Tweet
The XYZ Affair and the Rise of the United States Navy
Originally posted by Master Zen
Then if the US didn't have a navy, how did it fight an "undeclared quasi-naval war"? Ships ain't built in 48 hours...
It did have a navy, just not a major one though.
Then if the US didn't have a navy, how did it fight an "undeclared quasi-naval war"? Ships ain't built in 48 hours...
It did have a navy, just not a major one though.
The Jay Treaty of 1794
With the signing of the Treaty of Paris of 1781, the United States not only gained its independence, but also defined its future relationship with Great Britain. Once out of the empire, the American nation struggled to establish itself as an economic power at home and as a carrier of world maritime trade. Unfortunately, the Navigation Acts that had once fostered and encouraged American shipping to British ports now forbade the new nation to trade freely with British possessions. Furthermore, under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress had no power of taxation. With limited means of raising revenue, U.S. debt grew dramatically. The standing Continental Army was quickly disbanded. By 1785, the ships of the Continental Navy had all been sold or given away, and the naval force of the United States, with the exception of a handful of revenue cutters, ceased to exist.
The precarious state of the nation's economy and its limited means of enforcing its authority by use of military force put the United States in the embarrassing situation of not being able to assert itself in the theater of international diplomacy. Perhaps most damaging was its failure to ensure British compliance with the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1783 or to negotiate a satisfactory trade agreement with the British Empire.
Under the Treaty of Paris, the western border of the United States had been established at the eastern shores of the Mississippi River. However, ten years after American independence, British troops were still occupying portions of the Ohio Valley. Outstanding debts owed to the United States by the British and outlined in the treaty had gone unpaid. American shipping was essentially barred from ports under British control, and by 1794, British ships were seizing American vessels trading in the French West Indies on the grounds that such trade violated the British Orders in Council that prohibited neutral nations from trading with French ports.
In exasperation, President Washington dispatched Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay to England to negotiate a peaceful resolution to Britain's lack of adherence to the peace treaty and to enact a trade agreement that would allow American ships to trade in English ports. The result of his efforts was Jay's Treaty of 1794.
Under the provisions of the Jay Treaty, the British agreed to remove royal troops from the western frontiers of the United States and to establish a commission to examine the debts owed to the United States. In the area of trade, the British agreed to open a limited number of ports to American trade, most notably the British East Indies. These clauses proved profitable to the United States, but the British also dictated certain articles that, once accepted, would nullify portions of the Treaty of Commerce and Amity with France signed in 1778. Most notable of these points was the British insistence that privateers belonging to nations that were at war with England be forbidden to arm themselves or sell their prizes in American ports. Hostile privateers would also be limited in the amount of provisions they would be allowed to purchase while in American territory. Jay's Treaty further stipulated that the United States would agree to do all in its power to prevent British ships from being taken by an enemy vessel within "cannon shot of its coasts."
To the French, the American ratification of Jay's Treaty seemed to violate the previous treaties signed between the United States and France. France responded by acting on Article 27 of the Treaty of Commerce and Amity, which required that when either the United States or France was at war, the merchant ships of both nations must provide detailed certificates giving the nationalities of masters and crew, as well as descriptions of cargo and points of origin and destination. Failure to provide these certificates justified taking the ship. American vessels seldom sailed with such detailed papers, and in 1795 France seized more than 300 American merchant ships, which in turn were sold as prizes in French courts. By 1797, the United States and France teetered on the edge of war.
With the signing of the Treaty of Paris of 1781, the United States not only gained its independence, but also defined its future relationship with Great Britain. Once out of the empire, the American nation struggled to establish itself as an economic power at home and as a carrier of world maritime trade. Unfortunately, the Navigation Acts that had once fostered and encouraged American shipping to British ports now forbade the new nation to trade freely with British possessions. Furthermore, under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress had no power of taxation. With limited means of raising revenue, U.S. debt grew dramatically. The standing Continental Army was quickly disbanded. By 1785, the ships of the Continental Navy had all been sold or given away, and the naval force of the United States, with the exception of a handful of revenue cutters, ceased to exist.
