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If yes, then try airline pilot. Here is the report from the Airbus 380 incident in Singapore.
Yeah, it is a bit long, but not boring.
Yeah, it is a bit long, but not boring.
The engine failure
Following a normal takeoff, the crew retracted the landing gear and flaps. The crew reported that, while maintaining 250 kts in the climb and passing 7,000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL), they heard two, almost coincident ‘loud bangs’. The PIC immediately selected altitude and heading hold on the autopilot control panel, and the FO started his chronometer. The crew reported a slight yaw and that the aircraft immediately levelled off in accordance with the selection of altitude hold. The PIC expected the autothrust system to reduce power on the engines to maintain 250 kts as the aircraft levelled off; however, it became clear that the autothrust system was no longer active, so the PIC manually retarded the thrust levers to control the aircraft’s speed. Both flight directors remained available to the crew.
At the same time, the Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM)2 system displayed a message indicating an ‘overheat’ warning in the No 2 engine turbine. Soon after, multiple ECAM messages started to be displayed. The PIC confirmed with the flight crew that he was maintaining control of the aircraft and called for the commencement of the requisite ECAM actions by the FO in response to those messages.
The associated procedure for the overheat message was to move the affected engine’s thrust lever to the IDLE position and to monitor the situation for 30 seconds. During that 30 seconds monitoring period, at 0202, the crew transmitted a PAN3 radio call to Changi air traffic control (ATC). The FO looked down at the ECAM and saw a warning indicating a fire in the No 2 engine that displayed for about 1 to 2 seconds. The ECAM then reverted back to the overheat warning, which recommenced the 30-second monitoring procedure. The crew elected instead to shut down the No 2 engine and, after they had selected the ENG 2 master switch OFF, the ECAM displayed a message indicating that the No 2 engine had failed.
The aircraft’s engine failure procedure required the crew to determine whether serious damage had occurred to the affected engine. The crew reported assessing that there was serious damage and discharged one of the engine’s two fire extinguisher bottles into the engine in accordance with the relevant procedure. Contrary to their expectation, the flight crew did not receive confirmation that the fire extinguisher bottle had discharged. They repeated the procedure for discharging the fire extinguisher and again did not receive confirmation that it had discharged.
The flight crew recalled that, after a brief discussion, they followed the procedure for discharging the second fire extinguisher bottle into the No 2 engine. After completing that procedure twice, they did not receive confirmation that the second bottle had discharged. The crew reported that they then elected to continue the engine failure procedure, which included initiating an automated process of fuel transfer from the aircraft’s outer wing tanks to the inner tanks.
The crew also noticed that the engine display for the No 2 engine had changed to a failed mode, and that the engine display for Nos 1 and 4 engines had reverted to a degraded mode4. The display for the No 3 engine indicated that the engine was operating in an alternate mode as a result of the crew actioning an ECAM procedure. During this time, the ECAM continued to display numerous other warnings and alerts to the crew.
The customer service manager (CSM) reported attempting to contact the flight crew, including through the use of the EMERGENCY contact selection on the cabin interphone system, which activated the flight deck warning horn. However, that selection had no associated ECAM message and the flight crew stated that they associated the emergency contact warning horn with the continuously-sounding warnings from the ECAM system and so cancelled the horn.
The flight crew recalled the following systems warnings on the ECAM after the failure of the No 2 engine:5
• engines No 1 and 4 operating in a degraded mode
• GREEN6 hydraulic system – low system pressure and low fluid level
• YELLOW7 hydraulic system – engine No 4 pump errors
• failure of the alternating current (AC) electrical No 1 and 2 bus systems8
• flight controls operating in alternate law9
• wing slats inoperative
• flight controls – ailerons partial control only
• flight controls – reduced spoiler control
• landing gear control and indicator warnings
• multiple brake system messages
• engine anti-ice and air data sensor messages
• multiple fuel system messages, including a fuel jettison fault
• centre of gravity messages
• autothrust and autoland inoperative
• No 1 engine generator drive disconnected
• left wing pneumatic bleed leaks
• avionics system overheat.
