Hiroshima: a (probably overly long) exposé

[techumseh]

Originally posted by Ted Striker

The Soviet army was the most fearsome and mature land army on the planet at that time.

Agreed.

The Japanese army in Manchuria at that time was basically a bunch of n00bs, with no armor or artillery whatsover, with a serious depletion of manpower, no elite units, and a lack of manpower.

This is false. There were over a million men, 1215 armored vehicles, 1800 aircraft and 6700 guns and mortars.

[Ted Striker]

You are using the wrong estimates.

[ravagon]

Originally posted by techumseh
You don't crack 50 divisions in ten days, even with a lot of tanks, unless you're really good, Ted. Sorry. Have you ever wondered what the Allied vs. German tank and aircraft ratios were in France during 1944? The ratios were roughly similar to the Manchurian campaign, and yet it took the British and Americans 7 weeks to advance 50km.

Only when the Germans were completely exhausted were the Allies able to break out. In this, they were assisted greatly by the simultaneous Red Army offensive which destroyed Army Group Centre and advanced over 500km to the Polish border.

I agree that amphipious ops were a different matter. The smaller scale meant the Japanese could intensively fortify the defensive area, something they excelled at. And, yes, the Soviets were newbies at amphibious assaults. But they did well enough to capture their objectives.

The (Western) allies in France during 1944 and the Soviets in Manchuria a year later are two entirely different situations though.

Assuming that your figures are correct a 5:1 ratio in tanks and a 2:1 ratio in aircraft is an immense advantage. Add to this the huge difference in quality between Japanese/Soviet armour and ground attack aircraft and the terrain they were attacking on and I'm not surprised the IJA was blitzed. This was fairly comparable to the initial German thrusts in 1941 into the USSR.

The allies attacking in France may have had similar numerical advantages but they were far outclassed qualitatively on the ground at least plus were faced with supply lines across open beaches for months thereafter and were fighting in much more developed areas (those hedgerows were reputedly a nightmare) against a much more concentrated foe.

[Ted Striker]

In existence since 1919, the Kwangtung Army was more than 1 million men strong in early 1941. Manchuria represented the breadbasket and military warehouse for the Japanese armed forces. However, as the Allied effort in the Pacific war intensified, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters began to withdraw elite divisions from the Kwangtung Army to counter the Allied threat elsewhere.

By early 1943, the Japanese had approximately 600,000 troops protecting Manchuria against an estimated 750,000 Soviet troops deployed on its borders. Approaching the end of 1944, this former vanguard of Japanese military prowess found its strength reduced half again from its number in December 1942. The Japanese Army was short in more than manpower. They were severely deficient in aircraft, engineer support, communications and armor. What few tanks the Japanese did possess were armed with 57mm guns and were grossly overmatched by the Soviet T-34's.


Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) issued orders on 15 March 1945, which withdrew all remaining elite divisions from Manchuria to the homeland and included two divisions on the border. This also removed the Kwantung Army's 1st Tank Division, the last armor division in Manchuria. [18-125) The result left the Kwantung Army a mere shadow of its former self (its most seasoned division was formed only as late as the spring of 1944).

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm

[ravagon]

Originally posted by Geronimo


The red army did a superb job in manchuria, but how do you back up your claims that the allies were less effective at blitzkrieg? The allies blitzkreiged through western europe even faster than did the soviets through eastern europe despite the fact that the soviets had greatly superior tanks to the allies throughout the war.

I doubt we could be sure which was truly better at that type of warfare in the absence of any battles that pitted the one against the other.

To be fair here the allies were actually liberating Western Europe. The Soviets otoh were slugging their way through Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania - Axis allies.
They had to consolidate supply lines and guard against partisan-style attacks in much the same way that German forces had had to do in the USSR a couple of years earlier.

In combined arms (with air/naval support) the (western) allies were far superior throughout the war.
By the end though the Soviets (having learned to use their nicer toys properly) probably would've proved far superior in a strictly land-based engagement.

[Admiral]

Originally posted by notyoueither


Bull****. The USAF was involved in the Dresden raids, and the earlier firebomings as well IIRC.

According to everything I've seen, this is incorrect. The Dresden raid, and Hamburg as well, was conducted by Britain's Bomber Command. I do not know if USAF units were involved in either, but if so, they did not have any autonomy, and reported to Bomber Command.

[techumseh]

By August 1945, the Kwantury Army had pieced together a combat force of 1,155 tanks, 5,360 guns and 1,800 aircraft, most obsolete.

My figures are pretty close to those of your source.

