Did the Suez crisis in 1956 postpone the fall of the Soviet block for over 30 years?

[BeBMan]

Or asked differently, would Sov *not* have resorted to military means to crush the Hungarian uprise by force (for the second time, they had a first smaller invasion, but they had already stopped it when Suez began) if it hadn't the impression it must act quickly to stabilize it's own sphere of influence while another crisis was developing in the ME at the very same time?

Discuss

[VetLegion]

Perhaps you know otherwise but I don't think events in the Middle East had much influence on what happened in Europe.

Suez is an example of the worst in British, French and Israeli policy at the time. Colonialism, agression, secret plots and no gain in the end

[BeBMan]

Agree with the second part.

To the first, I don't know for sure, but I read quite some stuff about Hungary 56. The Suez crisis started on Oct 29 with Israel attacking across Sinai, the Hungarian uprise broke out only some days before on Oct 23, first military action by Soviet troops already based in Hungary only a day later, but it was stopped shortly afterwards and troops were withdrawn from Budapest. The final Soviet intervention is decided on Oct 31 and begins on Nov 4. There are certain indicators that the soviet leadership felt in late October 56 that both situations could mean a "loss" for them and a victory for the "imperialists".

I don't think there's clear proof that the Soviet decision to invade Hungary a second time was driven by Suez, but IMO it is at least possible that it had a certain impact.

[molly bloom]

Originally posted by BeBro


I don't think there's clear proof that the Soviet decision to invade Hungary a second time was driven by Suez, but IMO it is at least possible that it had a certain impact.

Morally at least they must have felt that the decadent West could hardly criticise the 'fraternal aid' offered Hungary by the Soviets when the Suez fiasco had ended in a dressing down for GB/France and Israel from the U.S. for such neo-colonial adventurism.

"It was the last thrash of empire," he (Eden) told me.

"A last attempt by a British government to do the old imperial thing in defence of far-off interests. It was a complete folly."

Corelli Barnett, 'The Collapse of British Power'.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5199392.stm

[jkp1187]

Originally posted by VetLegion
Perhaps you know otherwise but I don't think events in the Middle East had much influence on what happened in Europe.

Suez is an example of the worst in British, French and Israeli policy at the time. Colonialism, agression, secret plots and no gain in the end

Yes, and considering the aftermath, it was a damned fool thing for Eisenhower to oppose it.

On the other hand, I find it more likely that the Cuban Missile Crisis prolonged the Cold War than Suez. That led directly to the downfall of Khruschev (who, for all his faults, was -- at least in domestic politics -- a more "moderate" leader than his predecessor or successor,) and the initiation of a far more aggressive/interventionist foreign policy by Moscow. Not to mention a determination by Moscow to eliminate the "missile gap" (which was quite real, but pace Kennedy's 1960 campaign, existed in FAVOR of the United States at that time, which is how he was able to force the Soviets into a corner in the first place.)

[Imran Siddiqui]

Yes, and considering the aftermath, it was a damned fool thing for Eisenhower to oppose it.

Not necessarily. The last thing needed was for the British, French, and Americans to seem like neo-colonialists. That would have garnered a Hell of a lot more of pro-Soviet support across the 3rd world.

[jkp1187]

Originally posted by Imran Siddiqui

Yes, and considering the aftermath, it was a damned fool thing for Eisenhower to oppose it.

Not necessarily. The last thing needed was for the British, French, and Americans to seem like neo-colonialists. That would have garnered a Hell of a lot more of pro-Soviet support across the 3rd world.

This happened anyway. The U.S. was accused of being in league with colonialism by many, not least of which by Nasser (remember his ridiculous bluster about US and British aircraft assisting Israel in '67...some people still believe it, too) -- the beneficiary of Eisenhower's forbearance. And, certainly, no one could say that the British and French WEREN'T colonialists in 1956. The French were still hip deep in Algeria ("Metropolitan France", they considered it,) and the British still had many colonies and protectorates throughout Africa and Asia.

Certainly, Egypt moved more into the Soviet orbit after Suez anyway -- there were 20,000 Soviet "advisers" in the country in 1970. Syria became a Soviet client state until the end of the Cold War. And with the defeat of British power, the British-installed monarchy in Baghdad fell in '58.

In any event, the British withdrawal from East of Suez after '56 -- including and most especially the withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, where it effectively surrendered power to a bunch of -- led directly and indirectly to a series of events that were harmful to the interests of the United States and other countries that were part of the liberal westernized world. Perhaps these events would've happened anyway, but at least the west would've been in a stronger position to resist them.

