Two Palestinian States?

[Ramo]

hani Kawassemeh, who didnt want PA forces used to stop terror attacks, apparently.

Do you have a source for this that, you know, isn't part of the Murdoch empire? JP relied on anonymous sources, probably Fatah partisans, for that claim, not something I'd put much trust in. Here's for instance, the NYT on the same matter.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/world/middleeast/23cnd-mideast.html?ex=1334980800&en=0fa9029edfecaa26&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

[Last Conformist]

According to an analysis piece in my newspaper, Fatah had almost 20k fighters in Gazah against a couple thousand Hamasniki. Are they really such utter ****s that they can't defend themselves against a lightly armed foe one fcuking tenth of their numbers?

[Sirotnikov]

Are they really such utter ****s

yes.
they are good at being goons, or performing small time terrorist attacks.

and they are very frightened and have a rotten chain of command.

this is, btw, a very good proof of why good commanders are imperative.

[Drake Tungsten]

yes.
they are good at being goons, or performing small time terrorist attacks.

and they are very frightened and have a rotten chain of command.

Which is why they're eventually going to lose J&S, as well.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ramo


Do you have a source for this that, you know, isn't part of the Murdoch empire? JP relied on anonymous sources, probably Fatah partisans, for that claim, not something I'd put much trust in. Here's for instance, the NYT on the same matter.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/wo...rssnyt&emc=rss

The Jerusalem Post is not now, and has never been owned by Murdoch, as far as I know. It WAS owned by Conrad Black, but is today owned by a Tel Aviv company. It is a respected, moderately right of center Israeli paper, that publishes a diversity of opinion, and has good news coverage.

I read both articles, and I dont beleive the NYT more than the JP on this.

Clearly Fatah didnt trust Kwasemmeh. If you want to believe Sy Hersh that this was because the Eevil Neocon Fatahniks were plotting a "hard coup" you may.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Last Conformist
According to an analysis piece in my newspaper, Fatah had almost 20k fighters in Gazah against a couple thousand Hamasniki. Are they really such utter ****s that they can't defend themselves against a lightly armed foe one fcuking tenth of their numbers?

Martin Indyk, writing in the Washington Post (owned by the Grahams, not Murdoch, its ok, Ramo) suggested that maybe Abbas is dumb like a fox (no not the Murdoch company, will you people please RELAX) on this one.

To Indyk, Abbas's unwillingness to have his troops fight offensively, his idol talk of ceasefires while Fatah positions were rolled up, was a sign not of his incompetence, but that he didnt WANT to hold Gaza. That Gaza was ungovernable anyway, and hed just as soon let it be Hamas's problem, and leave him free to do state building in WB.

Interesting POV, though its hard to see Dahlan accepting the loss of his own powerbase. Unless of course Abbas is ALSO trying to relieve himself of Dahlan.


Note - the Fatah troops on the ground fought pretty hard, given the tactical positions they were in, IIUC. What they lacked was any higher level strategy. Assuming Indyk was not correct, it could be explained by Dahlan being away from the scene, and him never (for political reasons, probably) having assigned a competent deputy. Siro, undoubtedly, will recall the Isreali leadership difficulties just prior to the 1967 war, and in 1973, and will imagine what a smaller "bench" would do to the Fatah forces.

Also my impression is that Hamas had close to 20,000 fighters as well, and Fatahs advantage in manpower was not large.

[Ramo]

lotm, my mistake about Murdoch (though I don't think we'll agree about the reputability of the JP), but you're ignoring the point. Anonymous sources within the PA. Surely you'd agree that large parts of Fatah have credibility issues.

And no, Hersh hasn't written much about this AFAIK. Though he does have a fascinating new article centering around an interview of Gen. Taguba, not reflecting well on the Bush Admin's vigilance against detainee abuse.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Ramo
lotm, my mistake about Murdoch (though I don't think we'll agree about the reputability of the JP), but you're ignoring the point. Anonymous sources within the PA. Surely you'd agree that large parts of Fatah have credibility issues.

So does the govt of KSA, which pushed the Mecca accords and the appointment of Kawassemah, IIUC.

I cant prove that Kawassemah was protecting Hamasniks firing rockets at Israel. But I see no proof that he was fair and genuinely independent, which was the assertion (IIRC) that got us started on this. I do not see that Fatahs unwillingness to put their armed groups under him as convincing proof of their perfidy.
Nor that they were planning a "hard coup". From all I could see they were planning a political maneuver to institute new elections, and they wanted a strong force to protect them when they did that and Hamas tried to stop the new elections.

Well, Hamas DID learn from June 1967 (and from many coups d'etats in history which were much closer models) and preemptively took power in Gaza.

Now lets see what happens.

