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Ned says:
Yes, a conspiracy. That's why the subtitle of the book is "The Conspiracy Behind the Escape of the Goeben & Breslau".
Sadly, you are completely unaware about which conspiracy Mr. Miller is talking: he is talking about a conspiracy IN ATHENS, NOT IN LONDON, and this conspiracy is aimed AGAINST THE BRITISH, including Churchill. The entire 2nd part of Superior Force deals with this anti-British conspiracy. Admit it, you haven't read it, like you haven't read the diary of the American diplomat in Brussels although you said you had.
Lets talk about this Greek conspiracy. Greek was neutral, and a British officer, Adm. Kerr, was in command of the Greek navy. The Greek King wanted his country to remain neutral because he thought that Greece would be crushed in a war against the Central Powers. Adm. Kerr, for dubious personal reasons, decided to support the King in this decision, thus conspiring against his home country, Britain. Some quotes:
"Kerr had been convinced by the King that, in the interests of self-preservation, neutrality was the only course Greece could sensibly adopt; but could this be squared with a calculated decision to let two enemy ships escape? Was there another way? For the moment, Kerr could do nothing. The Kaiser’s impetuous telegram provided Kerr with the knowledge of Souchon’s eventual destination, yet, if he simply informed Milne that Goeben was near Syra was known to be heading for Constantinople, he stood the risk of compromising the King, with, perhaps, dire consequences for Greece. Admiral Kerr waited three days, until the evening of 7 August, when fortunately, or so it must have seemed at the time, the Greek navy obtained a W/T fix on Goeben. This, at last, provided Kerr with the opportunity to disguise the source. The signal Milne received after sailing from Malta stated that ‘from strength of signals Goeben thought to be near Syra’ so, apparently, Kerr was trying to lead Milne in the right direction. What he might not have counted on was the fact that Milne would ignore this new source of intelligence."
But another person in Greece wants the German ships to escape to Constantinople, Prime Minister Venizelos. He wants Greece to join the Entente, and he has 3 reasons for letting the Goeben and Breslau escape. I've bolded the most important parts.
"However, it was Venizelos himself who had three imperative motives for wanting Goeben and Breslau to reach Constantinople. Believing – following Quadt’s nocturnal visit – that Souchon was short of coal, the prospect of the German ships putting in to neutral Athens to coal, only to have them interned there should the British establish a blockade, must have been alarming to Venizelos to say the least. It is clear, for example, that Milne presumed that, once Souchon had entered the Aegean, one of the few options available to the German Admiral was to seek refuge in a Greek port.[lv] Whenever it suited him, Venizelos played on the King’s alleged German proclivities to win support for his own cause. Thoughts of a palace inspired coup against him, supported by the guns of the Mittelmeerdivision, would have been all the prompting Venizelos required to send Quadt on his way with a simple message on the back of a calling card and the expression of the Premier’s ‘friendliest intentions’ towards Germany.
Second, if the Turks were wavering at the prospect of their new allegiance, the presence of Goeben and Breslau in the Golden Horn would have signalled the unequivocal alliance of Turkey with Germany, would have jolted Greek public opinion (which was tired of war and remained neutralist in the current crisis) and, if Venizelos played his cards right and could win support from the Entente, would have given him a chance at last to put an end to the Ottoman Empire, keep the Aegean Islands and perhaps, just perhaps, march on Constantinople. As evidence of this, once the German ships had arrived in the Golden Horn, the Venizelist newspaper Patris began the process of forming public opinion: by arming the enemies of Greece it declared, Germany had departed from the benevolent neutrality Greece had shown to Germany. Later, citing the fictitious sale of the German ships to Turkey as a move directed against Greece, the paper advocated Greek entry into the War.[lvi] In gambling so, Venizelos was applying the same logic as Ponceau in the Quai d’Orsay who, on 10 August, declared to Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador, that ‘it might be advantageous for us to draw Turkey to the number of our enemies in order to make an end of her.’[lvii]
Third, a revivified Turkish navy, manned by German officers, and with the addition of a first rate battle cruiser and cruiser, would have been overwhelmingly powerful in the Black Sea and therefore able to forestall a Russian descent on Constantinople, leaving the way clear for the Greeks to achieve their ambition, while the Aegean would have been out of bounds to the German ships due to the presence of the British and French navies in addition to the Greek. By ensuring that Goeben and Breslau made it safely through the Dardanelles Venizelos was also ensuring that their future radius of action would be limited to the Black Sea. From that moment on, Souchon’s only opponents would be the Russians. The Russian Black Sea fleet could not hope to launch an assault against the Ottoman capital once the Turkish fleet had been augmented by Goeben and Breslau and, with the Turkish army and navy fully committed in the east against the Russians, the way was left open for a Greek move on the Turkish rear, with the ultimate objective being the capture of Constantinople."
