The Gettysburg campaign...

[Dr Strangelove]

The North began winning the Civil War within the six months of the conflict. People don't realise that. The north followed the general strategy called 'The Anaconda Plan" outlined by General Winfield Scott early in 1861. The plan called for the isolation of the Confederacy by the blockade and occupation of its ports, then the slicing of the Confederacy into pieces by securing corridors along the Mississippi and from Tennessee to the Georgia coast. The war in Virginia was a side show, yet as predicted, the Confederacy squandered their resources defending this area. The invasion of Pennsylvannia was a desperate gambit that never really had a chance of succeeding at anything more than feeding Lee's army on yankee victuals for a few months.

[Capt Dizle]

Good post. I don't agree that there was no chance of success but I do agree that it was a desperate gambit. In your mind, would the South have had a chance of winning by following the strategic defensive Dr. Stranglove?

[Boris Godunov]

IMO, the South was going to lose the war no matter what, barring an unrealistic amount of incompetence on the part of the North.

[Chris 62]

Originally posted by DinoDoc
Can someone give me an opinion on the veracity of this article: Lee and Gettysburg?

The article is factual, and does present a decent case against a true scared cow, RE Lee.

The comparison is NOT unfair, as Lee fought on the defensive for good portions of the war, and did incur needless losses attacking when he should have consolidated (the Gettysburg campaign is a major flaw, he should have pressued Washington DC, not invaded Penn, a MAJOR error), whereas Patton fough an offensive war.

Lee was heavily critised early in the war (he was called "The king of spades", a derogitory term, meaning he was to defensive in west virgina in 1861).

Lee botched Gettysburg, there is no doubt of this, he should have concentrated on the Union right, which was 'hanging on the air", instead of a frontal assault on the center.

From Grant's invasion in 64 till the end, there was nothing Lee could have done to stop the union, the war was lost in the west, not the east, it was just a matter of time.

I would rate Lee high, but not a true great, the US civil war lacked a truly great general.

[DinoDoc]

Originally posted by Boris Godunov
barring an unrealistic amount of incompetence on the part of the North.

Given the general quality of the North's generals, was that such an unrealistic hope?

[Ned]

Originally posted by DinoDoc
Can someone give me an opinion on the veracity of this article: Lee and Gettysburg?

The article faults Lee for "lack of coordination." This is the first battle where Lee did not have Stonewall Jackson. I think that explains it all.

[orange]

jimmytrick - you can drive or walk up to the top of a beautiful hill from which Union (?) soldiers fired upon Confederate forces (?)

IIRC the Confederates were successful in taking the hill top fortification, or if I have those mixed up, the Confederates were successful in defending it

From this hill (where the rock walls from which soldiers defended themselves still stand) you can see Devil's Den

I understand that on many battlefields the streams would run red with blood.

You can also see from this hill a creek that ran red with the blood that flowed down the hill during the battle...very gruesome. They have monuments up to explain which divisions faught where, as well as storyboards explaining how the battle unfolded. It was excellent

Che - you're absolutely right that they are well kept, but I don't think it takes away from the experience...the battlefields at Gettyburg are lined with monuments and field artillery, as well as giant statues of generals and such. Sure it wasn't 100% authentic, but that's not necessarily a bad thing

[Chris 62]

Originally posted by DinoDoc
Given the general quality of the North's generals, was that such an unrealistic hope?

Totally.

The army of the Potomic was not completly devoid of talent, and the Union had good officers in the west.

[Dr Strangelove]

Originally posted by jimmytrick
Good post. I don't agree that there was no chance of success but I do agree that it was a desperate gambit. In your mind, would the South have had a chance of winning by following the strategic defensive Dr. Stranglove?

The cpaital should never have been moved to Virginia. The Confederate forces should have had the ability to manuever between the eastern front and the western front, thereby not allowing the Union forces the opportunity to consolidate their advances. Unfortunately the rail system in the South was set up in the wrong way. The only east-west line ran from Lynchburg, Virginia to Chattanooga, Tennessee. Once it was cut the Confederate forces no longer had the ability to support each other.

[Boris Godunov]

Originally posted by DinoDoc
Given the general quality of the North's generals, was that such an unrealistic hope?

I think the incompetence of the North is greatly exaggerated. Certainly their overall strategy was bullet-proof. There were also many perfectly competent commanders.

