Will the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia continue?

[VetLegion]

Yes, Macedonians would sooner be Bulgarians than Serbs.

Socialist Macedonia was economically better off than Bulgaria, but since the breakup the former has declined a lot and perhaps closer ties with Bulgaria are now for them more attractive than ever. Especially since Bulgaria is going to become a member of EU sooner than Macedonia. But no partitioning

[Cyclotron]

Originally posted by VetLegion


Constructions of the post-Tito era?

Why do you speak about subjects you know nothing about?

Ethnic identity is constructed socially, not innately present. There has been extensive research done on why it was that the "proportions" of Croats, Serbs, and so on jumped so dramatically in the post-Tito era, from a time when many people considered themselves "Yugoslavs." There is a long history of intermarriage and connections between so-called "ethnic" communities, and yet the Croats, for example, talk about a thousand year kingdom that stretches continuously back to Tomislav and medieval croatia.

I'm not saying that the concepts of Serb, Croat, and so on were invented during this period - far from it. But the identities of cotemporary Croats and Serbs, the identities that were so well exploited during the war, were indeed constructions, as all ethnic identities are.

[Cyclotron]

Let me see if I can discuss this in a more coherent manner.

Traditional explanations of ethnic conflict and ethnically grounded warfare have often included the idea that conflict, while it may be incited by elites within societies, already exists in the sense that people of different ethnic groups already distrust each other, or at least prefer the company of their group to the company of another. Prejudice and misunderstanding are present, even if only in small ways, in multiethnic societies that have not erupted into violence and do not seem likely to. Conflict thus derives from an exploitation of an already present opposition, a division along an already clear ethnic boundary. The experiences of people in the former Yugoslavia, however, indicates that this is a false interpretation of events, little better than the vague mass media descriptions of “ancient hatreds” fueling conflict, that was bound to erupt sooner or later, waiting to be provoked by a crisis or opportunistic leader.

Ethnic conflict polarizes people within the society, forcing them to become Croats, Serbs, or Muslims (or, in other conflicts, Germans, Jews, Kurds, Shi'ites, Sunnis, Hutus, or Tutsis) rather than either “human beings” or “citizens of the state.” It would be a mistake to say that such a polarized society, which was clearly the result of current events and policies, predated the events and actions that clearly had a hand in its creation. Rather than feeling an automatic disdain or distrust of the ethnic enemy in Yugoslavia, many who witnessed the period and were subsequently interviewed were surprised and disappointed by the division and violence that tore Yugoslav society apart. The idea that Serbs should naturally dislike Croats fails to explain why a people that largely identified itself as Yugoslav should suddenly start speaking the language of Serbian supremacy, or why so many people hung on to the image of themselves as Yugoslavian even after the state ceased to exist, when ethnic violence was all around them.

Not only is identity complex and problematic in the case of mixed heritage people and those “minorities” that have been assimilated into majority culture, but it is also complex for a person who, by outside standards, is clearly belonging to an apparently uniform ethnic group. The fact that someone is of pure Serbian descent (which itself is problematic) does not mean he constructs his identity around “Serbian-ness,” and in fact that person may go to some lengths to define themselves as citizens rather than ethnic actors, until they are forced by an increasingly polarized society to conform or be treated as Other.

Perhaps the reinforcement of ethnic identity within a group entering a situation of perceived crisis is largely owed to the disintegration or discrediting of the larger identity that previously eclipsed ethnic descriptions of the self. Tito’s Yugoslav policy of “brotherhood and unity” was largely successful in the short term as long as Tito and a strong Yugoslav state existed to propagandize within the schools and communications networks of the country, reinforcing a Yugoslav identity even if the targets of this propaganda didn’t know what a Yugoslav identity was. Only the fall of Tito and his government from a position of international leverage was required to discredit the central Yugoslav authority – the only authority to which being Yugoslav really mattered – enough to bring ethnic divisions to the fore. The new groups of Croats, Serbs, Muslims, and so on, were really “new” in that those professing their loyalty to their ethnic group were clearly not nearly as common during the Titoist regime. When Yugoslav identity became useless and ethnic identity became required for a stable life within the bounds of that group’s power, identities changed to match, strongly pointing to the identities themselves as far more fluid and doubtful than a conception of “dyed in the wool” ethnic adversaries would have us believe.

[Cort Haus]

Cyclotron, I for one appreciate your efforts in explaining yourself, and was interested in what you had to say. It does still seem though, that your analysis isolates the concept of ethnicity in Yugoslavia from a wider historical and geopolitical context. Three areas spring to mind - history, economics, and outside forces - and I also believe these are linked.

