End of the Road for the RN

[Lonestar]

Selected exerpts from The Strategic Defense and Security Review:

Naval Forces
2.A.3 In the maritime environment, Future Force 2020 will be able to provide: nuclear Continuous At Sea Deterrence; maritime defence of the UK and its South Atlantic Overseas Territories; an enduring presence within priority regions of the world to contribute to conventional deterrence and containment; powerful intervention capabilities from our surface and submarine fleets; the ability to land forces from the sea by helicopter and over-the-beach with protective vehicles and supplies from specialist ships; and the ability to command UK and allied naval forces at up to Task Force level.
2.A.4 Capabilities will include:

• the Trident force and its supporting elements;
• the seven new Astute-class nuclear hunter-killer submarines (SSNs), able to deploy rapidly from the UK to operational areas, fuelled for 25 years and limited in endurance only by the food they can carry. Capable of operating in secret across the world’s oceans, they will contribute to the protection of the nuclear deterrent and maritime Task Groups and provide global strategic intelligence and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile strike capability. They are designed to be adaptable throughout their operational lives, with modular systems to reduce the costs of future upgrades;
• carrier-strike based around a single new operational carrier with the second planned to be kept at extended readiness. The carrier will embark Joint Strike Fighters and helicopters (see box overleaf);
• a surface fleet of 19 frigates and destroyers, providing military flexibility across a variety of operations, from full-scale naval warfare, to providing maritime security (for example protecting trade and energy supplies) and projecting UK influence (for example through
  their visible presence or supporting building the capacity of regional partners). These will include six Type 45 destroyers, a highly capable air defence destroyer whose missile system can protect both naval forces and UK sovereign territory, and the current Type 23 frigates. Both ship types operate the Merlin helicopter and the Type 45 can also operate the Chinook helicopter. As soon as possible after 2020 the Type 23 will be replaced by Type 26 frigates, designed to be easily adapted to change roles and capabilities depending on the strategic circumstances;
• the Royal Marines, whose 3 Commando Brigade will provide one key element of our high readiness Response Force. They will be able to land and sustain a commando group of up to 1,800 personnel from the sea from a helicopter platform and protective vehicles, logistics and command and control support from specialist ships, including landing and command ship. It would allow us to conduct an operation such as Sierra Leone in 2000;
• a maritime helicopter force based around Wildcat and Merlin helicopters, with numbers aligned to the overall size of the future maritime force structure. These will be capable of locating and attacking enemy forces in both antisubmarine and anti-surface warfare;
• 14 mine counter-measures vessels, based on existing Hunt and Sandown class ships with a replacement programme which will also have the flexibility to be used for other roles such as hydrography or offshore patrol. This capability provides a significant level of security and protection of the UK’s nuclear deterrent;
• a global oceanographic survey capability and an ice patrol ship;
• a fleet of resupply and refuelling vessels scaled to meet the Royal Navy’s requirements;
• maritime strategic transport provided by six roll-on, roll-off ferries;
• maritime intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities based on network enabled warships, submarines and aircraft;
• a streamlined Naval regional structure to command reserve forces and represent the Royal Navy throughout the UK.

2.A.5 We will accordingly:

• decommission HMS Ark Royal immediately;
• reduce by four the number of frigates;
• place at extended readiness a landing and command ship. Either HMS Ocean or HMS Illustrious will be decommissioned following a short study of which provides the most effective helicopter platform capability. A Bay-class amphibious support ship will be decommissioned

Aircraft carriers
Decisions on defence equipment require judgements on what our Armed Forces will need 20 to 30 years from now. That is particularly true for large warships like carriers and the fast jets that fly off them. The previous Administration ordered two new carriers three times the size of our existing ones. It planned to equip them from a combat air fleet of around 150 fifth generation Joint Strike Fighters. This £20 billion programme was crowding out other important investment in the Armed Forces.
The National Security Council has therefore looked hard at the strategic, industrial and financial aspects of this programme, and has taken a number of difficult but necessary decisions to achieve by the 2020s an adaptable and effective carrier-strike capability in balance with the rest of the Armed Force structure. The key conclusions are:

