Did Barak's offer at Camp David affect you view of the Mideast conflict?

[Sirotnikov]

Nope, there was collateral damage. Happens in war... very unfortunate and really shouldn't ever happen, but I guess we tried to be careful.

Israel's incursion doesn't seem to be solely against Hamas. It seems to also have as motive to humiliate the Palestinian people and destroy their spirits... in short further oppression against the people.

Or in short : double standard.

Why is it when America reportedly kills 3000 people, it's collateral damage, while When Israelis kill 28 people in ramallah, most of which are armed militants, it's "opresseion"?

They aren't being killed for being Jewish (many Christians and Muslims die in the blasts)... they are killed for being part of an oppresive regime.

So what are you saying, infact, that there is no "civilian" population?

If so, I gather you feel ok whith Israel killing non-armed palestinians, since, after all, they are part of a terrorist regime

I doubt either would work.. in the case of Gandhi, you have a colonial regime that wants the same land as the colonized.

And in this situation, you have Israel which wants to keep only small patches of land, to assure it's safety in case of war.

[Sirotnikov]

Originally posted by Kropotkin
http://www.passia.org/palestine_fact...campdavid.html

that's nice, but that isn't the map that was finally presented.

Possibly this is the first proposal by the Israelis.

The map I've seen (and currently can't find) is where much more territory goes to the palestinians.

[Sirotnikov]

Originally posted by chegitz guevara


Also check the link I previously provided and also: The PLO's FAQ on the Camp David Negotiations

I also suggest you stare at those maps for a while, and try and imagine a viable state based upon them. Consider that the water was going to remain in Israeli hands.

I suggest instead reading a more neutral site

https://www.mideastweb.org

and notice their map is also not updated with the clinton proposal, to which Israel again agreed.

[Sirotnikov]

Originally posted by chegitz guevara
Also check the link I previously provided and also: The PLO's FAQ on the Camp David Negotiations

That's revisionist.

Read MEMRI's analysis after you're done:

http://www.memri.org/ia/IA6801.html

http://www.memri.org/ia/IA6901.html

http://www.memri.org/ia/IA7001.html

It shows how they are now saying completely different things than a year ago.

[Sirotnikov]

The (Revised) Palestinian Account of Camp David Part I: The Refugee Issue

Introduction
The Palestinian account of Camp David and the reasons why Israel's proposals were rejected by Arafat, have recently undergone a transformation aimed at improving both the Palestinian image and the Palestinian public relations strategy. While Palestinian demands made at the summit have remained unchanged, the PA leadership and the PLO are beginning now to address the charge that the summit's failure rests on their shoulders.

The first shot of the revised Palestinian version of events was fired by Robert Malley, President Clinton's special assistant for Arab-Israeli affairs from 1998 to 2001 in a July article in the New York Times.[1] In a recent interview with the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, Yasser Arafat was asked about the charge that he had missed an opportunity at Camp David. He replied: "Rob Malley is good enough for me; [he] documented the Camp David talks in Clinton's presence, and published in the international press that I was not the reason for the [talks'] failure."[2]

The central motifs of the new Palestinian position also appeared in an interview with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), published in the Palestinian Authority daily Al-Ayyam[3], and in other statements by senior Palestinian leaders.

The new position has now been consolidated into a Palestinian Information Ministry document entitled "The Camp David Peace Proposal, July 2000 – Frequently Asked Questions." This document was published in Arabic and English on the ministry's Web site,[4] with the Hebrew version of the document published on the Web site of the PLO's Negotiation Affairs Department.[5] The quotes presented below are taken from the English version.

Many of the claims presented in the document are identical to those made by the Palestinians immediately after the conclusion of the Camp David summit. However, a comparison between the new narrative and statements made by senior Palestinian leaders a year ago shows different emphases on issues and some discrepancies between versions.

