A Question of Motives - Al Qaeda

[GePap]

What I see looking at that graph is an upward trend in cultivation no matter who was in power after the Soviet invasion. 1994, 1999, an 2001 are all anomalies. in '94 and '99 production for whatever reason spiked, and in 2001 the Taliban went full fledged against cultivators and the crop went down to pre-invasion levels.

The graph pretty clearly shows that the average for both the Soviets and the Warlords is smaller than the average for the Taliban. I'm not really sure how you can interpret the graph any other way.

Yes, but then the average post Taliban appears higher than the Taliban average, given that the high point of '99 is balanced out by the low of '01.

I

[GePap]

Originally posted by lord of the mark
There are always unique circumstances, that make sense in retrospect. Certainly I agree the likelihood was greater in Afghanistan than in Pakistan today - in Afghanistan it was almost overdetermined. But I dont think you can say the chances everywhere else are neglible.

I would argue that in most states in the ME they are. There is simply too large an urban secular middle class, the class that happens to hold most of the reigns of power, for that to occur. While in Egypt the Islamic Brotherhood might be the leading opposition party, they are not as backward as say the taliban. Iran is a good example - clerics took over, yet on women's rights Iran is far ahead than any of the Arab fundamentalists. So Islamic government, even conservative islamic government, is not the same as seeking some caliphate. The truth is that at the end, a conservative islamic regime interested only in making its people live that way is not a threat in any sense to the west.

As for KSA, yes it is just as fundy in its domestic policies as Sudan. Which makes yet one MORE example, after Afghanistan and Sudan and Somalia, of countries where the populace will tolerate that style of Islamic rule. We accepted KSA, and not Sudan, because of differences in their foreign policies, not domestic policies. Even so, Im not a big fan of relying on an "alliance" with KSA.

I don't think that KSA is a good example of a people who will "tolerate" conservative rule. And even if they do, KSA is no AQ, and honestly, if people in KSA want to live that way, whatever. Its their country. The problem is not conservative Islamic rule if it comes to power legitimately. The problem is the attempt tp undermine not only all these slamic regimes, but the entire world order.

Clearly failed states are a big factor helping AQ to take power. I never said they came out of nowhere. If one were to take power in Pakistan, it wouldnt come out of nowhere either, despite Pakistan not being a failed state like Somalia or Afghanistan.

Pakistan is too big to "fail." It has a large developed upper class with connections to the world, plenty of things to trade, relatively well developed organizations, and as what has happened the last few weeks show, a strong civil society movemen.
As for fundamentalists coming to power there, I defer to LS or Ramo on the subject of what that is unlikely.

I was using caliphate in the above sentence to mean any islamist govt that both identified with the caliphate movement and actually declared itself part of the caliphate, not one that had de facto control over the whole muslim world. Sorry for my unclear wording.

The caliphate movement is small for a reason - in the age of modern mass politics, and nationalistic politics, where more people care about soccer games than theological debates, the "caliphate" movement, one that seeks to create some godly authority over large sections of the world, has no hope of winning. I would posit that most groups affiliated with AQ are in the end mostly interested in their own sordid little piece of the world, and while they might be willing to pay lip service to the idea of some grand pan-muslim alliance in order to get funds and know-how, any attempt to create any real unison would soon collapse under the weight of different languages, customs, and nations that make up the Muslim world, specially given that most Muslims aren't Arabs, yet the Arabs assume they will for some reason be given instant control.

In part because the west, and the arab neighbors, gave strong support to the govt of algeria to prevent an Islamist victory. I agree, that if we give that kind of support to Pakistan, an Islamist victory is most unlikely.

I never heard of any "strong support" for the government from the West. Mostly I heard complaints about the large violations of human rights everyone was going around committing. I am sure the represive regimes of the ME went along. but not like they had that much money. Once the fringe of the islamist began committing massacres, that turned a lot of regular Algerians against them.

[Berzerker]

Are you not a native English speaker or do you have Downs?

Why dont you actually back up your "observation" instead of insulting me with juvenile comments. Was opium production higher the year before the Taliban came to power? Yes. Was it higher the year after they lost power? Yes. What did I say? Opium production was higher under the people in power before and after the Taliban - that graph proves what I said. And you posted it - Brilliant!

The graph pretty clearly shows that the average for both the Soviets and the Warlords is smaller than the average for the Taliban. I'm not really sure how you can interpret the graph any other way.

I'm not counting the Soviet occupation (or averages), I'm counting the people who were in charge before and after the Taliban and opium production was higher for both than 6 of the 7 years of Taliban control. Second, the Taliban banned opium in 2000 and production for 2001 was way down, far below any level "achieved" by the warlords and the current gov't. The opium farmers were quite happy to see them go. Shall we ask them if the Taliban promoted opium production more than the warlords and the current rulers?