• There is a strategic requirement for a future carrier-strike capability. The Invincible-class carriers were designed principally to meet Cold War threats on the high seas, with short-range jets providing air defence for a naval task group, without the ability to interoperate aircraft with our key allies and whose primary mission was anti-submarine warfare. A Queen Elizabeth-class carrier, operating the most modern combat jets, will give the UK the ability to project military power more than 700 nautical miles over land as well as sea, from anywhere in the world. Both the US and France, for example, have used this freedom of manoeuvre to deliver combat airpower in Afghanistan from secure carrier bases in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean. This capability will give the UK long term political flexibility to act without depending, at times of regional tension, on agreement from other countries to use of their bases for any mission we want to undertake. It will also give us in-built military flexibility to adapt our approach over the 50 years of the carrier’s working life. In particular, it provides options for a coercive response to crises, as a complement or alternative to ground engagements. It contributes to an overall Force Structure geared towards helping deter or contain threats from relatively well-equipped regional powers, as well as dealing with insurgencies and non-state actors in failing states.
• We will need to operate only one aircraft carrier. We cannot now foresee circumstances in which the UK would require the scale of strike capability previously planned. We are unlikely to face adversaries in large-scale air combat. We are far more likely to engage in precision operations, which may need to overcome sophisticated air defence capabilities. The single carrier will therefore routinely have 12 fast jets embarked for operations while retaining the capacity to deploy up to the 36 previously planned, providing combat and intelligence capability much greater than the existing Harriers. It will be able to carry a wide range of helicopters, including up to 12 Chinook or Merlin transports and eight Apache attack helicopters. The precise mix of aircraft will depend on the mission, allowing the carrier to support a broad range of operations including landing a Royal Marines Commando Group, or a Special Forces Squadron conducting a counterterrorism strike, assisting with humanitarian crises or the evacuation of UK nationals.
• A single carrier needs to be fully effective. As currently designed, the Queen Elizabeth will not be fully interoperable with key allies, since their naval jets could not land on it. Pursuit of closer partnership is a core strategic principle for the Strategic Defence and Security Review because it is clear that the UK will in most circumstances act militarily as part of a wider coalition. We will therefore install catapult and arrestor gear. This will delay the in-service date of the new carrier from 2016 to around 2020. But it will allow greater interoperability with US and French carriers and naval jets. It provides the basis for developing joint Maritime Task Groups in the future. This should both ensure continuous carrier-strike availability, and reduce the overall carrier protection requirements on the rest of the fleet, releasing ships for other naval tasks such as protection of key sea-lanes, or conducting counter- piracy and narcotics operations.
• The strike needs to be made more capable. Installing the catapult and arrestor will allow the UK to acquire the carrier-variant of Joint Strike Fighter ready to deploy on the converted carrier instead of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant. This version of the jet has a longer range and greater payload: this, not large numbers of aircraft, is the critical requirement for precision strike operations in the future. The UK plans to operate a single model of JSF, instead of different land and naval variants. Overall, the carrier-variant of the JSF will be cheaper, reducing through-life costs by around 25%.
• The current, limited carrier-strike capability will be retired. We must face up to the difficult choices put off by the last Government. Over the next five years combat air support to operations in Afghanistan must be the over-riding priority: the Harrier fleet would not be able to provide this and sustain a carrier-strike role at the same time. Even after 2015, short-range Harriers – whether operating from HMS Illustrious or HMS Queen Elizabeth – would provide only a very limited coercive capability. We judge it unlikely that this would be sufficiently useful in the latter half of the decade to be a cost-effective use of defence resources.

This new carrier-strike policy is consistent with the Strategic Defence and Security Review’s overall approach of holding defence capabilities at different levels of readiness appropriate to the strategic context. It makes strategic sense to focus on developing a more effective and appropriate carrier-strike capability to deal with the uncertain evolution in type and scale of potential threats from various states in the next decade and beyond. To provide further insurance against unpredictable changes in that strategic environment, our current plan is to hold one of the two new carriers at extended readiness. That leaves open options to rotate them, to ensure a continuous UK carrier-strike capability; or to re-generate more quickly a two-carrier strike capability. Alternatively, we might sell one of the carriers, relying on cooperation with a close ally to provide continuous carrier-strike capability. The next strategic defence and security review in 2015 will provide an opportunity to review these options as the future strategic environment develops. Retaining this flexibility of choice is at the core of the Government’s adaptable approach.