But lets go back to Adm. Kerr, and another summary of his motives for conspiring against his home country:
"And Kerr’s motives? It seems clear that, having finally decided upon a course of action, Kerr would not deviate; easily influenced initially he also possessed, in greater measure than average, a capacity for self-deception — Kerr could convince himself of anything. As a corollary to this was a predisposition, evident throughout his career, to an exaggerated appraisal of his own opinions. Is it not plausible therefore that, for a few crucial days early in August 1914, an impressionable, egotistical officer who suddenly found himself in possession of vital information which could affect the course of the war, might not have taken it upon himself to decide how that information was to be used? What other explanation is there for Kerr to have kept his silence when, if not by 4 August certainly by the 7th, he must have known that Souchon was heading for the Dardanelles? Having been convinced by the King that neutrality was the only course open to Greece, Kerr could have reasoned that, with the German ships safely through the Straits, the possibility of Greece now attacking Turkey was out of the question. Unable to attack Turkey, worried always about Bulgaria, the only option available then was neutrality.
The irony is that, for a number of different reasons, Venizelos also desired that the German ships should escape. Again, no other interpretation of his action in allowing the Bogados to sail with her precious cargo is tenable. Kerr and Venizelos were applying the same means to achieve different ends. Venizelos also knew Souchon’s destination and kept quiet about it. Once at their destination, the German ships, he could have reasoned, would have precipitated a quick breach between Turkey and her neighbours under the influence of Turkey’s German allies. With Turkey in the war it would have made sense for the Entente, as they planned, to seek active Greek participation. Venizelos could then name his terms, not least of which would be the fulfilment of long-standing Greek aspirations to large slices of the Ottoman Empire. What Venizelos did not count on, what robbed him of his glorious goal, was the reluctance of the Turks to enter the lists. By the time the Turks were eventually forced into the war by Souchon and Enver Pasha Venizelos had lost his chance to march, hand-in-hand, with the Entente Powers."
Result: Kerr does not inform London about the position of the German ships. The British government, INCLUDING CHURCHILL, didn't even know the destination of the German ships!!
"The eventual destination of Goeben and Breslau (a mystery to the British until the ships actually reached the Dardanelles)"
Yet you claim that it was Churchill who let them escape to Constantinople!
5) Historians cited Admiral Kerr's deliberate withholding of the destination of the two German ships as evidence of the conspiracy.
Sadly, you are completely unaware about which conspiracy Mr. Miller is talking: he is talking about a conspiracy IN ATHENS, NOT IN LONDON, and this conspiracy is aimed AGAINST THE BRITISH, including Churchill. The entire 2nd part of Superior Force deals with this anti-British conspiracy. Admit it, you haven't read it, like you haven't read the diary of the American diplomat in Brussels although you said you had.
Lets talk about this Greek conspiracy. Greek was neutral, and a British officer, Adm. Kerr, was in command of the Greek navy. The Greek King wanted his country to remain neutral because he thought that Greece would be crushed in a war against the Central Powers. Adm. Kerr, for dubious personal reasons, decided to support the King in this decision, thus conspiring against his home country, Britain. Some quotes:
"Kerr had been convinced by the King that, in the interests of self-preservation, neutrality was the only course Greece could sensibly adopt; but could this be squared with a calculated decision to let two enemy ships escape? Was there another way? For the moment, Kerr could do nothing. The Kaiser’s impetuous telegram provided Kerr with the knowledge of Souchon’s eventual destination, yet, if he simply informed Milne that Goeben was near Syra was known to be heading for Constantinople, he stood the risk of compromising the King, with, perhaps, dire consequences for Greece. Admiral Kerr waited three days, until the evening of 7 August, when fortunately, or so it must have seemed at the time, the Greek navy obtained a W/T fix on Goeben. This, at last, provided Kerr with the opportunity to disguise the source. The signal Milne received after sailing from Malta stated that ‘from strength of signals Goeben thought to be near Syra’ so, apparently, Kerr was trying to lead Milne in the right direction. What he might not have counted on was the fact that Milne would ignore this new source of intelligence."
But another person in Greece wants the German ships to escape to Constantinople, Prime Minister Venizelos. He wants Greece to join the Entente, and he has 3 reasons for letting the Goeben and Breslau escape. I've bolded the most important parts.
