Obama want to talk to the Taliban

[Kidlicious]

True, but dilettantes are wrong considerably more often.

They're also right sometimes.

[Darius871]

Look, find me someone with similar expertise who disagrees with Rufus, okay. (And I'm sure more than one such person exists.) But, let's be honest, my fellow Polytubbies--we are all just armchair quarterbacking, here. We're well-read, highly educated, very opinionated armchair quarterbacks, but we don't really understand all the ins and outs.

I agree to the extent that having more experience with the "ins and outs" (whatever that means) should give him "a bit more weight" as you said, but that's a far cry from being "amused" that someone who has spent an equal amount of time directly dealing with rural Afghan tribal politics (namely, zero seconds) daring to have an opinion. That's not analogous to a navy supply officer debating you about pediatrics, since you've actually done pediatrics. It's more analogous to a doctor debating an experienced securities compliance lawyer about environmental torts - the lawyer might still know the procedural "ins and outs" of filing a complaint, serving summons, moving for summary judgment, etc. better than the doctor, but after so much time fixated on securities compliance he knows no more about the substantive elements of environmental torts than the wiki-reading doctor does.

Besides, it's also entirely possible that someone shuffling paperwork for a Malay banker or Bengali tourist might accumulate generalized assumptions about Muslim society that make one less qualified to predict how a Pashtun poppy farmer would or would not behave. How could you or I make that judgment about qualifications without having worked in Afghanistan ourselves? This whole line of thinking is silly.

[Naked Gents Rut]

Actually, al Qaeda is looking more and more like a spent force

Bush

[Rufus T. Firefly]

Well, I certainly appreciate Guy's kind words, but I'm hardly an expert. What I am, however, is somebody who, as he gets ready to head out to Kabul later this year, has had the privilege of sitting at the table with people who are experts and hearing what they have to say. What they all seem to agree on is that the Taliban is here to stay, and so a strategy that focuses on undermining or neutralizing their influence, rather than wiping them out (which no one seems to believe is possible anyway), is likely to bear more fruit.

(I should also note that we're talking about the Afghan Taliban here, not the Pakistani Taliban; in spite of the common name and shared institutions in the FADA, they're different entities with different leadership and different goals; the Pakistani Taliban is a much, much bigger problem.)

Toward that end, DanS has the right analysis -- which is not surprising given that the right analysis is economic, not ideological. The simple truth is that the Taliban -- who are largely despised in Afghanistan, even in the Pashtun south -- is doing as well as they are because they pay better than anyone else (about 50% more that the army, for example). If we can change that situation, the Taliban's effectiveness would be greatly weakened.

And for what it's worth -- this to Darius, but just as a friendly FYI -- all State training, briefing, and effort at this point is, in fact, focused on Afghan tribal politics and the poppy trade. Again, I'm not in any way an expert on these things, but it is where our focus is right now; by contrast, I know diddly about Afghanistan's external trade agreements, to pick one example.

And all that being said, hell, Sloww could be right. I'm not sure anyone is 100% confident they know the answer here, and the mess in Pakistan just complicates matters. Afghanistan isn't called the"graveyard of Empires" for nothing.

[Darius871]

And for what it's worth -- this to Darius, but just as a friendly FYI -- all State training, briefing, and effort at this point is, in fact, focused on Afghan tribal politics and the poppy trade. Again, I'm not in any way an expert on these things, but it is where our focus is right now; by contrast, I know diddly about Afghanistan's external trade agreements, to pick one example.

Good to know; I was just eschewing assumptions to that effect until you could chime in.

[Berzerker]

Bit of a tangent, but I just wanted to say that I never cease to be amused by my fellow Polytubbies debating Rufus on topics such as these as if they were also State Department veterans.

Wonderful bureaucracy... didn't they play a big role getting us into this mess?

[DaShi]

Well, I certainly appreciate Guy's kind words, but I'm hardly an expert. What I am, however, is somebody who, as he gets ready to head out to Kabul later this year, has had the privilege of sitting at the table with people who are experts and hearing what they have to say. What they all seem to agree on is that the Taliban is here to stay, and so a strategy that focuses on undermining or neutralizing their influence, rather than wiping them out (which no one seems to believe is possible anyway), is likely to bear more fruit.

(I should also note that we're talking about the Afghan Taliban here, not the Pakistani Taliban; in spite of the common name and shared institutions in the FADA, they're different entities with different leadership and different goals; the Pakistani Taliban is a much, much bigger problem.)