Air Forces
2.A.9 In the air environment, Future Force 2020 will be able to provide: air defence of the UK and its South Atlantic Overseas Territories; a credible and capable combat air presence to contribute to conventional deterrence and containment; an expeditionary combat air contribution to enduring land operations; strategic and tactical airlift; and other air power capabilities, including ISTAR, helicopters and RAF Regiment ground units.
2.A.10 Capabilities will include:

• a fast jet fleet of Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft (see box overleaf) with around one third at high readiness. These are two of the world’s most capable combat aircraft, able to operate in the future high-threat airspace while providing air defence, precision ground attack and combat ISTAR capabilities;
• a modern strategic and tactical airlift fleet based on seven C-17, 22 A400M transport aircraft and up to 14 specially converted Airbus A330 future strategic transport and Tanker aircraft able rapidly to deploy, support and recover our forces and their equipment anywhere in the world and to provide airborne refuelling to maximise the range and endurance of our aircraft. It will replace the ageing TriStar and VC10 fleets; the first aircraft is due to be delivered towards the end of 2011;
• 12 new Chinook helicopters to increase battlefield mobility from land and sea, operating alongside Merlin medium lift helicopters to move personnel and equipment quickly over long distances. This rationalised fleet will beeasier and more cost-effective to support and will deliver significant operational advantages;
• command and control capabilities to direct air operations in the UK and overseas, centred on the deployable Joint Force Air Component Headquarters to command multinational forces across a theatre of operations;
• strategic surveillance and intelligence platforms capable of providing wide-area coverage as part of our broader combat ISTAR capability. These include the E3D Sentry AWACS to provide airborne command, control and surveillance; Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft to provide global independent strategic intelligence gathering; and a range of unmanned air systems to complement our strategic ISTAR assets and reduce the risk to our forces of operating over hostile territory;
• the Storm Shadow cruise missile carried by our current and future fast jets – a state of the art capability to strike ground targets at medium to long range;
• advanced air launched weapons to complement the capabilities of Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter;
• enhancements to our simulated training to produce a more efficient and cost-effective training environment;
• RAF Regiment Force Protection squadrons at high readiness to protect deployed aircraft and personnel in hostile areas;
• chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) detection, identification and monitoring units.

2.A.11 We will accordingly:

• in the transitional period, retain a reduced Tornado fleet, but remove Harrier from service in 2011 as the fast jet force moves to two operational types – Joint Strike Fighter and Typhoon. Retaining the Tornado fleet allows a fast jet contribution to be sustained in Afghanistan and support to concurrent operations which would not have been possible if Harrier was retained instead;
• reduce our planned number of Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. Installing a catapult on the new aircraft carrier will allow us to switch to the more capable carrier variant;
• not bring into service the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft programme. We will depend on other maritime assets to contribute to the tasks previously planned for them;
• withdraw the three variants of the TriStar transport/tanker aircraft from service from 2013 as we transition to the more capable A330;
• reduce the role of the VC-10 transport/tanker aircraft to undertake air-to-air refuelling only, with the target of withdrawing it by 2013 as A330 enters service;
• withdraw the C-130J Hercules tactical transport aircraft from service by 2022, a decade earlier than planned, as we transition to the larger and more capable A400M aircraft;
• withdraw the Sentinel airborne ground surveillance aircraft once it is no longer required to support operations in Afghanistan.

Fast jet fleets
Our fast jet fleet will be made up of two modern and highly capable multi-role combat aircraft, Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter. This combination will provide the flexibility and strike power to deal with a variety of new and existing threats, while also radically improving cost-effectiveness and efficiency.
Our current fleet of Harrier and Tornado air defence and ground attack aircraft have performed magnificently over the last 30 years, and Tornados currently provide essential support to our forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere. But these aircraft risk becoming outdated as threats continue to become more varied and sophisticated, and maintenance of such veteran fleets will become an increasing challenge. Rationalising our fast jet forces to two advanced and efficient fleets makes operational and economic sense.
We will therefore continue to develop our modern and extremely capable land-based Typhoon fighter, upgrading its ability to attack ground targets, and give it the additional advanced capabilities it needs to maintain its fighting edge over the next 20 years. We will also buy the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, a state-of the-art aircraft with an exceptionally broad range of capabilities, and an expected service life of several decades. It is specifically designed to operate independently in very challenging environments. It will carry a variety of electronic sensors to build up an unmatched picture of the threats around it, which it will be able to share with other UK and allied air, ground and maritime forces, linking into our future military networks. Joint Strike Fighter is also designed to be more affordable across its operating life, benefitting from an expected production run of more than 3,000 aircraft.

