World War I western front

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Lorizael
How did the trenches first come about? That is, what was the other side doing while one side was building trenches?

Trenches werent invented during WW1. The notion of digging in for protection was widespread during the US Civil War, especially as rifled muskets became almost universal. Trench war fare in some ways resembling WW1 began to develop in the Petersburg campaign.

With the widespread adoption of breach loading rifles entrenching on encampment became more routine, at least in the British army.

[Dr Strangelove]

Trenches also were a prominent feature of the Crimean War, but the British really came to appreciate them during the Boer War. The Boers often used entrenchments to help even out the odds and the British learned to respect them at a heavy cost.

In August of 1914 the British Army was the only major combatant that had encorporated the use of field entrenchments into its standard operational doctrine. As the BEF, a mere corps sized formation, faced an entire German Army its officers realized that at most they could slow down the advance on the flank of the allied line. The German infantry was equipeed with larger numbers of machine guns, a German company having more than twice the number of machine guns than an allied company. British professional soldiers OTOH were so well trained at rapid fire that a British company firing prone from a line could deliver nearly the same volume of fire as a German company.

As the Germans advanced into northern France British troops dug shallow trenches allowing company sized formations to bring batallions of Germans to a halt. With smaller numbers they couldn't avoid the possiblity of being outflanked, but the mere act of forcing the Germans to spread out and send formations laterally on flanking manuvers greatly slowed the German advance. In fact one of the BEF's major problems was that the withdrawal of the French army on its eastern flank repeatedly exposed the British to the possibility of being out flanked.

Nevertheless the presence of an unbroken force in the path of the far western portion of the German advance forced the furthermost German army to change its direction of advance towards an area east of Paris instead of going around the western side of the city. The German high command hoped to drive a wedge between the BEF and the French. Instead the French thrw together an additional army on the west flank of the British, causing the previously unstoppable Germans to pull back. The rest of the western campaign in 1914 was spent with each side trying to outflank the other in the countryside northwest of Paris and in the process also learning the art of field entrenchment.

[Dis]

Originally posted by Kropotkin
Yeah, after the miracle at Marne, where the german offensive was stopped, they drew back and set up defensive posititions. The french then tried to attack in turn but where obviously stopped by well defended german positions. When the french and british troops couldn't take on the Germans head on, both sides stared a series of attempt at out flanking each other. At the end their attempts moved their flanking units all the way to the north sea. Two opposing system of trenches from the north sea all the way to Switzerland was now a fact.

Even if generals in the great war often where stuck in their thinking, they wheren't as ignorant or stubborn as Hitler, and could actually give up a couple of yards to set up their trenches and bunkers on higher grounds and the best positions in general while their enemies had to dwell in the lowland.

makes me wonder why they never tried an amphibious invasion way behind enemy lines. Say the german heartland . Though I doubt any nation had the organization to pull off such a large invasion back in those days. But why couldn't it be done exactly? I'm beginning to think the generals in ww1 were just bad. It worked in Korea more or less (the chinese joining in didn't help).

[CerberusIV]

Originally posted by Dis


makes me wonder why they never tried an amphibious invasion way behind enemy lines. Say the german heartland . Though I doubt any nation had the organization to pull off such a large invasion back in those days. But why couldn't it be done exactly? I'm beginning to think the generals in ww1 were just bad. It worked in Korea more or less (the chinese joining in didn't help).

Fisher actually wanted to do this. He envisaged a major landing in the Baltic and an Allied army rapidly seizing Berlin. He was removed as First Sea Lord at the Admiralty before the idea came to fruition.

The light battlecruisers Courageous, Glorious and Furious were designed with this operation in mind so it indirectly helped British naval aviation between the wars. Also the X and Y lighters designed for this were the starting point for British landing craft designs in WW2.

[Kropotkin]

Originally posted by Dis
[M]akes me wonder why they never tried an amphibious invasion way behind enemy lines. Say the german heartland .

Like at Gallipoli. Yeah, that worked out well.

[Dr Strangelove]

Originally posted by Kropotkin

Like at Gallipoli. Yeah, that worked out well.

The German coastal waters were known to be heavily mined. The technology for removing sea mines at the time was pretty primitive. It would basically have entailed sending ships ahead to sacrifice themselves.

[CerberusIV]

Problem at Gallipoli was that the Turks, under German instruction, had laid minefields covered by gun batteries blocking access to the Bosphorus. The minefields could be swept - but not under fire. Ships could not deal with the gun batteries so what was meant to be a purely naval forcing of the Straits turned into a full blown amphibious invasion - and since no-one had really done anything on that scale before they cocked it up rather badly.

[Ecthy]

Anyone read The Peace To End All Peace by David Fromkin? A brilliant book on the shaping of modern Middle East at the eve of WWI, concnetrating on the personal role of Churchill. The book also features a chapter on Gallipoli and mentions several spoiled chances to win it early, though imperfection is probably normal in any military operation

[Dry]

Re: Re: Re: World War I western front

Originally posted by Kuciwalker
Also, didn't the Germans make it through Belgium fairly quickly?

http://www.greatwardifferent.com/Great_War/Liege/Liege_01.htm

For info: the biggest of the forts (Loncin) had 550 men. All 12 forts together, it was something like 3,500 men...