Flight crew response
The flight crew reported that they discussed the available options for the recovery of the aircraft, including an immediate return to Singapore, climbing or holding and decided that the best approach would be to hold at the present altitude while they processed the ECAM messages and associated procedures.
The flight crew recalled frequently assessing the amount of fuel on board, which they decided was sufficient to hold while they completed the procedures, and that the aircraft was controllable. They contacted ATC and advised that they would need about 30 minutes to process the ECAM messages and associated procedures, and sought an appropriate holding position in order for that to occur.
Singapore ATC initially cleared the flight crew for a holding pattern to the east of Singapore. However, following further discussion, the flight crew advised ATC of the requirement to remain within 30 NM (56 km) of Changi Airport in case they should need to land quickly. ATC acknowledged that requirement and advised of reports of a number of aircraft components being found by residents of the Indonesian island of Batam. ATC vectored the aircraft to a position east of the airport and provided heading information to maintain the aircraft in an approximately 20 NM (37 km) racetrack holding pattern at 7,400 ft.
As the crew continued to action the extensive ECAM messages and associated procedures, the SO was dispatched into the cabin to visually assess the damage to the No 2 engine. As the SO moved through the cabin a passenger, who was also a pilot for the operator, brought the SO’s attention to a view of the aircraft from the vertical fin-mounted camera that was displayed on the aircraft’s in-flight entertainment system. That display appeared to show some form of fluid leak from the left wing.
The SO proceeded to the lower deck on the left side of the aircraft and observed damage to the left wing and fuel leaking from the wing. The SO recalled that the fluid leak appeared to be coming from underneath the left wing, in the vicinity of the No 2 engine and that the fluid trail was about 0.5 m wide. He reported that he could not see the turbine area of the No 2 engine from any location within the cabin. The SO returned to the cockpit and reported his observations to the other members of the flight crew.
The flight crew reported that, during their assessment of subsequent multiple fuel system ECAM messages, they elected not to initiate further fuel transfer in response to a number of those messages, as they were unsure of the integrity of the fuel system. In addition, the crew could not jettison fuel due to the ECAM fuel jettison fault and they were aware that there was fuel leaking from the left wing. The crew also recalled an indication that the aircraft’s satellite communications system had failed. They also received an aircraft communications and automatic reporting system (ACARS10) message from the aircraft operator that indicated that multiple failure messages had been received by the operator from the aircraft. At the time, the flight crew were busy managing the ECAM messages and procedures and only found time to acknowledge that ACARS message.
The SCC and PIC made a number of public address (PA) announcements to the passengers indicating that the aircraft had sustained a technical failure, and that the crew were addressing the issues associated with that failure. The passengers were advised that it would take some time to complete those actions and that information updates would be provided as time progressed.
Subsequently, the SCC and SO returned to the cabin on numerous occasions to visually assess the damage on the left side of the aircraft, and to inspect the right side of the aircraft, and to provide feedback to the cabin crew and passengers.
It took about 50 minutes for the flight crew to complete all of the initial procedures associated with the ECAM messages. During that time, the aircraft’s autopilot was engaged. They then assessed the aircraft systems to determine those that had been damaged, or that were operating in a degraded mode. They considered that the status of each system had the potential to affect the calculation of the required parameters for the approach and landing. The crew also believed that the failure may have damaged the No 1 engine, and they discussed a number of concerns in relation to the lateral and longitudinal fuel imbalances that had been indicated by the ECAM.
Planning the recovery and landing
The FO and the SCC input the affected aircraft systems into the landing distance performance application (LDPA)11 to determine the landing distance required for an overweight landing to runway 20C at Changi Airport of about 440 t, which was 50 t above the aircraft’s maximum landing weight12.
Based on the initial inputs to the LDPA by the flight crew, the LDPA did not calculate a landing distance. After discussion, and in the knowledge that the runway at Changi was dry, the crew elected to remove the inputs applicable to a landing on a wet runway and re-ran the calculation. This second calculation indicated that a landing on runway 20C was feasible, with 100 m of runway remaining. The crew elected to proceed on the basis of that calculation and advised ATC to that effect.
