Philosophy (Part 2)

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Urban Ranger


I agree with you, but I posit that you will have to accept that your senses are necessarily reliable and correspondinf to the objective reality (I call it the primacy of senses, but I am not sure if that is the correct term), or you will be forever be stuck in Hume's extreme skepticism (brain in a vat and all that fun stuff). Proceed from the primacy of senses, you will end up with empiricism.

There is another alternative. Dump this silly and superstitious "internal senses" talk in favour of a more respectable view such as "mental states are brain states".

[KrazyHorse]

There is another alternative. Dump this silly and superstitious "internal senses" talk in favour of a more respectable view such as "mental states are brain states".

How do you know?

[Az]

Is this an interesting discussion? I might join in.

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Frogger
Don't just tell me what happened, what philosophers think they've proven to themselves. Put your cred on the line and tell me how you did it.

Well the Cartesian view of mind holds that there are certain internal data which we think represent reality and that's our evidence for things. This is motivated by the problem of accounting for error. Of course the question of whether they represent reality accurately or not cannot be answered if we accept that they are the sum total of our evidence so we end up facing sceptical problems about the external world. We also collapse "seems" and "is" because we have no right to make the inferences about extra mental entities that are required to support claims of seeming (i.e the distinction between appearance and reality). Hence, when you think about it the Cartesian conception of mental representation doesn't even do the job it was supposed to do.

But why should we buy the doctrine in the first place? I can't for the life of me find anything resembling a "mental representation" in my brain. There is a good scientific explanation of why our cognitive apparatus is fallible (in causal terms) which doesn't involve reference to such quasi-entities and has the advantage of being testable and being part of a larger theory which includes the objective world in its description.

That leaves the linguistic analysis. If we want to explain why we use the contrast between "is" and "seems" we should just look at how people use them and what is required for them to make sense. It's roughly this: "seems" talk is parasitic on "is" talk rather than the other way around (as the Cartesian has it). The only time I use "seems" is when the question of endorsement of claims comes up. For example, I see a bent stick poking out of a glass of water, and I say "that stick is bent", then someone else explains to me what happens when light goes through different mediums (some "is" talk) and then I say "No I was wrong, the stick only seems bent". All that has happened is that the question of endorsement has arisen for the original claim due to new information. Nowhere have I made reference to private mental entities or sense data to make sense of what's gone on.

There is more to say about how this is tied to language being by necessity a public phenomenon, but that's enough for now.

[spartak]

Has the "filosfy" thing been tried out yet?

[Berzerker]

Jon Miller -

while I think the objectivists are crap, I do think it is possible to beleive in a ethical metric, but not beleive in a supreme being

That was from page 2, but why is objectivism "crap" when it essentially seeks, and uses, this ethical metric - a means of applying a standard ethic? Objectivists try to find this standard and do not factor in a supreme being. Arguably the foremost of objectivists - Ayn Rand - was an atheist as are most, if not all, objectivists.

[KrazyHorse]

This is motivated by the problem of accounting for error

No it isn't, at least not in my mind. It's motivated by the fact that I have no basis for believing anything else.

We also collapse "seems" and "is" because we have no right to make the inferences about extra mental entities that are required to support claims of seeming (i.e the distinction between appearance and reality).

Huh? This is the sort of thing that casts doubt on the whole of philosophy for me. You've bootstrapped your argument by claiming that we have to actively reject information; I'm simply claiming that there is no evidence to force me to accept information. And my view doesn't hold that the internal evidence is infallible either...

By the way, your "linguistic analysis" of is and seems is utterly full of crap.

You assume that the default state must be "is" and that "seems" only comes into play later. On the contrary, as any good skeptic will tell you, they only believe in varying degrees of seems. "Is" is the nonincluded limit point of seems, and does not exist in a reasonable space.

[KrazyHorse]

And talk about bootstrapping, but "evidence" acquired by how other people use a word in order to prove that they exist is sort of ridiculous.

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Frogger

This is motivated by the problem of accounting for error

No it isn't, at least not in my mind. It's motivated by the fact that I have no basis for believing anything else.

