil wealth, in theory, will be distributed directly to Kurds in the north, Shi'ites in the south and Sunnis in the center. For all practical purposes, Iraq will be partitioned into three statelets. Most of the country's reserves are in the Shi'ite-dominated south, while the Kurdish north holds the best prospects for future drilling.
The approval of the draft law by the fractious 275-member Iraqi Parliament, in March, will be a mere formality. Hussain al-Shahristani, Iraq's oil minister, is beaming. So is dodgy Barnham Salih: a Kurd, committed cheerleader of the US invasion and occupation, then deputy prime minister, big PSA fan, and head of a committee that was debating the law.
But there was not much to be debated. The law was in essence drafted, behind locked doors, by a US consulting firm hired by the Bush administration and then carefully retouched by Big Oil, the International Monetary Fund, former US deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz' World Bank, and the United States Agency for International Development. It's virtually a US law (its original language is English, not Arabic).
Scandalously, Iraqi public opinion had absolute no knowledge of it - not to mention the overwhelming majority of Parliament members. Were this to be a truly representative Iraqi government, any change to the legislation concerning the highly sensitive question of oil wealth would have to be approved by a popular referendum.
In real life, Iraq's vital national interests are in the hands of a small bunch of highly impressionable (or downright corrupt) technocrats. Ministries are no more than political party feuds; the national interest is never considered, only private, ethnic and sectarian interests. Corruption and theft are endemic. Big Oil will profit handsomely - and long-term, 30 years minimum, with fabulous rates of return - from a former developing-world stalwart methodically devastated into failed-state status.
Get me a PSA on time
In these past few weeks, US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has been crucial in mollifying the Kurds. In the end, in practice, the pro-US Kurds will have all the power to sign oil contracts with whatever companies they want. Sunnis will be more dependent on the Oil Ministry in Baghdad. And Shi'ites will be more or less midway between total independence in the south and Baghdad's dictum (which they control anyway). But the crucial point remains: nobody will sign anything unless the "advisers" at the US-manipulated Federal Oil and Gas Council say so.
Nobody wants to colonial-style PSAs forced down their throat anymore. According to the International Energy Agency, PSAs apply to only 12% of global oil reserves, in cases where costs are very high and nobody knows what will be found (certainly not the Iraqi case). No big Middle Eastern oil producer works with PSAs. Russia and Venezuela are renegotiating all of them. Bolivia nationalized its gas. Algeria and Indonesia have new rules for future contracts. But Iraq, of course, is not a sovereign country.
Big Oil is obviously ecstatic - not only ExxonMobil, but also ConocoPhillips, Chevron, BP and Shell (which have collected invaluable info on two of Iraq's biggest oilfields), TotalFinaElf, Lukoil from Russia and the Chinese majors. Iraq has as many as 70 undeveloped fields - "small" ones hold a minimum of a billion barrels. As desert western Iraq has not even been exploited, reserves may reach 300 billion barrels - way more than Saudi Arabia. Gargantuan profits under the PSA arrangement are in a class by themselves. Iraqi oil costs only US$1 a barrel to extract. With a barrel worth $60 and up, happy days are here again.
What revenue the regions do get will be distributed to all 18 provinces based on population size - an apparent concession to the Sunnis, whose central areas have relatively few proven reserves.
The Sunni Arab muqawama (resistance) certainly has other ideas - as in future rolling thunder against pipelines, refineries and Western personnel. Iraq's oil independence will not go down quietly - at least among Sunnis. On the same day the oil law was being approved, a powerful bomb at the Ministry of Municipalities killed at least 12 people and injured 42, including Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi. Mahdi has always been a feverish supporter of the oil law. He's a top official of the Shi'ite party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI).
A whole case can be made of SCIRI delivering Iraq's Holy Grail to Bush/Cheney and Big Oil - in exchange for not being chased out of power by the Pentagon. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the SCIRI's leader, is much more of a Bush ally than Maliki, who is from the Da'wa Party. No wonder SCIRI's Badr Organization and their death squads were never the target of Washington's wrath - unlike Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army (Muqtada is fiercely against the oil law). The SCIRI certainly listened to the White House, which has always made it very clear: any more funds to the Iraqi government are tied up with passing the oil law.
Bush and Cheney got their oily cake - and they will eat it, too (or be drenched in its glory). Mission accomplished: permanent, sprawling military bases on the eastern flank of the Arab nation and control of some of largest, untapped oil wealth on the planet - a key geostrategic goal of the New American Century. Now it's time to move east, bomb Iran, force regime change and - what else? - force PSAs down their Persian throats."Beware of the man who works hard to learn something, learns it, and finds himself no wiser than before. He is full of murderous resentment of people who are ignorant without having come by their ignorance the hard way. "
-Bokonon
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