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Originally posted by padillah
Simply because you are better and more versed at this type of debate than I am doesn't make my argument any less valid nor does it allow you to redefine it as you see fit.
Both of your theories are equally invalid. I hope that helps.
I drank beer. I like beer. I still like beer. ... Do you like beer Senator?
- Justice Brett Kavanaugh
I would have loved to participate in this thread, but my squished scroll bar tells me that any attempt to tack myself onto the conversation at this point would fail. Ah, what a shame. Next time.
I would ask that you pardon me if I do not respond to your post in its entirety. I find that much of it appears to simply be simply attacking me rather than what I say. If I've skipped over something you consider particularly relevant, feel free to bring it up.
You have yet to establish, in your own words, what I am asserting.
In my understanding, you are asserting moral absolutism: There is an independent "right and wrong" that exists outside of human perceptions and has a truth value regardless of what humans do.
So can you then accept that there are some postulates that are commutative and some that are not? Yes, good. This is what I wish to enforce when you think of "right-thinking people can't defend Ted Bundy". This assertion is not commutative. You can't turn it around and say "therefore because you defend Ted Bundy you are not right-thinking". I can now assert that no, you will not find a right-thinking individual that will defend Ted Bundy's actions as sane and logical.
Except that what we must determine is whether you have defined "rational person" in such a manner that it makes the possibility of a rational person defending Ted Bundy impossible. Ultimately, if you have defined a rational person in such a manner, then that means that the statement is vacuous, since it would be reformulated "People who, among other things, do not defend Ted Bundy do not defend Ted Bundy".
On the other hand, if you have not defined "rational person" in such a way, then that means that it is *possible* theoretically for there to be a rational person out there that defends Ted Bundy. This possibility then therefore also means that Ted Bundy's actions are not inherently opposed to rational thought, since someday some rational person has the possibility of defending them.
If people with the property of being "rational" cannot defend Ted Bundy, that indicates that there is some thing about the property "rational" that contradicts Ted Bundy.
If people with the property of being "rational" can defend Ted Bundy, that indicates that there is no such contradiction.
Whether "rational" people do or do not defend Ted Bundy is irrelevant to determining whether there is a contradiction between rationality and Ted Bundy.
Is it possible to find a person with a third arm? Genetic abnormalities leave room for any number of diversions from the norm, so the answer should be "yes, it's theoretically possible". (Now, this is where reality kicks in) Is it a generally accepted state of being for humans to have three arms? The answer should be "no". Therefore the statement "people have two arms" can be held to be true (have truth-value) in normalistic reality. Even if there is some strech of the imagination that would allow for an alternate possiblity, the reality is people only have two arms.
The reality is that people *typically* only have two arms. Some people are born with a non-2 number of arms, and some people have the number of arms changed later in their life. One can uphold the statement "People have two arms" in a colloquial sense because it is vague.
As well, If someone puts forth the statement "People can have only two arms", then even if there is no one who actually has three arms, if there is a theoretical possibility then it means that the statement is false.
But this discussion is somewhat of a tangent anyway because in the above we are dealing with descriptive statements - statements about reality. You are capable of demonstrating to me that most people have two arms. I can doubt the integrity of the source or the sample size or a number of factual issues, but if we go through a picture of every person in the world and most of them have only 2 arms, then I must accept the statement "People typically only have two arms" (or, colloquially, "People have two arms").
That, or I can attempt to deny objective reality, except that you can still demonstrate it within my subjective reality.
But in order to accept the conclusion, I have to have a moral system that places a value on logic and reason and correspondance to reality. If I don't value those things, then while you may be able to demonstrate that most people have two arms, I have no need to accept it since I have no imperative to act within the bounds of logic and reason.
--Before you say that "Well, thats absurd, nobody operates like that..": People are capable of remarkable feats of self deception. A gay man may empirically be able to see that he has sexual attraction toward men, but may still emotionally reject it, since he places a higher value on being notgay than he does on logic. A religious man may recognise that they have no rational proof for the existence of God, but they may say "Thats the whole point: It is a matter of faith". Thus, they place higher value on God and faith than logic and reason.
The above example of people with arms, though, is a tangent because we aren't discussing descriptive statements: We are discussing the nature of normative statements. A descriptive statement is falsifiable, whereas a normative statement is not. Even with the statement "Most people have 2 arms", it is still able to be demonstrated false: We could theoretically go out and find that everyone has 3 arms, and thus the statement would be proven false. If there are theoretical conditions by which it is able to be demonstrated false, then it is falsifiable.
But a similar thing cannot be done to a moral statement. If I say "People should have only 2 arms", what evidence or reasoning can you present me even theoretically that would make the statement false? Under what conditions could you demonstrate to me that it is false? There are theoretical conditions that I can demonstrate to you why "people have only two arms" is false...can you provide the same thing for me?
I will hold fast to my understanding that there is a right and wrong and that, like gravity, just because I don't understand how it works doesn't make it any less so.
Except that the logic doesn't follow: We cannot take a proposition X, say that we don't understand X, and therefore say X exists. Otherwise: Tacc is a god. I don't understand how Tacc is a good, but just because I don't understand it doesn't make it any less so.
As well, gravity is still falsifiable, an observable phenomenon, and it exists outside of humans. Can we say the same for morality: Can we find instances (theoretical or otherwise) where some moral X is false? Can we observe and measure "goodness" or "badness"? What would that even mean?
And does morality exist if all beings capable of moral reasoning cease to exist?
Also, simply because you are better and more versed at this type of debate than I am doesn't make my argument any less valid.
Skill in rhetoric alone would not, of course, have any impact on the actual truth value of something. Still, because of this, one cannot logically say:
You believe X. I believe Not-X.
You are more skilled in rhetoric than I am.