The Refugee Issue
The Palestinian Information Ministry document establishes that "the Palestinians… seek… to secure the right of Palestinian refugees to return to the homes they were forced to leave in 1948. Although Palestinian negotiators have been willing to accommodate legitimate Israeli needs [in the Hebrew version, the word "legitimate" does not appear]… it is up to Israel to define these needs and to propose the narrowest possible means of addressing them."

Further down, the document raises a question of principle on the refugees issue: "Isn't it unreasonable for the Palestinians to demand the unlimited right of return to Israel of all Palestinian refugees?"

The answer the PA offered is as follows: "The refugees were never seriously discussed at Camp David, because Prime Minister Barak declared that Israel bore no responsibility for the refugee problem or its solution. Obviously, there can be no comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without resolving one of its key components: the plight of the Palestinian refugees. There is a clearly recognized right under international law that non-combatants who flee during a conflict have the right to return after the conflict is over. But an Israeli recognition of the right of return does not mean that all the refugees will exercise that right. What is needed in addition to recognition is the concept of choice [in Hebrew, ‘the consolidation of options'; in Arabic, ‘the freedom of choice']. Many refugees may opt for: 1) resettlement in third countries; 2) resettlement in a newly independent Palestinian state; 3) normalization of their legal status in their hosting countries. In addition, the right of return may be implemented in phases, so as to address Israel's demographic concerns."

Return to Israel or a Choice of Options
In the revised document, the Palestinians claim that at Camp David their position was that the refugees be given the right to choose between four options, one of which was to be resettled in the new Palestinian state.

However, in November 2000, Abu Mazen said that the Palestinians had opposed this at the Camp David summit and had demanded a return to Israel proper only. "It should be noted in this matter," he wrote in an article in the London daily Al-Hayyat, "and this is also what we clarified to the Israelis, that the right of return means a return to Israel, not to a Palestinian state, because the territory of the Palestinian Authority, which will in the future be the State of Palestine, was not a [body] that expelled refugees, but [a body] that absorbed them. Not a single refugee is from Gaza, Hebron, or Nablus. All the residents of these cities remained, and absorbed refugees from the neighbor[ing area]. Up to 70% of Gaza residents are refugees, as are 40% of West Bank residents. Therefore, when we talk of the right of return, we are referring to the return of refugees to Israel, because it is [Israel] that expelled them and because their property is there…"[6]

The Right of Return: Principle Versus Implementation
The Palestinian Information Ministry account of Camp David states that while the principle of return must be absolute, there can be flexibility on the part of the Palestinians regarding the implementation of that right, both on the timeline – "the right of return may be implemented in phases, so as to address Israel's demographic concerns" – and geographically, since many refugees may prefer other options to a return to Israel. This emphasis, on the "right" and the "principle" of return, as distinct from its practical implementation as per various models, has been a long-standing and recurrent theme in the statements of senior Palestinians, and even more so since the summit.

However, during the Camp David negotiations and afterwards at Taba, the principle went hand in hand with the implementation. Abu Mazen clarified that "the Palestinian delegation [to Camp David] refused to set a limit on the number of refugees that would be allowed to return – even if they [the Israelis] were to offer us [to allow a return of] three million refugees… This is because we wanted them to recognize the principle, and then we will come to an agreement on a timetable for the refugees' return, or for compensation for those who do not wish to return."[7]

Saeb Ereqat said in interviews with the Palestinian dailies Al-Hayat Al-Jadida and Al-Ayyam that the proposal on the refugees was rejected because it "left the door open to implementation without time limit, an implementation that could take just about forever."[8]

Yet Nabil Sha'ath, who was also present at Camp David and later on conducted the negotiations on the refugee issue at Taba, said, "At Taba we did not change a single line of the position paper we presented at Camp David… We said that recognition of Resolution [194] was not enough for us and that even recognition of the absolute right of return is not enough for us without the inclusion of a mechanism of implementation and international guarantees for implementation, as set forth in the UN resolutions. That is, I can't be happy just because they say beautiful words to me… my worries must be addressed with a mechanism of implementation. For example, how would a refugee apply for return? How can I guarantee his return? If the refugee returns, how can we guarantee that he gets his house back? And if he returns, how can we guarantee that he will be able to bring his family? Will the entire clan return, and if so how? We are discussing these details in order to ensure their implementation."[9]

---

[1] The New York Times, July 8, 2001.