Once McClellan whipped the army into shape, the Union was on its way to assured victory. It had overwhelming economic, industrial and population power.

[Capt Dizle]

Originally posted by Chris 62
The article is factual, and does present a decent case against a true scared cow, RE Lee.

The comparison is NOT unfair, as Lee fought on the defensive for good portions of the war, and did incur needless losses attacking when he should have consolidated (the Gettysburg campaign is a major flaw, he should have pressued Washington DC, not invaded Penn, a MAJOR error), whereas Patton fough an offensive war.

Lee was heavily critised early in the war (he was called "The king of spades", a derogitory term, meaning he was to defensive in west virgina in 1861).

Lee botched Gettysburg, there is no doubt of this, he should have concentrated on the Union right, which was 'hanging on the air", instead of a frontal assault on the center.

From Grant's invasion in 64 till the end, there was nothing Lee could have done to stop the union, the war was lost in the west, not the east, it was just a matter of time.

I would rate Lee high, but not a true great, the US civil war lacked a truly great general.

Lee always attacked when he could, he did not wage a defensive campaign except where he had no other option. This in fact may be the best grounds to criticize him. But you must understand that you simply could not attack without suffering heavy casualties in this time frame. The comparison is unsound.

[Capt Dizle]

As for your conclusion that the war did not have a truly great general, what in the world is that based on?

[Jon Miller]

Originally posted by Chris 62

I would rate Lee high, but not a true great, the US civil war lacked a truly great general.

I disagree on the last, I consider Stonewall Jackson to be a truly great general.

Jon Miller

[Chris 62]

I'm affraid it's a bit late for me to go into this deeply, i'll have to take it up again tomorrow guys, but while I'm gone, I ask some of you to list whom you think are the finest civil war comanders, and why you think so.

[Capt Dizle]

The Anaconda Plan (Scott to McClellan)

Union Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Maryland, Eastern North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia (Except Southwestern), And West Virginia, From January 1, 1861, To June 30, 1865.--#3
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME LI/1 [S# 107]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, May 3, 1861.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,
Commanding Ohio Volunteers, Cincinnati, Ohio:

SIR: I have read and carefully considered your plan for a campaign, and now send you confidentially my own views, supported by certain facts of which you should be advised.
First. It is the design of the Government to raise 25,000 additional regular troops, and 60,000 volunteers for three years. It will be inexpedient either to rely on the three-months' volunteers for extensive operations or to put in their hands the best class of arms we have in store. The term of service would expire by the commencement of a regular campaign, and the arms not lost be returned mostly in a damaged condition. Hence I must strongly urge upon you to confine yourself strictly to the quota of three-months' men called for by the War Department.
Second. We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with such blockade we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points, and the capture of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip; the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan. I suppose there will be needed from twelve to twenty steam gun-boats, and a sufficient number of steam transports (say forty) to carry all the personnel (say 60,000 men) and material of the expedition; most of the gunboats to be in advance to open the way, and the remainder to follow and protect the rear of the expedition, &c. This army, in which it is not improbable you may be invited to take an important part, should be composed of our best regulars for the advance and of three-years' volunteers, all well officered, and with four months and a half of instruction in camps prior to (say) November 10. In the progress down the river all the enemy's batteries on its banks we of course would turn and capture, leaving a sufficient number of posts with complete garrisons to keep the river open behind the expedition. Finally, it will be necessary that New Orleans should be strongly occupied and securely held until the present difficulties are composed.
Third. A word now as to the greatest obstacle in the way of this plan--the great danger now pressing upon us--the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant and vigorous action, regardless, I fear, of consequences--that is, unwilling to wait for the slow instruction of (say) twelve or fifteen camps, for the rise of rivers, and the return of frosts to kill the virus of malignant fevers below Memphis. I fear this; but impress right views, on every proper occasion, upon the brave men who are hastening to the support of their Government. Lose no time, while necessary preparations for the great expedition are in progress, in organizing, drilling, and disciplining your three-months' men, many of whom, it is hoped, will be ultimately found enrolled under the call for three-years' volunteers. Should an urgent and immediate occasion arise meantime for their services, they will be the more effective. I commend these views to your consideration, and shall be happy to hear the result.

With great respect, yours, truly,
WINFIELD SCOTT