[BeBMan]

Originally posted by jkp1187
Yes, and considering the aftermath, it was a damned fool thing for Eisenhower to oppose it.

While you're right that Sov won more influence in the ME out of Suez siding openly with UK/France in this situation could have dealt much more long term damage to the US, esp. since Suez wasn't only important for the ME but for the bigger picture in which both superpowers competed for influence in the so-called "third world" full of ex-colonies or still-colonies moving for independence, while the old colonial powers were on the withdrawal there anyway more and more since the end of WWII. Supporting them in another (neo-)colonial adventure would have been the best way to turn more countries against the west even outside the ME, I agree with Imran here.

Suez was perceived much more as a real international conflict, while Hungary played hardly that role worldwide, esp. since the west signalized it wouldn't do anything there because it simply couldn't act openly in the Soviet hemisphere without risking a war.

[jkp1187]

Yes, the US-USSR competition was focused on the newly-independent states in the '60s, but I still don't see how much would have changed had the US stood behind its closest friend and its oldest friend at Suez.

Honestly, what would've happened differently? Nasser certainly didn't offer any gratitude toward the US for saving his wholly unworthy regime. Cuba went communist. Algeria drifted leftward after France quit. The pro-western monarchies in Libya, Iraq and Ethopia were replaced by Marxist dictatorships that were hostile to the west. Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau went leftist after the Portuguese left.

Honestly, what difference would it have made? Those who opposed the US weren't impressed with Eisenhower's move, and many who supported the US were soon tossed out anyway.

[BeBMan]

Well, it's always difficult to say what *would* have happened surely, what we are left with are of course assumptions.

One would be IMO that the ME situation itself would have escalated much more, and certainly not with a pro-western drive.

The UK and France would be in a situation where they have a serious long-term engagement in Suez at their hands if they wanted to control the channel for long. And that when they're already far beyond the height of their power, and under pressure in several parts of the world, probably with erroding support at home (not sure here for Suez 56, but if Algeria later is any indicator....).

Short term success in Suez, even with US help, would not have changed their strategical weakness after WWII, and so would hardly have ensured long term success in a more and more hostile environment (much of it as a result of their own actions).

So US help would mean taking the risks of such an action for at best questionable results, against the wider circumstances which already tell that colonialism is on the way out globally. The domestic situation in the US could have been challenging as well since AFAIK the country never saw itself as classic colonial power.

[GePap]

Originally posted by jkp1187

Honestly, what difference would it have made? Those who opposed the US weren't impressed with Eisenhower's move, and many who supported the US were soon tossed out anyway.

The problem is not with Eisenhower, but with the fact that the presidents that followed him were not as principled.

[molly bloom]

Originally posted by jkp1187


This happened anyway. The U.S. was accused of being in league with colonialism by many,

Given that U.S. sponsored coups in Iran and Guatemala predated Suez by only 2 or 3 years, this in itself is hardly surprising.

Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau went leftist after the Portuguese left.

Having had such a sterling example of what a Rightist Western colonial military dictatorship was like, is this such a shock ?


To say that they 'went Left' is not to say that they were Soviet stooges- in fact Angola's leftist government asked for U.S. support.

[jkp1187]

Well, BeBro, counterfactual history is always problematic, but I'm afraid you sipped from that particular glass of Flavor Aid by starting this thread.

You're right that a long-lasting Suez adventure would've been detrimental to the UK and France. Absolutely. However, in the world that we live in, the UK and France were humiliated at Suez, and Nasser, despite his incompetence, was lionized in the Arab world (and, indeed, in much of the post-colonial world) as a hero because of his stand against the UK and France.

Had Nasser been the one who was humiliated or overthrown, things might have played out differently. Before Suez, the UK and France were viewed as weakened, but still powerful nations. Suez showed that their international position was a bluff that could easily be called if the United States wasn't behind them. My thought, however, is that if the bluff hadn't been called at Suez -- if Ike hadn't put a stop to it, but rather acquiesced in the adventure, and if Suez had ended in the humiliation or overthrow of Nasser, the UK and France would have had a stronger hand to play in the world for a longer period of time thereafter. France may not have drifted as far into the anti-US/anti-UK attitude that de Gaulle took in the '60s (vetoing UK entrance into the EEC, withdrawing from the military wing of NATO,) which to be fair, occurred because de Gaulle felt betrayed by the US at Suez. I think that these events made the western alliance weaker, and that things would've been better for the free nations of the world had they been avoided.