[2] Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 2, 2001.

[3] Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), July
28, 2001 (Part I); July 29 2001 (Part II). Also see Special Dispatch 249 &
250 for more on Abu Mazen.

[4] English:
www.minfo.gov.ps/issues/camp_david­_II.HTM ; Arabic:

https://www.minfo.gov.ps/issues/camp_david_II_arabic.htm

[5] www.nad-plo.org/eye/newsH40.html

[6] Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), November 23,
and 24, 2000.

[7] Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), July
30, 2000.

[8] From: www.nad-plo.org/david/diaries/html

[9] Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority),
February 3, 2001.

[Kropotkin]

Originally posted by Sirotnikov
The map I've seen (and currently can't find) is where much more territory goes to the palestinians.

It's possible, can you find it? What interested me in this case was the control of the roads.... Oh well.

[Sirotnikov]

Originally posted by Kropotkin
It's possible, can you find it? What interested me in this case was the control of the roads.... Oh well.

I've been trying to find it for a week now



I imagine Israel suggested some control over some roads, yet this doesn't mean all, or even most roads.


But from what I recall (very blurry) Israel was supposed to uproot almost all settlements which were not to be annexed in exchange for other territory.

[chequita guevara]

Originally posted by Sirotnikov
I suggest instead reading a more neutral site

https://www.mideastweb.org

and notice their map is also not updated with the clinton proposal, to which Israel again agreed.

I don't see a terrible lot of difference between the two maps. The area shaved off the bottom of the teritories, and that Southern finger are gone, as well as a sliver of land in the North East. 10% more land is misleading, since it appears to be ten percent of what the Israelis were taking, which would amount to 2% more land for Palestine.

[Sirotnikov]

The (Revised) Palestinian Account of Camp David Part II: Jerusalem and Territorial Withdrawal
By: Yotam Feldner*

Jerusalem
The Palestinian Information Ministry addressed the Israeli proposal on Jerusalem at Camp David as follows: "The [Israeli] proposals at Camp David demanded that the Palestinians relinquish every claim [in Arabic: 'all the rights'] to the occupied parts of Jerusalem. The proposal would require the Palestinians to recognize the Israeli annexation of all of Arab East Jerusalem."

The document further states: "In talks after Camp David, it was suggested that Israel was prepared to allow Palestinians sovereignty over isolated Palestinian neighborhoods in the heart of East Jerusalem, however such neighborhoods would remain surrounded by illegal Israeli colonies and separated not only from each other, but also from the rest of the Palestinian state. In effect, such a proposal would create Palestinian ghettos in the heart of Jerusalem."

The document's central claim, therefore, is that any sovereignty in East Jerusalem was proposed to the Palestinians only in talks held after the Camp David summit. While at the summit itself what was proposed was, in fact, the Israeli annexation of the entire eastern part of the city, which is why there is no wonder that the Palestinians rejected the proposal.

Yet this claim contradicts statements by senior Palestinians after the end of the summit. Although the Jerusalem proposals at Camp David were obviously not satisfactory to the Palestinians, they did offer some Palestinian sovereignty in the eastern part of the city. Abu Mazen himself said that "once, they talked about [Palestinian] sovereignty over the villages surrounding Jerusalem, autonomy in the neighborhoods outside the [Old City] walls, and special status inside the walls; another time, they talked about [Palestinian] sovereignty over the neighborhoods outside the walls, autonomy in the surrounding villages, and special status for the neighborhoods within the walls."[1]

