It is 8,600 words long.
It is very descriptive and what it tells is stragerring.
If you don't want to read it all, I guess you could just read the synopsis.
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Personally I think it is very sad that power slips away from the people's civil chosen. It's also sad when those affecting the issues, have serious conflicts of interest.
It is suprising to me, how much corrupt can people who used to be parts of top Israeli security echelons, can be. It's nothing new, but I thought that being brought up in the military institution, somehow made you less willing to sell out.
It is also sad that as the article shows, very little significance is given to the strategical advice that Israeli intelligence agencies give to our leaders.
While the most basic intelligence (as in: "x is a terrorist") is dealt with, no one paid regard to the military's position about Yossi Ginossar as corrupt and involved up to his neck in Palestinian money.
The same is true when it comes to the attitude of Israeli leaders since 1992, towards the military intelligence position on the PLO and Arafat. Many mistakes have been made, and conclusions that were made by Barak and Sharon, were pretty clear to MI way back in 1992.
Infact, I remember reading that the Rabin government changed the heads of military intelligence and shabak, and chief of staff, because they all were against the Oslo agreement.
As always, Israeli PMs react instead of acting, and use silly tactics, instead of employing well thought out strategies, and take into account the strategies of others.
What's the point of having 4 intelligence research departments, if none of them are listened to by whomever wins the office?
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