Something's fishy there.
The United States started rapprochement with Red China during the late 60s. Kissinger first visited the PRC in 1971, the famous summit of Nixon and Mao was in 1972. This is exactly the time when the US began the 'Vietnamization' of the conflict in SE Asia, when the conflict had reache dsuch a scale of escalation that there was no option but retreat - "peace in honor".
It's impossible hat the PAVN / VC only received support from the USSR. Even if the PRC didn't contribute anything, material support from the Soviets still had to be shipped through China, it being highly unlikely (in my civilian estimate) that it came in by ships, assuming the US had naval supremacy in the region.
So how am I supposed to interpret the changes in the late 60s/ early 70s. How substantial was support from the major communist powers for Vietnam? During the Sino-Soviet split / divergence that occured during the same time (and that probably made Sino-American reapprochement feasible), the Vietnamese commies stayed aligned with the USSR. So you'd suppose Chinese cooperation would decrease, yet they didn't become any weaker, as the 1972 offensive shows.
Assuming China played along all the time, how could the US-PRC reapprochement work so easily? Was there a deal like "you let Vietnam go commie (though pro-Soviet) and we agree on reapprochement in order to become your proxies against the USSR" from the PRC point of view?
It just doesn't seem to make a lot of sense. But then maybe the PRC, though in want of some sort of reapprochement to the US, was still happier with a pro-Soviet regime in the South than with a pro-US one. Then on the other hand they invaded in 1979, so it just doesn't figure...
Been reading mostly Wiki so far. Lots of data, but little to know strategic analysis. What do our military guys / IR specialists have to say about this?
The United States started rapprochement with Red China during the late 60s. Kissinger first visited the PRC in 1971, the famous summit of Nixon and Mao was in 1972. This is exactly the time when the US began the 'Vietnamization' of the conflict in SE Asia, when the conflict had reache dsuch a scale of escalation that there was no option but retreat - "peace in honor".
It's impossible hat the PAVN / VC only received support from the USSR. Even if the PRC didn't contribute anything, material support from the Soviets still had to be shipped through China, it being highly unlikely (in my civilian estimate) that it came in by ships, assuming the US had naval supremacy in the region.
So how am I supposed to interpret the changes in the late 60s/ early 70s. How substantial was support from the major communist powers for Vietnam? During the Sino-Soviet split / divergence that occured during the same time (and that probably made Sino-American reapprochement feasible), the Vietnamese commies stayed aligned with the USSR. So you'd suppose Chinese cooperation would decrease, yet they didn't become any weaker, as the 1972 offensive shows.
Assuming China played along all the time, how could the US-PRC reapprochement work so easily? Was there a deal like "you let Vietnam go commie (though pro-Soviet) and we agree on reapprochement in order to become your proxies against the USSR" from the PRC point of view?
It just doesn't seem to make a lot of sense. But then maybe the PRC, though in want of some sort of reapprochement to the US, was still happier with a pro-Soviet regime in the South than with a pro-US one. Then on the other hand they invaded in 1979, so it just doesn't figure...
Been reading mostly Wiki so far. Lots of data, but little to know strategic analysis. What do our military guys / IR specialists have to say about this?
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