The crew also advised ATC that they would require emergency services to meet the aircraft at the upwind end of the runway, and that the aircraft was leaking fluid from the left wing that was likely to include hydraulic fluid and fuel. ATC acknowledged that advice and continued to provide radar vectors to the crew to assist them maintain the holding pattern.
Prior to leaving the holding pattern, the crew discussed the controllability of the aircraft and conducted a number of manual handling checks at the holding speed. The crew decided that the aircraft remained controllable, and advised ATC that they would like radar vectors for a 20 NM (37 km) final approach to runway 20C that commenced at 4,000 ft. ATC fulfilled that request.
The approach and landing
As the crew started to reconfigure the aircraft for the approach by lowering flaps, they conducted further controllability checks at the approach speed and decided that the aircraft remained controllable. As a result of the landing gear-related ECAM messages, the landing gear was lowered using the emergency extension procedure and a further controllability check was conducted.
The landing performance application indicated a required approach speed of 166 kts. The flight crew reported being aware that: reverse thrust was only available from the No 3 engine13, no leading edge slats were available, there was limited aileron and spoiler control, anti-skid braking was restricted to the body landing gear only, there was limited nosewheel steering and that the nose was likely to pitch up on touchdown. An ECAM message indicated that they could not apply maximum braking until the nosewheel was on the runway. The wing flaps were extended to the No 3 position.
Singapore ATC vectored the aircraft to a position 20 NM (37 km) from the threshold of runway 20C and provided for a progressive descent to 4,000 ft. The PIC was aware that accurate speed control on final would be important to avoid either an aerodynamic stall condition, or a runway overrun. Consequently, the PIC set the thrust levers for Nos 1 and 4 engines to provide symmetric thrust, and controlled the aircraft’s speed with the thrust from No 3 engine.
The autopilot disconnected a couple of times during the early part of the approach as the speed reduced to 1 kt below the approach speed. The PIC initially acted to reconnect the autopilot but, when it disconnected again at about 1,000 ft, he elected to leave it disconnected and to fly the aircraft manually for the remainder of the approach. Due to the limited landing margin available, the CC reminded the PIC that the landing would have to be conducted with no flare14 and that there would be a slightly higher nose attitude on touchdown.
The flight crew briefed the cabin crew to prepare the cabin for a possible runway overrun and evacuation.
The aircraft touched down at 0346, the nosewheel touched down within about 6 seconds, and the PIC commenced maximum braking and selected reverse thrust on the No 3 engine. The flight crew observed that the deceleration appeared to be ‘slow’ in the initial landing roll, but that with maximum braking and reverse thrust, the aircraft began to slow. The PIC recalled feeling confident that, as the speed approached 60 kts, the aircraft would be able to stop in the remaining runway distance. In consequence, the No 3 engine was gradually moved out of maximum reverse thrust. Manual braking was continued and the aircraft came to a stop about 150 m from the end of the runway. The aircraft was met by emergency services.
Securing and exiting the aircraft
The flight crew commenced to shut down the remaining engines and, when the final engine master switch was selected OFF, the aircraft’s electrical system went into a configuration similar to the emergency electrical power mode. That rendered many of the aircraft’s cockpit displays inoperative, and meant that there was only one very high frequency (VHF) radio available to the crew.
It was reported that, just before the cockpit displays went blank, a number of the flight crew noticed that the left body landing gear brake temperature was indicating 900 °C, and rising. After some initial confusion about which radio was functioning, the FO contacted the emergency services fire commander, who asked for the No 1 engine to be shut down. The FO responded that they had done so already, but was advised again by the fire commander that the engine continued to run.
The flight crew briefly discussed the still-running No 1 engine and recycled the engine master switch to OFF, but the engine did not shut down. In response, the flight crew decided to use the emergency shutoff and fire extinguisher bottles to shut down the engine. Despite the flight crew’s action to complete that procedure, the engine continued to run. At that stage, the fire commander indicated that there appeared to be fuel leaking from the aircraft’s left wing. The FO advised the commander of the hot brakes, and requested that fire retardant foam be applied over that fuel. The fire commander complied with that request.