The precarious state of the nation's economy and its limited means of enforcing its authority by use of military force put the United States in the embarrassing situation of not being able to assert itself in the theater of international diplomacy. Perhaps most damaging was its failure to ensure British compliance with the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1783 or to negotiate a satisfactory trade agreement with the British Empire.
Under the Treaty of Paris, the western border of the United States had been established at the eastern shores of the Mississippi River. However, ten years after American independence, British troops were still occupying portions of the Ohio Valley. Outstanding debts owed to the United States by the British and outlined in the treaty had gone unpaid. American shipping was essentially barred from ports under British control, and by 1794, British ships were seizing American vessels trading in the French West Indies on the grounds that such trade violated the British Orders in Council that prohibited neutral nations from trading with French ports.
In exasperation, President Washington dispatched Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay to England to negotiate a peaceful resolution to Britain's lack of adherence to the peace treaty and to enact a trade agreement that would allow American ships to trade in English ports. The result of his efforts was Jay's Treaty of 1794.
Under the provisions of the Jay Treaty, the British agreed to remove royal troops from the western frontiers of the United States and to establish a commission to examine the debts owed to the United States. In the area of trade, the British agreed to open a limited number of ports to American trade, most notably the British East Indies. These clauses proved profitable to the United States, but the British also dictated certain articles that, once accepted, would nullify portions of the Treaty of Commerce and Amity with France signed in 1778. Most notable of these points was the British insistence that privateers belonging to nations that were at war with England be forbidden to arm themselves or sell their prizes in American ports. Hostile privateers would also be limited in the amount of provisions they would be allowed to purchase while in American territory. Jay's Treaty further stipulated that the United States would agree to do all in its power to prevent British ships from being taken by an enemy vessel within "cannon shot of its coasts."
To the French, the American ratification of Jay's Treaty seemed to violate the previous treaties signed between the United States and France. France responded by acting on Article 27 of the Treaty of Commerce and Amity, which required that when either the United States or France was at war, the merchant ships of both nations must provide detailed certificates giving the nationalities of masters and crew, as well as descriptions of cargo and points of origin and destination. Failure to provide these certificates justified taking the ship. American vessels seldom sailed with such detailed papers, and in 1795 France seized more than 300 American merchant ships, which in turn were sold as prizes in French courts. By 1797, the United States and France teetered on the edge of war.
The XYZ Affair
In the wake of the ratification of Jay's Treaty between the United States and England, the French policy of seizing American vessels on the high seas threatened to cripple the American merchant fleet. Unprepared for war and lacking a sufficient naval force to defend American merchant ships at sea, President John Adams dispatched a special commission to France to renegotiate trade treaties with the French Republic.
The American commission to France was made up of John Marshall of Virginia, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, and South Carolinian Charles Pinckney. While the Americans were negotiating from a standpoint of weakness, France was working from a point of strength. Bonaparte's army had proven highly effective in its conquest of Europe, and France's governing body, the Directory, had gained considerable prestige abroad as a result of French military might. As the French army proved triumphant, the officials within the Directory had become corrupt and grasping. Small nations that wished to avoid conflict with France, such as Portugal, accepted the fact that bribes and loans had to be provided to the Directory.
If the American commissioners were to succeed in establishing peace with France, they had to gain the cooperation of the French Directory's Minister of Foreign Relations, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord. The Americans hoped that Talleyrand would be open to constructive discussion and peaceful settlement with America because he had been treated well during his two-year exile in the United States. However, Talleyrand's experience in America had the opposite effect. Talleyrand disliked his stay in the United States, and grew to believe that the Americans would always be more favorably inclined to ally themselves with Britain than France. He felt Americans had not yet developed a separate national image from England. Language, culture, and history united the Americans and the English, and Talleyrand ultimately viewed the United States as a nation whose power needed to be checked.
However, Talleyrand aside, the American commission was doomed from the start, largely due to the corruption of the French Directory. Before the Americans were allowed an audience with the Foreign Minister, they were pointedly informed that personal bribes to Directory ministers in the sum of 50,000 pounds would be required. That initial bribe would then be followed by a large loan to the French government, and only then could negotiations on a new treaty and the seizure of American ships begin. Outraged and shocked by this demand, the Americans refused to pay. For four months the Americans demanded to be diplomatically recognized by the French government and to begin negotiations, and for four months the French made it clear that until the bribe had been paid, nothing could be done. In January 1798, the French further hardened their determination to bully the Americans into denouncing Jay's Treaty. Without warning, France announced it would confiscate any ship found to be carrying English goods of any kind. After a year of fruitless demands and counterdemands, the American commissioners returned to the United States having achieved nothing.