Also, it is more than a little misleading to take the figure immediately before the Taliban were in power and hold it up as the "Soviet/Warlord" average, and then take the figure immediately after the Taliban were deposed, and then hold up 2001 as being the "representative average" of the Taliban when there were obviously political and economic circumstances that were at play in 2001.

Strawmen are misleading too, I'm not using averages (and you shouldn't either) or the Soviets. Dont make up dumb arguments and attribute them to me and then accuse me of lying. The fact is: the Taliban lowered production when they got into power compared to their predecessors (the warlords in '94) and nearly eliminated it in 2001. Production then took off once they were out of power, and that graph backs up what I said. Look at trends, not averages. Production had been climbing and was high when they came into power and it was shut down within a few years before they were ousted.

Again, I'm not really sure what would possess you to think that such a presentation of the data will in any way support the contention that your conclusion corresponds at all with reality, given that you've just distorted the data to the point where it is entirely useless.

Looking at that graph and concluding the Taliban promoted more opium production than the people in power before and after them requires ignoring their ban and its effectiveness. If a gov't comes to power and nearly eliminates opium production in 6-7 years, most would call that a success. Do tell, how did the Taliban achieve such a reduction in opium if they were softer on opium production than the people before and after them?

[Tassadar500]

Originally posted by Lord Nuclear


Are you not a native English speaker or do you have Downs?

So are you going to pick one or are you going to force me to guess?

[Nubclear]

What did I say? Opium production was higher under the people in power before and after the Taliban - that graph proves what I said.

But what you are doing is saying "It was higher immediately before and immediately after the Taliban came into and exited from power", which is a true statement according to the graph, but then you switch aruond and say "Therefore production was higher under previous regiemes", which isn't true. One doesn't support the other, but you are acting as if they are entirely interchangable here - which, obviously, they aren't.

I'm not counting the Soviet occupation

Well, they would seem to be a "predecessor", unless of course you are just excluding data you don't like (which, given your "defence" of your position, seems to be the most likely explanation for why the Soviets suddenly don't count)

I'm counting the people who were in charge before and after the Taliban

Again, the Soviets (or the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) would seem fall under "in charge before [...] the Taliban". In fact, the DRA was a somewhat notable period in Afghan recent history.

opium production was higher for both than 6 of the 7 years of Taliban control.

But this statement is only true if you decide to exclude 14 out of 15 years prior to the Taliban taking power. We can do that, of course, but it renders everything basically useless for any sort of discussion at all: I could choose the US GDP from 1788 and compare it with the GDP of the Soviet Union and say "lol the soviet gdp was bigger!!!1", but obviously this would be a useless comparison and a highly dishonest presentation of the data.

and production for 2001 was way down, far below any level "achieved" by the warlords and the current gov't.

But this doesn't particularly support the contention that the rule of the Taliban was characterised by intense repression of opium production, particularly considering that it went down in the very last year of their rule.

I could say that the rule of the Soviet Union was characterised by internal chaos, expanding freedoms, and expanding market forces, and this would be true for the very last years of the Soviet Union, but obviously describing the period of Soviet administration using these words would, again, be highly dishonest.

Dont make up dumb arguments

In this discussion, sir, I'm not the one making up the dumb arguments.

the Taliban lowered production when they got into power compared to their predecessors

But again, the graph just doesn't support this. I'm not sure why this is so difficult for you to understand: If we look at the general rule of the Warlords, production continued basically as it was. We can include the outlier of 94, but then why would we exclude the outlier of 99? If we exclude both, the Taliban didn't do particularly much to production (it continued to, on average, go up until 2001), and if we include both, then the Taliban did lower production temporarily, but it spiked in 1999 anyway.

Again, your just drawing dishonest conclusions from your dishonest "analysis" of the data. You have a pet theory you want to hold on to, and so you are basically deliberately ignoring sections of the graph that conflict with it.

Look at trends, not averages.

And the trend shows: It was increasing up to about 1991, then it hit a bit of a plateau with an outlier in 1994, then it started increasing in 1997 until special circumstances prompted the Taliban to actually do something about it in 2001.

Looking at that graph and concluding the Taliban promoted more opium production than the people in power before and after them requires ignoring their ban and its effectiveness.

Requires ignoring a ban at the end of their existence prompted by special political circumstances in and around Afghanistan, whereas the rest of their rule was characterised by generally increasing production.
However, I'm not taking a position here: YOU are the one who said "The Taliban were far tougher on the opium trade than either their predecessors or successors", and the data shows that they only got tough at the end of their existence. As a general trend, they were not, and the graph does not support your contention, and you have provided no evidence that does.

You made an error in an internet debate, but instead of saying "oh" and moving on, you keep clinging onto it like everything you have ever believed depends on it, when clearly the data is against you here.

Hence, I'm sorry, but I have to conclude that you are either intentionally misreading the data or you have had a rather large failure of analysis.