[Ramo]

Incidentally, Daniel Levy has an interesting critique of the Indyk plan:

Hamas is now in control of Gaza after a cruel, if somewhat surprisingly easy, military victory over Fatah. The images coming out of the Palestinian territories have been harsh to say the least and neither side looks good to put it mildly. The spillover to the West Bank, thus far, has been limited to sporadic Fatah-revenge attacks against identifiable Hamas targets. President Abbas has declared a state of emergency and the disbanding of the unity government. These actions appear to be within the remit of his power, but only for a limited time period, after which Parliamentary approval would be required (and tricky given that the PLC is majority Hamas and that so many members are now in Israeli prisons). Abbas could call elections, that would be even more high-risk. Those who always viewed the political Islam of Hamas and responsible government as incompatible think they have been vindicated. They are wrong.

The situation is bleak, if predictable. The unity government arrangement was always a fragile one. The core group within both Fatah and Hamas who supported a national political accommodation between the factions were fighting a rearguard action against rejectionists from within their respective ranks from day one. The hopes for a functioning unity government were dealt a mortal blow when outside actors led by America and Israel, with the support also of certain Arab states and the complicity of Europe, all worked to undermine the government and strengthened those elements within Fatah striving to violently collapse the government.

Naturally, everyone is now looking for a way out and for a ray of hope in this desperate situation. That is a healthy human instinct, but the emerging plan articulated over the last days from many quarters and in danger of becoming entrenched, is a fantastical one – divorced from reality and far too similar to the previous failed policies that helped create this disaster. The emerging plan is known variously as promoting Fatahland, while punishing Hamastan, or West Bank first, or feed the West Bank/starve Gaza. There is no detailed elaboration of the plan yet, but its outline would look something like this:

Use the new reality as an opportunity to drive home the division between the West Bank-Fatahland and the Gaza-Hamastan.Visibly demonstrate to the Palestinians that Fatahland is a happy place with an advancing peace process, while Hamastan is a dark and hopeless place excluded from this march of peace. Ultimately, so the story goes, the Palestinians embrace the Fatah alternative. Hamas peacefully accepts the consequences or is militarily defeated and we all live happily ever after.

This vision may feature in next week’s Washington talks between President Bush and Prime Minister Olmert. The most sophisticated version of this approach, far more sophisticated than what today’s politicians are likely to come up with, appears in a Washington Post oped by Martin Indyk.

And in truth, it does sound attractive and it is understandable that many people including people of good will and members of the peace camp would begin to mobilize around this plan. It kills two birds with one stone – we are not only provided with a supposedly workable policy for supporting the goodies against the badies, but also given a pathway back to the peace process, as part of the plan would be for Olmert to negotiate with Abbas and perhaps, agree to further withdrawals and/or confidence building measures in the West Bank. A complex and difficult to understand situation suddenly is presented with great clarity and deemed amenable to attractive solutions.

As is clear from the above, I think this approach is wrong-headed and more of the same failed policies, rather than a departure from them. I want to explain why that is and what the alternatives might be.

Learning from how we got here

To understand the shortcomings of both the existing and proposed “new” policies, a little background is needed. I will try to keep this brief. There is sometimes a tendency to be dismissive of developments on the Palestinian side and choices that they make and to assume that one can reconfigure Palestinian reality by external edict with relative ease. I have attributed, I think justifiably, significant blame for the current predicament to external actors, but there are internal Palestinian dynamics at work whose significance should not be underestimated. Palestinian society has undergone a process of Islamasization or a deepening of religious trends in the last years that is part of a more general phenomenon in the Muslim world. Part of the Hamas ascendancy should be seen against that background.

The death of Arafat set in motion a period of Palestinian transition that was aching to happen (for an excellent explanation, see Rob Malley and Hussein Agha in the recent New York Review of Books). The era of single party Palestinian rule is in the past. It cannot be reimposed, nor should that be tried, some variation of Hamas is now a fixed feature of the Palestinian political landscape.

Another important lesson of the last years is that absence of an active peace process and an engaged US administration, does not apparently make Israeli and Palestinian hearts grow fonder. Rather, with no peace process to pin one’s hopes on, other, more destructive options, fill the vacuum and capture the public imagination. Any exercise in learning the lessons of what went wrong should include the need for a consistent drive towards peace as a linchpin for any constructive realistic policy alternative. And finally, the jury is in on unilateralism. It is, predictably, a woefully short-sighted approach.

It is 2007, not 2005

The emerging plan that I am critiquing here might have made sense in 2005 after the death of Arafat and Abbas becoming President in the run-up to Parliamentary elections. I, too (rightly or wrongly), advocated a variation of this approach in 2005. If the proponents of the Fatahland versus Hamastan plan have developed a time machine that can take us back to 2005, then they should come clean and reveal it. If not, they should not pretend that the last 24 months can be wished away. The toothpaste is out of the tube. Hamas democratically won an election deemed to be free and fair by outside observers. From that moment on, the policy pursued by Israel, America, most of Europe, and the Arab world has not been helpful. It has failed to deliver on its express purpose, namely strengthening Fatah against Hamas, and at the same time has weakened the realist camp within Hamas that was beginning to grapple with the practicalities and implications of entering the democratic process, it also set back, rather than advanced prospects for peace and security. Any policy predicated on this same premise will meet the same fate. A paradigm shift is called for.