While Marshall, Gerry, and Pinckney had been in France, the United States Congress had been debating the issue of what could be done to defend American ships on the high seas. Many Federalists argued that a navy should be established and every effort made to complete the three frigates that had been under construction since 1794. They further insisted that the time had come to establish a separate executive department to oversee naval affairs--the Department of the Navy. Republicans, opposed to government spending, were simultaneously calling for an investigation of the War Department and War Secretary McHenry on the overspending and delays in the construction of ships. Party divisions deadlocked action on all issues. In March 1798, President Adams received verification of the American commission's failure to gain any ground in establishing new relations with France. That month, he sent a message to Congress announcing that efforts to reach a peaceful settlement had failed. He encouraged Congress to take action to protect American merchant shipping.
Initially, many Republican members of Congress doubted the truthfulness of Adams's announcement of the failed mission, seeing it as a Federalist ploy to build a navy. However, Adams produced the diplomatic papers recording the French demands, after having substituted X, Y, and Z for the names of the French agents, thus giving rise to this affair's historic name. Congressional outrage with France grew. Further debate on ways to placate the French ceased, and Congress quickly focused on finding a way to defend American ships at sea.
In the wake of the ratification of Jay's Treaty between the United States and England, the French policy of seizing American vessels on the high seas threatened to cripple the American merchant fleet. Unprepared for war and lacking a sufficient naval force to defend American merchant ships at sea, President John Adams dispatched a special commission to France to renegotiate trade treaties with the French Republic.
The American commission to France was made up of John Marshall of Virginia, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, and South Carolinian Charles Pinckney. While the Americans were negotiating from a standpoint of weakness, France was working from a point of strength. Bonaparte's army had proven highly effective in its conquest of Europe, and France's governing body, the Directory, had gained considerable prestige abroad as a result of French military might. As the French army proved triumphant, the officials within the Directory had become corrupt and grasping. Small nations that wished to avoid conflict with France, such as Portugal, accepted the fact that bribes and loans had to be provided to the Directory.
If the American commissioners were to succeed in establishing peace with France, they had to gain the cooperation of the French Directory's Minister of Foreign Relations, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord. The Americans hoped that Talleyrand would be open to constructive discussion and peaceful settlement with America because he had been treated well during his two-year exile in the United States. However, Talleyrand's experience in America had the opposite effect. Talleyrand disliked his stay in the United States, and grew to believe that the Americans would always be more favorably inclined to ally themselves with Britain than France. He felt Americans had not yet developed a separate national image from England. Language, culture, and history united the Americans and the English, and Talleyrand ultimately viewed the United States as a nation whose power needed to be checked.
However, Talleyrand aside, the American commission was doomed from the start, largely due to the corruption of the French Directory. Before the Americans were allowed an audience with the Foreign Minister, they were pointedly informed that personal bribes to Directory ministers in the sum of 50,000 pounds would be required. That initial bribe would then be followed by a large loan to the French government, and only then could negotiations on a new treaty and the seizure of American ships begin. Outraged and shocked by this demand, the Americans refused to pay. For four months the Americans demanded to be diplomatically recognized by the French government and to begin negotiations, and for four months the French made it clear that until the bribe had been paid, nothing could be done. In January 1798, the French further hardened their determination to bully the Americans into denouncing Jay's Treaty. Without warning, France announced it would confiscate any ship found to be carrying English goods of any kind. After a year of fruitless demands and counterdemands, the American commissioners returned to the United States having achieved nothing.
