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National holiday. That was the date we said NO to collaborating with the Axis. A bessetting "sin" that has haunted us and now we say no to logical things as well.
Anyway,
here is the brave speech we gave
This translation of the open letter is Appendix II of the book Greece Against the Axis by Stanley Casson first published in London in 1941 by Hamish Hamilton and reprinted 3 times in 1942.
Anyway 500.000 of Greeks lost their lives in that "adventure". On a pop of around 7 million that's a huge sum. (For LOTM: that includes the Greek jews that lost their lives too. Around 30.000 IIRC).
And we got in return the Dodecanese so the brits can go and drop dead in the pavement from too much booze.
WHich brings me to my "anglophobic" (Copyrighted Molly Bloom) question.
Greece would have stayed out of the war if Britain didn't insist on landing its troops here. That resulted in 500.000 deaths.
It doesn't say that in school books does it?
Anyway,
here is the brave speech we gave
To His Excellency, Adolf Hitler,
Chancellor of the German Reich
Excellency,
Greece, as you know, wished to keep out of the present war. When it broke out she had barely recovered frim the wounds that she had suffered from various wars and dissensions at home. She had neither the strength nor the intention, nor any reason to take part in a war, the end of which, no doubt, would be of great importance to the whole world, but at the start did not offer any direct threat to her integrity. Let us ignore her declarations on this point, let us ignore the official documents published in the White Book, let us ignore the speeches and articles which bore witness to her permanent desire to keep out of the war. Let us take into account one fact only. When, after the Italian sinking of the Helle in the port if Tenos, Greece found the remains of torpedoes, when she had proof that these torpedoes were Italian, she kept silent. Why? Because if she had disclosed the truth she would have been forced either to declare war, or to see war declared against her. Greece never wished for war with Italy, neither by herself nor with allies, whether these be British or Balkan. She wished only for her small part of the world to live as quietly as possible, because she was exhausted, because she had fought many wars and because her geographical position is such that she could not have as an enemy either the Germans on land or the English on sea.
At the moment of the sinking of the Helle, Greece, apart from her pacific longings, had a guarantee as well, bearing two signatures. The Italian signature, which had guaranteed her against all aggression on the part of Italy, and that of England, which was a spontaneous guarantee of Greek integrity. Nevertheless, when, some time after the sinking of the Helle, Italy had shown clearer signs of her future aggression, Greece, convinced that the first signature was valueless, did not turn, as she should have turned, towards the country which had given her the second. She turned - do you remember, Excellency? - towards yourself, and she asked for your protecion. What was the reply we were given then? What was said I do not know exactly, but this I know, because I heard it from the lips of our late President himself, that Germany replied to our request by advising us not to offer any pretexts - that is to say, not to mobilise - and to stay quiet.
We did not offer any pretexts,we did not mobilise; we slept quietly, or rather we were sleeping quietly - for that evening the Italians had invited us to dinner - when the Italian Minister appeared with his ultimatum. To whom and where then would you have liked us to turn? Towards Italy, whose valueless signature we had in our pocket with the remains of the torpedoes? But it was the Italians who had declared the war. Towards yourself? But unfortunately that very morning of October 28th, you were in Florence. To remain alone? We had no air force, no material, no money and no fleet. We turned then to the signature left, to the English. And those whose own homeland was in flames, those were keeping anxious watch and ward on the Channel, those who, they said it themselves, had not sufficient material for their own defence, they came, and they came immediately. Without haggling, without excuses, they came, and a few days later on the front in the mountains of Epirus, where the brutal Italian aggression had begun, fell together the Greek troops and the first English airman.
What happened after that you know well, you and the whole world. The Italians have been thrashed. They have been thrashed there man to man by us, the weak and Feeble Greeks. Not by the English, because no English soldier has set foot in Albania. The Italians have been thrashed. Why? Because they had no ideals, because they had no heart in the fight, because - but this is another story. In the face of this victory, it is sure because we have been told so, you have remained a spectator. "This affair," you said, "does not interest me. It concerns the Italians only. I will only interfere when the English army lands at Salonika in numbers." We could have asked your Excellency: "Florence? Is it a fact that on the very day that the Italians attacked us you were meeting them on the banks of the Arno, and you handed over to them the Greeks?" But we did not wish to ask. Hidden away with the remains of the Italian torpedoes we hid Florence also, and when indiscreet people brought it to our notice we said, "They were not in agreement, the Italians deceived them." Why?
