Sten:
"Q4 GDP should beat estimates by 100bp or so, even with the deflator accelerating."
That doesn't sound the bond trader I know and like.
DrSpike:
Colon is right in that you're as evasive as a trial lawyer on steroids, though I'm not sure you are that on purpose. But let's see, maybe you can answer those questions to further my understanding from what corner of economics you're actually coming....
1. You advocated "if you have reason to think it (NAIRU) may have changed, due to, say, a hypothetical permanent upward shift in potential productivity growth then you can use the (albeit not perfect) model you have built to see what that implies for possible policy."
IMO that is what the greenspan fed did, based on assumptions about NAIRU originally being at 5-6 % and supposedly accelerated poductivity growth pushing it lower. Agree ? The result was an artificial easy money boom and the current hangover. Agree ?
2. You mentioned an "unhealthy obsession with monetary aggregates is undesirable."
What do you consider proper consideration of monetary aggregates in light of Fed policy from 1996-2000 ?
Do you really think the Fed's leniancy to tolerate 10 or 12 % M3 growth was a good idea while
- the household savings rates approaches zero
- the private sector financing deficit reaches 7 % of GDP
- the foreign account deficit reaches 4-5 % of GDP
- asset price inflation stands at ~7 % in real estate and 10-20 % in the stock markets as opposed to output or consumer price inflation somewhere in the 2-4 % range
Or would you agree that those taken combined clearly showed a monetary policy that was too easy ?
3. Do you assume NAIRU for germany to be maybe 7 % ? 8 %?
What changed that from the 1960s/early 70s where I suppose the NAIRU estimate would be 2 % unemployment or so ?
"Q4 GDP should beat estimates by 100bp or so, even with the deflator accelerating."
That doesn't sound the bond trader I know and like.
DrSpike:
Colon is right in that you're as evasive as a trial lawyer on steroids, though I'm not sure you are that on purpose. But let's see, maybe you can answer those questions to further my understanding from what corner of economics you're actually coming....
1. You advocated "if you have reason to think it (NAIRU) may have changed, due to, say, a hypothetical permanent upward shift in potential productivity growth then you can use the (albeit not perfect) model you have built to see what that implies for possible policy."
IMO that is what the greenspan fed did, based on assumptions about NAIRU originally being at 5-6 % and supposedly accelerated poductivity growth pushing it lower. Agree ? The result was an artificial easy money boom and the current hangover. Agree ?
2. You mentioned an "unhealthy obsession with monetary aggregates is undesirable."
What do you consider proper consideration of monetary aggregates in light of Fed policy from 1996-2000 ?
Do you really think the Fed's leniancy to tolerate 10 or 12 % M3 growth was a good idea while
- the household savings rates approaches zero
- the private sector financing deficit reaches 7 % of GDP
- the foreign account deficit reaches 4-5 % of GDP
- asset price inflation stands at ~7 % in real estate and 10-20 % in the stock markets as opposed to output or consumer price inflation somewhere in the 2-4 % range
Or would you agree that those taken combined clearly showed a monetary policy that was too easy ?
3. Do you assume NAIRU for germany to be maybe 7 % ? 8 %?
What changed that from the 1960s/early 70s where I suppose the NAIRU estimate would be 2 % unemployment or so ?
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