While Marshall, Gerry, and Pinckney had been in France, the United States Congress had been debating the issue of what could be done to defend American ships on the high seas. Many Federalists argued that a navy should be established and every effort made to complete the three frigates that had been under construction since 1794. They further insisted that the time had come to establish a separate executive department to oversee naval affairs--the Department of the Navy. Republicans, opposed to government spending, were simultaneously calling for an investigation of the War Department and War Secretary McHenry on the overspending and delays in the construction of ships. Party divisions deadlocked action on all issues. In March 1798, President Adams received verification of the American commission's failure to gain any ground in establishing new relations with France. That month, he sent a message to Congress announcing that efforts to reach a peaceful settlement had failed. He encouraged Congress to take action to protect American merchant shipping.
Initially, many Republican members of Congress doubted the truthfulness of Adams's announcement of the failed mission, seeing it as a Federalist ploy to build a navy. However, Adams produced the diplomatic papers recording the French demands, after having substituted X, Y, and Z for the names of the French agents, thus giving rise to this affair's historic name. Congressional outrage with France grew. Further debate on ways to placate the French ceased, and Congress quickly focused on finding a way to defend American ships at sea.
Benjamin Stoddert and the Rise of the Navy
As negotiations with France broke down following the XYZ Affair, Congress began to prepare the nation for naval conflict. While the Naval Act of 1794 had called for the building and manning of a squadron of frigates, it had not established a naval department to oversee their operation. Furthermore, the act had expired with the peaceful settlement of the conflict with Algiers.
Benjamin Stoddert, secretary of the navy. From the collections of The Mariners' Museum.
With the urging of President John Adams, Congress began to establish the protocols needed for the operation of a new and more substantial navy.
The first step in the creation of the new navy was the passage of a new naval appropriations bill. Passed on April 27, 1789, it called for the building or purchase of twelve ships of war, the raising of a naval officers corps, and the creation of a budget of $950,000. Congress also authorized the creation of the Department of the Navy on April 30, 1789. President Adams appointed Benjamin Stoddert to administer this new executive office.
A native of Maryland and an ardent Federalist, Stoddert was a tobacco merchant by profession. He had begun his public service as a captain of artillery during the American Revolution. Wounded in action at the Battle of Brandywine in 1777, Stoddert was troubled by poor health for the rest of his life. Nevertheless, as a respected businessman and manager, Stoddert prospered in the early days of the Republic. He established himself in Georgetown and began speculating in land, a gamble that paid off when the federal government chose to establish the new national capital on land partly owned by Stoddert. However, by the time of his appointment to the Navy Department, a declining American economy and a downward turn in land prices nearly resulted in his financial ruin.
At first, Stoddert was hesitant to accept Adams's offer of an appointment to lead the navy. In truth, he was not Adams's first choice. That man had been George Cabot of New York, who had turned down the position because of ill health. The $3,000 salary offered to Stoddert did not promise financial security, but he accepted the position, feeling that it would be cowardly to turn down the offer. Managing ships was something Stoddert had done well in peacetime, and he felt sure he would do as well in time of war.
The staunch Federalist proved to be an able federal executive and administrator. He oversaw every detail in the creation of the navy. He even acted as his own chief of naval operations, directing the strategic movements of fleets and ships. Working with a tiny staff of clerks and assistants, Stoddert personally oversaw the expansion of the navy budget from $16,408 in 1794 to $3 million in 1799. Under Stoddert, the original frigates called for by the Navy Act of 1794 were completed. He also initiated a major expansion of the American fleet.
During the Quasi-War with France, Stoddert initiated the construction of six additional frigates and three sloops and orchestrated the conversion of more than forty merchant vessels into warships. By the end of the Federalist period in 1801, U.S. naval strength had increased to fifteen frigates, twelve ships, seven brigs, four schooners, and nine gunboats. To man these ships, Stoddert oversaw the recruitment of seamen and reestablished the United States Marine Corps. Under Stoddert, a number of naval yards became involved in naval ship construction. This ultimately led to the establishment of a system of United States Navy Shipyards, including Gosport in Virginia, Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, Portsmouth in New Hampshire, Brooklyn in New York, and Charleston in Massachusetts.