The crew then discussed the options for disembarking the passengers. The PIC made a PA to the cabin crew and passengers to advise them of the situation, and that the emergency services were dealing with a fluid leak from the left side of the aircraft. After accessing the necessary checklists, the crew decided that the fire risk had decreased, and that a precautionary disembarkation via stairs on the right side of the aircraft would be the safest course of action.
The crew elected to use a single door so that the passengers could be accounted for as they left the aircraft and because they wanted the remainder of the right side of the aircraft to be kept clear in case of the need to deploy the escape slides. They also decided to have the other doors remain armed, with crew members in their positions at those doors ready to activate the escape slides if necessary, until all of the passengers were off the aircraft. The crew asked the fire commander to have stairs brought to the right side of the aircraft and to arrange for buses to move the passengers to the terminal. Initially, one set of stairs was provided. Consideration of how to shut down the No 1 engine continued, with some crew members contacting the operator via mobile phone to seek further assistance.
The passengers commenced disembarking from the aircraft via the No 2 main deck forward door about 55 minutes after the aircraft touched down. The last passengers and cabin crew disembarked the aircraft about 1 hour later.
The crew were advised by the fire commander that four of the wheels on the left body landing gear had deflated. The crew continued their attempts to shut down the No 1 engine but without success.
The operator’s maintenance personnel advised the flight crew to attempt to shut down the No1 engine by activating a series of circuit breakers in the aircraft’s equipment bay. That was not successful. Attempts were then made to reconfigure the transfer valves in the aircraft’s external refuelling panel, in an effort to transfer fuel out of the No 1 feed tank, and starve the No 1 engine of fuel. However, due to the lack of electrical power, that was not possible.
Ground engineers also attended the aircraft and attempted a number of methods to shut down the engine, each without success. Finally, the decision was taken to drown the engine with fire-fighting foam from the emergency services fire vehicles. The No 1 engine was reported to have finally been shut down at 0653, about 2 hours and 7 minutes after the aircraft landed.
Following a normal takeoff, the crew retracted the landing gear and flaps. The crew reported that, while maintaining 250 kts in the climb and passing 7,000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL), they heard two, almost coincident ‘loud bangs’. The PIC immediately selected altitude and heading hold on the autopilot control panel, and the FO started his chronometer. The crew reported a slight yaw and that the aircraft immediately levelled off in accordance with the selection of altitude hold. The PIC expected the autothrust system to reduce power on the engines to maintain 250 kts as the aircraft levelled off; however, it became clear that the autothrust system was no longer active, so the PIC manually retarded the thrust levers to control the aircraft’s speed. Both flight directors remained available to the crew.
At the same time, the Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM)2 system displayed a message indicating an ‘overheat’ warning in the No 2 engine turbine. Soon after, multiple ECAM messages started to be displayed. The PIC confirmed with the flight crew that he was maintaining control of the aircraft and called for the commencement of the requisite ECAM actions by the FO in response to those messages.
The associated procedure for the overheat message was to move the affected engine’s thrust lever to the IDLE position and to monitor the situation for 30 seconds. During that 30 seconds monitoring period, at 0202, the crew transmitted a PAN3 radio call to Changi air traffic control (ATC). The FO looked down at the ECAM and saw a warning indicating a fire in the No 2 engine that displayed for about 1 to 2 seconds. The ECAM then reverted back to the overheat warning, which recommenced the 30-second monitoring procedure. The crew elected instead to shut down the No 2 engine and, after they had selected the ENG 2 master switch OFF, the ECAM displayed a message indicating that the No 2 engine had failed.
The aircraft’s engine failure procedure required the crew to determine whether serious damage had occurred to the affected engine. The crew reported assessing that there was serious damage and discharged one of the engine’s two fire extinguisher bottles into the engine in accordance with the relevant procedure. Contrary to their expectation, the flight crew did not receive confirmation that the fire extinguisher bottle had discharged. They repeated the procedure for discharging the fire extinguisher and again did not receive confirmation that it had discharged.
