WW2 - the Axis in the Mediterrenean

[BeBMan]

In 41 the Royal Navy already had gained the upper hand in the Med vs. Italy (after the Taranto raid in late 1940 and the win at Cape Matapan march 41), I think you seriously overestimate axis capabilities here.

[Fake Boris]

I don't see where I've been talking about large-scale naval strategies.

Besides, one would assume Germany to intervene right in summer 1940 on the Mediterranean front (with planes at least), supposing it's their strategy.

[BeBMan]

Well, that was mainly against the "the Italian fleet can make it to the Atlantic" and "Italian raiders" part.....at this time the Italians already played their "fleet in being" game because they were too scared to lose the rest of the once proud Regia Marina....

[Sandman]

Axis forces seize Gibraltar

Remember that this means they almost certainly lose the Canary Islands and Equatorial Guinea to the UK, and that if the war goes badly for them, the Balearics and Spanish Morocco as well. Not much of a swap.

[Fake Boris]

Well, hasn't it been documented that Franco was willing to join the war in exchange for French Morocco ?

Was he just making knowingly unreasonable demands so as to have a convenient pretext, or did he really mean it ?

[Sandman]

Re: Re: WW2 - the Axis in the Mediterrenean

Originally posted by lord of the mark
I think that theres very little that could have plausibly led to an Axis victory in WW2. Allied victory in that war happens to be one of the most overdetermined outcomes in modern history. To the extent an axis victory is even possible, with a post-1939 POD, it requires either a UK offer for a negotiated peace BEFORE Dunkirk, well before the BoB, or things going vastly better for the Germans in Russia in summer of 1941 (and some of the more widely discussed possibilitied dont do it)

Had the Germans managed their economy more effectively (say, if Speer was promoted two years earlier), the outcome could have been quite different. Fortunately, the Nazi ideology didn't place much emphasis on economics, and their chaotic bureaucracy inhibited the adoption of mass production.

[Myrddin]

Originally posted by Oncle Boris
Well, hasn't it been documented that Franco was willing to join the war in exchange for French Morocco ?

Was he just making knowingly unreasonable demands so as to have a convenient pretext, or did he really mean it ?

As has been pointed out, Spanish involvement means:

losing the Canary Islands
blockade and no more oil and other imports
SOE encouraging Spanish guerilla warfare

Franco made a reasonable choice

[Fake Boris]

Originally posted by Myrddin


As has been pointed out, Spanish involvement means:

losing the Canary Islands

OK, but if the plan goes well, this loss is temporary, right ?

blockade and no more oil and other imports

This I don't believe - if the Mediterranean becomes an Axis lake (Suez-Gibraltar) then Spain is likely not strangled.

SOE encouraging Spanish guerilla warfare

Giving Franco a pretext for a Patriot Act ? he'd have loved it

Franco made a reasonable choice

I agree, but I still think that a Mediterranean strategy could have worked.

[Dr Strangelove]

I think it's documented that Spain didn't want to join the war because Spain was in no shape to support a war effort and he was never fully convinced that the Axis was going to win it. Furthermore until the invasion of the western coasts of North Africa by the Allies Morroco wasn't Hitler's to give away, it was a colony of Vichy France.

Supply lines were an enormous problem for the Axis in the western desert. They were under continual attack by Allied airpower and land raiders. People today don't realise that the German (and Italian) army's in WW2 were generally highly dependent on animal transport to relay supplies from railheads to the front line. Animals also moved artillery. The typical Wehrmacht division used more than 1000 animals for transportation. I'm not sure if that includes those devoted to moving the artillery. In the Sahara desert this wasn't possible so everything had to be moved by truck. I'd guess that the average division in North Africa required 5 to 10 times more motor transport than the average German division deployed in Europe. You can imagine how the commanders of other fronts felt about that. Remember, the Germans came a lot closer to seizing the Soviet Union's oilfields than they did to seizing the oilfields of the Middle East.
Actually the main oil supply for the British Isles prior to the entry of the US into the war was Trinidad.

[Fake Boris]

Didn't most supply problems (not all) arise from the failure to neutralize Malta ?

Seeing what Rommel was able to do despite all problems, it appears quite evident that control of the Mediterranean would have resulted in a swift victory.

[Sandman]

Originally posted by Oncle Boris
OK, but if the plan goes well, this loss is temporary, right ?

Possibly, although I tend to think that the U.S. would not tolerate an Axis base in the Canary islands.

[Dr Strangelove]

Originally posted by Oncle Boris
Didn't most supply problems (not all) arise from the failure to neutralize Malta ?

Air interdiction of the seas between Italy and Tunisia was only part of the problem, the Axis did after all manage to suppress the Malta based RAF for awhile any way, but there was also a problem of transporting material from the ports to the front.

Seeing what Rommel was able to do despite all problems, it appears quite evident that control of the Mediterranean would have resulted in a swift victory.

Rommel also took advantage of the diversion of Allied forces from the western desert due to action on other fronts. In early 1942, a few months after the British drove the axis back from Tobruk the Japanese invaded Malaysia and Burma forcing the British to divert forces from Africa. Consequently the British were unable to prosecute their gains or even consolidate a new defensive position in Libya. Rommel took advantage of this situation. El Alamein however provided a natural defensive position. The geographic depression south of El Alamein was quite impassable, so the zone of conflict was considerably narrowed, a situation favoring the defender. Finally, the British maintained a very large reserve in Egypt. There were actually more troops in reserve than there were on the front lines.

[Deity Dude]

Re: WW2 - the Axis in the Mediterrenean

Originally posted by Oncle Boris
When people speak of outcomes that could have lead to an Axis victory in WW2, it usually boils down to the three following 'mistakes' :

a) Hitler's decision of bombing British cities instead of concentrating on RAF infrastructure in August '40 ;
b) Going for Ukraine instead of Leningrad and Moscow, in the summer of '41 ;
c) failure to devote sufficient forces to the Mediterranean front.

EDIT: misspelled 'Mediterranean' in the thread title

How about letting the French and British escape at Dunkirk?

Attacking Russia, especially before defeating England?

Signing the treaty with Japan that allowed the Japanese to force the US into the European War.

[Lord Avalon]

Actually, Japan did not force the US into the European war - it was Germany's declaration of war on the US which enabled the US to go to war there. If Germany had not declared war, FDR would have had a hard time getting a declaration of war on Germany.

Tripartite Pact ARTICLE THREE

Germany, Italy and Japan agree to co-operate in their efforts on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/triparti.htm

The US did not attack Japan, therefore Germany was not obligated to declare war on the US.

(BTW, I have no idea why there is an Avalon Project at Yale Law School. )

[molly bloom]

Originally posted by Oncle Boris
Well, hasn't it been documented that Franco was willing to join the war in exchange for French Morocco ?

Was he just making knowingly unreasonable demands so as to have a convenient pretext, or did he really mean it ?

Vichy France was not really in a position to refuse Hitler anything; but the essay in the book I've mentioned has Hitler convincing Franco to go to war before Taranto and the air strike on the Italian fleet at anchor.

Franco's Spain was still recovering from a devastating civil war, and all the destruction and distrust such a war entails.

The conquest of Gibraltar could have been the 'Falklands factor' for the new regime; a hoped-for easy victory which unites the whole of the populace behind the Franco regime.