Originally posted by Shi Huangdi
Was that because of Pickett's charge though or because of a bad decision by Gen. Meade?
Was that because of Pickett's charge though or because of a bad decision by Gen. Meade?
Meade probed, and when the ANV fought hard, Meade just stalled and waited. Had Lee not attacked on the 3rd, the Army of the Potomac could have forced an engagement on at least equal ground, or gone on an offensive of its own, or at the very least, maintained contact on the 4th and 5th, preventing the ANV from digging in on the 6th to protect their engineer crossing.
The South wasn't exactly in the best position in terms of manpower and so losing those forces had to a be tough sting to the South.
Grant took control of forces that had seen a good deal of defeat and won the war with them.
Lee had his chances to go up against some of the dumbest generals in American history and still couldn't put together a victory.
In any case, Grant is rightly remembered as an American hero for defeating the Slaveocracy of the South, Lee is rightly remembered as a villain because of his defense of the Southern Slavocracy.
UR - the Chinese revolution or Octavius / Marc Antony are irrelevant comparisons. Lee had fixed terrain he was obligated to secure, and a national capital immediately in his rear the entire war. He didn't have the luxury of fighting a guerilla war, but his conduct of the war from taking command just before the Seven Days through the invasion of Maryland was textbook.
He started with a vastly superior enemy force seven miles from the suburbs of his state's and nation's capital. That force had better than a two to one advantage in manpower, a four to one advantage in field artillery, and a huge amount of siege artillery awaiting deployment. Lee moved a majority of his forces away from the fixed defensive positions, attacked a geographically isolated portion of McClellan's army so strongly and forcefully that he convinced McClellan his position was untenable. Merely weeks later, Lee showed up with his army reorganized and with higher than ever morale (mind you, he'd taken command of someone else's army and staff in the middle of a fight) 50 miles in the enemy's rear, at one of his vital supply points. Lee then routed a larger Yankee army in a classic attack, then went on the offense in enemy territory less than three months from taking command of poorly led rabble on the verge of defeat in their own capital.
Comment