...
The forts were still holding out stubbornly. A force of 30,000 of the enemy had been left for their reduction. They were shelled day and night. They were, indeed, proving a dangerous thorn in the enemy's side. They disconnected his lines of communication. They retarded the passage of troops and transport wagons. Pontoon bridges especially were objects of the attention of the fort artillery. One Belgian gun was said to have destroyed no less than ten. But on August 13 and 14 the German heavy artillery began to arrive. It was brought into action. Fort Boncelles was one of the first to receive the fire. Bombardment was opened at six o'clock on August 14, and continued for two hours. The guns were so placed that the garrison could neither see nor fire at them. At eight o'clock two German officers approached, and called upon the fort to surrender. Guns still more colossal than those already used, they said, would render its destruction instantaneous. The Belgian commander replied that honour forbade surrender. His men burst into a cheer. The Germans returned, and the bombardment was continued. The fort began to feel the effects. The chimney of the engine-house fell in; part of the works caught fire; the electric light went out; suffocating fumes filled the galleries. Resistance was maintained throughout the day and night. But at six o'clock next morning the concrete chambers which held the guns began to give way. Several of the cupolas turned no more. Two hours later a shell pierced the roof and burst inside the fort. Several men were wounded. Further resistance seemed useless, and it was decided to surrender. Three white flags were hoisted. While the Germans were approaching the Belgians disabled their guns and rifles and destroyed their ammunition. The enemy took possession of the fort. The prisoners, looking back as they were marched off, could see nothing but a heap of ruins.

Similar destruction gradually overtook the remaining forts. Their fabrics crumbled under the constant impact of heavy shells. Their garrisons, forced to retire into the small chambers within the central concrete blocks, had to inhale oxygen to keep themselves alive. Many were, indeed, at last asphyxiated.

Storming parties could no longer be resisted by machine-guns. The strongest of the forts, Loncin, the quarters of General Leman, succumbed in turn. It was shelled by the heavier German guns at a distance of seven miles. The batteries upon the Citadel of Liège were also turned upon it. It is asserted that, during twenty-six hours of bombardment, shells were rained upon the works at the rate of six a minute. The incessant concussions and explosions at last shattered the structure to ruins. Leman saw that the end was inevitable. He destroyed all his plans, maps, and papers. The three remaining guns were disabled, and the ammunition kept beside them exploded. He had about one hundred men left. These he led out of Loncin in a daring effort to reach another fort. But they were seen by the enemy, and had to abandon the attempt.

A German storming party rushed forward to a final assault. But suddenly a shell tore through the battered masonry, and exploded in the main magazine. The fort blew up. There was a terrific crash. Huge masses of concrete were hurled high into the air. An immense cloud of dust and fumes arose. When it had cleared away the Germans advanced. The ground was strewn with the bodies of their storming party. A Belgian corporal with a shattered arm raised his rifle and started to fire at them as they approached. Most of the garrison were buried under the ruins. Leman lay, white and still, pinned beneath a massive beam. He was drawn from his dangerous position, half suffocated by fumes, by some of his men. 'Respectez le general. Ii est mort,' cried a soldier as the Germans came up. He was borne gently away to a trench, where a German officer gave him drink. He came to his senses and looked round. 'The men fought valiantly,' he said. 'Put it in your dispatches that I was unconscious. He was placed in an ambulance, and carried into Liège. Shortly afterwards, when sufficiently recovered, he was brought before Von Emmich. The two commanders saluted. Genera],' said the German, holding out his hand, 'You have gallantly and nobly held your forts.' 'I thank you,' Leman replied: 'Our troops have lived up to their reputation. War is not like manoeuvres, he added, with a smile. He unbuckled his sword, and tendered it to the victor. Von Emmich bowed. ' No,' he said, 'Keep it. To have crossed swords with you has been an honour.' A tear sparkled in the Belgian's eye.1

Nothing more remains to be told. The forts were not built to resist the pounding of artillery as heavy as that brought against them. They had been constructed when the typical siege gun was the 6-inch howitzer. They had to contend with artillery the calibres of which ranged as high as 16 inches. Each was reduced in turn. The last fell on August 17 or 18.

Thus ended the memorable stand of Liège. The struggle was watched with the intensest interest and emotion by the whole of the civilized world. British statesmen paid tributes to the gallant city. France conferred upon it the Cross of the Legion of Honour. The Tsar of Russia expressed his admiration in a message to the Belgian King. Events which followed proved the importance of the time lost to the Germans before Liège. British troops were enabled, reaching Mons not an hour too soon, to oppose a second bulwark to the advancing tide. The strategic value of the defence was hardly greater than its moral effect. The spell of 1870 was broken. German arms were looked upon as invincible no more.