The flight crew recalled that, after a brief discussion, they followed the procedure for discharging the second fire extinguisher bottle into the No 2 engine. After completing that procedure twice, they did not receive confirmation that the second bottle had discharged. The crew reported that they then elected to continue the engine failure procedure, which included initiating an automated process of fuel transfer from the aircraft’s outer wing tanks to the inner tanks.
The crew also noticed that the engine display for the No 2 engine had changed to a failed mode, and that the engine display for Nos 1 and 4 engines had reverted to a degraded mode4. The display for the No 3 engine indicated that the engine was operating in an alternate mode as a result of the crew actioning an ECAM procedure. During this time, the ECAM continued to display numerous other warnings and alerts to the crew.
The customer service manager (CSM) reported attempting to contact the flight crew, including through the use of the EMERGENCY contact selection on the cabin interphone system, which activated the flight deck warning horn. However, that selection had no associated ECAM message and the flight crew stated that they associated the emergency contact warning horn with the continuously-sounding warnings from the ECAM system and so cancelled the horn.
The flight crew recalled the following systems warnings on the ECAM after the failure of the No 2 engine:5
• engines No 1 and 4 operating in a degraded mode
• GREEN6 hydraulic system – low system pressure and low fluid level
• YELLOW7 hydraulic system – engine No 4 pump errors
• failure of the alternating current (AC) electrical No 1 and 2 bus systems8
• flight controls operating in alternate law9
• wing slats inoperative
• flight controls – ailerons partial control only
• flight controls – reduced spoiler control
• landing gear control and indicator warnings
• multiple brake system messages
• engine anti-ice and air data sensor messages
• multiple fuel system messages, including a fuel jettison fault
• centre of gravity messages
• autothrust and autoland inoperative
• No 1 engine generator drive disconnected
• left wing pneumatic bleed leaks
• avionics system overheat.
Flight crew response
The flight crew reported that they discussed the available options for the recovery of the aircraft, including an immediate return to Singapore, climbing or holding and decided that the best approach would be to hold at the present altitude while they processed the ECAM messages and associated procedures.
The flight crew recalled frequently assessing the amount of fuel on board, which they decided was sufficient to hold while they completed the procedures, and that the aircraft was controllable. They contacted ATC and advised that they would need about 30 minutes to process the ECAM messages and associated procedures, and sought an appropriate holding position in order for that to occur.
Singapore ATC initially cleared the flight crew for a holding pattern to the east of Singapore. However, following further discussion, the flight crew advised ATC of the requirement to remain within 30 NM (56 km) of Changi Airport in case they should need to land quickly. ATC acknowledged that requirement and advised of reports of a number of aircraft components being found by residents of the Indonesian island of Batam. ATC vectored the aircraft to a position east of the airport and provided heading information to maintain the aircraft in an approximately 20 NM (37 km) racetrack holding pattern at 7,400 ft.
As the crew continued to action the extensive ECAM messages and associated procedures, the SO was dispatched into the cabin to visually assess the damage to the No 2 engine. As the SO moved through the cabin a passenger, who was also a pilot for the operator, brought the SO’s attention to a view of the aircraft from the vertical fin-mounted camera that was displayed on the aircraft’s in-flight entertainment system. That display appeared to show some form of fluid leak from the left wing.
The SO proceeded to the lower deck on the left side of the aircraft and observed damage to the left wing and fuel leaking from the wing. The SO recalled that the fluid leak appeared to be coming from underneath the left wing, in the vicinity of the No 2 engine and that the fluid trail was about 0.5 m wide. He reported that he could not see the turbine area of the No 2 engine from any location within the cabin. The SO returned to the cockpit and reported his observations to the other members of the flight crew.
