HAMAS holds secret talks with US Democratic Party

[SlowwHand]

Hillary has some of the same points as Jane Fonda.

[TCO]

Jane's points are a lot perkier.

[SlowwHand]

They jiggle.

[Ned]

Originally posted by TCO
The meeting never happened. This bruhaha was just a little Mossad trick to make sure that the new Congressional leaders don't sell out Israel.

Possibly. But I suspect this is something pulled out of thin air.

[lord of the mark]

[QUOTE] Originally posted by Ramo
"An Iraq that has a popularly elected gov't is probably going to be a reliable ally of Iran. As has been the case with the Maliki and Ja'afari gov't's. "


Maliki and Jaafari have asked the Americans to stay, when getting the Americans to leave is probably one of the most desired goals of Iranian for policy. So even the Dawa led govts have not been RELIABLE allies for Iran, despite limited Sunni influence in them. A govt with more Sunni participation would be even less reliable to Iran, and more likely to try to play off Iran and the Sunni Arab states against each other.




"Something's gotta give. The Saudis are threatening to get involved if the Shia militias continue to consolidate control. The Turks have been raiding Iraqi Kurdistan. The Shia/Kurdish consensus seems to be heading towards partition, which IMO would immediately escalate the war. It's hard to see a regional war not break out if the current trends perpetuate."



Turkish raids are looking for PKK, a seperable issue. The Saudis have few "boots on the ground" to send into Iraq. Theyd send money and arms, neither of which the Sunnis insurgents seem to be short of anyway. Im not sure how this regional war looks much worse from an Iranian perspective than the current situation, or then a stable Iraqi govt. Indeed, KSA takes major risks getting involved, given its own shia minority.


"That'd be SCIRI. Remember that they switched sides to Sadr only when it became clear that the Mahdi Army had a clear advantage over the Badr Corps. Sadr might be too nationalistic and too interested in reconciliation with the Sunnis for Tehran's preferences."


I dont see SCIRI as having been particularly pro-Iranian since the invasion. Its not clear that Iran switched sides, so much as different factions in Iran emphasized different policies, and the Rev Guards, who have always leaned more towards the Khomeinism of Sadr, have recently been more ascendent in Iran. Sadr could play the "im more interested in reconciliation" card in 2004, but since March hes been in the forefront of anti-Sunni atrocities, and his influence in the South has grown precisely with the increased ethnic violence. The notion of Sadr as an Iraqi nationalist, against the Americans and uniting Sunni and Shia, has proven an illusion - rather he will use anything to gain power - rather he has proven a Shiite extremist, while its SCIRI that has attempted to negotiate (albeit on their terms) with the Sunnis.

"Sadr does. Hakim doesn't, but his influence is on the wane. But that's one of the many reasons why we need to engage Tehran."

Hakims influence has waned, with Sistanis. Both have lost influnce as the ethnic tensions have been inflamed. Sadr isnt going to make a reconciliation that eliminates the tension that is the main source of his influence. Not unless his Iranian masters (assuming he has Iranian masters) tell him to. And given how little they have to gain from giving the US an easy exit from Iraq, and from a stable Iraqi state that inevitably will balance between Iran and the Sunni states, they will have to be given something BIG to win their cooperation. Maybe that wont work. IIUC one of the members (or was he a witness?) of the Baker commision, Larry Diamond, suggests negotiations just to prove that Iran ISNT serious about negotiating. The question then arises whether the US would be able to get mileage out of that. Given the poor track record on public diplomacy, and the way past offers to negotiate have been discounted, Id say thats questionable.




"Our direct presence constitutes a short-term stabilizing and long-term destabilizing force. So removing them would be leverage, but also may be the optimal choice in the long-term."

Well of course its desirable for them to leave eventually. But Baker-Ham seems to want them to get off the streets and move almost entirely to a training role very imminently.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ramo


The direct approach hasn't seemed to work so far. I haven't heard of any better ideas.

You mean asking him pretty please? I agree, thats been a failure. An alternative might be a surge strategy that puts enough troops into Baghdad to deal more directly with Sadrs militias, and which reduces the ethnic violence, and sets up a better environment for political negotiations. The B-H comm seems to agree with the Admin that the outcome in Iraq doesnt justify the costs of doing that. McCain, whos pretty aware on the availability of troops issue, and on the numbers needed, doesnt seem to agree, and seems to think BH evaded that alternative.

[Ned]

LotM, with a new Sec of Def not blocking the idea, we might actually expand the Army and Marines to a reasonably sized force so that we can handle not only Iraq, but any war in the future. Clearly, the armed forces size must be dictated not only on defeating an enemy army, but on imposing peace on a defeated enemy afterwords.

[Drake Tungsten]

For Ned...

http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=53312

[Ned]

Thanks Drake,

Some quotes:

"Ahmed Yousuf, chief political advisor to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, told the Maannews Palestinian news website that Hamas officials met recently with high-ranking American figures, "especially members of the Democratic party."

