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Clark supported unilateral action against Iraq in testimony before Congress

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  • Clark supported unilateral action against Iraq in testimony before Congress

    "There's no requirement to have any doctrine here. I mean this is simply a longstanding right of the United States and other nations to take the actions they deem necessary in their self defense," Clark told Congress on September 26, 2002.

    "Every president has deployed forces as necessary to take action. He's done so without multilateral support if necessary. He's done so in advance of conflict if necessary. In my experience, I was the commander of the European forces in NATO. When we took action in Kosovo, we did not have United Nations approval to do this and we did so in a way that was designed to preempt Serb ethnic cleansing and regional destabilization there. There were some people who didn' t agree with that decision. The United Nations was not able to agree to support it with a resolution."

    "There's no question that Saddam Hussein is a threat... Yes, he has chemical and biological weapons. He's had those for a long time. But the United States right now is on a very much different defensive posture than we were before September 11th of 2001... He is, as far as we know, actively pursuing nuclear capabilities, though he doesn't have nuclear warheads yet. If he were to acquire nuclear weapons, I think our friends in the region would face greatly increased risks as would we."

    "And, I want to underscore that I think the United States should not categorize this action as preemptive. Preemptive and that doctrine has nothing whatsoever to do with this problem. As Richard Perle so eloquently pointed out, this is a problem that's longstanding. It's been a decade in the making. It needs to be dealt with and the clock is ticking on this."

    "I think there's no question that, even though we may not have the evidence as Richard [Perle] says, that there have been such contacts [between Iraq and al Qaeda]. It' s normal. It's natural. These are a lot of bad actors in the same region together. They are going to bump into each other. They are going to exchange information. They're going to feel each other out and see whether there are opportunities to cooperate. That's inevitable in this region, and I think it's clear that regardless of whether or not such evidence is produced of these connections that Saddam Hussein is a threat."

    http://tools.wikimedia.de/~gmaxwell/jorbis/JOrbisPlayer.php?path=John+Williams+The+Imperial+M arch+from+The+Empire+Strikes+Back.ogg&wiki=en

  • #2
    Well, lets see how much press this gets....

    I do have to state my general dislike of drudge. Its a matter of principles.
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    • #3
      Originally posted by GePap
      I do have to state my general dislike of drudge. Its a matter of principles.
      He ceratinly stuck his foot in it with that Blumenthal libel, but seems to not far from the ethical norm of that very dirty business.
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      • #4
        I wonder if Democrat support for Dean and Clark will now wane as their anti-war credentials seem increasingly ad hoc.
        http://tools.wikimedia.de/~gmaxwell/jorbis/JOrbisPlayer.php?path=John+Williams+The+Imperial+M arch+from+The+Empire+Strikes+Back.ogg&wiki=en

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        • #5
          Originally posted by Ned
          I wonder if Democrat support for Dean and Clark will now wane as their anti-war credentials seem increasingly ad hoc.
          Why is Clark's position ad hoc? As a former theater commander, he is pretty much conditioned (and everyone would question his judgment otherwise) to accept the accuracy of information passed up from intel and diplomatic channels to the President, and from the President through the SecDef to his desk.

          Supporting action because you believed the (now known to be marginally to blatantly false and inaccurate) premises given to justify the necessity of that action is not inconsistent with opposing it when you come to be aware that those premises were false and the urgent national security need was not there.

          It is also not inconsistent to support the principal of taking action, but disagreeing with the timing, means or manner of execution in which that action was taken.
          When all else fails, blame brown people. | Hire a teen, while they still know it all. | Trump-Palin 2016. "You're fired." "I quit."

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          • #6
            MtG, All true.

            But is that Clark's explanation for his shift in views?
            http://tools.wikimedia.de/~gmaxwell/jorbis/JOrbisPlayer.php?path=John+Williams+The+Imperial+M arch+from+The+Empire+Strikes+Back.ogg&wiki=en

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            • #7
              BTW, MtG, I agree with Clark on most issues other than his position on the war. I agree with what he said in his testimony before Congress.

              But he seems now to have denied that he ever said what he said because he has repeatedly stated that the was ALWAYS against the war.