What basis do you have for believing this?

We also collapse "seems" and "is" because we have no right to make the inferences about extra mental entities that are required to support claims of seeming (i.e the distinction between appearance and reality).

Huh? This is the sort of thing that casts doubt on the whole of philosophy for me. You've bootstrapped your argument by claiming that we have to actively reject information; I'm simply claiming that there is no evidence to force me to accept information. And my view doesn't hold that the internal evidence is infallible either...

I'm claiming that the Cartesian conception of mental representations doesn't account for error or hallucination or anything like that on its own terms. I haven't bootstrapped at all. I've just claimed, and I think rightly, that the usual motivation for positing such mental entities makes them a poor candidate for explaining what they claim to explain (namely error).

By the way, your "linguistic analysis" of is and seems is utterly full of crap.

Ah diddums. Is that the best you can do?

You assume that the default state must be "is" and that "seems" only comes into play later. On the contrary, as any good skeptic will tell you, they only believe in varying degrees of seems. "Is" is the nonincluded limit point of seems, and does not exist in a reasonable space.

What a load of rubbish. "Is is the nonincluded limit point of seems". That's just a load of old rubbish. "Is" and "seems" are ordinary words that people use every day. I think it is better practice when one wants to understand the meaning of terms to look at their use by competent speakers - not some hypostasied logicians account of them.

Anyway, your argument doesn't work. What reasons do I have for believing that my scepticism about, say, the bent stick, has anything to do with limits or noninclusion. I gave the reason for not endorsing the claim - and it was a perfectly OK reason (light travelling through different mediums).

Anyway, you've contradicted yourself hilariously.

"Is" is the nonincluded limit point of seems.

What explanation are you going to give of how "seems" statements work, without making some assumption about the way things are (like you just did). "Is" statements are prior to "seems" statements. Get used to it.

[KrazyHorse]

What basis do you have for believing this?

That no evidence to the contrary has been presented.

[KrazyHorse]

I'm claiming that the Cartesian conception of mental representations doesn't account for error or hallucination or anything like that on its own terms. I haven't bootstrapped at all. I've just claimed, and I think rightly, that the usual motivation for positing such mental entities makes them a poor candidate for explaining what they claim to explain (namely error).

Anyway, your argument doesn't work. What reasons do I have for believing that my scepticism about, say, the bent stick, has anything to do with limits or noninclusion. I gave the reason for not endorsing the claim - and it was a perfectly OK reason (light travelling through different mediums).

You're being thick as a brick. I'm sceptical about everything, not just stuff I know is wrong. That's the meaning of the word "skepticism"

Instead of attacking the motivations of a theory, attack the theory itself. I haven't read any cartesian reasoning.

By the way, it's usually considered bad form in arguments to make statements that are as utterly open to personal interpretation and which have no supporting evidence as your original statement "We also collapse "seems" and "is" because we have no right to make the inferences about extra mental entities that are required to support claims of seeming (i.e the distinction between appearance and reality)."

Around here this is known as a BAM!

Demonstrate from base principles that this is true. Define the terms "extra mental entities" "appearance" "reality". Demonstrate that "extra mental entities" are required to differentiate between appearance and reality.

Your argument doesn't even provide the semblance of a formal proof. It "seems" to be on par with most of the other philosophical crap I've read.

Do you folks actually think that arguments like this have an effect on the way people think? Talk to any physicist. I'll bet you that almost every last one of them is a cartesian in one form or another. And it's not because they've been poring over 16th century philosophical texts; it's because the conclusion is obvious to any thinking being. So your big move away from the antiscientific principle of Cartesianist duality is sort of laughable on its face.

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Frogger

What basis do you have for believing this?

That no evidence to the contrary has been presented.

So no evidence for the contrary has been presented. Well people who study brain activity have yet to discover Cartesian mental entities so if you think the mind is the brain you would be better doing without them.

Anyway, no evidence to the contrary of God's existence has been presented, but that doesn't mean I should believe in God.