Because thatis what we wished to believe. That is what it was our interest to believe. So at the same time as we were advancing in Albania, our relations with Germany went smoothly on their way. The swastika flew from your Legation on New Year's day, it came to half-mast when Metaxas dies, and your Minister paidhis respects to the new President of the Council. Commercial dealings were renewed, and you yourselves protested strongly on one occasion when an American paper announced that German tanks had appeared in Albania. You as spectators, and the English, our allies, with their air force and their fleet. Only that. You know how we tried to keep that "Only that" a reality. Enough to say that when an English aeroplane crashed at Salonika we asked the English not to salvage it themselves, in order that not even ten British soldiers should appear there, in order that there should be no misunderstanding, no pretexts. You laugh? How right you are.
But all the time that our relations were like this, while a certain calm due to the German attitude remained, you had begun to concentrate forces in Rumania. But the first contingent were to teach the Rumanian army, the second to protect the oilfields, the third the frontiers. The fourth... but the fourth contingent was 300,000 men. The writer went as a journalist to Bulgaria, covering the road over which now pass your soldiers. And when he came back he said to the late President, "The road to Sofia has just been widened. The wooden bridges have just been strengthened, the shavings of the carpenters are still lying on the ground. It is clear that the Bulgarians have got ready hastily the road on which an army passes."
And after that what was Greece to do? To see the Germans on the frontiers of Bulgaria? To count their ships on the Danube, to see them entering Sofia and allying themselves with the Bulgarians? To hear the Bulgarians talking of their national claims, and to keep calm in the knowledge tha the Germans are at Koula to guard the Rumanian oilfields?
But enough. Forget the past. Come to facts. According to every witness station in the world it appears that the Germans wished to invade Greece. Why? If an attack on Greece was from the beginning essential to the interests of the Axis, M. Grazzi would not have been laone four months ago at three o'clock in the morning. Germany and Italy would have been together. Fron the beginning, therefore, the attack on Greece does not seem to have been necessary for the Axis. Apparently now it is. But why? Is it an order that a front was not to be created in the Balkans against Germany? But this comes out of a fairy story. Neither the Greeks nor the English - this was stated officially in a communique of March 6th, and is shouted from the housetops by logic - nor Serbia nor Turkey have any reason for spreading the war. The war as it has been is big enough for all these countries. Is it, then, in order to save the Italians in Albania? But what sort of salvation is this? The Italians have been thrashed openly and for all eternity, and will not the public opinion of the world be certain of this thrashing as soon as a single German soldier steps on to the soil of Greece? Will not the whole world shout that forty-five millions of Italians after having attacked our poor eight millions, have now to call for help to another eighty-five millions? But if the Italians wish to be saved, why should others come to their help in a way which is particularly humiliating for them when we could save them ourselves with pleasure and without exposing them to ridicule? Let the Italians evacuate Albania, let them shout from the housetops that they are tired of chasing us and are satiated with glory and have decided to retire. We will help them. But, Excellency, perhaps you are going to say to us, "This is all very well, but what about the English?"
But it is not we, your Excellency, who made the English come to Greece. It was the Italians. And now you wish us to say farewell to those whom the Italians brought here. So be it. Let us say it. But to whom? To the living. But how can we throw out the dead? Those who died on our mountains. Those who, wounded, fell to earth in Attica and drew there their last breath. Those who at a time when their own country was in flames came to Greece and fought there, died there, and there found their graves. Listen, your Excellency, there are deeds which cannot be done in Greece, and that is one of them. We cannot throw out either the living or the dead. We will throw out no one, but we shall stand here upright by their side until the day when the sunshine breaks through the storm.
Everyone is saying that you intend to invade Greece. But we do not believe it, and we are an ingenuous people. We do not believe it of your army, with its history and its traditions which even its enemies do not deny. We do not believe that your army is willing to disgrace itself by such an action. We do not believe that a great power armed to the teeth, with a population of eighty-five millions fighting to create in the world a "New Order," an Order which we thought to be founded on right, we do not believe that this great power wishes to attack on the flank a little country which already struggles for its liberty against an Empire of fourty-five millions.
What would your army do, your Excellency, if instead of horse and artillery we sent to receive them on the frontier our twenty thousand wounded in their bloody bandages? But no, that cannot be. Small or great, that part of the Greek army which can be sent there will stand in Thrace as they have stood in Epirus. There they will await the return from Berlin of the Runner, who came five years ago to light the torch at Olympus. We shall see this torch light a fire, a fire which will light this nation, which has taught all other nations how to live, and will now teach them how to die.
