Ok, so I'm dead - where's the fun ?

[joncnunn]

Of note, with BTS it's possible to engage in Quasi-wars as well as long as at least one side builds Privateers.

[Unimatrix11]

Uhem, joncnunn, it´s what the FRENCH did until spring 1940. Remember, they did declare on germany to defend poland - and never quite delivered: Phoney war. It really got phoney when the germans attacked though. I dont remember who it was (and am too lazy to look it up now), but i think it was the french minister of defence and the french commander in chief, who before may 1940 and some quarrals, but put them aside when the german offensive began. One said to the other: ´From now on, there is only one thing that matters: Victory´, whereupon the other replied: ´To that i have only one answer: France´. Or something along these lines.

[rah]

Followed up by "let's surrender now" ,
"NO, run away, run away"

[Unimatrix11]

Over which they almost started a civil war in the middle of the world war...

[joncnunn]

Decided to look up the article on the Wikipedia; from memory I remembered it as German from a German name that rhymes with the Blitzreig. It was called "der Sitzkrieg" and translates to sitting war.

What I didn't know was Churchill called it "The Twilight War", and there is also another name for it called "la drôle de guerr" (Possibly French?), translated into "The strange war".

Anyway I think it clearly benefited Germany more than France or the UK, and here's an interesting quote from one of them: Alfred Jodl at the Nuremberg Trials said that "if we did not collapse already in the year 1939 that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held completely inactive against the 23 German divisions."

[Unimatrix11]

* Drôle de guerre (´funny´ war)

Yes, indeed it served the germans better than the allies. Gamelin i think it was, who said, he´d give a million to be attacked. The problem was, that the french army doctine was utterly derived, without much refinement, from the experience of the first world war. And that meant, they favored the static defence (which is ironic, since they entered WWI with a very offensive doctrine - so both wars, they entered with exactly the unsuited doctrine for the time). To have advanced into germany would have forced the french generals into open terrain, and into a battle of manouvre, for which they had no proper doctrine. They rather opted to put all their cards into that one decicive battle for when they are being attacked (in some 1918-ish parallel), which, and who would doubt that in the face of the mighty maginot line, they must win.

For the same reason, belgium posed to be quite a diplomatic and military problem for the allies. On the one hand, they would have liked them in, and that before the germans would invade through it. In that case, they would have tried to bring their forces up to the river meuse (maas) and the albert-channel. The problem was, that the french generals were not so sure, that this was a good idea, since it would have forced them, to leave their prepared battlefield and do a rush-advance in order to reach their new postions and dig in, before the germans would react and start marching into belgium. In the event (not least because the belgiums still hoped the germans would not attack, and thus refused to give up neutrality) they settled for waiting for the belgians being attacked and then move their left wing forward to a line, that ran roughly through the centre of belgium, anchoring at Sedan. They thus moved their armies, has if hitler commanded them, putting half of them neatly into the salient north of the somme, that were then cut off.

The fact, that germany benifitted more from the drôle de guerre than the allies didnt mean that the situation was beneficial for them either, though. They wanted to bring down france as soon as they could (and some generals had seriuos doubts that they indeed could do that at all). From their completed conquest of Poland on, it was with the germans the initiative lied on the western front. As soon as nov 1939 hitler wanted to attack france. Generals could convince him, that that would be a bad choice, since germany was not fully geared for war yet and the weather would be bad as well. In addidition there was no proper attack plan for the west yet, other than the old, modified Schlieffenplan (which was used in WWI and thus would yield no surprise). Then the second date was made for the Jan of 1940. The plan got compromised though: a) by bad weather again and b) by a german plane going down behind enemy lines near mechelen, with all the attack plans. Thus the attack was redesigned yet again. This 3rd attack plan, which was then executed in may, was seriously a very good example of hitler´s early military intuition. He worked the basics out all on his own, and only after he had done so, he got a memorandum by von Manstein, undoubtfully one of the most able generals of his time, suggesting exactly what he had thought of before (he said, that manstein had graped his idea remarkably correct and detailed and quick, while manstein said the same about hitler - they both had the same idea independendly).

So: in the beginning, while germany was still busy with poland, germany profitted more from the passiveness of the western front, but after that, the situation gradually changed, upto a point, when defeating france almost got a free ride with little negative consequnces for germany´s military expansion.

[wodan11]

In brief, the French prepared the Maginot line, fixed static defenses designed to bleed the German army if they attacked. Then, declaring war to entice the Germans to do exactly that.

The faux war was that the French had absolutely no intention of invading Germany in aid of Poland.

The canny Germans, however, simply invaded Belgium rather than attack directly on the Maginot line. Thus able to invade France through the low countries, the Germans simply flanked the Maginot line and were able to enter France relatively unobstructed.

[Unimatrix11]

Well, but the flanking part can have hardly been of any surprise, since in 1914 the germans had already bypassed the french fortification system by invading via belgium. In this light, the maginot line even weakened France (as some french contemporary generals also observed - but they got shunned aside), for various reasons: First of all the sheer cost of constructing it. Billions went into it. I do not dare to give an estimate, of how many tanks, guns and planes could have been build instead (a tank-corps maybe, with which an invasion of germany would have actually been feasable - like de Gaulle had suggested). Then, instead of relieving soldiers, it sucked them up. The best 1/3 of the french army was under concrete. There were plans to expand the line to the channel and supplement it with a second line in front of paris, but aside from the staggering cost, there would have been little left of the french army in the field, if those fortifactions would be manned appropriately. But even fortresses need protection from the field. And thirdly, it impoisoned french military doctine, pretty much in the way described in this thread - just because they had sunk so much cost in the defensive doctrine by it, they could not give it up so easily. When in may 1940, the german tanks had reached Sedan, the point at which the line roughly met up with the allied troops in belgium, and broke through, it was characteristic of the french leadership to first look for the security of the maginot line, that it would not get encircled, and thus reinforcement went to the southern side of the german buldge, instead of to the western part, through which the german tanks then raced right through to the sea, cutting of the allies in flanders (and flanders sucks!). And even after the first phase, when the BEF had escaped and germany was delivering the finishing blow to france (´Fall Rot´), the french army leaders insisted on a 2.5 to 1 ratio at the rhine (meaning the maginot line), despite the fact, that an attack there was unlikely and of the least harm given the overall situation with troops lacking everywhere else. The maginot line was a military tool, whose value was indeed hard to overestimate - for Germany.

Overall, the bankrupcy of the french generals in the foreshadow and at the beginning of WWII was complete. But one of the reasons for that may have also been, that, in contrast to germany, in france, the people who decided to go to war, were not the same, who actually had to prepare for war. The french polticians took some sort of pride in being utterly ignorant about military facts. And the generals prided themselves in telling them that the french army was stronger than ever before, since the napoleonic days. Taken together, the attitudes of these two groups caused a massive desaster for France. The polticians didnt know, their army wasnt a proper tool for power projection and interventionism, and the generals didnt imagine ever fighting anything else, but either colonial compaigns or a defensive battle on french ground. And for that, they thought they were excellently prepared.

[wodan11]

Well, but the flanking part can have hardly been of any surprise... they thought they were excellently prepared.

So, to sum up, the FRENCH probably were surprised.