Overseas bases
We will maintain our network of permanent joint operating bases, including: in Gibraltar; in the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus; British Forces South Atlantic Islands, based on the Falkland Islands and Ascension Island and maintaining a regular presence in South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands; and on Diego Garcia in British Indian Ocean Territory. These bases give us and in some cases our allies wide geographical reach and logistic support hubs for deployed forces. They will continue to be central to our ability to deploy military force around the world and respond to changing strategic circumstances.
We will also maintain our training areas in Canada, Kenya and Brunei. These help prepare our forces for operations. They are also concrete manifestations of our close and valued defence relationships with these countries.
The UK currently also has a major military presence in Germany, with 20,000 service personnel and their families based there. For more than 50 years the Federal Government has supported the British military presence providing essential training and operational opportunities as well as basing. The presence of the British military has played an important role in demonstrating Alliance solidarity, and has also been a symbol of steadfast UK-German friendship. But there is no longer any operational requirement for UK forces to be based there, and the current arrangements impose financial costs on the UK, disruption on personnel and their families and opportunity costs in terms of wider Army coherence. We therefore aim to withdraw all forces from Germany by 2020.

The Deterrent
3.1 The National Security Tasks and Planning Guidelines set out the need for a minimum effective nuclear deterrent as the ultimate means to deter the most extreme threats. In parallel with the Strategic Defence and Security Review we have conducted a review of our nuclear declaratory policy, and scrutinised Trident replacement to ensure value for money, including the scope for further reductions in the scale of our nuclear weapons capability. The conclusions are set out below.
The strategic context
3.2 No state currently has both the intent and the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the UK. But we cannot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge – a state’s intent in relation to the use or threat of use of its capabilities could change relatively quickly, and while we will continue to work internationally to enhance mutual trust and security, we cannot rule out a major shift in the international security situation which would put us under grave threat.
3.3 Despite the success of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) over the last 40 years in limiting the number of states with nuclear capabilities, large arsenals remain and the risk of nuclear proliferation continues. We cannot discount the possibility that the number of states armed with nuclear weapons might increase. Equally there is a risk that some countries might in future seek to sponsor nuclear terrorism. We must not allow such states to threaten our national security or to deter us and the international community from taking the action required to maintain regional and global security.
3.4 It is also important to recognise that the UK’s nuclear deterrent supports collective security through NATO for the Euro-Atlantic area; nuclear deterrence plays an important part in NATO’s overall strategy and the UK’s nuclear forces make a substantial contribution.
Nuclear weapons policy
3.5 At the beginning of this Parliament, the Foreign Secretary announced a review of our nuclear declaratory policy to ensure that it is appropriate to the political and security context in 2010 and beyond. The UK has long been clear that we would only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies, and we remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use.
3.6 As a responsible nuclear weapon state and party to the NPT, the UK also remains committed to the long term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We will continue to work to control proliferation and to make progress on multilateral disarmament, to build trust and confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, and to take tangible steps towards a safer and more stable world where countries with nuclear weapons feel able to relinquish them.
3.7 We are now able to give an assurance that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. In giving this assurance, we emphasise the need for universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and note that thisbreach of those non-proliferation obligations. We also note that while there is currently no direct threat to the UK or its vital interests from states developing capabilities in other weapons of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development and proliferation of these weapons make it necessary.
Value for money
3.8 In December 2006, the previous Government published The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent White Paper (Cm6994). In March 2007 Parliament voted to retain a minimum nuclear deterrent based on the current Trident missile delivery system. Under the previous Government, work started on a programme to replace the current Vanguard class submarines when they leave service in the late 2020s. In May this year the Coalition programme for government stated that ‘we will maintain Britain’s nuclear deterrent, and have agreed that the renewal of Trident will be scrutinised to ensure value for money. Liberal Democrats will continue to make the case for alternatives’. The value for money review has now been completed.
3.9 The Government will maintain a continuous submarine-based deterrent and begin the work of replacing its existing submarines. We will therefore proceed with the renewal of Trident and the submarine replacement programme, incorporating the savings and changes set out below. The first investment decision (Initial Gate) will be approved, and the next phase of the project commenced, by the end of this year.
3.10 The review has concluded that the overall cost of the submarine and warhead replacement programmes and associated infrastructure remains within the £20 billion cost estimate foreseen in 2006 at 2006 prices. To drive value for money we will:

• defer decisions on a replacement to the current warhead
• reduce the cost of the replacement submarine missile compartment
• extend the life of the current Vanguard class submarines and re-profile the programme to build replacement submarines
• consequently, take the second investment decision (Main Gate) finalising the detailed acquisition plans, design and number of submarines around 2016
• work with British industry to improve efficiency and optimise to expected demand its capacity to build and support submarines.