Chancellor of the German Reich
Excellency,
Greece, as you know, wished to keep out of the present war. When it broke out she had barely recovered frim the wounds that she had suffered from various wars and dissensions at home. She had neither the strength nor the intention, nor any reason to take part in a war, the end of which, no doubt, would be of great importance to the whole world, but at the start did not offer any direct threat to her integrity. Let us ignore her declarations on this point, let us ignore the official documents published in the White Book, let us ignore the speeches and articles which bore witness to her permanent desire to keep out of the war. Let us take into account one fact only. When, after the Italian sinking of the Helle in the port if Tenos, Greece found the remains of torpedoes, when she had proof that these torpedoes were Italian, she kept silent. Why? Because if she had disclosed the truth she would have been forced either to declare war, or to see war declared against her. Greece never wished for war with Italy, neither by herself nor with allies, whether these be British or Balkan. She wished only for her small part of the world to live as quietly as possible, because she was exhausted, because she had fought many wars and because her geographical position is such that she could not have as an enemy either the Germans on land or the English on sea.
At the moment of the sinking of the Helle, Greece, apart from her pacific longings, had a guarantee as well, bearing two signatures. The Italian signature, which had guaranteed her against all aggression on the part of Italy, and that of England, which was a spontaneous guarantee of Greek integrity. Nevertheless, when, some time after the sinking of the Helle, Italy had shown clearer signs of her future aggression, Greece, convinced that the first signature was valueless, did not turn, as she should have turned, towards the country which had given her the second. She turned - do you remember, Excellency? - towards yourself, and she asked for your protecion. What was the reply we were given then? What was said I do not know exactly, but this I know, because I heard it from the lips of our late President himself, that Germany replied to our request by advising us not to offer any pretexts - that is to say, not to mobilise - and to stay quiet.
We did not offer any pretexts,we did not mobilise; we slept quietly, or rather we were sleeping quietly - for that evening the Italians had invited us to dinner - when the Italian Minister appeared with his ultimatum. To whom and where then would you have liked us to turn? Towards Italy, whose valueless signature we had in our pocket with the remains of the torpedoes? But it was the Italians who had declared the war. Towards yourself? But unfortunately that very morning of October 28th, you were in Florence. To remain alone? We had no air force, no material, no money and no fleet. We turned then to the signature left, to the English. And those whose own homeland was in flames, those were keeping anxious watch and ward on the Channel, those who, they said it themselves, had not sufficient material for their own defence, they came, and they came immediately. Without haggling, without excuses, they came, and a few days later on the front in the mountains of Epirus, where the brutal Italian aggression had begun, fell together the Greek troops and the first English airman.
What happened after that you know well, you and the whole world. The Italians have been thrashed. They have been thrashed there man to man by us, the weak and Feeble Greeks. Not by the English, because no English soldier has set foot in Albania. The Italians have been thrashed. Why? Because they had no ideals, because they had no heart in the fight, because - but this is another story. In the face of this victory, it is sure because we have been told so, you have remained a spectator. "This affair," you said, "does not interest me. It concerns the Italians only. I will only interfere when the English army lands at Salonika in numbers." We could have asked your Excellency: "Florence? Is it a fact that on the very day that the Italians attacked us you were meeting them on the banks of the Arno, and you handed over to them the Greeks?" But we did not wish to ask. Hidden away with the remains of the Italian torpedoes we hid Florence also, and when indiscreet people brought it to our notice we said, "They were not in agreement, the Italians deceived them." Why?
Because thatis what we wished to believe. That is what it was our interest to believe. So at the same time as we were advancing in Albania, our relations with Germany went smoothly on their way. The swastika flew from your Legation on New Year's day, it came to half-mast when Metaxas dies, and your Minister paidhis respects to the new President of the Council. Commercial dealings were renewed, and you yourselves protested strongly on one occasion when an American paper announced that German tanks had appeared in Albania. You as spectators, and the English, our allies, with their air force and their fleet. Only that. You know how we tried to keep that "Only that" a reality. Enough to say that when an English aeroplane crashed at Salonika we asked the English not to salvage it themselves, in order that not even ten British soldiers should appear there, in order that there should be no misunderstanding, no pretexts. You laugh? How right you are.