Pre 1945 history could be swept under the carpet by Tito's regime - as such things can in any autocratic system by simply forbidding discussion of them. The Ottomans, the Austrians, King Alexander, the Nazis, the Chetniks, the Ustasha, the Partisans - all these involved winners and losers, and particularly grievances and frequently along ethnic lines. Burying these memories under the slogan of 'Brotherhood and Unity' may have been a fine sentiment, and many people were doubtless determined that the only identity that mattered was 'Yugoslav', but the historical memory beneath could not be so easily erased.

Secondly, while economic conditions are favourable, ethnic differences are more easily ignored. This is not just a Yugoslav issue, for example - countries experiencing immigration may have economic implications involved where one group (either newcomers or existing inhabitants) may feel, rightly or wrongly, that they are facing discrimination if resources (jobs, housing) are seen to be in short supply. Yugoslavia enjoyed good international credit until, I think, 1987, when IMF loans dried up with a negative impact on the Yugoslav economy overall. Under these conditions, the 'balances' of Tito's system were percieved by some groups to disadvantage them, which helped to set the scene for the ructions to follow.

Thirdly, the role of outside forces reappeared again, as they did in the past. Empires and Great Powers contributed to shaping the ethnic make-up in the first place, and whilst those outside powers would change through history, their influence would be brought to bear again. Seen on a map, the former Yugoslavia was not only very large, it was very independant - standing between the Eastern and Western blocks owing allegiance to neither. With the fall of the Soviet block and the unification of Germany, Yugoslavia became strategically and economically important, and in my view, the best way for the dominant powers of the day to establish influence over that territory was to leverage the faultlines that existed to create a divide-and-conquer scenario, and basically break the country up into maneagable chunks, with the help of local nationalists.

Today all the states from the former Yugoslavia are effectively vassals of the EU and US - unable to really do anything without the blessing of their Great Power masters. A toolbox of measures - from carrots like EU membership and loans, to the sticks of sanctions and The Hague exist to keep these states in line, denying them real independence and sovereignty.

[VetLegion]

Originally posted by Cyclotron
Ethnic identity is constructed socially, not innately present.

That's obvious

There has been extensive research done on why it was that the "proportions" of Croats, Serbs, and so on jumped so dramatically in the post-Tito era, from a time when many people considered themselves "Yugoslavs."

Be precise. "Many people" means nothing.

http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761567145/Yugoslavia.html

Yugoslavia’s population was ethnically mixed. According to the 1991 census, Serbs made up 36 percent of the total population, Croats 20 percent, Muslim Slavs 10 percent, Albanians 9 percent, Slovenes 8 percent, Macedonian Slavs 6 percent, “Yugoslavs” (people who declined to declare themselves members of any specific ethnic group) 3 percent

This was after 50 years of communism in which it was actually very advantageous for bureaucrats, party officials and army personel to declare themselves as Yugoslavs. 3 percent.

This probably did fall close to zero when hostilities erupted, but this can't be described as dramatic jump in proportions of people declaring themselves as Croats, Serbs and so on.

There is a long history of intermarriage and connections between so-called "ethnic" communities

Not really. The region was always rather backwards, and you don't usually have intermarriage with people of different religions in rural countries. Especially since the Turkish rule was despised. But the Catholics and the Orthodox didn't historically mix either.

This changed somewhat with urbanization and greater population mobility of the later communist era. But keep in mind that even then the proportion of mixed marriages wasn't very high.

and yet the Croats, for example, talk about a thousand year kingdom that stretches continuously back to Tomislav and medieval croatia.

Nonsense.

I'm not saying that the concepts of Serb, Croat, and so on were invented during this period - far from it. But the identities of cotemporary Croats and Serbs, the identities that were so well exploited during the war, were indeed constructions, as all ethnic identities are.

It's a common trap to misinterpret the really obvious and existing linguistic, cultural and other similarities (nobody denies them) between various south Slav nations as them being one nation. It is in fact not so.

My position on that is:

1) the only real criteria for some people to be a nation is: that they consider themselves one.

2) a nation is not worth less than another nation if it formed later.

[VetLegion]

Cyclotron, you're playing down pre-1945 identities too much. They indeed existed, and were very strong. Nations were already formed. As Cort Haus correctly notes, it was a combination of communist brutality and relatively good economic situation that has managed to keep nationalist sentiments at bay, but they were there, especially strong among the large diasporas. For example, in 1972., a group of Croatian emigrants returned to Yugoslavia armed, hoping to instigate a rebellion against the commies in the middle of Bosnia. There were also sporadic terrorist acts against Yugoslavian embassies and such.

[Cyclotron]

I can't reasonably argue with anything Cort Haus said. My posts were a reaction to TCO's wish for a simple ethnic map, the want of which I perceive as a big stumbling block to understanding of ethnic conflict in general and Yugoslavia's situation in particular.

