Originally posted by Roland
DrSpike:
How is that different ? The only possible effect depends on how the loan deals are structured wrt interest payments and principal payments, and that is minimal at best.
Well, what happens to prices when excess capacity is liquidated ?
DrSpike:
How is that different ? The only possible effect depends on how the loan deals are structured wrt interest payments and principal payments, and that is minimal at best.
Well, what happens to prices when excess capacity is liquidated ?
I am sorry if I have offended you, that was not my intention. I probably tend to get a little snappy when my lengthy efforts at explaining this fail miserably. There is something to my point above about respecting one's experience in the field though. We flatly disagree on a couple of points, and one of us is wrong. I am pretty good at debating, but when I get caught with a high price hooker and a kilo of coke holding a smoking gun over the body of a dead rival am I going to try and bend the truth in court? No, I'm going to get a professional to do it for me.

As to your other questions (and I should say now that I'm probably not going to have time to immediately respond to your objections to this information), I'll have a go, because they are good questions. In fact I asked Krugman about the first when he came to my country, because I felt it was pretty key in understanding how to prevent such spirals.
Partly the problem was structural in Japan; the attitudes of savers and the demographics within the country. This only put Japan more at risk than other OECD economies, it doesn't necessarily presage deflation. Then there was also the drive within the relevant institutions to keep to yen high when it wanted to depreciate in response to other changes within Asia (and I am _not_ getting into currency crises here - they are if anything more difficult than deflationary spirals). Policy was kept too tight for too long after the bubble burst. All of these things drove Japan into a very low inflation region where deflation not inflation was the potential problem, but monetary policy continued not to reflect this (to be fair there were price pressures that made a decision tricker than normal).
As to policy when the bubble was building I'll have to check this. All I remember is that Japan did nothing to burst the bubble, but as Greenspan commented recently it is tricky to decide what to do. I could do without his comments on the trend growth rate of the US and the new economy when considering the US (Stock Market) bubble - I think they pushed things along, but that is by the by.
As to your last questions should deflation start any stimulus is good whilst policy still has traction. If it starts to take hold yes, the measures to buy financial assets are good ones, and conform to what I have been telling you the right policy is, (particularly foreign currencies as has been observed in Japan) though one should be careful about public sector building up holdings of stocks.
You have read most of my article already, since I am lazy. The 4) points above in conjunction with a small discussion of recapitalisation of the banking sector and how that would help (help, not replace

Lol on the walking macro textbook. You know it is ironic, within academia I am far from conformist (I am leaving academia at the end of next year as well), but when I argue economics with non-professionals I nearly always end up defending orthodoxy. You see there is a reason it is orthodoxy, and there is a reason me and countless professional all say things like the points I have made on this issue in this thread. If you choose to challenge our ideas and hence further your understanding - great. If you choose to honestly believe that you have more insight than the economics profession, well, I'm afraid I find that a little foolish.
This is my last post on this issue for a while at least.
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