But all the time that our relations were like this, while a certain calm due to the German attitude remained, you had begun to concentrate forces in Rumania. But the first contingent were to teach the Rumanian army, the second to protect the oilfields, the third the frontiers. The fourth... but the fourth contingent was 300,000 men. The writer went as a journalist to Bulgaria, covering the road over which now pass your soldiers. And when he came back he said to the late President, "The road to Sofia has just been widened. The wooden bridges have just been strengthened, the shavings of the carpenters are still lying on the ground. It is clear that the Bulgarians have got ready hastily the road on which an army passes."
And after that what was Greece to do? To see the Germans on the frontiers of Bulgaria? To count their ships on the Danube, to see them entering Sofia and allying themselves with the Bulgarians? To hear the Bulgarians talking of their national claims, and to keep calm in the knowledge tha the Germans are at Koula to guard the Rumanian oilfields?
But enough. Forget the past. Come to facts. According to every witness station in the world it appears that the Germans wished to invade Greece. Why? If an attack on Greece was from the beginning essential to the interests of the Axis, M. Grazzi would not have been laone four months ago at three o'clock in the morning. Germany and Italy would have been together. Fron the beginning, therefore, the attack on Greece does not seem to have been necessary for the Axis. Apparently now it is. But why? Is it an order that a front was not to be created in the Balkans against Germany? But this comes out of a fairy story. Neither the Greeks nor the English - this was stated officially in a communique of March 6th, and is shouted from the housetops by logic - nor Serbia nor Turkey have any reason for spreading the war. The war as it has been is big enough for all these countries. Is it, then, in order to save the Italians in Albania? But what sort of salvation is this? The Italians have been thrashed openly and for all eternity, and will not the public opinion of the world be certain of this thrashing as soon as a single German soldier steps on to the soil of Greece? Will not the whole world shout that forty-five millions of Italians after having attacked our poor eight millions, have now to call for help to another eighty-five millions? But if the Italians wish to be saved, why should others come to their help in a way which is particularly humiliating for them when we could save them ourselves with pleasure and without exposing them to ridicule? Let the Italians evacuate Albania, let them shout from the housetops that they are tired of chasing us and are satiated with glory and have decided to retire. We will help them. But, Excellency, perhaps you are going to say to us, "This is all very well, but what about the English?"
But it is not we, your Excellency, who made the English come to Greece. It was the Italians. And now you wish us to say farewell to those whom the Italians brought here. So be it. Let us say it. But to whom? To the living. But how can we throw out the dead? Those who died on our mountains. Those who, wounded, fell to earth in Attica and drew there their last breath. Those who at a time when their own country was in flames came to Greece and fought there, died there, and there found their graves. Listen, your Excellency, there are deeds which cannot be done in Greece, and that is one of them. We cannot throw out either the living or the dead. We will throw out no one, but we shall stand here upright by their side until the day when the sunshine breaks through the storm.
Everyone is saying that you intend to invade Greece. But we do not believe it, and we are an ingenuous people. We do not believe it of your army, with its history and its traditions which even its enemies do not deny. We do not believe that your army is willing to disgrace itself by such an action. We do not believe that a great power armed to the teeth, with a population of eighty-five millions fighting to create in the world a "New Order," an Order which we thought to be founded on right, we do not believe that this great power wishes to attack on the flank a little country which already struggles for its liberty against an Empire of fourty-five millions.
What would your army do, your Excellency, if instead of horse and artillery we sent to receive them on the frontier our twenty thousand wounded in their bloody bandages? But no, that cannot be. Small or great, that part of the Greek army which can be sent there will stand in Thrace as they have stood in Epirus. There they will await the return from Berlin of the Runner, who came five years ago to light the torch at Olympus. We shall see this torch light a fire, a fire which will light this nation, which has taught all other nations how to live, and will now teach them how to die.
Anyway 500.000 of Greeks lost their lives in that "adventure". On a pop of around 7 million that's a huge sum. (For LOTM: that includes the Greek jews that lost their lives too. Around 30.000 IIRC).
And we got in return the Dodecanese so the brits can go and drop dead in the pavement from too much booze.
WHich brings me to my "anglophobic" (Copyrighted Molly Bloom) question.
Greece would have stayed out of the war if Britain didn't insist on landing its troops here. That resulted in 500.000 deaths.
It doesn't say that in school books does it?
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