              His commanders and his fellow, Franks, all seem to have a highly negative view of Clark in terms of character. Perhaps he has a problem with the truth.
              http://tools.wikimedia.de/~gmaxwell/jorbis/JOrbisPlayer.php?path=John+Williams+The+Imperial+M arch+from+The+Empire+Strikes+Back.ogg&wiki=en

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              • #8
                He is not a very warm fellow. Hard to get a feel for.

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                • #9
                  I take a look at his entiry testimony, not only that part:

                  See for instace that quote

                  We have to work this problem in a way to gain worldwide legitimacy and understanding for the concerns that we rightly feel and for our leadership. This is what U.S. leadership in the world must be. We must bring others to share our views not be too quick to rush to try to impose them even if we have the power to do so. I agree that there's a risk that the inspections would fail to provide evidence of the weapons program. They might fail, but I think we can deal with this problem as we move along, and I think the difficulties of dealing with this outcome are more than offset by the opportunities to gain allies, support, and legitimacy in the campaign against Saddam Hussein.

                  If the efforts to resolve the problem by using the United Nations fail, either initially or ultimately, then we need to form the broadest possible coalition including our NATO allies and the North Atlantic Council if we're going to have to bring forces to bear. We should not be using force until the personnel, the organizations, the plans that will be required for post conflict Iraq are prepared and ready. This includes dealing with requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance and preparations for a transitional governing body and eventual elections, perhaps even including a new constitution.

                  Ideally, the international/multinational organizations will participate in the readying of such post conflict operations, the United Nations, NATO, other regional organization, Islamic organizations, but we have no idea how long this campaign could last, and if it were to go like the campaign against the Afghans, against the Taliban in which suddenly the Taliban collapsed and there we were.

                  We need to be ready because if suddenly Saddam Hussein's government collapses and we don't have everything ready to go, we're going to have chaos in that region. We may not get control of all the weapons of mass destruction, technicians, plans, capabilities; in fact, what may happen is that we'll remove a repressive regime and have it replaced with a fundamentalist regime which contributes to the strategic problem rather than helping to solve it.
                  Or this other quote
                  HUNTER: But now, General Clark, if we embark on these inspections and we accept inspections as the answer, as the end, and we embark on these inspections and we must presume that Saddam Hussein is as successful as he's been in the past at hiding the evidence from the inspection teams, evidence that we knew existed, how are we going -- you've mentioned that if we do these inspections, we're somehow going to galvanize the community of nations on our side.

                  Now if we do inspections and we don't find that which we know is there, but Saddam Hussein has allowed us to come into the country and absorb the inspectors successfully, how does that galvanize a community of nations to rally behind the United States?

                  CLARK: Well, I think you have to have an echelon series of inspections. I think you start small and I think you expand the intrusiveness, the scope and the scale of the inspections, and I think you do that until you are either satisfied and the nation which brings the complaint to the United Nations, i.e. the United States, is satisfied, or you cross and trip a red line in which Saddam says no and you move to the next stage.

                  But I'm not presuming that inspections will be successful. What I'm asking you to consider is the United States overall leadership responsibilities in the world and how we move ahead collectively with our allies and friends around the world to deal with this problem. What inspections are useful in doing is they're useful in highlighting the nature of the Iraqi regime, and we may deter him, impede him, undercut him, get warning and establish a trigger and build our legitimacy from this, and this is one way of proceeding.

                  HUNTER: Would you recommend very aggressive, very intrusive inspections, which would be accompanied by forces which could, in cases where inspectors are denied entry, literally force their way into Iraqi facilities?

                  CLARK: I would like to see a program like that established but it would not be the initial program.

                  HUNTER: But what if the United Nations does not end up ordering those inspections but nonetheless, but instead orders inspections which to some degree replicate those that went in the past, those which were not successful in removing this program? What would you recommend at that point?

                  CLARK: I think we need to give the president the strongest possible leverage to get the right program put in place at the United Nations, and that leverage...

                  HUNTER: But that would require consensus from other members of the United Nations. That's not a unilateral instrument for the United States.