As a result of the Russians' meticulous planning and bold offensive plan, they took 594,000 Japanese prisoners including 143 generals and 20,000 wounded. The Kwangtung Army suffered over 80,000 men and officers killed in combat which lasted less than two weeks. In contrast, the well-prepared Soviet Army had 8,219 killed and 22,264 wounded.

The lessons to be learned from this closing chapter to World War II are many indeed. Foremost in one's mind must be the adaptability and boldness demonstrated by the Soviets as well as the high degree of initiative shown by commanders at all levels during the campaign. The Soviet war machine had matured. It developed a combined-arms army concept which relied on armored units at every unit level as the spearhead of the offensive thrust and heavy concentrations of artillery. Tactical surprise, a key element to their rapid success, was achieved despite the enormous volume of supplies, equipment and men moved forward to the border regions. The Soviet planners were aucacious and imaginative in their utilization of multiple axes of advance through the worst terrain to maneuver hundreds of thousands of men and machines. They task-organized their forces to accomplish their assigned missions in different terrain against varying degrees of enemy opposition. The Manchurian campaign was characterized by its gigantic scale, use of large formation and extensive employment of amphibious and airborne troops.

As Raymond Garthoff stated, "to mount such a campaign after being bled for four years in Europe represented a major achievement."

This achievement should be studied closely by present day war-planners and tacticians to avoid the danger of underestimating Soviet military capability. The deception techniques and offensive combined-arms tactics begun by General Zhukov at Nomonhan and refined by Marshal Vasilevsky in the Far East offer a case study in which modern Soviet Army tactics can be studied.

It seems that your source, the US Marine Corps University Command and Staff College, pretty much agrees with me.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm

[notyoueither]

Originally posted by Admiral


According to everything I've seen, this is incorrect. The Dresden raid, and Hamburg as well, was conducted by Britain's Bomber Command. I do not know if USAF units were involved in either, but if so, they did not have any autonomy, and reported to Bomber Command.

You have been misled.

http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/dresden.htm

19. On 8 February 1945 SHAEF (Air) informed the RAF Bomber Command and the United States Strategic Air Forces that Dresden was among a number of targets that had been selected for bombing because of their importance in relation to the movements of military forces to the Eastern Front.28 This action, based upon the authoritative recommendation of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee, SHAEF (Air), and in turn based upon the recommendations of the Joint Intelligence Committee (see paragraph 16 above), was in keeping with the procedural structure and authority set up in SHAEF for the conduct of aerial operations by Allied forces.29

20. Allied aerial operations were ultimately the responsibility of the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, though normally he delegated the immediate authority for employment of Allied air forces to his Deputy Supreme Commander, Marshal Tedder. The latter, in turn, relied upon the commanders of the RAF Bomber Command and the United States Strategic Air Forces (General Carl Spaatz, Commanding) for the actual conduct of specific strategic aerial operations. The top commanders of the Allied strategic bomber forces were required to conduct all of their operations within the framework of bombing directives laid down to them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (the British Chiefs of Staff and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff). In February 1945, when SHAEF (Air) directed the bombing of Dresden in immediate support of the Russians and in keeping with strategic objectives of mutual interest to the Allies and the Russians, the strategic objectives of mutual interest o the Allies and the Russians, the strategic bomber forces were operating under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) “Directive No. 3 for the Strategic Air Forces in Europe,” dated 12 January 1945.30 The second priority, after bombing of the German petroleum industry for the Allied strategic air forces was, in that directive, listed as the bombing of “German lines of communications.”31 The authority for and the ordering of the bombing of Dresden by Allied strategic air forces and the steps taken to carry out these orders were therefore within the framework of the existing basic CCS Directive No. 3 governing the operations of the Allied strategic air forces in Europe.

23. In the Dresden bombing attacks of 14-15 February 1945 the American Eighth Air Force and the RAF Bomber Command together employed a total of 1299 bomber aircraft (527 from the Eighth Air Force, 722 from the RAF Bomber Command) for a total weight, on targets, of 3906.9 tons. Of this tonnage, 1247.6 tons were expanded by the Eighth Air Force, 2659.3 tons by the RAF Bomber Command. The Americans employed 953.3 tons of high explosive bombs and 294.3 tons of incendiary bombs--all aimed at the Dresden Marshalling Yards. The British employed 1477.7 tons of high explosive bombs and 1181.6 tons of incendiary bombs--all aimed against the Dresden city area.42 The American aircraft used H2X (radar) bombing method, with visual assists, and the British used the marker and visual method.

Oh, and for all the effort the USAF put into the marshalling yards? The rails survived.