[KrazyHorse]

"People who study brain activity"

a) Remember what I said about bootstrapping? You haven't even convinced me that my brain exists, never mind the people to study it

b) They've also yet to discover the mechanism for consciousness. Does that mean that we can't even be sure of our own consciousness?

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Frogger

I'm claiming that the Cartesian conception of mental representations doesn't account for error or hallucination or anything like that on its own terms. I haven't bootstrapped at all. I've just claimed, and I think rightly, that the usual motivation for positing such mental entities makes them a poor candidate for explaining what they claim to explain (namely error).

Anyway, your argument doesn't work. What reasons do I have for believing that my scepticism about, say, the bent stick, has anything to do with limits or noninclusion. I gave the reason for not endorsing the claim - and it was a perfectly OK reason (light travelling through different mediums).

You're being thick as a brick. I'm sceptical about everything, not just stuff I know is wrong. That's the meaning of the word "skepticism"

Sure it is, but what reasons can I have for being a skeptic? You are sceptical, so what? Why should I be sceptical about everything? Should I be sceptical about scepticism? You need to do better than this otherwise you are just a dogmatist.

Instead of attacking the motivations of a theory, attack the theory itself. I haven't read any cartesian reasoning.

Well I haven't read any reasoning from you as to why you believe in Cartesian mental entities. You've just said in effect, "there is no alternative". I don't believe you, I can't detect them, convince me.

By the way, it's usually considered bad form in arguments to make statements that are as utterly open to personal interpretation and which have no supporting evidence as your original statement "We also collapse "seems" and "is" because we have no right to make the inferences about extra mental entities that are required to support claims of seeming (i.e the distinction between appearance and reality)."

Demonstrate from base principles that this is true. Define the terms "extra mental entities" "appearance" "reality". Demonstrate that "extra mental entities" are required to differentiate between appearance and
reality.

I thought this would have been obvious to anybody who thought about it.

An extra mental entity is an entity that exists outside a person's mind, like a chair or a dog.

Appearance. I don't think that appearances are entities although the Cartesians do (this is the mistake I suggest they make). I suppose they would say that an appearance is a mental entity which represents some external state of affairs or object.

Reality. In the Cartesian tradition this is just the sum total of extra mental physical entities.

OK. I postulate that my knowledge of the world is solely based on private mental representations. There is no other datum from which to infer anything about the reality that they represent. In fact based on the representations we have no basis for claiming that there in fact is a noumenal reality behind them. In order to prove there was a reality behind appearances I would have to have some other data other than appearances (specifically data about the relation between mental representations and reality), but I don't and by dictates of the theory itself I can't, so I have no reason to assume that such a relation exists. So the reasonable thing to be is a phenomenalist or an idealist and say that there is no external world, there are just phenomenal events. The usual move after this is to say that we construct the world from appearances, but I don't see why we have to start down that road in the first place.

Your argument doesn't even provide the semblance of a formal proof. It "seems" to be on par with most of the other philosophical crap I've read.

And you are just a man who's operating with an antiquated 17th and 18th century conception of mental states.

Talk to any physicist. I'll bet you that almost every last one of them is a cartesian in one form or another. And it's not because they've been poring over 16th century philosophical texts; it's because the conclusion is obvious to any thinking being. So your big move away from the antiscientific principle of Cartesianist duality is sort of laughable on its face.

Maybe physicists are just stupid or perhaps they need to take more philosophy of mind courses to stop them talking about entities which have the scientific respectablility of fairies. Talk to people who work on the brain or in cognitive science or psychologists and you might find a different story (not necessarily all in agreement with me, but agreement that this is an open question). Look, behaviourists disputed the existence of such states precisely because they weren't observable - so mine is not a weird or totally unheard of position.

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Frogger
"People who study brain activity"

a) Remember what I said about bootstrapping? You haven't even convinced me that my brain exists, never mind the people to study it.

This is not bootstrapping. You assume it is because you take one thing as given and not another. But you haven't provided any reason as to why.

b) They've also yet to discover the mechanism for consciousness. Does that mean that we can't even be sure of our own consciousness? [/QUOTE]

I don't see what this has to do with belief in private mental representations that are the basis for our thinking about the world.

Until later.