During the summit too, the Americans put forth a proposal to divide the Old City so that the Jewish and Armenian quarters would be under Israeli sovereignty and the Christian and Muslim quarters would be under Palestinian sovereignty. Barak did not reject this proposal. The Palestinians were unwilling to recognize any Israeli sovereignty whatsoever in the Old City area. Saeb Ereqat said about this proposal: "Clinton said that the Palestinians would have full sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters; as for the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, the [UN] Security Council will take a decision to hand it over to Palestine and Morocco, the chair of the Jerusalem Committee, while Israel maintains full sovereignty over it."[2]

President Clinton's advisor Robert Malley himself determined that "in Jerusalem, Palestine would have been given sovereignty over the many Arab neighborhoods of the eastern half [of the city], and over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City."[3] Malley stated that the Palestinians refused because of Israel's demand for sovereignty over Al-Haram Al-Sharif. Indeed, the disagreement at Camp David centered on the question of the Temple Mount and of what came to be called the "holy basin."

When the Palestinian leaders left the summit, they did not claim that they had been offered no sovereignty over East Jerusalem. They said they had rejected the proposal because of Israel's various claims to the Al-Aqsa compound, because of its uncompromising demand for sovereignty over the Western Wall, and because of its demand for sovereignty in the Armenian quarter. According to Saeb Ereqat, Arafat said: "I will not agree to Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, in the Armenian quarter, over the Al Aqsa Mosque, in the Via Dolorosa, or over the Church of the Holy Sepulcher."[4] Recently, Arafat also said that according to the Camp David proposal, the Israelis "would take over the churches and the Armenian quarter. I told them, 'My name is Arafatian,' to indicate my affiliation with the Armenian ethnic group and [my commitment] to the protection of their rights."[5]

Therefore, it can be said that the Israeli and American proposals at Camp David were not compatible with the minimum demands set out by the Palestinians. But it would be wrong to claim that at issue was Israel's annexation of "all Arab East Jerusalem," as the Palestinian Information Ministry claims.

A Change of Tact in Palestinian Public Relations
The section on Jerusalem in the Palestinian Information Ministry account reflects the Palestinian leadership's attempt to retroactively change its image with regard to its position at the Camp David summit. The document makes no mention of the bone of contention – Al-Haram Al-Sharif, an issue that was discussed for many days.

When the Palestinian leadership left the Camp David summit, it enumerated three main reasons why it found the Israeli proposal unacceptable: its affront to the sanctity of Jerusalem, its impingement on the just rights of the refugees, and its insult to rights, honor, and justice with regard to the territorial issue. Obviously, all these claims were in the emotional and symbolic sphere.

The Western world found it difficult (and still does) to accept emotional and symbolic claims, especially when they are contrasted with what was viewed as Prime Minister Barak's slaughter of all Israel's sacred cows and his compromise on all Israel's symbols in favor of what he conceived as a realistic solution. The West found it even harder to comprehend the Palestinians' clinging to emotional and symbolic themes against the backdrop of the renewed bloodshed.

When Arafat returned from Camp David, a mass rally was held in Gaza City in his honor. "Jerusalem is all Jerusalem, not only the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, Al-Haram, or the Armenian quarter," he declared, adding that "anyone who doesn't like it should go drink from the Dead Sea."[6] The world refused to accept this attitude, and labeled him rejectionist.

Hanan Ashrawi, who was recently appointed Arab League spokeswoman, acknowledged that the Palestinians' handling of the international media was "shocking" and "catastrophic," and that this was why Barak had managed to convince the world that Arafat was to blame. "The Palestinian leaders spoke to the UN as if they were talking to a bunch of Palestinians on the street in Gaza,"[7] she said.

The Palestinians' growing awareness of the damage to their image following the Camp David summit led to a change of tact in PR efforts, which now began to focus on realistic arguments.