The scouts of the forts were constantly infiltrating the german positions to spot the guns able to reach the forts. Reporting their coordinates allowed the fort's artillery to silence them before they could. Those scouts had sometimes to fire at german soldiers to avoid capture. Rumors among german soldiers began to circulate about civilians shooting at german soldiers, while it was in fact infiltrated scouts.
It is believed by many historians that it is the resistance at Liege and the firing 'out of nowhere' from 'belgian civilian snipers' that pissed off the Germans and was the cause of the attrocities later comitted against belgian civilians.
'How dare them to resist!'

[Dr Strangelove]

Originally posted by CerberusIV
Problem at Gallipoli was that the Turks, under German instruction, had laid minefields covered by gun batteries blocking access to the Bosphorus. The minefields could be swept - but not under fire. Ships could not deal with the gun batteries so what was meant to be a purely naval forcing of the Straits turned into a full blown amphibious invasion - and since no-one had really done anything on that scale before they cocked it up rather badly.

The failure of the Gallipoli landings may be attributed to a delay of only a few hours. British troops landed on the south shore of the peninsula and began climbing to the top of the cliffs. Part of a battalion sized force made it to the top of the cliffs and paused about a quarter mile from a hillock that dominated the plateau on the southern part of the peninsula. The commander decided to not take the short hike to the hill, which at the time was unoccupied by the Turks. A few hours later when he got the go ahead from regimental command the hill had been occupied by a company of Turks, who had had time enough to set up machine guns. The British advance group was unable to take the hill, and for the rest of the Gallipoli campaign this hill was what kept the British from securing the peninsula. Had the British taken the hill before the Turks they could have reversed the situation, because the terrain north of the hill was flat and defenseless.

[Zkribbler]

Dr Strangelove knows that of which he speaks.

[Darius871]

Originally posted by Kuciwalker


You've got to wonder what the end of the line at the border looked like...

No need to wonder:

[Darius871]

There's still one thing I don't get though: even if there were good reasons for the Brits not to have used amphibious operations on the North Sea, couldn't they have at least subjected the right flank of the German line to 24/7 naval bombardment so as to soften it up for the gradual advance of ground troops? It's not as if they were terrified of the German fleet...

[Andemagne]

Originally posted by Darius871
No need to wonder:

He meant the other end.

[Dr Strangelove]

Originally posted by Darius871
There's still one thing I don't get though: even if there were good reasons for the Brits not to have used amphibious operations on the North Sea, couldn't they have at least subjected the right flank of the German line to 24/7 naval bombardment so as to soften it up for the gradual advance of ground troops? It's not as if they were terrified of the German fleet...

They were terrified of German U boats though. German U boats demonstrated their value very early in the war by sinking a couple of British cruisers. A fleet in motion was generally safe from U boats, WW1 battleships would cruise at 12 to 16 knots and could make 20 to 24 knots top speed, but WW1 U boats could only cruise at 5 to 8 knots and had a top speed of 12 knots. U boats simply could not manuever to get in a shot. If a battleship was stationary while bombarding a position though it would be a sitting duck. In this age at the very end of the aristocratic era the naval high command was not going to take this kind of risk. In the mind set of naval officers of this era nothing could have been more humiliating than losing a mamoth battleship to a measliy submarine. In such a case it's likely that the commanding officer, not to mention some convenient persons in the high command, would have been forced to resign. Remember also they didn't have sonar until the end of the war. A sub approaching submerged was virtually immune to destroyers until it fired its torpedos.
During the first few years of the war both sides tried using ultra-heavy artillery to soften up the trenches. The Germans already had a few 305mm and 410mm howitzers, and soon the British and French began modifing naval guns for land use. Destroying trench lines proved more difficult than destroying the old fashioned Belgian forts. Even with the heaviest caliber shells you had to hit within 15 to 20 feet of the trench to destroy it. The guns of that era weren't that accurate, plus the infantry could simply retreat to the 2nd or 3rd line until the bombardment was over.
There were a number of examples where one side unleashed monstrous multi-day long bombardments on the other side's trenches. To do so was like sending an advance announcement that an attack was imminent. The side being attacked would withdraw most of its men from the front trenches and also call in reinforcements in anticipation of the subsequent infantry attack. When the barrage was lifted it would rush soldiers back into the trenches, so when the attacking sides troops arrived it would find nearly as much resistence as if the barrage had never taken place.
The British tried to solve the problem of the gap between the end of the bombardment and the arrival of the attacking force at the enemy's trench line with the rolling barrage. The idea was that the British artillery would target the Geman front line for a predetermined period, then at a designated time would move the barrage on to the German 2nd line, providing a shield for the advancing British infantry. The problem was that the technology needed for that level of precision and timing didn't exist, they wound up firing on their own soldiers. Even where everything went as planned they found the Germans rushing through the barrage curtain via their collateral trenches to push back the British attack.