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I've often seen arguments against moral relativism which are of the nature that "If moral relativism is true, there is no way that we can argue that one morality is better than another, and therefore, there is no way to say that / is as good as not perpetrating ". Unfortunately, trying to "prevent judgementalism" on the part of others is one major reason many of its strongest proponents adopt moral relativism.
Apart from the fact that the argument itself is fallacious - bad things following from the truth of a proposition are in no way indicative of the proposition's truth value - there is another, implicit fallacy here, which points to the fact that both the person asserting the equality of all moral systems and the person arguing against the same lack an understanding of the implications of relativism.
It is relativism which is, in truth, the moralists' strongest weapon, and the concept of an objective "one morality to rule them all" which is his downfall.
When a relativist says that one morality is "as good as another", he is invoking a standard of judgement to judge their relative worth, or their moral equivalence, based on the idea that one subjective value is, by some metric, just as good as another. What he overlooks, however, is that that standard or metric is also part of a moral system. Therefore, he is, at a level, asserting absolutism. The true relativist, on the other hand, says nothing of the sort. He will assert that one set of values - his valuation - is the correct one, and if anyone tries to claim that another is equivalent to it, he will say that he does not accept the moral system used to make that equivalence judgement, and if his opponent tries to invoke relativism to claim thus, he will simply point out the absolutism of assuming an absolute metric of this nature, and the self-contradiction inherent therein.
In the form of a dialogue:
Relativist True: My valuation is the correct one.
Relativist False: How can you say that? All moral systems are equivalent, because they are all subjective, and there exists no objective standard.
Relativist True: You are right in that there is no absolute standard. How, then can you claim the equivalence of all moral systems? Doesn't that implicitly assume that there exists some absolute standard which we are invoking to judge the relative worth of these systems? Is not doing so and claiming relativism at the same time a contradiction?
Relativist False: Ah! I am enlightened! (Becomes a true relativist.)
On the other hand, when a person assumes some objective standard of morality exists, there always exists the usual philosophical doubt about whether he has correctly perceived that standard. Thus, the proponent of the objective morality is always in a state of self-doubt as to whether or not his perception of the "One True Morality" is the correct one - because here, morality is as such separate from us, and the best we can do is to try to perceive it. Here, the best-case scenario is an asymptotic convergence towards the one true morality. The one who rests his moral foundation on absolutism is, therefore, the one who cannot claim the absolute correctness of his morality.
Another illustrative dialogue:
Absolutist: I claim that an absolute morality exists, and that therefore some action is right and another wrong.
Doubter: Are you free of all doubt about the correctness of your perception of this one true morality? Can you be sure that you have made no errors in perceiving its nature? Is your grasp of it free from all those philosophical doubts which plague the epistemologists?
Absolutist: No. I cannot claim absolute certainty.
In a sense, then, it is relativism which is the moralists' true liberation, as it is the only system in which, morality not having to be perceived, he can make an absolute assertion about the moral nature of an act, and on the correctness of other systems, and still retain confidence without self-doubt, because of the logical nature of the system itself.
Now, this does not constitute an argument for or against relativism - were I to do that, I would be guilty of the same sort of fallacy I mentioned the deluded absolutist engage in against the relativist. But I hope I can spark off a discussion on relativism and absolutism, because usually they are used in the opposite sense, and for the opposite purpose.
Apart from the fact that the argument itself is fallacious - bad things following from the truth of a proposition are in no way indicative of the proposition's truth value - there is another, implicit fallacy here, which points to the fact that both the person asserting the equality of all moral systems and the person arguing against the same lack an understanding of the implications of relativism.
It is relativism which is, in truth, the moralists' strongest weapon, and the concept of an objective "one morality to rule them all" which is his downfall.
When a relativist says that one morality is "as good as another", he is invoking a standard of judgement to judge their relative worth, or their moral equivalence, based on the idea that one subjective value is, by some metric, just as good as another. What he overlooks, however, is that that standard or metric is also part of a moral system. Therefore, he is, at a level, asserting absolutism. The true relativist, on the other hand, says nothing of the sort. He will assert that one set of values - his valuation - is the correct one, and if anyone tries to claim that another is equivalent to it, he will say that he does not accept the moral system used to make that equivalence judgement, and if his opponent tries to invoke relativism to claim thus, he will simply point out the absolutism of assuming an absolute metric of this nature, and the self-contradiction inherent therein.
In the form of a dialogue:
Relativist True: My valuation is the correct one.
Relativist False: How can you say that? All moral systems are equivalent, because they are all subjective, and there exists no objective standard.
Relativist True: You are right in that there is no absolute standard. How, then can you claim the equivalence of all moral systems? Doesn't that implicitly assume that there exists some absolute standard which we are invoking to judge the relative worth of these systems? Is not doing so and claiming relativism at the same time a contradiction?
Relativist False: Ah! I am enlightened! (Becomes a true relativist.)
On the other hand, when a person assumes some objective standard of morality exists, there always exists the usual philosophical doubt about whether he has correctly perceived that standard. Thus, the proponent of the objective morality is always in a state of self-doubt as to whether or not his perception of the "One True Morality" is the correct one - because here, morality is as such separate from us, and the best we can do is to try to perceive it. Here, the best-case scenario is an asymptotic convergence towards the one true morality. The one who rests his moral foundation on absolutism is, therefore, the one who cannot claim the absolute correctness of his morality.
Another illustrative dialogue:
Absolutist: I claim that an absolute morality exists, and that therefore some action is right and another wrong.
Doubter: Are you free of all doubt about the correctness of your perception of this one true morality? Can you be sure that you have made no errors in perceiving its nature? Is your grasp of it free from all those philosophical doubts which plague the epistemologists?
Absolutist: No. I cannot claim absolute certainty.
In a sense, then, it is relativism which is the moralists' true liberation, as it is the only system in which, morality not having to be perceived, he can make an absolute assertion about the moral nature of an act, and on the correctness of other systems, and still retain confidence without self-doubt, because of the logical nature of the system itself.
Now, this does not constitute an argument for or against relativism - were I to do that, I would be guilty of the same sort of fallacy I mentioned the deluded absolutist engage in against the relativist. But I hope I can spark off a discussion on relativism and absolutism, because usually they are used in the opposite sense, and for the opposite purpose.
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