Now, the Palestinians are claiming that the proposal at Camp David was rejected because it was not "viable" – not because it violated "just" and "sacred" rights, and not because it was an affront to the honor of the Palestinians. Al-Haram Al-Sharif, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, the Western Wall, the Wailing Wall, the Al-Burraq Wall, Arafat's denial that a Jewish Temple ever existed on the site, and the discussion of questions such as whether Jews would be permitted to blow the shofar at the Western Wall plaza or whether Arab donkey traffic would be allowed only before a certain hour in the morning – all these issues are not to be found in the Palestinian Information Ministry document. Instead, a single term appeared again and again: viability.

The Camp David proposal, "denied the Palestinian state viability and independence"; "such a Palestinian state would have had less sovereignty and less viability than the Bantustans created by the South African apartheid regime." The Palestinians "seek to establish a viable and sovereign state on their own territory"; and "no people can be expected to compromise fundamental rights or the viability of their state."

This shift in image and PR is also evident in the question of the size of the area on which the Palestinian state is to be established. The Palestinians are now demanding 100% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, seeing this as the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242. This is documented in countless statements, including one by Abu Mazen, who once said, "I will cut off my hand if it signs an agreement in which even one centimeter of Palestinian territory conquered in 1967 is missing."[8] As a conciliatory move, the Palestinians declared their willingness to accept a limited swap of territories equal in size and quality, so that the total area of their state would be equal to 100% of the area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Such was their position at Camp David, and it remains their position today.

After the Camp David summit, it became accepted by the international community that the Palestinians had been offered a state on the territory of the Gaza Strip and 95% of the West Bank. This figure was mentioned also by a number of senior Palestinian leaders, among them Faisal Husseini who in March 2001 said: "Barak agreed to withdraw from 95% of the Palestinian lands occupied before 1967… If we undermine Sharon and his [promised] security, no one else will be able to conduct a dialogue with us that does not start where Barak left off – that is, our right to 95% of the territory."[9]

However, now there is a Palestinian consensus that the Camp David proposal concerned only over 91% of the West Bank being handed over to the Palestinians and an additional percentage be granted to Israel for a long-term lease, as Malley sets forth in his New York Times article. Yet the Palestinian Information Ministry does not present any figure for the size of the state offered to the Palestinians. Instead, it focuses on the parts that Israel seeks to keep for itself, i.e. the annexation of some 9% of the West Bank in exchange for 1% in a land swap. "However," the Information Ministry emphasizes, "the question is not one of percentages. It is a question of the independence and viability of the state." According to the new Palestinian PR strategy, Israel's holding on to parts of the West Bank damages the viability of the Palestinian state, rather than impinges upon the just rights of the Palestinians according to the Palestinian interpretation of Resolution 242.

*Yotam Feldner is MEMRI's Director of Media Analysis.

---

[1] Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), November 23, and 24, 2000.

[2] From: www.nad-plo.org/david/diaries/html.

[3] The New York Times, July 8, 2001.

[4] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (Palestinian Authority), August 12, 2000.

[5] Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 2, 2000.

[6] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, (Palestinian Authority), July 28, 2000.

[7] Al-Qahira (Egypt), August 21, 2001.

8] Al-Quds (Palestinian Authority) November 11, 1998.

[9] Al-Safir (Lebanon), March 21, 2001.

[Kropotkin]

No mystery that you can't find the map if the people who where there can't remember what it looked like.

[Sirotnikov]

http://www.fmep.org/maps/2001/taba.jpg

[chequita guevara]

Of course, final status, without noting the territories that Israel would be "eventually" handing over, looks pretty good. Until you remember that Israel has little history of living up to its interntaional agreements, with the exception of the peace with Egypt. I trust Israel as far as I can throw it.

[Sirotnikov]

Until you remember that Israel has little history of living up to its interntaional agreements

And which those would be?

[Az]

Che: unlike the palestinians , of course.