Rather than encouraging whatever Hamas capacity for flexibility might have existed, the policy disempowered those very tendencies within the movement. The decision to boycott and not engage the Hamas government meant that the theory, whereby assuming a governing role can moderate militants-in-transition, was not put to the test in the Palestinian context. When the unity government was formed at Mecca between Fatah and Hamas, another opportunity was missed. That arrangement was fragile from day one, opposed, as it was by significant forces from within Fatah and Hamas. One option would have been to work to empower the core groups in both Fatah and Hamas and other factions who did want to give the Mecca deal a chance. This was not the option pursued by external actors. Israel and America sided with a faction within Fatah, whose goal was the collapse of the unity deal. With certain Arab support, financial, material, and even military assistance was provided to that faction within Fatah. It is true also that the Hamas military wing continued to receive similar external assistance from its supporters.

Europe strongly hinted to the Palestinians that if a unity government were to emerge, then the EU would end its diplomatic and financial embargo. The opposite happened and Europe, too, shoulders some responsibility for what has gone on. Inevitably, the assistance and weapons intended for Fatah are now in Hamas hands.

Less than three weeks ago, at a Congressional hearing, the American security envoy, General Dayton suggested that the security assistance package to the security forces of President Abbas should be supported and even contended that the national security forces were looking good against Hamas. They were routed this week. I think General Dayton is trying to make the best of an impossible mandate. Talking to only one side and getting the picture of the realities on the ground only through one lense, normally leads to bad policy.

Round one of defeating Hamas militarily has failed. Round two should not be tried. Its results will likely be terror emanating from the West Bank or the emergence of an al-Qaedist alternative to Hamas. This is an important part of looking at things as a simplistic Fatah-Hamas dichotomy. There is a third way. It is about al-Qaeda wannabes and copy-cats and they are likely to be the big winners if wise-heads fail to prevail.

Fuzzy headed thinking

Embracing the Fatahland versus Hamastan project would represent a willful denial of these past mistakes. The approach is a combination of fuzzy headed thinking and wishful thinking that is likely to undermine the prospects for both security and peace. In truth the plan is unlikely to get off the ground, but it may become the guiding policy orientation and block out other options. If it does begin to fly, here are some additional reasons why the plan is unlikely to work.

First, if Hamas sees such an effort being carried out, then it will be incentivized to create a security crisis emanating from the West Bank. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or renegade Fatah guns-for-hire will try to precipitate a violent clash from the West Bank. If, as is likely, they succeed, then Israel will quickly lose its appetite for any positive gestures it is making to Fatahland in the West Bank (easing of closures, redployment of IDF, etc).

Second, no Palestinian leadership that takes its domestic credibility seriously can pursue a position of cutting off the West Bank from Gaza, let alone starving Gaza over a period of time. It may sound attractive and, instinctively, in the heat of the moment, some Palestinians might even welcome it, but it is unsustainable. No Palestinian President or government can accept the situation whereby they cannot enter Gaza. Imagine a Palestinian government that accepts the PA tax monies that Israel is withholding, but spends them exclusively in the West Bank, while Gaza is suffering. Is that really the way to make Fatah popular again?!

Third, the Arab world and the Palestinian diaspora will not put up with such a situation over time. Supporting such a policy will only further weaken the already embattled Arab regimes in the eyes of their own publics and is likely to lead to unrest in the already volatile Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Such sentiments could even spill over with destabilizing consequences to the Palestinian community in Jordan. This really is head buried deep in the sand stuff. Finally, this is no basis on which to build a stable or sustainable peace process. Violence is likely to torpedo the process. An Abbas at war with Hamas is less of a partner than an Abbas who can deliver Hamas. That is the basic equation that needs to be recognized.

And one more fuzzy headed idea – deploying an international force in Gaza right now. A force deployment under the current circumstances and by powers, who neither recognize, nor engage with Hamas is ludicrous. Show me a military willing to deploy under such conditions and I suggest it is an army desperately in need of either cash or political guidance.

Getting Real: Sketching out an Alternative

Creating a working political accommodation between Fatah and Hamas has obviously just become much more difficult. Yet if allowed to fester, it could lead to an ongoing crisis and breakdown that will become ever more difficult to reverse. Harsh division within a given polity, wherever it is allowed to fester and especially when both sides are heavily armed rarely produces good results (see Lebanon, Iraq, Somalia).