"However, it was Venizelos himself who had three imperative motives for wanting Goeben and Breslau to reach Constantinople. Believing – following Quadt’s nocturnal visit – that Souchon was short of coal, the prospect of the German ships putting in to neutral Athens to coal, only to have them interned there should the British establish a blockade, must have been alarming to Venizelos to say the least. It is clear, for example, that Milne presumed that, once Souchon had entered the Aegean, one of the few options available to the German Admiral was to seek refuge in a Greek port.[lv] Whenever it suited him, Venizelos played on the King’s alleged German proclivities to win support for his own cause. Thoughts of a palace inspired coup against him, supported by the guns of the Mittelmeerdivision, would have been all the prompting Venizelos required to send Quadt on his way with a simple message on the back of a calling card and the expression of the Premier’s ‘friendliest intentions’ towards Germany.
Second, if the Turks were wavering at the prospect of their new allegiance, the presence of Goeben and Breslau in the Golden Horn would have signalled the unequivocal alliance of Turkey with Germany, would have jolted Greek public opinion (which was tired of war and remained neutralist in the current crisis) and, if Venizelos played his cards right and could win support from the Entente, would have given him a chance at last to put an end to the Ottoman Empire, keep the Aegean Islands and perhaps, just perhaps, march on Constantinople. As evidence of this, once the German ships had arrived in the Golden Horn, the Venizelist newspaper Patris began the process of forming public opinion: by arming the enemies of Greece it declared, Germany had departed from the benevolent neutrality Greece had shown to Germany. Later, citing the fictitious sale of the German ships to Turkey as a move directed against Greece, the paper advocated Greek entry into the War.[lvi] In gambling so, Venizelos was applying the same logic as Ponceau in the Quai d’Orsay who, on 10 August, declared to Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador, that ‘it might be advantageous for us to draw Turkey to the number of our enemies in order to make an end of her.’[lvii]
Third, a revivified Turkish navy, manned by German officers, and with the addition of a first rate battle cruiser and cruiser, would have been overwhelmingly powerful in the Black Sea and therefore able to forestall a Russian descent on Constantinople, leaving the way clear for the Greeks to achieve their ambition, while the Aegean would have been out of bounds to the German ships due to the presence of the British and French navies in addition to the Greek. By ensuring that Goeben and Breslau made it safely through the Dardanelles Venizelos was also ensuring that their future radius of action would be limited to the Black Sea. From that moment on, Souchon’s only opponents would be the Russians. The Russian Black Sea fleet could not hope to launch an assault against the Ottoman capital once the Turkish fleet had been augmented by Goeben and Breslau and, with the Turkish army and navy fully committed in the east against the Russians, the way was left open for a Greek move on the Turkish rear, with the ultimate objective being the capture of Constantinople."
But lets go back to Adm. Kerr, and another summary of his motives for conspiring against his home country:
"And Kerr’s motives? It seems clear that, having finally decided upon a course of action, Kerr would not deviate; easily influenced initially he also possessed, in greater measure than average, a capacity for self-deception — Kerr could convince himself of anything. As a corollary to this was a predisposition, evident throughout his career, to an exaggerated appraisal of his own opinions. Is it not plausible therefore that, for a few crucial days early in August 1914, an impressionable, egotistical officer who suddenly found himself in possession of vital information which could affect the course of the war, might not have taken it upon himself to decide how that information was to be used? What other explanation is there for Kerr to have kept his silence when, if not by 4 August certainly by the 7th, he must have known that Souchon was heading for the Dardanelles? Having been convinced by the King that neutrality was the only course open to Greece, Kerr could have reasoned that, with the German ships safely through the Straits, the possibility of Greece now attacking Turkey was out of the question. Unable to attack Turkey, worried always about Bulgaria, the only option available then was neutrality.
The irony is that, for a number of different reasons, Venizelos also desired that the German ships should escape. Again, no other interpretation of his action in allowing the Bogados to sail with her precious cargo is tenable. Kerr and Venizelos were applying the same means to achieve different ends. Venizelos also knew Souchon’s destination and kept quiet about it. Once at their destination, the German ships, he could have reasoned, would have precipitated a quick breach between Turkey and her neighbours under the influence of Turkey’s German allies. With Turkey in the war it would have made sense for the Entente, as they planned, to seek active Greek participation. Venizelos could then name his terms, not least of which would be the fulfilment of long-standing Greek aspirations to large slices of the Ottoman Empire. What Venizelos did not count on, what robbed him of his glorious goal, was the reluctance of the Turks to enter the lists. By the time the Turks were eventually forced into the war by Souchon and Enver Pasha Venizelos had lost his chance to march, hand-in-hand, with the Entente Powers."
Result: Kerr does not inform London about the position of the German ships. The British government, INCLUDING CHURCHILL, didn't even know the destination of the German ships!!
"The eventual destination of Goeben and Breslau (a mystery to the British until the ships actually reached the Dardanelles)"
Yet you claim that it was Churchill who let them escape to Constantinople!
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