There is no denying the fact that all these things took place within a broader context, and that these contexts mattered - but I think that one of the reasons they did matter is because ethnic actors within Yugoslavia were so willing to exploit them. The actions of the Ustase, for instance, are relevant to a discussion of Yugoslavia's dissolution, but what is more relevant is the way those actions were interpreted, exaggerated, glorified, demonized, and used by all sides of the conflict. In a war of narratives like this, it is the storytelling more than the structural effect of contextual actions that influences public opinion, and ultimately the identities people define themselves by.

Originally posted by VetLegion

Yugoslavia’s population was ethnically mixed. According to the 1991 census, Serbs made up 36 percent of the total population, Croats 20 percent, Muslim Slavs 10 percent, Albanians 9 percent, Slovenes 8 percent, Macedonian Slavs 6 percent, “Yugoslavs” (people who declined to declare themselves members of any specific ethnic group) 3 percent

This was after 50 years of communism in which it was actually very advantageous for bureaucrats, party officials and army personel to declare themselves as Yugoslavs. 3 percent.

That's in 1991, eleven years after Tito died. That's plenty of time for the kind of identity construction I am referring to. If you wanted to use statistics effectively, you'd have to get a similar census from 1980 or before, but I somehow doubt that such things would be available.

[Cyclotron]

Originally posted by VetLegion
Cyclotron, you're playing down pre-1945 identities too much. They indeed existed, and were very strong. Nations were already formed. As Cort Haus correctly notes, it was a combination of communist brutality and relatively good economic situation that has managed to keep nationalist sentiments at bay, but they were there, especially strong among the large diasporas. For example, in 1972., a group of Croatian emigrants returned to Yugoslavia armed, hoping to instigate a rebellion against the commies in the middle of Bosnia. There were also sporadic terrorist acts against Yugoslavian embassies and such.

Terrorist acts are not demonstrative of widespread sentiment or identities. It would be a mistake to conclude that some violent ethnically motivated people - especially such people coming from outside Yugoslavia - indicate a mass polarization of ethnicities of the type that occured after Tito's death.

[VetLegion]

Originally posted by Cort Haus With the fall of the Soviet block and the unification of Germany, Yugoslavia became strategically and economically important, and in my view, the best way for the dominant powers of the day to establish influence over that territory was to leverage the faultlines that existed to create a divide-and-conquer scenario, and basically break the country up into maneagable chunks, with the help of local nationalists.

I don't have much to disagree with your post. I certainly agree that great powers always played an important part.

But I disagree that Yugoslavia was broken from outside. Firstly, it wasn't really all that important. Though better off than practically any other communist country, its economy was a dwarf compared to capitalist European economies. Sometimes one can read that Yugoslavia was broken up because it had a relatively successful brand of socialism, which was anathema to world capitalists. Truth is, this successful brand of socialism had a lot of problems and instead of exporting it, Yugoslavia was on the path of embracing reforms in the direction of capitalism.

With 22 million people it was big, but not big enough to be a danger to any European power. If anything, capitalists should have loved to keep it intact so that they have a big and compact market instead of six or more small fragmented and impoverished markets which they have now.

The primary reasons why Yugoslavia dissolved were internal. But it is nothing unusual. If you think about it, multhiethnic countries are the exception in the world, not the rule. It is because they are not as stable as nation-states with a dominant majority.

[VetLegion]

Originally posted by Cyclotron
Terrorist acts are not demonstrative of widespread sentiment or identities.

Look, if you don't want to believe me that Serb, Croat and other identities were always far stronger than the Yugoslavian identity for the vast majority of people, trust the numbers.

[Datajack Franit]

let's do something: we wait until muslims become an immigrated majority in Belgium as well, then we allow them to join Albania

[VetLegion]

There is an analogy between the Yugoslavian and the European identities. Both are supranational. Also, even after 50 years of EU I doubt that many people will think of themselves as European first and (insert nation) second.

[Dinner]

Originally posted by Sir Og
Because organised crime hurts all. There is Kosovar mafia all over Europe.

Like southern Italy in the first half of the 20th century Kosovo has an organized crime problem because there is little development and little opportunity to make a decent living in a legit way. Thus you see young men banding together to form mafia organizations since it's the only real way to make money in the place.

[Dinner]

Originally posted by Sir Og
I am not quite sure what "off shoots" means but Macedonians have a lot more in common with Bulgarians than with Serbs.
They are Bulgarians based on evry criteria for nationality but since the collaps of the Ottoman Empire we have not lived together in the same country.

So I've heard. I know Bulgaria annexed the area in WW2 and that Serbs refer to Macedonians as "south Serbs". I think the reality is much closer to Macedonia being a border region where Serbs and Bulgarians ended up mixing so they're part both.

[VetLegion]

There are also some issues with the Macedonian church. Orthodox countries usually have one church per nation and until recently Macedonian church was part of the Serbian, but they split or something and Serbs aren't happy about it. Not quite sure if that's the exact story, but something like that.