UK Trident vote today

[C0ckney]

Which is probably (although there's definitely an argument against it) true. However as at least 8 countries already have them and the majority have zero intention of giving them up again, what does that matter exactly outside of intellectual theory?

it matters because the argument in favour of having nuclear weapons and thus those against unilateral disarmament are, in my view, no longer valid. therefore, when a chance for a country to disarm comes, it's vital to have solid reasoning to make the case for that to happen.

You keep talking about these 'circumstances' that supposedly mean the world is no longer (and presumably never again will be) at risk of global conflict. Can you specify exactly what you think these circumstances are please?

i have referred to them in other posts, but to bring them together:

1) the cold war is over.
2) the economies of the leading powers are interconnected at an unprecedented level.
3) the lack of the circumstances that led to major world conflicts in the past (colonial rivalry, outstanding territorial claims, bitterness about past defeats/peace settlements, etc.)
4) the changing nature of warfare, with many more asymmetric conflicts rather than roughly equal armies facing off.

[kentonio]

it matters because the argument in favour of having nuclear weapons and thus those against unilateral disarmament are, in my view, no longer valid. therefore, when a chance for a country to disarm comes, it's vital to have solid reasoning to make the case for that to happen.

You haven't explained WHY they would no longer be valid. You can't just extrapolate out from 'Any countries having nuclear weapons is dangerous' to 'Any country giving up their nuclear weapons makes everyone safer'. As long as any one country has them, the risk to the others is increased, and there is literally no probability of all countries giving them up.

i have referred to them in other posts, but to bring them together:

1) the cold war is over.
2) the economies of the leading powers are interconnected at an unprecedented level.
3) the lack of the circumstances that led to major world conflicts in the past (colonial rivalry, outstanding territorial claims, bitterness about past defeats/peace settlements, etc.)
4) the changing nature of warfare, with many more asymmetric conflicts rather than roughly equal armies facing off.

1) The Cold War was actually fairly beneficial to world peace as it presented two relatively equal rivals. Even then the risk of nuclear annihilation came within minutes on several occasions. We now have three powerful but unequal rivals, with a number of aligned and unaligned powerhouses either bolstering the power of each of the three, potentially counterbalancing them, or just uncertain actors. We also have a lot of political instability threatening to disrupt the relationships we've previously taken for granted. If anything the coming decades are looking more dangerous than the Cold War, not less.

2) Yet we still have major countries using the same threats of military power as they have for basically most of human history. Economically it makes very little sense for Russia to have invaded the Crimea. Equally it makes very little economic sense for China to risk its relations with its neighbours and its trade around the world over increased ownership of the South China Sea. Regardless, both those things have happened.

3) I have no idea why you would think that given that Russia has just used (and continues to use in the Ukraine) force to resolve outstanding territorial claims, and China are threatening the same in the South China Sea.

4) There is no changing face of warfare in those terms, it was a short term reaction to the use of proxy warfare and the immediate threat of terrorism. If the big nations fight again it will be with tanks, divisions of infantry, bombers, missiles and all the other trappings of major conventional warfare. This idea of a 'changing nature of warfare' was nothing more than procurement strategy by defense departments who were taking for granted that the threats they would face in future would be the same type of threats they were facing at the time. Russia's actions in Crimea and Ukraine showed that idea up as being incredibly dangerous and stupid which should have been obvious from the start. It's been less than a single lifetime since the last time the major nation states fought each other, the idea we've somehow completely removed that danger since is just mindblowingly naive to me.

[BeBMan]

Maybe we can all agree that it's enough to have guns at home.

[C0ckney]

Really? The situation with Russia basically relies on Russia not overplaying its hand with regards to the Baltic states. As history very clearly shows us, we can in no way rely on state leaders to always understand their limitations and to not overplay their hand. Any invasion of the Baltics could very easily and most importantly very quickly, trigger a shooting war between Russia and NATO. If that happens, things could spiral out of control incredibly quickly.

The China situation is probably less at risk of a sudden spark, but is more a gradual buildup of tension that at some point is going to require either a Chinese backdown (extremely unlikely as its their backyard) or an American backdown (again very unlikely). Without either of those things, the US and China are going to be banging heads regularly and hard and it doesn't require much imagination to see how that could spiral out of control.

it's a question of objectives though isn't it. russia's horizon is essentially limited to protecting ethnic russian interests and those of client states. its actions in georgia and ukraine have been consistent with this: the objectives have been limited and there has been no desire to spark a wider conflict.

as for china, however that plays out, it's a local dispute that is hardly likely to become more important than the mutually beneficial US/china relationship.

[kentonio]

it's a question of objectives though isn't it. russia's horizon is essentially limited to protecting ethnic russian interests and those of client states. its actions in georgia and ukraine have been consistent with this: the objectives have been limited and there has been no desire to spark a wider conflict.

The 'protecting ethnic russian interests' is certainly one of their most frequent claims, however its worth remembering that the number of people they consider Russian citizens is absolutely huge and comprises large communities in pretty much all of the former Soviet states. Russia frequently attack the Baltic states publically over treatment of Russian speakers it considers unfair.

This speech Putin gave back in 2014 is very well worth considering, especially against the backdrop of what happened in Crimea.