"[T}the alleged meeting with the Democrats took place in a European country following a series of preliminary meetings with representatives from the British and French governments.

The source told Maannews the Democrats expressed an understanding with the Hamas principal of not recognizing Israel and applauded Hamas' willingness to accept a long-term cease-fire with the Jewish state in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to what is known as the pre-1967 borders – meaning an evacuation of the Gaza Strip, West Bank and eastern sections of Jerusalem. "

There is no doubt that the Dems are on a course to stab Israel in the back and undermine US foreign policy for the ME.

[Ramo]

Maliki and Jaafari have asked the Americans to stay, when getting the Americans to leave is probably one of the most desired goals of Iranian for policy. So even the Dawa led govts have not been RELIABLE allies for Iran, despite limited Sunni influence in them. A govt with more Sunni participation would be even less reliable to Iran, and more likely to try to play off Iran and the Sunni Arab states against each other.

Up until a year or so ago, I think that our presence was generally in Iran's interest. Since during that period, we've been reasonably effective in terms of stabilizing their allied gov't. That's why they generally cooperated with us at the time. They want us out right now, but circumstances have changed in terms of our contribution to the regime's security (and the threat that we're going to invade is growing). The Da'wa gov't's haven't been Iranian puppets, but I'd definitely consider them solid allies. The reason I say so is that there's little doubt in my mind as to which side they'd back if we were to bomb Iran.

Turkish raids are looking for PKK, a seperable issue. The Saudis have few "boots on the ground" to send into Iraq. Theyd send money and arms, neither of which the Sunnis insurgents seem to be short of anyway.

Probably because of the support they're getting. The other Gulf States, maybe even Egypt and Jordan might join the fray if the Saudis come in. It'd be interesting if Mubarak could figure out a way to supply troops in Iraq.

Im not sure how this regional war looks much worse from an Iranian perspective than the current situation, or then a stable Iraqi govt.

Much bigger refugee crises and economic disruptions. The idea that Iran wants to deal with a failed state on its border for years or even decades is silly. And of course, there might be spill-over into Iran-proper (i.e. in terms of disrupting oil exports). The bottom line is the economy, and Khamenei ain't gonna last in the event of a severe crash.

Indeed, KSA takes major risks getting involved, given its own shia minority.

And it looks like they're ready to take the plunge.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 — Saudi Arabia has told the Bush administration that it might provide financial backing to Iraqi Sunnis in any war against Iraq’s Shiites if the United States pulls its troops out of Iraq, according to American and Arab diplomats.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia conveyed that message to Vice President Dick Cheney two weeks ago during Mr. Cheney’s whirlwind visit to Riyadh, the officials said. During the visit, King Abdullah also expressed strong opposition to diplomatic talks between the United States and Iran, and pushed for Washington to encourage the resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, senior Bush administration officials said.

The Saudi warning reflects fears among America’s Sunni Arab allies about Iran’s rising influence in Iraq, coupled with Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. King Abdullah II of Jordan has also expressed concern about rising Shiite influence, and about the prospect that the Shiite-dominated government would use Iraqi troops against the Sunni population.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/13/world/middleeast/13saudi.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin

I dont see SCIRI as having been particularly pro-Iranian since the invasion. Its not clear that Iran switched sides, so much as different factions in Iran emphasized different policies, and the Rev Guards, who have always leaned more towards the Khomeinism of Sadr, have recently been more ascendent in Iran. Sadr could play the "im more interested in reconciliation" card in 2004, but since March hes been in the forefront of anti-Sunni atrocities, and his influence in the South has grown precisely with the increased ethnic violence. The notion of Sadr as an Iraqi nationalist, against the Americans and uniting Sunni and Shia, has proven an illusion - rather he will use anything to gain power - rather he has proven a Shiite extremist, while its SCIRI that has attempted to negotiate (albeit on their terms) with the Sunnis

I think that a distinction needs to be made between Sadr and the Sadrists. Sadr doesn't really have strong control over the Sadrists, particularly after the attack on the Askariyah Shrine. The militia was ascendant before that, and their increased role after the attack was simply due to their greater numbers. And I think that Hakim is definitely for a Khomeneist agenda.

Sadr isnt going to make a reconciliation that eliminates the tension that is the main source of his influence.

Sadr's become a lot less relevant since March. His control on the Mahdi Army has become a lot more limited since he became the Kingmaker, and particularly since the violence of late February.

Not unless his Iranian masters (assuming he has Iranian masters) tell him to.

I think that you're exaggerating Iran's ability to reign in violence and underestimating their will to do so. Same with Sadr's. I think that ultimately the issue isn't whether Iran would reign in the militias, but if they can.

You mean asking him pretty please? I agree, thats been a failure. An alternative might be a surge strategy that puts enough troops into Baghdad to deal more directly with Sadrs militias, and which reduces the ethnic violence, and sets up a better environment for political negotiations. The B-H comm seems to agree with the Admin that the outcome in Iraq doesnt justify the costs of doing that. McCain, whos pretty aware on the availability of troops issue, and on the numbers needed, doesnt seem to agree, and seems to think BH evaded that alternative.