As a result of our reassessment of the minimum necessary requirements for credible deterrence we will:

• reduce the number of warheads onboard each submarine from 48 to 40
• reduce our requirement for operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120
• reduce our overall nuclear weapon stockpile to no more than 180
• reduce the number of operational missiles on each submarine.

The overall impact of the changes identified by the value for money review will be to reduce costs by £3.2 billion, saving approximately £1.2 billion and deferring spending of up to £2 billion from the next 10 years; we expect some of the deferred spend ultimately to be translated into real savings in later years. These savings do not alter in any way the nature and credibility of the nuclear deterrent, including maintenance of Continuous At Sea Deterrence. Further detail is set out below.
Scale
3.11 The Government has concluded that we can meet the minimum requirement of an effective and credible level of deterrence with a smaller nuclear weapons capability. We will therefore cut the maximum number of nuclear warheads onboard each deployed submarine from 48 to 40. Together with improved stockpile management, that will reduce our requirement for operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120. We will also reduce the number of operational missiles on the Vanguard class submarines to no more than eight. These changes will start to take effect over the next few years. This will enable us to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid 2020s.
Replacement warheads
3.12 Since 2006, work has been progressing in order to determine the optimum life of the existing warhead stockpile and the range of replacement options. Under the 1958 UK-US Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes (the ‘Mutual Defence Agreement’) we have agreed on the future of the Trident D5 delivery system and determined that a replacement warhead is not required until at least the late 2030s. Decisions on replacing the warhead will not therefore be required in this Parliament. This will defer £500 million of spending from the next 10 years. We have also reached agreement with the US over the size of the missile tubes in the new submarines; this has enabled us to reduce the cost of the submarine missile compartment by up to £250 million.
Submarines
3.13 We have reviewed the scope to extend the life of the existing Vanguard class submarines and have concluded that, with sufficient investment, we can safely operate them into the late 2020s and early 2030s. This affords us the opportunity to adjust the build programme of the replacement submarines to match, reducing cost in the short-term with the aim of delivering the first new submarine in 2028. Later this year detailed design work on the new class of submarines will begin. This will provide the information needed in order to determine whether maintaining continuous at sea deterrence would require four submarines, or a fleet of only three. A decision on submarine numbers would be required at the Main Gate point of our acquisition programme, around 2016.
3.14 We have also determined that the next generation of submarines can be configured with only eight operational missile tubes, rather than the 16 on the current Vanguard class. Together with the US, we will now proceed with a common design for the missile compartment that provides that capacity.
Industry and infrastructure
3.15 The value for money work has also examined the organisations and infrastructure that support our deterrent to ensure that they are as efficient as possible. We have identified a number of areas where spending can be reduced and in some cases deferred in order to minimise expenditure. As a result, we have agreed to defer and potentially to remove over £1 billion of future spending on infrastructure over the next 10 years.
3.16 Across the whole of the nuclear defence programme we will be working closely with our industrial suppliers to improve commercial arrangements and efficiency. Under this Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme we expect to deliver substantial savings of at least £900 million over the next 10 years.

Some comments:

The contract for the new carriers was (apperantly) written in such a way that it would have cost nearly as much to cancel the vessels as build them. With that in mind the UK Government has decided to build the two vessels, immediately mothball one, and have the other deployable with a grand total of 12 F-35s for the air group. I am unconvinced that maintaining these (largely empty) carriers is a better choice then killing the program and building a few more small boys or amphibious vessels.

Changing the F-35 requirement from the STOVL model to the conventional carrier one presents a chance for the United States to kill the F-35B, which is what's primarily holding up the program. Before we couldn't tell the USMC to pound sand and live without STOVL craft because it was going to be the platform for the RN, but if that is no longer the case...

UK defense spending is going to end up being below 2% of the GDP...below NATO norms. IMO this makes our relationship with the UK less of a "Special Relationship" and more of a "dependency relationship". Maybe the UK should step down from the Big-boys table at the UN Security Council and we can stick India or Japan there.