In one respect, at least, the current escalation and breakdown perhaps presents one advantage – that the artificial unity of post Mecca has been exposed and that any future deal will clearly require deeper power-sharing and greater buy-in. There are still significant elements within Fatah and Hamas that understand the need for reconciliation sooner, rather than later. There are likely to be Arab-led or other efforts to bring Hamas and Fatah back to the table. Again, success will neither be easy, nor quick, but building an arrangement for deeper power sharing is the best option, certainly from a security and peace perspective. This will require a different delineation of security responsibilities and incorporation of militias and an agreed upon stabilization plan that would win international support. The international policy of divide and rule will have to find its resting place, along with the more aggressive version of selective engagement. Europeans, Arabs, and others should begin to explore the parameters for a deeper power-sharing arrangement with the two parties. Efforts should be made to cease the arming up of either side, importantly this should include the flow of weapons from Egypt into Gaza. If the Bush administration cannot sign on to this change in policy direction, it should at least do no harm, sit this round out, and let others take the lead.

In the meantime, Israel and Hamas will have to sober up and find ways to conduct their interaction over urgent humanitarian issues, such as food, power, water, and medical supplies. The two main criteria for calibrating progress with Hamas should be security and respect for the rule of law and democratic process (this should apply to Fatah also). Interestingly, a Hamas-led Gaza may be better able to impose security discipline – no Qassams have been fired in the last days. Israel should be seriously exploring, via intermediaries, the possibility of a comprehensive ceasefire. Hamas should see to the immediate freeing of the BBC’s Alan Johnston and negotiate a deal for the release of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit. Rather than hurtling towards new elections, the Fatah-Hamas Humpty Dumpty needs to be put together again.

A renewed negotiating process will require Israeli and Palestinian partners. The Israeli side of that equation is problematic, but not our immediate subject. The Palestinian side must have credibility -- in Palestine, not Washington -- and recreate a Palestinian national agenda. There are people in Fatah and Hamas still trying to do that, the Prisoner's Document is an example. Their success should matter to Israelis and Americans seeking to advance their own respective national interests and security, and working to re-stabilize the Middle East. The alternatives are appealing, but illusory and their pursuit is plain dangerous.

http://www.prospectsforpeace.com/2007/06/what_next_on_palestine_time_to.html

I don't see this sort of policy as all that clever if Abbas is consciously persuing it...

[Ramo]

So does the govt of KSA, which pushed the Mecca accords and the appointment of Kawassemah, IIUC.

An appointment Abbas consented to...

I cant prove that Kawassemah was protecting Hamasniks firing rockets at Israel. But I see no proof that he was fair and genuinely independent, which was the assertion (IIRC) that got us started on this. I do not see that Fatahs unwillingness to put their armed groups under him as convincing proof of their perfidy.
Nor that they were planning a "hard coup". From all I could see they were planning a political maneuver to institute new elections, and they wanted a strong force to protect them when they did that and Hamas tried to stop the new elections.

Dahlan's militia actually took to the streets after rejecting the integration order. Certainly not folks trying to avoid a fight.

[lord of the mark]

The situation is bleak, if predictable. The unity government arrangement was always a fragile one. The core group within both Fatah and Hamas who supported a national political accommodation between the factions were fighting a rearguard action against rejectionists from within their respective ranks from day one.

Interesting rhetorical turn of phrase. "Rejectionists" are those opposed to a Hamas-Fatah unity govt. A govt that would included Hamasniks refusing to accept Israel, who in most folks terminology are "rejectionists"
I would say this indicates the attitude of the author of this article. IMHO the unity govt was fragile because it conflicted with Abbas's commitment to the peace process, as long as Hamas retained its positions in denial of the peace process, which it had done, despite some weasel words.

The hopes for a functioning unity government were dealt a mortal blow when outside actors led by America and Israel, with the support also of certain Arab states and the complicity of Europe, all worked to undermine the government

Ah, blaming the West for opposing a govt that would by its existence undermine the peace process.

and strengthened those elements within Fatah striving to violently collapse the government.

If you agree that Dahlan was attempting to do so by violence, and not by politics.

This vision may feature in next week’s Washington talks between President Bush and Prime Minister Olmert. The most sophisticated version of this approach, far more sophisticated than what today’s politicians are likely to come up with, appears in a Washington Post oped by Martin Indyk.

In fact theres no detailed plan, and Indyk did not present one, as its too early, and too much depends on many imponderables, including Hamas behavior.

And in truth, it does sound attractive and it is understandable that many people including people of good will and members of the peace camp would begin to mobilize around this plan. It kills two birds with one stone – we are not only provided with a supposedly workable policy for supporting the goodies against the badies, but also given a pathway back to the peace process, as part of the plan would be for Olmert to negotiate with Abbas and perhaps, agree to further withdrawals and/or confidence building measures in the West Bank. A complex and difficult to understand situation suddenly is presented with great clarity and deemed amenable to attractive solutions.

It is not clear, nothing in the ME is, but nice straw man.