[Sirotnikov]

The (Revised) Palestinian Account of Camp David Part III: The Palestinian Strategic Goals
By: Yotam Feldner*

The Palestinian Information Ministry document also addresses a question that was not included in the Camp David negotiations. "Have the Palestinians abandoned the two-state solution and do they now insist on all of historic Palestine?"

The Information Ministry's answer is: "The current situation has undoubtedly hardened positions on both sides with extremists in both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories claiming all of historic Palestine. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the PA or the majority of Palestinians have abandoned the two-state solution. The two-state solution however is most seriously threatened by the ongoing construction of Israeli colonies and bypass roads aimed at incorporating the Occupied Palestinian Territories into Israel. Without a halt to such construction, a two-state solution may simply be impossible to implement – already prompting a number of Palestinian academics and intellectuals to argue that Israel will never allow the Palestinians to have a viable state and Palestinians should instead focus their efforts on obtaining equal rights as Israeli citizens." (In the Hebrew version: "That is, to strive towards a democratic bi-national state.")

What Is the Palestinian Position?

A statement in an official Palestinian Information Ministry document saying that "there is no evidence" that the Palestinian Authority and most Palestinians have abandoned the two-state solution is strange. One could have expected that the ministry would set out an official position favoring two states, instead of using negative language, i.e. "there is no evidence…" – as if it were merely making an observation about the Palestinian Authority position.

The demand for "all of historic Palestine," attributed in the document to both Palestinian and Israeli extremists, is a long-standing ideological and religious claim that has not arisen from "the current situation."

Ideas of a "bi-national state," "a state of all its citizens," and a "secular democratic state" are also not new; they are based on ideology not on settlements, bypass roads, or despair because "Israelis will never allow the Palestinians to have a viable state." Intellectuals such as Edward Said and Azmi Bishura, and those who share their opinions in the PA territories had presented such ideas as an alternative to the Oslo Accords at the time of their signing, not as a result of their failure.

Moreover, there is enthusiastic support in PA circles for the various models of a bi-national state, primarily among the old guard. Even though these positions are not voiced by Arafat or by members of the Palestinian negotiating team, they are not restricted to academics and independent intellectuals, or to Islamic extremists.

Thus, for example, Faysal Al-Husseini, reiterated his position on the matter several times. For example, during a speech in Lebanon, he said, "A distinction must be drawn between the strategic aspirations of the Palestinian people, who are unwilling to relinquish a single speck of Palestinian territory, and [their] political striving, connected to the balance of power and the nature of the current international system… Our eyes will continue to be lifted to the strategic goal - that is, a Palestine from the river to the sea – [and] what we take today cannot make us forget this supreme truth."[1]

Fateh Central Committee member Sakhr Habash recently adopted a similar approach in a speech on Arafat's behalf: "If a democratic state is not established on all this land, peace will not be realized. We are now in the interim stages, through which we can make the Zionist society rid itself of Zionism. Zionism cannot coexist with the national Palestinian movement, and these Jews must rid themselves of the Zionism that takes them over and casts them into battles that do not serve their interests. They must be citizens of the state of the future – the democratic state of Palestine."[2]

Palestinian Minister of Supplies in the PA Cabinet, Abu Ali Shahin, declared several times that "the Oslo agreement was a precursor… The Palestinian Authority is a precursor of the Palestinian state, and the Palestinian state will be a precursor to the liberation of all Palestinian lands"; "We still insist on implementing what [the PLO] was established for on January 1, 1965, and the negotiation process is only a way station… we anticipate the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state in which Muslims, Christians, and Jews will live"; "The Fateh movement still adheres to the plan of January 1, 1965"; "the Oslo Accords will not be the end of the road. The Palestinian state is a transitional state, on the way to the great humane solution…"[3]

The New Palestinian Position on Camp David's Failure
The Information Ministry document states that Ehud Barak is to blame for the failure of the Camp David summit and the peace process. "What decisively undermined Palestinian support for the peace process," it states, "was the way Israel presented its proposal. Prior to entering into the first negotiations on permanent status issues, Prime Minister Barak publicly and repeatedly threatened Palestinians that his 'offer' would be Israel's best and final offer and if not accepted, Israel would seriously consider 'unilateral separation' (a euphemism for imposing a settlement rather than negotiating one). The Palestinians felt that they had been betrayed by Israel, who had committed itself at the beginning of the Oslo process to ending its occupation of Palestinian lands in accordance with UN Resolutions tack 242 and 338."