[Jon Miller]

btw

I am pretty sure that those japanese tanks couldn't even really hurt the russian tanks

the T34 was roughly on the order of the panther (a bit worse) and the russians had tanks that were the match of tigers

US doctrine was to send 5 shermans against one tiger (our tanks were a lot weaker...)

our shermans way overmatched the japanese tanks

japanese tanks were more comparable to what was being used at the beggining of the war in europe

Jon Miller

[Admiral]

The purpose of the raid, as you have shown, was to disrupt communications to the Eastern Front. The reason that Dresden was chosen was because of a strategic bridge there. Since this was located in the center of the city, presumably this would have fallen within the purvue of the British aspect of the bombing, yet ironically, the bridge remained intact, and so the primary purpose of the mission failed.
The Marshalling Yards would have been located outside the city proper. Dresden was an old city, and with industrial developments happening in the early-mid 19th century, would have been located outside of the areas where there was any highly-concentrated population. Given this, I was too hasty in my above post. The US were associated with the bombing of Dresden, but the mass casualties, and the actual destruction of the city, are almost entirely a result of the British units, under the British Bomber Command. In fact, and I don't have specific evidence, just the general pattern of how the US and British conducted their bombing campaigns, the US probably hit the targets during the day, while the British probably conducted their raid during the night. (Alternatively, if the US chose to attack during the night, it would explain why it was less than effective.)
My point is that that is how it was in every raid. The Americans would target the industry, while the British would target the city. Why is it that the Americans never targetted the city, while the British targetted the industry?
I just don't think that this can be explained away every time.

[notyoueither]

Is a bridge why the US 8th AF dropped 294.3 tons of incendiary bombs? I'd say they failed. Failed to try to knock down a bridge.

Incidently, the Yanks came along during the day and plastered the areas firefighters might have been expected to have been working in. Can't have a good firestorm if the locals are playing Smokey, after all.

You don't seem to have a good grasp of what these raids entailed. They were multiday affairs. It took a lot of effort sustained over a period of time to get the desired results. Typically the bombers would come in waves spread over two or more days and nights. The civil defence, and the citizens, were ground down until all they could do is flee or burn.

Tell me that crude atomic weapons are 'worse' than this.

[techumseh]

nye is correct. The Dresden raid was a combined effort by the USAAF and the RAF. Indeed, in the days after the raid US fighters straffed survivors and rescue workers. Dresden, never a military target, was one of the last undamaged German cities. As the capital of the German state of Saxony, it was one of the most beautiful cities in Europe, with wonderful baroque palaces, cathedrals and churches, an opera house and historic bridges. It was in the path of a Soviet spearhead and it's capture by the Red Army was imminent.

If the raid's intention was to disrupt German communications, then bombing the bridges and interdicting the river crossings would have been sufficient, and very possible, given Allied air supremacy at that point in the war. As it was in the Soviet zone of operations, an operation to disrupt German communications would presumably been discussed with the Russians, yet this did not happen either. The only remaining explanation was that the British and Americans wished to deny the city to the Soviets.

[notyoueither]

Actually, it had been bombed many times before Feb '45. In those cases they actually went after the rails as a communcations hub.

And actually, the Russians asked for interdiction of German communications in the general vicinity, so saying the Russians weren't consulted is fairly... strange.

What remains is that Bomber Harris had a serious hard on for killing Germans in whatever city he could find handy to obliterate, and he had some influence beyond the RAF. At least he did until the firestorm begun in Dresden spread to Parliament and Congress.

[molly bloom]

Originally posted by Admiral


An interesting tidbit relating to the firebombings of Germany.
The US never engaged in it. The US spent the entire war (that they participated in) conducting precision bombing, during the daytime, over occupied Europe.

Oh dear. Don't know much about WWII and the Allied bombing campaigns in Europe do you?

I've seen this attempt to absolve Americans from general 'beastliness' in Europe before, and it was unconvincing then.

You seem to have fallen, hook line and veritable sinker for Nazi propaganda (originating with that well-known fount of truth, Goebbels), David Irving's various tomes absolving virtually anyone who was a Nazi from doing anything bad at all, and a gaggle of right wing and left wing post war revisionists who all leap up and down going:

'See? The Allies were just as bad as the Nazis!'


In the absence of hard evidence you guess that Dresden's industries was located in some unspecified suburbs.

Coventry was a mediaeval city, with a preserved mediaeval core, but with a mixture of light and heavy industry around that inner core.

Why do you assume that Germans treated their Baroque cities with greater care for historic buildings than the British did, and on what evidence?

You speak about the Marshalling Yards as if they were some great distance away, but what do you think the purpose of Marshalling Yards is?