There is sometimes a tendency to be dismissive of developments on the Palestinian side and choices that they make and to assume that one can reconfigure Palestinian reality by external edict with relative ease. I have attributed, I think justifiably, significant blame for the current predicament to external actors, but there are internal Palestinian dynamics at work whose significance should not be underestimated. Palestinian society has undergone a process of Islamasization or a deepening of religious trends in the last years that is part of a more general phenomenon in the Muslim world. Part of the Hamas ascendancy should be seen against that background.

The death of Arafat set in motion a period of Palestinian transition that was aching to happen (for an excellent explanation, see Rob Malley and Hussein Agha in the recent New York Review of Books).

Rob Malley has made a personal industry out of denying what his bosses, Bill Clinton and Dennis Ross, said about what happened at Camp David and Taba. He is NOT a credible source.

The era of single party Palestinian rule is in the past. It cannot be reimposed, nor should that be tried, some variation of Hamas is now a fixed feature of the Palestinian political landscape.

I hope that Fatah does not attempt to impose one part rule in the WB. I would hope there is political space for independence and 3rd way Pals. I note the Fayed cabinet is mainly independents, and I also note that the civilian wing of Hamas doesnt seem to have been banned.

Another important lesson of the last years is that absence of an active peace process and an engaged US administration, does not apparently make Israeli and Palestinian hearts grow fonder. Rather, with no peace process to pin one’s hopes on, other, more destructive options, fill the vacuum and capture the public imagination.

An active peace process is a good idea, but doesnt necessarily need an engaged US admin. Note that Oslo was achieved without US input.

Any exercise in learning the lessons of what went wrong should include the need for a consistent drive towards peace as a linchpin for any constructive realistic policy alternative.

And that is what is intended, a peace process between Israel and a viable partner.

And finally, the jury is in on unilateralism. It is, predictably, a woefully short-sighted approach.

I dont agree. I still think Israel is better off than it would have been staying in Gaza.

It is 2007, not 2005

The emerging plan that I am critiquing here might have made sense in 2005 after the death of Arafat and Abbas becoming President in the run-up to Parliamentary elections. I, too (rightly or wrongly), advocated a variation of this approach in 2005. If the proponents of the Fatahland versus Hamastan plan have developed a time machine that can take us back to 2005, then they should come clean and reveal it. If not, they should not pretend that the last 24 months can be wished away. The toothpaste is out of the tube. Hamas democratically won an election deemed to be free and fair by outside observers.

So? they also denied the basis for that election which was the Oslo accords. They continued a policy of war and terror, and they lost popularity sufficiently as to fear a new election.

From that moment on, the policy pursued by Israel, America, most of Europe, and the Arab world has not been helpful.

On what basis does he say this?

It has failed to deliver on its express purpose, namely strengthening Fatah against Hamas,

No, it was strengthening Fatah politically, but failed to strengthen them sufficiently to win militarily with Dahlan absent from Gaza.

and at the same time has weakened the realist camp within Hamas that was beginning to grapple with the practicalities and implications of entering the democratic process,

I see no evidence that any such camp was a significant force in Hamas, or independent of the most extremist forces. Constantly catering to this "moderate" element was undermining the propeace elements in Israel. Why not cater to the moderates in the settler movement?

it also set back, rather than advanced prospects for peace and security. Any policy predicated on this same premise will meet the same fate. A paradigm shift is called for.

It only set back the prospects of peace, IF the Indyk concept is wrong, so it cannot be used as a basis for showing Indyk is wrong. This is circular reasoning.

Rather than encouraging whatever Hamas capacity for flexibility might have existed,

If that capacity was minimal, it wasnt worth encouraging at the cost of strengthening Hamas overall.

the policy disempowered those very tendencies within the movement. The decision to boycott and not engage the Hamas government meant that the theory, whereby assuming a governing role can moderate militants-in-transition, was not put to the test in the Palestinian context.

They HAD the opportunity to easily undermine the boycott by seriously discussing the issues that were at the core of the boycott. They did NOT.

When the unity government was formed at Mecca between Fatah and Hamas, another opportunity was missed. That arrangement was fragile from day one, opposed, as it was by significant forces from within Fatah and Hamas. One option would have been to work to empower the core groups in both Fatah and Hamas and other factions who did want to give the Mecca deal a chance. This was not the option pursued by external actors. Israel and America sided with a faction within Fatah, whose goal was the collapse of the unity deal.

hes repeating exactly what he said above. See above.

With certain Arab support, financial, material, and even military assistance was provided to that faction within Fatah. It is true also that the Hamas military wing continued to receive similar external assistance from its supporters.

No, Hamas received it. Theres no evidence that any formal part of Hamas opposed the miltiary wing.

Europe strongly hinted to the Palestinians that if a unity government were to emerge, then the EU would end its diplomatic and financial embargo. The opposite happened and Europe, too, shoulders some responsibility for what has gone on.