Putin provided his—and Russia’s—most sweeping definition yet of population groups deemed to belong to the “Russian World” outside that country itself. By implication (see below), Russia is entitled to protect such population groups in countries beyond Russia’s own borders. As objects of such entitlement abroad, Putin listed:

[O]ur compatriots [sootechestvenniki], Russian people [russkiie lyudi], people of other ethnicities, their language, history, culture, their legitimate rights. When I say Russian people and Russian-speaking [russkoyazychnyie) citizens, I mean people who sense that they are a part of the broad Russian World, not necessarily of Russian ethnicity, but everyone who feels to be a Russian person [russkiy chelovek].

Illustrating this concept, Putin invoked Russia’s recent military intervention against Ukraine in Crimea: “We, of course, had no right to abandon the Crimeans to the whims of [Ukraine’s] radical, militant nationalists.” He went to warn: “I would like to make it clear to all: our country will continue to actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means— from political and economic to operations under international humanitarian law and the right [of compatriots abroad] to self-defense.”

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_...9#.V5zTDqIUWpo

Before Crimea you could have argued that what he said was hyperbolic or not meant as implying a genuine threat of military force. Now I don't see how that could be considered a reasonable interpretation.

as for china, however that plays out, it's a local dispute that is hardly likely to become more important than the mutually beneficial US/china relationship.

It's not just a local dispute, because it has directly led to increased Japanese militarization and the abandonment of their prior pacifist stance. The amount of hate and bitterness between China and Japan (worth looking back at your third point above again) is unimaginable to us considering how much healing has gone on in Europe since WW2. The US meanwhile is treaty bound to defend Japan against any aggressor. The potential for an initial confrontation between Japan and China is huge, and if that escalates (and realistically it probably would, because neither would be publically willing to back down in the face of their hated enemy) it all gets very messy very quickly.

[Aeson]

yup, just as i thought; but at least you managed to keep it brief. thank heavens for small mercies!

It's hilarious that you agree with dauphin who said the same thing I did, trying to claim that was your point when the reality is you were arguing against that point.

The only question remaining is if you are doing so out of stupidity, dishonesty, or some combination thereof.

[Dinner]

This discussion "nuclear on non-nuclear" is not really what is at stake with Trident, this particular nuke delivery mechanism has two serious objections.

#1 - cost, and the other one is full dependence on the US - even for navigation - thus basically the "right" for UK to utilize it without US supervision is pure posturing. (French have independent capacity for their nuclear arsenal, thus being the only "genuine" nuclear power in Europe).

This is a different discussion other than "nukes" or "no nukes" - the correct answer IMO is in the middle, ie keep nukes for posturing purposes, since UK is already the member of the club, but cut the costs to minimum.

(not to mention that as a side benefit this would increase independence of the delivery platform).

Will never be done due to vassalage status, ie "special relationship is very special".

If the UK wants they could build their own GPS satnav system which is independent of the US though, let's face a little reality here, any major war the UK gets involved in where nukes might be on the table will likely involve all of NATO so why bother with the added expense of having a parallel non-NATO system when the NATO system is already up and running and free to use? If they seriously wanted to do so then that would be a minor cost compared to tge updated missile systems and delivery hardware.

[Dauphin]

moreover, my argument in this thread is that that premise, which may have been true in the past, is not true today due to the circumstances that obtain in the world, and, therefore, the arguments in favour of nuclear weapons based upon it cannot be sustained.

The premise has not changed, the equation variables have.

It's been a while since I studied game theory and arms races, so forgive me if I get this slightly wrong:

There are three key variables in the decision of how much to spend on your military. i) the perceived size/capability of your enemy's army, ii) the perceived risk of enemy action and iii) the (typically) money cost of matching that threat.

All arms races are a feedback loop of i) and ii), and it normally ends in war or the economic collapse of one of the antagonists. Demilitarisation occurs when ii) is reduced or iii) is increased. In the nuclear equation, unless you remove i), you will always seek to match it, unless iii) is prohibitive, because you cannot ever see ii) as being a nil likelihood.

[Elok]

All right, back up. Why is large-scale conventional warfare unlikely now? What's changed in the past twenty-five years to make big fights between big groups less likely, but nuclear engagements equally likely or more so? That's something that really needs explaining IMO.

[Elok]

I mean, conventional war should be significantly less repellent for policymakers--less odds that they themselves or people they love will be hurt--and more rewarding, due to the whole military-industrial complex thing. Otherwise, well, it's war. Similar calculations involved either way, so why is the one kind more probable now?

[notyoueither]

3) the lack of the circumstances that led to major world conflicts in the past (colonial rivalry, outstanding territorial claims, bitterness about past defeats/peace settlements, etc.)

3) I have no idea why you would think that given that Russia has just used (and continues to use in the Ukraine) force to resolve outstanding territorial claims, and China are threatening the same in the South China Sea.

And then there's the sentiment in Russia that is aggrieved that the USSR was betrayed by Gorbachev and Russia was betrayed by Yeltsin. Sort of like there were hard feelings in interwar Germany over the betrayals of 1918.

I think that qualifies as bitterness about past defeats.

[notyoueither]

All right, back up. Why is large-scale conventional warfare unlikely now? What's changed in the past twenty-five years to make big fights between big groups less likely, but nuclear engagements equally likely or more so? That's something that really needs explaining IMO.

It can't be because large scale conventional war between super powers attacking each other is as likely as nuclear war in that essentially they are the same thing. The super power that is losing a conventional war WILL reach for nukes if the fight comes to their own territory. That's part of MAD: the tanks never roll because it's the same as launching nukes, essentially, and it turned out the Russians did love their children too.