"Dresden was home to any number of high-tech engineering firms all working flat out to supply Hitler’s war machine. One was Carl Zeiss-Jena, the lens-making company which was churning out optics for bomb sights, artillery sights and U-boat periscopes. Many of these factories relied on slave labour from concentration camps. In fact, the Dresden Yearbook for 1942 boasts that the city was “one of the foremost industrial locations of the Reich.”

Dresden was also the site of one of the most important railway marshalling yards in eastern Germany. It was a nodal point on the network with hundreds of thousands of troops, guns and tanks being shunted through Dresden on their way to the eastern front. Politically, the city was solidly Nazi. Hitler’s visits were met with wild enthusiasm. There was an SS barracks in the suburbs. Hundreds of Hitler’s enemies had died on the blade of Dresden’s electric-powered guillotine. One way or another, Dresden was a “legitimate” target for the allied bombers (if bombing of any city can be regarded as legitimate).

Ironically perhaps, Dresden’s tragedy was not to have been bombed far earlier in the war. If it had been, things might have been different. But for years the city was beyond the reach of allied aircraft. Dresden seems to have been lulled, quite literally, into a false sense of security. As a result it failed to build the kind of deep, air-raid shelters with blast shutters and air-filtration systems which was the norm elsewhere in Germany (and which probably saved millions of lives). Dresdeners made their own arrangements – in basements, cellars, under stairs, where so many were to prove utterly vulnerable to the rain of high explosives and incendiaries. "

http://www.sundayherald.com/40093

The casualties from the bombing never reached Irving's inflated figures- under 40 000 is the figure supplied by emergency services in Dresden in the aftermath, not the figures altered and forged by Irving and Nazi propaganda.

The idea that somehow Americans had pure motives, bombing with precision only industrial, strategic targets is hilarious. I suggest you research the accuracy (or otherwise) of WWII bombing runs.

You might be greatly surprised. After all, these were the same Americans who in their bombing runs in China managed not to hit the industrial/strategic targets they were aiming for, but Chinese civilians and homes instead.

Are we then to believe that the American pilots or the aeroplanes in the European theatre were of a different, higher calibre? I think not.

[Sikander]

Originally posted by techumseh
You don't crack 50 divisions in ten days, even with a lot of tanks, unless you're really good, Ted. Sorry. Have you ever wondered what the Allied vs. German tank and aircraft ratios were in France during 1944? The ratios were roughly similar to the Manchurian campaign, and yet it took the British and Americans 7 weeks to advance 50km.

Only when the Germans were completely exhausted were the Allies able to break out. In this, they were assisted greatly by the simultaneous Red Army offensive which destroyed Army Group Centre and advanced over 500km to the Polish border.

I agree that amphipious ops were a different matter. The smaller scale meant the Japanese could intensively fortify the defensive area, something they excelled at. And, yes, the Soviets were newbies at amphibious assaults. But they did well enough to capture their objectives.

The Soviets used a hand picked force in a set piece surprise attack. They used everything they had learned in the previous 4 years about mobile warfare against a Japanese force that was scattered over too wide an area, had many of its best formations and personnel transferred to other fronts, had little experience of mechanized warfare and had weapons which were generally two generations behind the Soviet equipment. The result was predictable, the reactions of the enemy in such a situation are almost irrelevant. Only bad luck / bad weather can slow an attacker who has so many advantages.

Regarding the Anglo-Americans vs the Germans on the Western Front, for most of the summer they were penned up in bad terrain with not overwhelming numerical advantage against a foe which was superior in mobile operations and more skilled tactically in general. The Germans were ahead in tanks by at least one generation, but this hardly offset the Allied advantage in firepower from land and sea based artillery and aircraft. The main advantage of the Allies was that they were able to reinforce more efficiently than the Germans while applying an immense amount of firepower to somewhat offset their tactical ineptitude. They wrested control over the battle area and wore the Germans down to the nubs and managed to take good advantage when the line collapsed.

Both side played to their strengths, and this result too was inevitable except for the small prospect that the Allies might have somehow failed in the initial stages of the operation. The breakout phase did show some good intitiative and skill, especially considering that most of the American units that were conducting it were green or little experienced.

The Soviets fought on a much grander scale in the East at the same time, had a greater numerical advantage than the Western Allies (of troops actually in place on the line), equivalent tanks to their enemy and many more of them, a longer line which was less well-defended (in terms of men per mile) and had experienced troops all along the line. It is no surprise that they managed to take twice as much territory as the Allies as their line was more than twice as long and the terrain was open. Though the road network in the West was far superior, the Soviets were able to operate from rails directly to their supply sources while the Anglo-Americans had enormous difficulty supplying their thirsty forces from the cramped beach-head to the lengthy truck convoys after the breakthrough. This reduced perhaps significantly the gains that could have been made in 1944.