Moral Relativism: Good, bad...etc?

[Kidlicious]

That's true. Again, I shouldn't have said anything. I guess I ruined their good time. They should have more opportunities though.

[Ramo]

Statements are concepts strung together. Strings of symbols are our method of encoding and transmitting these statments.

The strings are how we formalize it - whether you write it down or speak it or think it. That's what we base logic on. Abstract symbolism.

A universe in which people could communicate concepts directly, with no need for a language of any kind, is entirely conceivable.

As I said, words, symbols are the formalizations of concepts.

Ramo is the one not concerned about it. He's the one who brought up the subject of language being imprecise as, somehow, a criticism of relativism.

Where did I criticize relativism? You're taking a more absolutist stance than I am.

And you totally misunderstand what I'm saying, the issue was never the imprecision of language, simply the necessity of an a priori context - a set of axioms - on which to base logical statements.

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by Ramo

Statements are concepts strung together. Strings of symbols are our method of encoding and transmitting these statments.

The strings are how we formalize it - whether you write it down or speak it or think it. That's what we base logic on. Abstract symbolism.

Actually, no. In your mind, assuming you are a conscious being, you can actually feel concepts, independent of any sort of symbolism. The concept just... is... in your mind.

A universe in which people could communicate concepts directly, with no need for a language of any kind, is entirely conceivable.

As I said, words, symbols are the formalizations of concepts.

No, they're means of communicating concepts.

Ramo is the one not concerned about it. He's the one who brought up the subject of language being imprecise as, somehow, a criticism of relativism.

Where did I criticize relativism? You're taking a more absolutist stance than I am.

You were equating moral relativism with the fact that people can mean different things when they say the same words - essentially trivializing it.

And you totally misunderstand what I'm saying, the issue was never the imprecision of language, simply the necessity of an a priori context - a set of axioms - on which to base logical statements.

The difference is that moral absolutists aren't creating an a priori context - both absolutists and relativists are using the same context - but actually creating synthetic statements, linking the concept of right and wrong to murder or theft or whatever, in ways that are not contained within the mutual understanding of those terms.

[Ramo]

Actually, no. In your mind, assuming you are a conscious being, you can actually feel concepts, independent of any sort of symbolism. The concept just... is... in your mind.

That's why I said formalization.

No, they're means of communicating concepts.

Not true. I use symbols and words when thinking to myself (especially, i.e. in math). They're for any general abstractions.

You were equating moral relativism with the fact that people can mean different things when they say the same words - essentially trivializing it.

Relativism is the idea that one can arbitrarily construct philosophical systems. Moral relativism is the idea that one can arbitrarily construct ethical systems. I don't see what I'm "trivilizing."

The difference is that moral absolutists aren't creating an a priori context - both absolutists and relativists are using the same context - but actually creating synthetic statements, linking the concept of right and wrong to murder or theft or whatever, in ways that are not contained within the mutual understanding of those terms.

What you call "synthetic statements" with regards to morality are the axioms of ethical systems used.

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by Ramo

Actually, no. In your mind, assuming you are a conscious being, you can actually feel concepts, independent of any sort of symbolism. The concept just... is... in your mind.

That's why I said formalization.

What's the point?

No, they're means of communicating concepts.

Not true. I use symbols and words when thinking to myself (especially, i.e. in math). They're for any general abstractions.

You can think in symbols, but it's also possible to think in pure concepts (even in mathematics, though it's a bit more difficult because math just is a formal system).

The difference is that moral absolutists aren't creating an a priori context - both absolutists and relativists are using the same context - but actually creating synthetic statements, linking the concept of right and wrong to murder or theft or whatever, in ways that are not contained within the mutual understanding of those terms.

What you call "synthetic statements" with regards to morality are the axioms of ethical systems used.

No they aren't. Both moral relativists and moral absolutists have the same understanding of the terms right and wrong, murder and theft. There is nothing in the concept of murder that implies that it is wrong. There is nothing in the concept of lightning (in the sense of "bright spiky stuff that goes from the clouds to the ground really fast") that implies that it is electricity. In the case of lightning and electricity, experience provides the bridge between the two concepts. In the case of wrong and murder, it is just an unsupported assertion - it is not a definition, because the terms are already wholly defined.

[Whaleboy]

Theres a reason I haven't posted much here, and here is why... you people don't understand each other (especially the absolutists not understand the relativists) and as a result you're arguing in circles, unable to put forward you view coherently while others wouldn't understand it anyway. I've been in more relativism debates than I can think of right now, a tiny fraction of them on ACS I hasten to add, and unless people are exceedingly intelligent or exceedingly well read, it always ends up like this .

Most the anti-relativism arguments were debunked by Hume in any case, a few remain that have prevented it's acceptance in modern philosophy and still keep it being banded about as an insult, thus people are more attracted to subjectivism, alas, no work is done on showing that they are not mutually exclusive.