Pulling all the forces out of Germany makes sense. If the costs are anything like American troops in Germany, it'll cost the British taxpayer something like 5 times the normal upkeep to station troops in Germany rather than at home.

[OneFootInTheGrave]

UK relationship to US is one of a specially dependant state...

[MikeH]

UK defense spending is going to end up being below 2% of the GDP...below NATO norms. IMO this makes our relationship with the UK less of a "Special Relationship" and more of a "dependency relationship". Maybe the UK should step down from the Big-boys table at the UN Security Council and we can stick India or Japan there.

Security council based on nukes though right?

[Lonestar]

Security council based on nukes though right?

Should it be? It was originally based upon the "Big 5" winners of WW2. If it's strictly based upon nukes than India and Pakistan(well, mostly India) have just as good a claim to a permanent seat as the UK, if it's based upon economic clout there are better choices than the UK(Japan), if it's based upon military clout then there are better choices than the UK(Possibly Japan again, or India), if it's based upon a combination of the two there are better choices(Japan, India).

Right now the UK has a deterrent based upon 4 submarines. The number of subs(and deployable warheads) is decreasing...does this mean that someone like India who is actively building a credible global deterrence in the form of SSBNs should be excluded from a permanent seat?

[MikeH]

All the permanent members have a veto, so we'd veto any call to remove us as a permanent member. Any other member would surely support our power of veto, or they'd lose theirs.

I didn't argue there shouldn't be other members.

[OzzyKP]

What will we do without registered nurses...

[Al B. Sure!]

Changing the F-35 requirement from the STOVL model to the conventional carrier one presents a chance for the United States to kill the F-35B, which is what's primarily holding up the program. Before we couldn't tell the USMC to pound sand and live without STOVL craft because it was going to be the platform for the RN, but if that is no longer the case...

You are such a hater... Harriers are getting old, buddy. And having F-35B will increase operational versatility and effectiveness over F/A-18 Hornets that are also approaching obsolescence

[Elok]

There's an article in the latest Economist that says the Brits are now interested in cooperating closely with the French armed forces--splitting duties and such, so each country can get by with a smaller, cheaper force.

(cue jokes about the French military)

[bc1871]

There's an article in the latest Economist that says the Brits are now interested in cooperating closely with the French armed forces--splitting duties and such, so each country can get by with a smaller, cheaper force.

(cue jokes about the French military)

[Lonestar]

You are such a hater... Harriers are getting old, buddy. And having F-35B will increase operational versatility and effectiveness over F/A-18 Hornets that are also approaching obsolescence

Hey Speer, you know what? USMC aviation did just find BEFORE Harrier jets. All the STOVL aircraft being is just so the Marines can do a circle jerk with "their" own aircraft carriers in the form of LHDs and LHAs. What "versatiliy and effectiveness" do they bring over super hornets and the F-35C?

"lol it can take off from highways". When was the last time that was used in a combat situation?

(let me help you out: never)

[Lonestar]

There's an article in the latest Economist that says the Brits are now interested in cooperating closely with the French armed forces--splitting duties and such, so each country can get by with a smaller, cheaper force.

(cue jokes about the French military)

Yeah that'll be great the first time the Brits want to "borrow" assets for something that the French don't want them to be used for. One of the ideas that was floated was a "shared deterrent". I'm sure the French would be all about a two-key agreement with th Anglos

[Hauldren Collider]

Hey Speer, you know what? USMC aviation did just find BEFORE Harrier jets. All the STOVL aircraft being is just so the Marines can do a circle jerk with "their" own aircraft carriers in the form of LHDs and LHAs. What "versatiliy and effectiveness" do they bring over super hornets and the F-35C?

"lol it can take off from highways". When was the last time that was used in a combat situation?

(let me help you out: never)

I've never really understood why the marines need their own aviation apart from helicopters. To be honest, I'm still not sure what the point of separate branches of the military is.

[Dinner]

The contract for the new carriers was (apperantly) written in such a way that it would have cost nearly as much to cancel the vessels as build them.

I heard the previous government had done that on purpose to prevent future governments from canceling what it considered an essential program (the carriers).

[Lonestar]

I heard the previous government had done that on purpose to prevent future governments from canceling what it considered an essential program (the carriers).

I don't doubt it. I'm unconvinced that paying the upkeep costs for those vessels(with 12! airplanes) is still cost effective considering they aren't planning on using them the way the Americans or French do.

[OneFootInTheGrave]

French