The flight crew reported that, during their assessment of subsequent multiple fuel system ECAM messages, they elected not to initiate further fuel transfer in response to a number of those messages, as they were unsure of the integrity of the fuel system. In addition, the crew could not jettison fuel due to the ECAM fuel jettison fault and they were aware that there was fuel leaking from the left wing. The crew also recalled an indication that the aircraft’s satellite communications system had failed. They also received an aircraft communications and automatic reporting system (ACARS10) message from the aircraft operator that indicated that multiple failure messages had been received by the operator from the aircraft. At the time, the flight crew were busy managing the ECAM messages and procedures and only found time to acknowledge that ACARS message.
The SCC and PIC made a number of public address (PA) announcements to the passengers indicating that the aircraft had sustained a technical failure, and that the crew were addressing the issues associated with that failure. The passengers were advised that it would take some time to complete those actions and that information updates would be provided as time progressed.
Subsequently, the SCC and SO returned to the cabin on numerous occasions to visually assess the damage on the left side of the aircraft, and to inspect the right side of the aircraft, and to provide feedback to the cabin crew and passengers.
It took about 50 minutes for the flight crew to complete all of the initial procedures associated with the ECAM messages. During that time, the aircraft’s autopilot was engaged. They then assessed the aircraft systems to determine those that had been damaged, or that were operating in a degraded mode. They considered that the status of each system had the potential to affect the calculation of the required parameters for the approach and landing. The crew also believed that the failure may have damaged the No 1 engine, and they discussed a number of concerns in relation to the lateral and longitudinal fuel imbalances that had been indicated by the ECAM.
Planning the recovery and landing
The FO and the SCC input the affected aircraft systems into the landing distance performance application (LDPA)11 to determine the landing distance required for an overweight landing to runway 20C at Changi Airport of about 440 t, which was 50 t above the aircraft’s maximum landing weight12.
Based on the initial inputs to the LDPA by the flight crew, the LDPA did not calculate a landing distance. After discussion, and in the knowledge that the runway at Changi was dry, the crew elected to remove the inputs applicable to a landing on a wet runway and re-ran the calculation. This second calculation indicated that a landing on runway 20C was feasible, with 100 m of runway remaining. The crew elected to proceed on the basis of that calculation and advised ATC to that effect.
The crew also advised ATC that they would require emergency services to meet the aircraft at the upwind end of the runway, and that the aircraft was leaking fluid from the left wing that was likely to include hydraulic fluid and fuel. ATC acknowledged that advice and continued to provide radar vectors to the crew to assist them maintain the holding pattern.
Prior to leaving the holding pattern, the crew discussed the controllability of the aircraft and conducted a number of manual handling checks at the holding speed. The crew decided that the aircraft remained controllable, and advised ATC that they would like radar vectors for a 20 NM (37 km) final approach to runway 20C that commenced at 4,000 ft. ATC fulfilled that request.
The approach and landing
As the crew started to reconfigure the aircraft for the approach by lowering flaps, they conducted further controllability checks at the approach speed and decided that the aircraft remained controllable. As a result of the landing gear-related ECAM messages, the landing gear was lowered using the emergency extension procedure and a further controllability check was conducted.
The landing performance application indicated a required approach speed of 166 kts. The flight crew reported being aware that: reverse thrust was only available from the No 3 engine13, no leading edge slats were available, there was limited aileron and spoiler control, anti-skid braking was restricted to the body landing gear only, there was limited nosewheel steering and that the nose was likely to pitch up on touchdown. An ECAM message indicated that they could not apply maximum braking until the nosewheel was on the runway. The wing flaps were extended to the No 3 position.
Singapore ATC vectored the aircraft to a position 20 NM (37 km) from the threshold of runway 20C and provided for a progressive descent to 4,000 ft. The PIC was aware that accurate speed control on final would be important to avoid either an aerodynamic stall condition, or a runway overrun. Consequently, the PIC set the thrust levers for Nos 1 and 4 engines to provide symmetric thrust, and controlled the aircraft’s speed with the thrust from No 3 engine.
The autopilot disconnected a couple of times during the early part of the approach as the speed reduced to 1 kt below the approach speed. The PIC initially acted to reconnect the autopilot but, when it disconnected again at about 1,000 ft, he elected to leave it disconnected and to fly the aircraft manually for the remainder of the approach. Due to the limited landing margin available, the CC reminded the PIC that the landing would have to be conducted with no flare14 and that there would be a slightly higher nose attitude on touchdown.