Granted, those are BIG ifs, but given that Egypt's military wasn't exactly doing well in the Sinai at that moment, and given the imbalance in strategic power between the US and USSR at that time (the same imbalance that allowed JFK to force Khruschev into a corner in Cuba six years later,) it isn't inconceivable. And obviously, this isn't to say that the colonial empires were all peaches and cream, nor that London and Paris exercised power with wisdom in all respects.

I do not buy into GePap's argument that Ike was being principled about Suez. From my understanding, Ike was furious that he hadn't been even consulted about the action and that he was a man who was fiercely vengeful in such situations. Further, Suez went down right before the presidential election, and Ike, having just condemned the Soviet intervention in Hungary, found it politically expedient to show his "even-handedness" with regard to Suez, and cut the financial rug out from under our two closest allies in Europe.


@Molly: I believe that it was a standard leftist propaganda point to equate the US to evil capitalism/imperialism/etc. long before 1953. Yes, leftist does not always equate to Soviet satellite, although it sometimes did, and even when it didn't, it usually meant a state taking a position hostile to the interests of the westernized world. History tells us that it almost always meant disaster for the nation's inhabitants, too.

To get back to the original point, though, I am not aware of any solid source showing that Suez was a pressing concern when they decided to move into Hungary in force. I'm sure it was in the background, and may have provided additional arguments, but Suez or no, they couldn't let such a large prize slip from their grasp without a fight. I do think that the Cuban Missile Crisis would be a better candidate for what BeBro is suggesting.

(With that in mind, would an all-out American invasion of Cuba in 1961, ousting Castro and thus avoiding the Missile Crisis, led to an end to the Cold War sooner? Ahh, all these "what ifs"!)

[Imran Siddiqui]

I do not buy into GePap's argument that Ike was being principled about Suez. From my understanding, Ike was furious that he hadn't been even consulted about the action and that he was a man who was fiercely vengeful in such situations. Further, Suez went down right before the presidential election, and Ike, having just condemned the Soviet intervention in Hungary, found it politically expedient to show his "even-handedness" with regard to Suez, and cut the financial rug out from under our two closest allies in Europe.

Why exactly would Eisenhower find it politically expedient to show evenhandedness? The US electorate wouldn't have held it against him, especially if you could claim Egypt was in the pocket of the Soviets (and Hell, what, Ike would have won with only 400 EC votes instead of 450?). If you are talking interest based politics, Eisenhower was probably looking at not alienating its Saudi allies in the region and Khrushchev was threatening to enter the war on the Egyptian side and dramatically escalate the conflict.

[jkp1187]

Why exactly would Eisenhower find it politically expedient to show evenhandedness? The US electorate wouldn't have held it against him, especially if you could claim Egypt was in the pocket of the Soviets (and Hell, what, Ike would have won with only 400 EC votes instead of 450?).

Because a politician, like any sensible animal, will try to avoid steps that will cause him to lose support in the days before an election. Certainly, it was easy for him to make the comparison of great powers beating up on little countries, whatever the differences between Suez and Hungary. And there is a tendency among Americans to not view themselves as a colonial or imperial power in the traditional mold, regardless of the reality; the raw exercise of power politics, regardless of its results, tends to be disdained. (This is a trend that continues in American politics to this day, in my opinion. Oh, and yes, this fact does complicate my argument above.)

If you are talking interest based politics, Eisenhower was probably looking at not alienating its Saudi allies in the region and Khrushchev was threatening to enter the war on the Egyptian side and dramatically escalate the conflict.

Regarding the Saudis, although they were considered friends, I'm not sure that their attitude was a primary concern. After all, ARAMCO had not been nationalized at that time, and therefore was still controlled by its private investors.

As for Khruschev, he was always full of bluster wasn't he? But would he have gone to war over Suez? I rather doubt it. He'd certainly have done everything he could short of war to make the venture costly for the allies, but intervene? I'm having a hard time seeing how he would have gotten across the Med. And he surely knew -- as Ike also knew, thanks to the U-2 flights -- that the nuclear balance was decisively in America's favor at that time.


It probably wasn't an easy call. War never is. I just tend to think that, when all was said and done, it might have been better for Ike to cut the Europeans some slack.