Should revolutions be considered a normal economic event?

[Kuciwalker]

It's somewhat similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma, especially in that game theory renders the problem trivial.

[GePap]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker

I'm not avoiding the basic point - you just don't understand the situation. There doesn't need to be any original reason, or any original reason that persists. All that matters is that it's in no individual's interest to disobey.

I don;t understand the situation?

That's rich.

Hello! IN the basic condition given to you, there is no individual interest to obey orders either, at least, on the part of the individual that is supposed to act as an "enforcer".

[GePap]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker
It's somewhat similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma, especially in that game theory renders the problem trivial.

Oh, and its absolutely nothing like the prisoner's dilemma, since in that "game" you are given a known set of possible consequences for each action. That game also requires multiple parties trying to guess the intentions of other parties.

None of that is present in my simple question.

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by GePap


I don;t understand the situation?

That's rich.

Hello! IN the basic condition given to you, there is no individual interest to obey orders either, at least, on the part of the individual that is supposed to act as an "enforcer".

Yes there is. All the other enforcers shoot you if you desert.

It's not a good idea to desert unless you do so in sufficient numbers simultaneously.

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by GePap
Oh, and its absolutely nothing like the prisoner's dilemma, since in that "game" you are given a known set of possible consequences for each action. That game also requires multiple parties trying to guess the intentions of other parties.

Actually, after thinking about it, I realized it's exactly the same as the Prisoner's Dilemma. I know you're a liberal arts person (and therefore don't know any math), so I'll just let you know that all the rules of game theory work just as well with more than two participants. The payoff matrix is basically the same, just multidimensional.

[GePap]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker


Yes there is. All the other enforcers shoot you if you desert.

It's not a good idea to desert unless you do so in sufficient numbers simultaneously.

Except you were presented with a scenerio in which there is only 1 enforcer, not multiple enforcers.

[GePap]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker


Actually, after thinking about it, I realized it's exactly the same as the Prisoner's Dilemma. I know you're a liberal arts person (and therefore don't know any math), so I'll just let you know that all the rules of game theory work just as well with more than two participants. The payoff matrix is basically the same, just multidimensional.

Except as a Political scientist, one of the social sciences that loves the prisoners dilemma, I understand that it has nothing to do with the scenerio I have presented you, and which you currently have failed utterly to address.

[Kuciwalker]

Except as a Political scientist, one of the social sciences that loves the prisoners dilemma, I understand that it has nothing to do with the scenerio I have presented you, and which you currently have failed utterly to address.

You're a menial public servant, not a political scientist.

Anyway, the payoff matrix is almost exactly the same, except it has two equilibria - everyone revolts, and everyone obeys. When at one equilibrium, it is difficult/impossible to move to the other (especially without outside interference).

Except you were presented with a scenerio in which there is only 1 enforcer, not multiple enforcers.

There's no such scenario in real life.

[GePap]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker
You're a menial public servant, not a political scientist.

Have you even started college?

There's no such scenario in real life.

Since when has that done anything to hamper game theory boy?

There is an added reason why the "prisoner's dilemma" is a failure in this regard-that game assumes that all players have the same outcome they aim for, and that all players know the desired outcome of the other player.

The question I posed to you, and which you have as of yet failed utterly to address, is one of where intentions come from. If in the prisoners dilemma one of the men actually wants prison time, his optimal outcome is the total opposite as that of the other man, and now you have a different set of possible strategies.

So again, to pose for the last time the simple question you seem incapable of answering:

Why should any individual follow the orders of another individual?

read it carefully, note the words being used, and lets see if you can finally gather an answer.

[Flip McWho]

GePap, a lot of it's ideological. The followers all believe as/in the Dictator.

[Agathon]

Kuci,

Why do any of the individuals with guns follow the first individual rather than any one of each other?

You've described a scenario that resembles an oligarchy (a bunch of people with guns for mutual enforcement - i.e. like a gang), not a bunch of people with guns obeying one particular person.

Why should the group not overthrow the tyrant – it would serve their mutual interest.

If you say that the others will shoot them, then that is the same as the oligarchy scenario, so it doesn't really explain why one individual accepts the control of another particular person over equals accepting a mutually beneficial arrangement.

[Flip McWho]

Which is why all the popular tyrants are ideologically bent. Its much easier to convince people to enforce for you if they believe that same as you do.

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by Agathon
Kuci,

Why do any of the individuals with guns follow the first individual rather than any one of each other?

They could have started following Dear Leader for any number of reasons - ideology, nationalism, charisma, whatever. Once the system is established, though, there's no way out unless most of them quit at once.

You've described a scenario that resembles an oligarchy (a bunch of people with guns for mutual enforcement - i.e. like a gang), not a bunch of people with guns obeying one particular person.

They are obeying one person, because the others obey and will shoot them if they disobey.

Why should the group not overthrow the tyrant – it would serve their mutual interest.

That's the rub. It's entirely possible for a group of people to get locked into a behavior that doesn't serve their mutual interest because it directly conflicts with their individual interest. You would say capitalism falls into that category

If you say that the others will shoot them, then that is the same as the oligarchy scenario, so it doesn't really explain why one individual accepts the control of another particular person over equals accepting a mutually beneficial arrangement.

It's because there's no escape short of mass mutiny. No individual is interested in resisting because he'd get shot and it wouldn't do anything. Even conspiring with other soldiers to resist together would probably get you killed.

In a real society, some individuals will still resist because people aren't perfectly rational. There's no guarantee it will be enough.

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by GePap
Since when has that done anything to hamper game theory boy?

Game theory as a reasonably useful field deals with approximations of real situations.

There is an added reason why the "prisoner's dilemma" is a failure in this regard-that game assumes that all players have the same outcome they aim for, and that all players know the desired outcome of the other player.

Situations that are mathematically equivalent exist in reality.

[Blaupanzer]

On point.
Despite considerable ignorance of this in the press, economic disruptions are quite common due to the complex interrelationships of the international economy (strikes, boycotts, favored customer deliveries, misfit or too poor quality parts, transportation issues, etc.).

Revolts are also common and going on in many parts of the world in many forms right now.

However, full scale overthrows of one class by another are fairly rare. The scale of violence and destruction usually required for the so-called "hopeless" poor to rise up and risk it all trying to overthrow the hired guns of the rich just doesn't happen that often. The poor slide along, the rich pull back before overdoing it usually. Accepting/provoking this scale of risk is not inevitable.