Abizaid and others have said that the troops aren't there. I'm more inclined to believe them than McCain's political posturing. The only other major player that I can recall who's advocating the surge strategy is incoming House Intel Chair Reyes, and he doesn't know Sunni from Shia.

[lord of the mark]

[QUOTE] Originally posted by Ramo


"Up until a year or so ago, I think that our presence was generally in Iran's interest. Since during that period, we've been reasonably effective in terms of stabilizing their allied gov't. That's why they generally cooperated with us at the time. They want us out right now, but circumstances have changed in terms of our contribution to the regime's security (and the threat that we're going to invade is growing). The Da'wa gov't's haven't been Iranian puppets, but I'd definitely consider them solid allies. The reason I say so is that there's little doubt in my mind as to which side they'd back if we were to bomb Iran."


I think the likelihood of our going to war with Iran in the next two years is low, and the likelihood of our using Iraq as the base for a land invasion of Iran is near zero. If we did attack Iran, it would like be by air, and main role for boots on the ground would be to occupy parts of the Iranian gulf coast to prevent its usage for attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi oil shipments. To achieve that it would be preferable for the US to be OUT of Iraq.


"Probably because of the support they're getting. The other Gulf States, maybe even Egypt and Jordan might join the fray if the Saudis come in. It'd be interesting if Mubarak could figure out a way to supply troops in Iraq."


my understanding is that the large majority of Sunni fighters are Iraqis, and that in terms of money its largely self-financing via kidnapping, etc, and what money they get from KSA is from individuals, not the state (granted that can be a fuzzy distinction in KSA)


"Much bigger refugee crises and economic disruptions. The idea that Iran wants to deal with a failed state on its border for years or even decades is silly. And of course, there might be spill-over into Iran-proper (i.e. in terms of disrupting oil exports). The bottom line is the economy, and Khamenei ain't gonna last in the event of a severe crash."


Wanting to deal with a failed state on their borders might appear irrational, but so do many positions taken by the govt of Iran. And Im not sure they would need a failed state for years - they would need an acceleration of chaos until we leave, and until the side favorable to them (which i see as Sadr and the Mahdi army) win and establish a Khomienist state.



"And it looks like they're ready to take the plunge."

With some more money, which as i said, the sunni insurgency doesnt seem to be short of.

"I think that a distinction needs to be made between Sadr and the Sadrists. Sadr doesn't really have strong control over the Sadrists, particularly after the attack on the Askariyah Shrine. "

I dont buy that, for one minute. Since the shrine attack Sadr has opposed every action by either the Iraqi govt or by coalition forces that would control the militias, and hes defended his supporters in the cabinet who seem to be protecting and enabling the militias. There may be rogue elements, but Sadr is happy to have them do his work for them.


" The militia was ascendant before that, and their increased role after the attack was simply due to their greater numbers. And I think that Hakim is definitely for a Khomeneist agenda."

You are asking me to belive that you have greater insight into Hakim than Ayatollah Sistani did.

"Sadr's become a lot less relevant since March. His control on the Mahdi Army has become a lot more limited since he became the Kingmaker, and particularly since the violence of late February."

He may have less direct control of the MA, but hes generally in a stronger political position, as the influence of SCIRI, Dawa, and other Shiites wanes.


"I think that you're exaggerating Iran's ability to reign in violence and underestimating their will to do so. Same with Sadr's. I think that ultimately the issue isn't whether Iran would reign in the militias, but if they can."

And I think you, and BH, are doing the opposite.



"Abizaid and others have said that the troops aren't there. I'm more inclined to believe them than McCain's political posturing. "

IIUC Peter Pace has said the opposite, and that a surge strategy has been seriously under consideration at the Pentagon. The question becomes what the definition of surge is. If youre going to put another 100,000 troops in for several years, you cant do that at acceptable cost. But you can do a smaller surge for a shorter period of time. That was what McCain was so angry about, they only looked at the big long surge, not at the realistic one. This is a standard bureucratic practice for killing an alternative you dont like, and BH was nothing if not filled with people expert at such practices.

[KrazyHorse]

Indeed, KSA takes major risks getting involved, given its own shia minority

The Shi'a are ~5% of SA's pop.

How worried are they, really?

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by KrazyHorse

Indeed, KSA takes major risks getting involved, given its own shia minority

The Shi'a are ~5% of SA's pop.

How worried are they, really?

90% of Saudi Arabia is sand dune and camels. And big cities paid for by the revenue from the commodity produced in the other 10% of Saudi Arabia. Do you know where in SA that commodity is produced? Do you know where in Saudi Arabia the Shiite minority is concentrated?

[Sirotnikov]

LOTM is correct on SA.

Iran can always threaten to incite the shiites sitting on the oil fields, thus leaving Saudi Arabia incapacitated. And giving Iran major control of the gulf.

[lord of the mark]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061213/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_politics