The Palestinian claim is not presented as a retrospective account after nearly a year of mini-war between the parties, but as the reality at the time the Camp David talks ended in July 2000, a reality which stemmed from Barak's declarations prior to the summit.

However, the Palestinian leaders' statements at the time reflected no sense of predestined failure. Then, they stated that the summit had not been a failure at all; on the contrary, it was a stunning success: "Contrary to the opinions of the many pundits who were not even there, Camp David was not a failure," wrote Saeb Ereqat in The Washington Post a week after the summit.[4] "Camp David was an important, even historic, step in the 52-year effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. As someone who has been involved in negotiations since the 1992 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, I can state categorically that Palestinians and Israelis are [now] closer to a comprehensive peace agreement than ever before. The end of our conflict is truly in sight. I say it without underestimating the gaps that still exist between the two sides on all issues."

In a Palestinian Television interview, Abu Mazen added his voice to Ereqat's albeit with slightly less enthusiasm: "I consider the Camp David summit a success in that it brought about an understanding of all the final status issues among the sides."[5]

In addition, it should be noted that the Palestinian Information Ministry document, which states that Barak was at fault for the summit's failure because of his threats of unilateral separation, disregards the fact that threats of unilateral actions were voiced by both sides. As early as 1996, Arafat began setting target dates for the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state. Before and after the Camp David summit, the Palestinian and international press was full of declarations by Arafat and PLO heads that the state would be declared unilaterally, this time on September 13, 2000.

Conclusion
The Palestinian positions on the various elements of the final status agreement have not changed in the thirteen months since the Camp David summit. The only thing that has changed is the way in which the Palestinian positions during the summit are presented. This change is in accordance with the Palestinians' realization that in the international arena they are considered to be responsible for the summit's failure. In the revised Palestinian version of Camp David, the summit has been transformed from a "stunning success" to a failure. The "nobody is to blame" position stated by Saeb Ereqat right after the summit has turned into "Barak is to blame now." Israel's consent to Palestinian sovereignty over parts of East Jerusalem has been turned into an Israeli demand for sovereignty over all of East Jerusalem. The insult to Palestinians' sacred and just rights has turned into "non-viability" of the Palestinian state; and the resolute Palestinian demand for the return of refugees to Israel has turned into a claim that the Palestinians had agreed to "a choice" between options.

The corrosive effect of time on memory is not the issue here. It appears that the new Palestinian position derives from the need to adjust past positions to present political needs. At the summit's conclusion, Arafat needed to prove to the Arabs that he had resisted all pressures and had fought uncompromisingly. In contrast, Barak passed up an opportunity to entrench himself in the domestic political arena for the sake of political gains in the international arena, and paid for it by losing power.

Today, after nearly a year of violence, no one in the Palestinian street has any doubt about Arafat's loyalty to the cause, but his international status has seriously weakened. The Palestinian Information Ministry has changed tacks accordingly.

---

[1] Al-Safir (Lebanon), March 21, 2001; also see MEMRI Special Dispatch 197.

[2] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (Palestinian Authority), January 30, 2001.

[3] Respectively, Al-Hayat Al-Jadida
(Palestinian Authority) January 4, 1998; Al Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), July
27, 1997; Al Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), December 31, 1997; Al Quds (Palestinian Authority) November 15, 2000.

[4] Washington Post, August 5, 2000.

[5] July 29, 2000, from the Web site of the Palestinian negotiating team: www.nad-plo.org/speeches/abumazen3.html