The flight crew briefed the cabin crew to prepare the cabin for a possible runway overrun and evacuation.
The aircraft touched down at 0346, the nosewheel touched down within about 6 seconds, and the PIC commenced maximum braking and selected reverse thrust on the No 3 engine. The flight crew observed that the deceleration appeared to be ‘slow’ in the initial landing roll, but that with maximum braking and reverse thrust, the aircraft began to slow. The PIC recalled feeling confident that, as the speed approached 60 kts, the aircraft would be able to stop in the remaining runway distance. In consequence, the No 3 engine was gradually moved out of maximum reverse thrust. Manual braking was continued and the aircraft came to a stop about 150 m from the end of the runway. The aircraft was met by emergency services.
Securing and exiting the aircraft
The flight crew commenced to shut down the remaining engines and, when the final engine master switch was selected OFF, the aircraft’s electrical system went into a configuration similar to the emergency electrical power mode. That rendered many of the aircraft’s cockpit displays inoperative, and meant that there was only one very high frequency (VHF) radio available to the crew.
It was reported that, just before the cockpit displays went blank, a number of the flight crew noticed that the left body landing gear brake temperature was indicating 900 °C, and rising. After some initial confusion about which radio was functioning, the FO contacted the emergency services fire commander, who asked for the No 1 engine to be shut down. The FO responded that they had done so already, but was advised again by the fire commander that the engine continued to run.
The flight crew briefly discussed the still-running No 1 engine and recycled the engine master switch to OFF, but the engine did not shut down. In response, the flight crew decided to use the emergency shutoff and fire extinguisher bottles to shut down the engine. Despite the flight crew’s action to complete that procedure, the engine continued to run. At that stage, the fire commander indicated that there appeared to be fuel leaking from the aircraft’s left wing. The FO advised the commander of the hot brakes, and requested that fire retardant foam be applied over that fuel. The fire commander complied with that request.
The crew then discussed the options for disembarking the passengers. The PIC made a PA to the cabin crew and passengers to advise them of the situation, and that the emergency services were dealing with a fluid leak from the left side of the aircraft. After accessing the necessary checklists, the crew decided that the fire risk had decreased, and that a precautionary disembarkation via stairs on the right side of the aircraft would be the safest course of action.
The crew elected to use a single door so that the passengers could be accounted for as they left the aircraft and because they wanted the remainder of the right side of the aircraft to be kept clear in case of the need to deploy the escape slides. They also decided to have the other doors remain armed, with crew members in their positions at those doors ready to activate the escape slides if necessary, until all of the passengers were off the aircraft. The crew asked the fire commander to have stairs brought to the right side of the aircraft and to arrange for buses to move the passengers to the terminal. Initially, one set of stairs was provided. Consideration of how to shut down the No 1 engine continued, with some crew members contacting the operator via mobile phone to seek further assistance.
The passengers commenced disembarking from the aircraft via the No 2 main deck forward door about 55 minutes after the aircraft touched down. The last passengers and cabin crew disembarked the aircraft about 1 hour later.
The crew were advised by the fire commander that four of the wheels on the left body landing gear had deflated. The crew continued their attempts to shut down the No 1 engine but without success.
The operator’s maintenance personnel advised the flight crew to attempt to shut down the No1 engine by activating a series of circuit breakers in the aircraft’s equipment bay. That was not successful. Attempts were then made to reconfigure the transfer valves in the aircraft’s external refuelling panel, in an effort to transfer fuel out of the No 1 feed tank, and starve the No 1 engine of fuel. However, due to the lack of electrical power, that was not possible.
Ground engineers also attended the aircraft and attempted a number of methods to shut down the engine, each without success. Finally, the decision was taken to drown the engine with fire-fighting foam from the emergency services fire vehicles. The No 1 engine was reported to have finally been shut down at 0653, about 2 hours and 7 minutes after the aircraft landed.
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