Stoddert envisioned a navy that would eventually be capable of defending expanding American interests and maritime commerce. He pushed for the creation of ships of the line that could rival the most powerful ships of the European navies. Though he did not succeed in this endeavor, he is credited with being the first "battleship man" of the U.S. Navy. Stoddert served the navy with energy and devotion until 1801, when peace with France and a change in political fortunes prompted his resignation. The arrival of President Thomas Jefferson, a Republican with an eye to cutting the nation's debt and limiting the size and role of the navy, frustrated Stoddert. The day before Jefferson's inauguration, Stoddert tendered his resignation. Having no one to replace him, Jefferson pleaded with Stoddert to remain at his post until a suitable replacement could be found. Stoddert consented to remain until the end of March, when the new secretary, Samuel Smith, was appointed.
As negotiations with France broke down following the XYZ Affair, Congress began to prepare the nation for naval conflict. While the Naval Act of 1794 had called for the building and manning of a squadron of frigates, it had not established a naval department to oversee their operation. Furthermore, the act had expired with the peaceful settlement of the conflict with Algiers.
Benjamin Stoddert, secretary of the navy. From the collections of The Mariners' Museum.
With the urging of President John Adams, Congress began to establish the protocols needed for the operation of a new and more substantial navy.
The first step in the creation of the new navy was the passage of a new naval appropriations bill. Passed on April 27, 1789, it called for the building or purchase of twelve ships of war, the raising of a naval officers corps, and the creation of a budget of $950,000. Congress also authorized the creation of the Department of the Navy on April 30, 1789. President Adams appointed Benjamin Stoddert to administer this new executive office.
A native of Maryland and an ardent Federalist, Stoddert was a tobacco merchant by profession. He had begun his public service as a captain of artillery during the American Revolution. Wounded in action at the Battle of Brandywine in 1777, Stoddert was troubled by poor health for the rest of his life. Nevertheless, as a respected businessman and manager, Stoddert prospered in the early days of the Republic. He established himself in Georgetown and began speculating in land, a gamble that paid off when the federal government chose to establish the new national capital on land partly owned by Stoddert. However, by the time of his appointment to the Navy Department, a declining American economy and a downward turn in land prices nearly resulted in his financial ruin.
At first, Stoddert was hesitant to accept Adams's offer of an appointment to lead the navy. In truth, he was not Adams's first choice. That man had been George Cabot of New York, who had turned down the position because of ill health. The $3,000 salary offered to Stoddert did not promise financial security, but he accepted the position, feeling that it would be cowardly to turn down the offer. Managing ships was something Stoddert had done well in peacetime, and he felt sure he would do as well in time of war.
The staunch Federalist proved to be an able federal executive and administrator. He oversaw every detail in the creation of the navy. He even acted as his own chief of naval operations, directing the strategic movements of fleets and ships. Working with a tiny staff of clerks and assistants, Stoddert personally oversaw the expansion of the navy budget from $16,408 in 1794 to $3 million in 1799. Under Stoddert, the original frigates called for by the Navy Act of 1794 were completed. He also initiated a major expansion of the American fleet.
During the Quasi-War with France, Stoddert initiated the construction of six additional frigates and three sloops and orchestrated the conversion of more than forty merchant vessels into warships. By the end of the Federalist period in 1801, U.S. naval strength had increased to fifteen frigates, twelve ships, seven brigs, four schooners, and nine gunboats. To man these ships, Stoddert oversaw the recruitment of seamen and reestablished the United States Marine Corps. Under Stoddert, a number of naval yards became involved in naval ship construction. This ultimately led to the establishment of a system of United States Navy Shipyards, including Gosport in Virginia, Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, Portsmouth in New Hampshire, Brooklyn in New York, and Charleston in Massachusetts.
Stoddert envisioned a navy that would eventually be capable of defending expanding American interests and maritime commerce. He pushed for the creation of ships of the line that could rival the most powerful ships of the European navies. Though he did not succeed in this endeavor, he is credited with being the first "battleship man" of the U.S. Navy. Stoddert served the navy with energy and devotion until 1801, when peace with France and a change in political fortunes prompted his resignation. The arrival of President Thomas Jefferson, a Republican with an eye to cutting the nation's debt and limiting the size and role of the navy, frustrated Stoddert. The day before Jefferson's inauguration, Stoddert tendered his resignation. Having no one to replace him, Jefferson pleaded with Stoddert to remain at his post until a suitable replacement could be found. Stoddert consented to remain until the end of March, when the new secretary, Samuel Smith, was appointed.
)
Comment