@ thread

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by Whaleboy
Theres a reason I haven't posted much here, and here is why...

Cuz I've been holding the fort?

EDIT: btw, I've never seen the reasoning from the assertion that everyone acts in his or her self-interest to the different categories of self-interest to morality must be subjective before Is that new?

[Ramo]

What's the point?

The point is that word and symbolic sentences are statements, formalized statements.

You can think in symbols, but it's also possible to think in pure concepts (even in mathematics, though it's a bit more difficult because math just is a formal system).

That has absolutely nothign to do with my statement that words/symbols are formalizations of concepts.

In the case of wrong and murder, it is just an unsupported assertion - it is not a definition, because the terms are already wholly defined.

It is a definition. If it were an "unsupported assertion," that would imply that it could be supported. It inherently can't. Morality can only be defined. And it can be defined arbitrarily.

The terms aren't wholly defined, I have no idea where you get that. Just and unjust actions are not already defined.

[Whaleboy]

EDIT: btw, I've never seen the reasoning from the assertion that everyone acts in his or her self-interest to the different categories of self-interest to morality must be subjective before Is that new?

Well if the premise is subjective in context then the conclusion will be too. If you speak with regards to emotivism, then no, it's not new.

[Kuciwalker]

Huh?

[Kuciwalker]

You can think in symbols, but it's also possible to think in pure concepts (even in mathematics, though it's a bit more difficult because math just is a formal system).

That has absolutely nothign to do with my statement that words/symbols are formalizations of concepts.

Who cares about formalizations of concepts?

In the case of wrong and murder, it is just an unsupported assertion - it is not a definition, because the terms are already wholly defined.

It is a definition. If it were an "unsupported assertion," that would imply that it could be supported. It inherently can't. Morality can only be defined. And it can be defined arbitrarily.

It could be supported, were there a way to provide evidence from experience. It isn't a definition, because the two terms have already been defined.

The terms aren't wholly defined, I have no idea where you get that. Just and unjust actions are not already defined.

Yes they are. Right, wrong, are what you are "supposed" to do. The actions you "should" take. It takes an assumption - not a definition - to say that one should not kill people. This is because I can say "it is wrong to kill people" and "it is wrong not to kill people" with the same understanding of the concept wrong.

[Whaleboy]

Well emotions are fundamentally self-interested if you accept determinism and no altruism (that's my view... Ayer and Stevenson would just take emotions on simply that basis... an emotional reaction to a given event).

[Whaleboy]

If you want more proof of the relative truth of relativism...

"At a party Ayer, then 77, encountered Mike Tyson harassing Naomi Campbell and demanded Tyson stop. Tyson said "Do you know who the **** I am? I'm the heavyweight champion of the world." Ayer replied "And I am the former Wykeham Professor of Logic. We are both pre-eminent in our field; I suggest that we talk about this like rational men.""

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A._J._Ayer

[Kuciwalker]

Originally posted by Whaleboy
Well emotions are fundamentally self-interested if you accept determinism and no altruism (that's my view... Ayer and Stevenson would just take emotions on simply that basis... an emotional reaction to a given event).

My post:

Every individual happens to act in his or her perceived self-interest, that is, towards the end with which they are happiest/most content. We, rather arbitrarily, divide self-interest into two categories: selfishness and altruism. The division tends to be something like this: selfishness contains all acts that are in one's self-interest without regard to others' self-interests, and altruism contains all acts that are in one's self-interest without regard to one's own self-interest (that is, based wholly on how it will benefit others). We also have a third category, enlightened self-interest, that contains all actions that are partially based upon others' self-interests (for example, buying something from someone as opposed to stealing from them). We tend to look at this category as something of a gradiant; there are some actions more "enlightened" and others less "enlightened" (a company donating money to cancer research, with the main goal to help cancer victims, but with a limited desire to gain popularity, would be more enlighted, while someone who pays a prostitute for sex rather than raping here would be less enlightened). An individual's morality is generally thought of as the rules governing his altruistic acts, whereas an individual's preferences are generally thought of as the rules governing his selfish acts, with a mix of the two governing his enlightened self-interest. However, these are arbitrary definitions, and when relativism states that there is no absolute morality, it also states that there are no absolute preferences. It doesn't prevent an individual from acting on his morality OR his preferences.

There, I wasn't precisely proving relativism, but if you change the end a little bit, to showing how if one's preferences are subjective, one's morals must be as well, it becomes a proof of relativism. And it doesn't require determinism (a stochastic universe just replaces "will" with "will probably") OR no free will (which is wholly consistent with determinism, as you well know, having read Hume ).

[Whaleboy]

Note at the time that Tyson was 21, and Campbell was 17, which begs the question of why a 77 year old philosophy was present thus, but hey