Toward that end, DanS has the right analysis -- which is not surprising given that the right analysis is economic, not ideological. The simple truth is that the Taliban -- who are largely despised in Afghanistan, even in the Pashtun south -- is doing as well as they are because they pay better than anyone else (about 50% more that the army, for example). If we can change that situation, the Taliban's effectiveness would be greatly weakened.

And for what it's worth -- this to Darius, but just as a friendly FYI -- all State training, briefing, and effort at this point is, in fact, focused on Afghan tribal politics and the poppy trade. Again, I'm not in any way an expert on these things, but it is where our focus is right now; by contrast, I know diddly about Afghanistan's external trade agreements, to pick one example.

And all that being said, hell, Sloww could be right. I'm not sure anyone is 100% confident they know the answer here, and the mess in Pakistan just complicates matters. Afghanistan isn't called the"graveyard of Empires" for nothing.

Damn, if we had not screwed up our economy, we could have solved this problem by outbidding for our own islamic militants.

[Naked Gents Rut]

Obama is about to drop $634 billion as a "downpayment" on healthcare reform and you don't think we could outbid the Taliban if we really wanted to?

[Theben]

From what I know not only is the $$ an issue, but whoever has the most guns in an area. Troops would regularly switch sides between the Taliban and Northern Alliance based on perception of strength... once one side was seen as a little stronger the defections would start rolling. Not that should be too surprising, but just another indicator the Afghan Taliban regulars aren't ideologically focused.

[Rufus T. Firefly]

Wonderful bureaucracy... didn't they play a big role getting us into this mess?

Yes, I see the , but it's still an interesting comment so I'll chime in.

As far as I can tell, everybody at this point -- the Pentagon, the CIA, the NSC, State, various think tanks of various stripes -- everyone agrees that Afghanistan got screwed up not when we invaded it, but when, having invaded it, we then diverted needed security resources to our pointless war in Iraq; without Iraq, Afghanistan wouldn't be the problem it is today. And -- though he ultimately played ball at the UN -- the fiercest opposition to the proposed Iraq war sounds like it came from Colin Powell and his folks at State. Similarly, while State's rank-and-file resisted Iraq tours, there's never been a similar problem staffing Kabul and the Afghan PRTs.

There's a lot of things you can blame State for, but I don't think this is one of them.

[Naked Gents Rut]

without Iraq, Afghanistan wouldn't be the problem it is today.

I find this wholly unconvincing. Afghanistan is the problem it is today because the Taliban had a safe haven in Pakistan to retreat to and regroup in. I don't see how the U.S. would've been any more effective in dealing with the Taliban in Pakistan in an alternate past where Iraq was never invaded.

Afghanistan was always going to turn into a problem. The U.S. should've declared victory and gone home after the Karzai government took power.

[DaShi]

Obama is about to drop $634 billion as a "downpayment" on healthcare reform and you don't think we could outbid the Taliban if we really wanted to?

Yes, Ben.

[Arrian]

Well if we're going to discuss the usefulness or lack thereof of deals with the Taliban, would it not be useful to discuss the deals Pakistan made with the Taliban and look at the fruit those bore.

So long as you remember to look at how that deal works out from Pakistan's perspective. If we can work out a deal with the Taliban types such that they leave our forces alone and fight somebody else (who, I'm not sure), that would be lovely. That's what Pakistan has done. Unfortunately for us, that "somebody else" is... us.

The plan, I hope, is to convince *some* of the Taliban leaders to knock it off. Much like groups were splintered off the Iraqi insurgency. Paid off, really. That works for me, since the current situation isn't good.

-Arrian

[Blaupanzer]

Well if we're going to discuss the usefulness or lack thereof of deals with the Taliban, would it not be useful to discuss the deals Pakistan made with the Taliban and look at the fruit those bore.

I can't believe I am agreeing with DD, but his point is not meaningless. I see Arrian try to divert DD's thought above, but why should these guys deal in good faith? We can't (or won"t) chase them accross the Paki border if they renege. So if I was them, I would take the money then slowly fade back across the border, use the money to buy the best new weapons, and take up the fight again. How can we possibly know they won't do exactly the same thing? In Islam, as I understand it, there is no loss of honor for cheating or lieing to non-muslims, especially if it relates to war.

[DanS]

The simple truth is that the Taliban -- who are largely despised in Afghanistan, even in the Pashtun south -- is doing as well as they are because they pay better than anyone else (about 50% more that the army, for example).

May I ask how much the Taliban are paying? Do we know who or what is footing the bill for them?