IIUC, Europes hints were based on a unity govt that would be prepared to recognize Oslo, renounce terror, etc. Which the Unity govt never did. If Europe hinted at support on a basis short of that, that was indeed a mistake - but its not a mistake Mr Indyk seems to have ever supported.

Inevitably, the assistance and weapons intended for Fatah are now in Hamas hands.

Its hardly inevitable, wars are contingent.

Less than three weeks ago, at a Congressional hearing, the American security envoy, General Dayton suggested that the security assistance package to the security forces of President Abbas should be supported and even contended that the national security forces were looking good against Hamas. They were routed this week. I think General Dayton is trying to make the best of an impossible mandate. Talking to only one side and getting the picture of the realities on the ground only through one lense, normally leads to bad policy.

AFAICT even Hamas was surprised at the course of the battle.

Round one of defeating Hamas militarily has failed. Round two should not be tried.

The next round is intended to be politcal and economic, not military.

Its results will likely be terror emanating from the West Bank

While Hamasniks on the WB will have an incentive to undermine Fatah by launching such terror attacks, I beleive they can be stopped, and I think improving material conditions will make such attacks less and less popular.

or the emergence of an al-Qaedist alternative to Hamas.

They can be contained in Gaza.

This is an important part of looking at things as a simplistic Fatah-Hamas dichotomy. There is a third way. It is about al-Qaeda wannabes and copy-cats and they are likely to be the big winners if wise-heads fail to prevail.

We needed to accept that Fatah couldnt crackdown on terror, cause of Hamas. Now we need to go easy on Hamas to avoid AQ. This line of argument will never go away, no matter how little sense it makes.

Fuzzy headed thinking


First, if Hamas sees such an effort being carried out, then it will be incentivized to create a security crisis emanating from the West Bank. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or renegade Fatah guns-for-hire will try to precipitate a violent clash from the West Bank. If, as is likely, they succeed, then Israel will quickly lose its appetite for any positive gestures it is making to Fatahland in the West Bank (easing of closures, redployment of IDF, etc).

That is why its essential for Fatah to crack down on armed elements of Hamas, on IJ, and ultimately on any Fatah elements that are not in the chain of command. However Israel has repeatedly said it expects 100% effort from the PA, NOT 100% results, and if 100% effort is there, I doubt Israel will stop making gestures. Meanwhile such actions by Hamas will further weaken there standing in world opinion.

Second, no Palestinian leadership that takes its domestic credibility seriously can pursue a position of cutting off the West Bank from Gaza,

I doubt the Abbas govt will want a 100% cutoff, nor is one required. They will continue to try to influence events in Gaza.

let alone starving Gaza over a period of time.

Israel has made very clear they dont want to suspend food deliveries. This article is arguing against a straw man.

It may sound attractive and, instinctively, in the heat of the moment, some Palestinians might even welcome it, but it is unsustainable. No Palestinian President or government can accept the situation whereby they cannot enter Gaza. Imagine a Palestinian government that accepts the PA tax monies that Israel is withholding, but spends them exclusively in the West Bank, while Gaza is suffering. Is that really the way to make Fatah popular again?!

They may well spend some money on Gaza, but attempt to spend it on govt officials loyal to them. If hamas refuses that, does the unpopularity accrue to Fatah or to Hamas?

Third, the Arab world and the Palestinian diaspora will not put up with such a situation over time.

The arab street can see life improving for the WB, and they can see how Hamas is responsible for what is happening in Gaza.

Supporting such a policy will only further weaken the already embattled Arab regimes in the eyes of their own publics and is likely to lead to unrest in the already volatile Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

The refugee camps are volatile cause Syria is sponsoring combat there.

Such sentiments could even spill over with destabilizing consequences to the Palestinian community in Jordan.

The pals in Jordan are quite aware of what goes on in the territories. They are aware of the pragmatic reasons for Abbas to spend aid money in the WB, and the reasons not to spend it in Gaza. And the Jordanian govt, surely is better informed on public opinion in Jordan than Mr Levy is.

This really is head buried deep in the sand stuff. Finally, this is no basis on which to build a stable or sustainable peace process. Violence is likely to torpedo the process. An Abbas at war with Hamas is less of a partner than an Abbas who can deliver Hamas. That is the basic equation that needs to be recognized.

A lexus would be better than the Honda that I drive, but I cant afford a Lexus, and the honda works pretty well. Of course it would be better if Abbas could deliver hamas FOR PEACE, but he cant, and Abbas in a determined political/economic competition with Hamas (including banning Hamas forces on the WB) will be far better than any partner Israel has had among the pals, well, in fact, EVER.

And one more fuzzy headed idea – deploying an international force in Gaza right now. A force deployment under the current circumstances and by powers, who neither recognize, nor engage with Hamas is ludicrous. Show me a military willing to deploy under such conditions and I suggest it is an army desperately in need of either cash or political guidance.

