Hi all:
I just finished reading the book called "The Causes Of War" (1973) by Geoffrey Blainey. Now, I haven't read much in this area specifically, but the author had an argument that I found striking. Of course there are many and varied reasons for why different wars start. However, he claimed that the basic root of most wars was a misunderstanding of the relative power of the states involved. To paraphrase in my own words, at least one of the states involved in a war is probably over-estimating its chances of winning by a fair amount. The reasoning is fairly simple. If both sides had a realistic idea of each side's chances, there would likely be some sort of bargain possible to resolve the situation (whatever it is) short of war. Resolve in this case may mean one side ceding territory, or even allowing itself to be conquered without a shot being fired. And also the 'realistic appraisal of military power' requirement in this theory may be necessary, but certainly isn't the only factor leading to any given war.
Anyway, that's my brief synopsis, in one paragraph, of a book that's nearly 300 pages long. What do those of you know about such things think of his argument?
Regards,
-Mark
[This message has been edited by Mark_Everson (edited August 02, 1999).]
I just finished reading the book called "The Causes Of War" (1973) by Geoffrey Blainey. Now, I haven't read much in this area specifically, but the author had an argument that I found striking. Of course there are many and varied reasons for why different wars start. However, he claimed that the basic root of most wars was a misunderstanding of the relative power of the states involved. To paraphrase in my own words, at least one of the states involved in a war is probably over-estimating its chances of winning by a fair amount. The reasoning is fairly simple. If both sides had a realistic idea of each side's chances, there would likely be some sort of bargain possible to resolve the situation (whatever it is) short of war. Resolve in this case may mean one side ceding territory, or even allowing itself to be conquered without a shot being fired. And also the 'realistic appraisal of military power' requirement in this theory may be necessary, but certainly isn't the only factor leading to any given war.
Anyway, that's my brief synopsis, in one paragraph, of a book that's nearly 300 pages long. What do those of you know about such things think of his argument?
Regards,
-Mark
[This message has been edited by Mark_Everson (edited August 02, 1999).]
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