                  CLARK: That's correct and one of the difficulties that we have...

                  HUNTER: Let me finish my question. Don't you think that it is not reasonable to expect that the United Nations is going to produce an extremely aggressive, backed by force, inspection regime?

                  CLARK: I think that the president's determination has given us strong leverage to get the kind of commitment from the United Nations that we need, but every country has its own domestic problems, and this requires the energy and imagination of our diplomats to work through this. I don't consider this case lost at this point. I think it's very much up in the air. I think the actions of this body are very important to determining the outcome.

                  But I will say this, that the administration has not proceeded heretofore in a way that would encourage its friends and allies to support it.
                  The full text can be read in



                  I found it very interesting and somewaht different of what drugereport could you make to believe.
                  Trying to rehabilitateh and contribuing again to the civ-community

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                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Ned
                    His commanders and his fellow, Franks, all seem to have a highly negative view of Clark in terms of character. Perhaps he has a problem with the truth.
                    The highest ranks in the military have long tended to have people with strongly negative views of each other. To get to be an O-10, you have to have a lot of luck, a very forceful personality one way or another, some broken subordinates and people who got passed over for slots you got, different styles of dealing with peers, superiors and subordinates, and you have to have rabbis along the way who help your career along.

                    From O4 on up, every successively higher rank has between 1/3 and 1/2 the total available slots as the rank immediately below, and from O6 on, every promotion also has to run through Congress.

                    Powell, Schwarzkopf, Tommy Franks, Fred Franks (O9 commander of US VII Corps in gulf war, O10 commander of TRADOC after), McCaffrey, Fred Woerner, Max Thurman, (the latter two CinC's of Southcom during the runup to the Panama invasion) all have had people with very negative reactions to them, and some very unflattering views. Several of that group have had senior officers who nearly or clearly hated their guts. So bad blood from other senior officers isn't surprising, nor is it particularly meaningful.
                    When all else fails, blame brown people. | Hire a teen, while they still know it all. | Trump-Palin 2016. "You're fired." "I quit."

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                    • #11
                      yaroslav, and it, appears, we actually did everything Clark suggested. We went for inspections. When they were rebuffed by Saddam by failing to account for missing WMD, we went to the UN and to our allies. Only when this failed, did we form a coalition, etc, etc., etc.

                      So, since we did everything Clarks said we should do, in the order he suggested, where does his disagreement begin?
                      http://tools.wikimedia.de/~gmaxwell/jorbis/JOrbisPlayer.php?path=John+Williams+The+Imperial+M arch+from+The+Empire+Strikes+Back.ogg&wiki=en

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                      • #12
                        Steve abbot (EUCOM DCINC) was well-liked as was Clark's predecessor. Shwartzenegger was a bully. But easy to understand. Clark comes across as sort of a cold fish. Wait...he is a cold fish. smart guy and hard worker and all that of course.

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                        • #13
                          Originally posted by Ned
                          yaroslav, and it, appears, we actually did everything Clark suggested. We went for inspections. When they were rebuffed by Saddam by failing to account for missing WMD, we went to the UN and to our allies. Only when this failed, did we form a coalition, etc, etc., etc.

                          So, since we did everything Clarks said we should do, in the order he suggested, where does his disagreement begin?
                          Umm, not sure (after all, I'm not american and english is not my main language) but the Clark's testitomy appears to differ with Bush in that Clark thinks Bush didn't work hard enough to get more allies
                          Trying to rehabilitateh and contribuing again to the civ-community

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                          • #14
                            Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat
                            Powell, Schwarzkopf, Tommy Franks, Fred Franks (O9 commander of US VII Corps in gulf war, O10 commander of TRADOC after), McCaffrey, Fred Woerner, Max Thurman, (the latter two CinC's of Southcom during the runup to the Panama invasion) all have had people with very negative reactions to them, and some very unflattering views.
                            IIRC, most of them weren't fired for character & integrity issues.
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                            • #15
                              Hey, if Bush was allowed to do a 180 on his objection to nationa building and other international expeditions that he campaigned on, I can stand Clark having a change of mind about this.
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