HEre I agree. Theres not going to be an international force IN Gaza anytime soon. A force to help the Egytians with the Rafah crossing might be viable, though.

Getting Real: Sketching out an Alternative

Creating a working political accommodation between Fatah and Hamas has obviously just become much more difficult. Yet if allowed to fester, it could lead to an ongoing crisis and breakdown that will become ever more difficult to reverse. Harsh division within a given polity, wherever it is allowed to fester and especially when both sides are heavily armed rarely produces good results (see Lebanon, Iraq, Somalia).

See Kurdistan, Puntland, etc.

In one respect, at least, the current escalation and breakdown perhaps presents one advantage – that the artificial unity of post Mecca has been exposed and that any future deal will clearly require deeper power-sharing and greater buy-in. There are still significant elements within Fatah and Hamas that understand the need for reconciliation sooner, rather than later. There are likely to be Arab-led or other efforts to bring Hamas and Fatah back to the table. Again, success will neither be easy, nor quick, but building an arrangement for deeper power sharing is the best option, certainly from a security and peace perspective. This will require a different delineation of security responsibilities and incorporation of militias and an agreed upon stabilization plan that would win international support.

International support should continue to require affirmation of the Oslo process.

The international policy of divide and rule will have to find its resting place, along with the more aggressive version of selective engagement. Europeans, Arabs, and others should begin to explore the parameters for a deeper power-sharing arrangement with the two parties.

Efforts should be made to cease the arming up of either side, importantly this should include the flow of weapons from Egypt into Gaza. If the Bush administration cannot sign on to this change in policy direction, it should at least do no harm, sit this round out, and let others take the lead.

Theres not much reason to arm up Fatah, theyre not attacking Gaza. They should be armed sufficiently to maintain order on the WB.

In the meantime, Israel and Hamas will have to sober up and find ways to conduct their interaction over urgent humanitarian issues, such as food, power, water, and medical supplies.

Israel has already taken steps in that direction.

The two main criteria for calibrating progress with Hamas should be security and respect for the rule of law and democratic process (this should apply to Fatah also). Interestingly, a Hamas-led Gaza may be better able to impose security discipline – no Qassams have been fired in the last days.

But how much of that is due to Hamas knowing Israel would react with less restraint now?

Israel should be seriously exploring, via intermediaries, the possibility of a comprehensive ceasefire.

While Israel can and should act with restraint while there are no attacks, I see no reason to go beyond that minimum. Certainly signing a "20 year truce" that doesnt involved recognition of Israel makes no sense.

Hamas should see to the immediate freeing of the BBC’s Alan Johnston

They'll probably have to do that to keep on the good side of euro lefties.

and negotiate a deal for the release of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit.

Will they require 700 bloodstained terrorists in return?

Rather than hurtling towards new elections, the Fatah-Hamas Humpty Dumpty needs to be put together again.

HD could never be put back together again, that was the point. Meanwhile Fatah, to have a strong bargaining position in ANY talks with Hamas, and do have the ability to maintain order in the WB, needs legitimacy, and elections would be an excellent way to reinforce their legitimacy. Interesting that Mr. Levy wants to avoid those, just as Hamas has feared new elections.

A renewed negotiating process will require Israeli and Palestinian partners. The Israeli side of that equation is problematic, but not our immediate subject. The Palestinian side must have credibility -- in Palestine, not Washington -- and recreate a Palestinian national agenda. There are people in Fatah and Hamas still trying to do that, the Prisoner's Document is an example. Their success should matter to Israelis and Americans seeking to advance their own respective national interests and security, and working to re-stabilize the Middle East. The alternatives are appealing, but illusory and their pursuit is plain dangerous.

The above is a flawed article, filled with assertions about the arab street on the basis of no empirical evidence, straw men, circular reasoning, and 20/20 hindsight.

[lord of the mark]

[QUOTE] Originally posted by Ramo

So does the govt of KSA, which pushed the Mecca accords and the appointment of Kawassemah, IIUC.

An appointment Abbas consented to...

I agree that Abbas made mistakes in leaning over backwards to create a unity govt.

I cant prove that Kawassemah was protecting Hamasniks firing rockets at Israel. But I see no proof that he was fair and genuinely independent, which was the assertion (IIRC) that got us started on this. I do not see that Fatahs unwillingness to put their armed groups under him as convincing proof of their perfidy.
Nor that they were planning a "hard coup". From all I could see they were planning a political maneuver to institute new elections, and they wanted a strong force to protect them when they did that and Hamas tried to stop the new elections.

Dahlan's militia actually took to the streets after rejecting the integration order. Certainly not folks trying to avoid a fight.

Hamas was also in the streets at the time, IIUC. Certainly with the expectation that Hamas would resist a new election by force, it was not irrational for Dahlan to try to weaken Hamas in anticipation. Hamas isnt the only group that can learn from June '67.

[lord of the mark]

BTW, the above came from a site sponsored by the New America Foundation. Here are some of their associates.



Steven Clemons: Director, American Strategy Program; Senior Fellow
Gary Hart: Distinguished Fellow, American Strategy Program

Flynt Leverett: Director, Geopolitics of Energy Initiative; Senior Fellow
Anatol Lieven: Senior Research Fellow, American Strategy Program
Maria Figueroa Kupcu: Co-Director, Privatization of Foreign Policy Initiative; Senior Research Fellow
Ghaith Al-Omari: Senior Fellow
Michael A. Cohen: Co-Director, Privatization of Foreign Policy Initiative; Senior Research Fellow
Parag Khanna: Director, Global Governance Initiative; Fellow
Jeffrey G. Lewis: Director, Nuclear Strategy & Nonproliferation Initiative
Priscilla Lewis: Deputy Director, American Strategy Program; Director, U.S. in the World
Sue Veres Royal: Deputy Director, U.S. in the World
Sameer Lalwani: Policy Analyst, American Strategy Program



Not exactly unbiased on Israel and the ME. But since theyre not owned by Murdoch or Black, I suppose we must let that pass.

[lord of the mark]

An opinion piece from the english version of Yediot Aharonot


"Window of opportunity
Gaza upheaval could enable Israel to reach agreement with moderate Fatah

Carmi Gillon Published: 06.18.07, 13:08 / Israel Opinion

During the period of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, the question of connecting the Palestinian Authority's two parts, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, was the most complex issue.

I remember hours of discussions where miles of virtual roads, train tracks, bridges and tunnels were paved and constructed in a bid to resolve the problem – but there was no solution.

None of the negotiators – Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans – came up with the simplest idea, to establish two separate entities. The Palestinians now came along and did their thing, and by doing so resolved at least this problem.

In the immediate term, Israel has been presented with the opportunity to initiate a rapid diplomatic move following a period of long freeze since the Palestinian Authority elections. Israel needs to maintain different policies vis-à-vis the two entities it faces and act based on the realization that the new reality is limited in time.


At the end of this period the Palestinians will find – through intensive Arab mediation, particularly on Egypt's part – channels for new dialogue. Until then, if Israel is able to create a new horizon, there is a chance we will be rewarded by this reality.


At this time, the Fatah organization and its moderate leaders control the most problematic area with the greatest potential to constitute a strategic threat on Israel – the West Bank. As opposed to Gaza, the West Bank has the longest border with Israel and is replete with hundreds of settlements and Israeli outposts.


Hundreds of thousands of Israelis travel across the Green Line and within the West Bank every day. In this state of affairs, there is no possibility for a unilateral solution such as the disengagement. At this time, a window of opportunity has been created for an agreement with Fatah.


As long as the memory of the massacre undertaken by Hamas against Fatah members in Gaza will be fresh in the minds of Fatah's West Ban leaders, we can hope that they would finally realize that the snake, in the form of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, constitutes a threat to them no less than it does to Israel. As a result, we should hope, they will operate against West Bank terror cells.


In order to realize this opportunity Israel must immediately hand over withheld PA funds to the Salam Fayyad's government, embark on negotiations on the release of Fatah prisoners only, and present a plan, conditioned on the security situation, to remove West Bank checkpoints.


Meanwhile, Israel should address the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip in a tough manner, but completely refrain from being dragged to humanitarian sanctions, which have always served as a boomerang against us.



There are a million and a half people residing in the Gaza Strip, with only thousands of them being our enemies. Israel needs to ensure open channels food and medicine supply for residents through international organizations. We must continue, under all circumstances, to provide electricity and water, particularly now during summer.


Humanitarian aid that cannot be offered without Israel's consent must be leveraged day and night on the public relations front vis-à-vis the Palestinian target audience in the Strip and the West Bank.


At the same time, we must impose complete sanctions on anything that cannot be characterized as humanitarian, such as the export of goods or transfer of money. Israel must announce that it would be willing to discuss those issues only after we see calm prevail on our southern border and progress in the contacts to release abducted IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.


The war against terror did not cease and Israel should continue operating in the Strip in order to thwart terrorism and curb terror leaders' freedom of movement.


The time available to Israel in this sensitive reality is short, and our government would do well to formulate a policy and direct its ministries to act in accordance with it in order to get the most out of the window of opportunity created here today.

[Ramo]

lotm has tunred into a libertarian

Before I delve into all that (later), I'd like to point out one major problem to the Indyk plan:

Once he controls the territory, he could make a peace deal with Israel that establishes a Palestinian state with provisional borders in the West Bank and the Arab suburbs of East Jerusalem.

As, IIRC, Matt Yglesias has pointed out, there's practically no constitutency for that kind of border among Pals. There would need to be some sort of joint sovereignty worked out in the Old City, otherwise Abbas would be crucified.