Therefore, I am right.
Your position isn't bad because I'm such a brilliant speaker (), but rather because of the arguments I have raised.
You have accomplished the philisophical equivelent of beating up a drunk.
I'm not strong enough to beat up even drunk people
Both of your theories are equally invalid. I hope that helps.
Coming from you, that might strengthen both of our cases...
Originally posted by Lorizael
I would have loved to participate in this thread, but my squished scroll bar tells me that any attempt to tack myself onto the conversation at this point would fail. Ah, what a shame. Next time.
Feel free. It is ye general ethics debate anyway, so I'm sure after 1 or 2 replies you'll fit right in.
Originally posted by Tacc
I would ask that you pardon me if I do not respond to your post in its entirety. I find that much of it appears to simply be simply attacking me rather than what I say. If I've skipped over something you consider particularly relevant, feel free to bring it up.
If I appear to be attacking you I apologize. It is not my intention to attack you, mearly to point out the futility of arguing with you (or, indeed, anyone who suffers from what I call an "extreem need for philosophy").
I will try to use statements within this post to explian this stance (I am no longer bothering with "moral absolutism" since it seems to be an impossible dream to have a rational discussion about such with a philosopher).
You have yet to establish, in your own words, what I am asserting.
In my understanding, you are asserting moral absolutism: There is an independent "right and wrong" that exists outside of human perceptions and has a truth value regardless of what humans do.
Um, OK. Yeah. That's what my original assertion was.
So can you then accept that there are some postulates that are commutative and some that are not? Yes, good. This is what I wish to enforce when you think of "right-thinking people can't defend Ted Bundy". This assertion is not commutative. You can't turn it around and say "therefore because you defend Ted Bundy you are not right-thinking". I can now assert that no, you will not find a right-thinking individual that will defend Ted Bundy's actions as sane and logical.
Except that what we must determine is whether you have defined "rational person" in such a manner that it makes the possibility of a rational person defending Ted Bundy impossible. Ultimately, if you have defined a rational person in such a manner, then that means that the statement is vacuous, since it would be reformulated "People who, among other things, do not defend Ted Bundy do not defend Ted Bundy".
This is an extreem need for philosophy. I had a friend that, when cornered, would simply choose not to believe the reality that didn't support his outlook. This is what philosophy means to me.
Do you honestly walk around wondering if the next person you meet will have three or four or more arms? Or that all the air molecules will coelesce in the bottom 2 inces of the room?
No, because you understand that, while that may be a theoretical possibility, our experience has shown it to be so rare as to safely discount it's possibility. Only philosophers trying to prove/disprove some abstract fanciful notion even need to know this fact. Only philosophers deal with the totality of a "theoretical possibility", other people deal with the actual reality in front of them.
In the quote above you are proffering that there is no way to define "rational person" such that it doesn't include anybody that would defend Ted Bundy without the defence of Ted Bundy as a criteria for exclusion.
I reject that postulate. Say I define a sub-set as "those having depth perception". This set would not include people with only one eye. Not because there is a criteria for not having one eye, because people with no eyes aren't in the group either. And blind people that do have two eyes are not in the group, yet there is no criteria against blind people.
On the other hand, if you have not defined "rational person" in such a way, then that means that it is *possible* theoretically for there to be a rational person out there that defends Ted Bundy. This possibility then therefore also means that Ted Bundy's actions are not inherently opposed to rational thought, since someday some rational person has the possibility of defending them.
If people with the property of being "rational" cannot defend Ted Bundy, that indicates that there is some thing about the property "rational" that contradicts Ted Bundy.
If people with the property of being "rational" can defend Ted Bundy, that indicates that there is no such contradiction.
Whether "rational" people do or do not defend Ted Bundy is irrelevant to determining whether there is a contradiction between rationality and Ted Bundy.
Again, I reject this postulate. As above, I defined a subset of people such that blind people weren't included but I didn't exclude them. Now how is it that without excluding them it's possible to have a blind person in the above subset? This is what you are postulating, that in order to define a subset of "rational people" I must do it in such a way as to exclude "people that would defend Ted Bundy" specifically, and I reject that. So, in fact, does modern psychology.
Also, simply because you are better and more versed at this type of debate than I am doesn't make my argument any less valid.
Skill in rhetoric alone would not, of course, have any impact on the actual truth value of something. Still, because of this, one cannot logically say:
You believe X. I believe Not-X.
You are more skilled in rhetoric than I am.
Therefore, I am right.
Your position isn't bad because I'm such a brilliant speaker (), but rather because of the arguments I have raised.
Then you argue the opposite and I'll dance on the head of a pin.
You can't honestly believe that skill has nothing to do with the outcome of a debate. Especially a philisophical one.
(I am no longer bothering with "moral absolutism" since it seems to be an impossible dream to have a rational discussion about such with a philosopher).
Hmm.
The thing is that you are unable to respond without simply assuming your position in the first place. I have brought up many arguments that you simply are unable to respond to, and while I cannot simply say "Because you do not respond, therefore you are wrong"...Your unwillingness to continue with this most central aspect of the debate, especially given that you generally had trouble creating warrants for your statements anyway, is telling.
I was in particular interested on your thoughts regarding falsifiability. Oh well.
Um, OK. Yeah. That's what my original assertion was.
Then it appears that I have established, in my own words, what you were asserting
This is what philosophy means to me.
Then you really ought to study it more.
No, because you understand that, while that may be a theoretical possibility, our experience has shown it to be so rare as to safely discount it's possibility.
Our experience has shown that I need not give it considerable weight when deciding how to act. There is a big difference This experience in no way would justify the statement "This phenomenon is impossible".
yet there is no criteria against blind people.
Yes there is: If we define some subset as "those having depth perception", we must also exclude "those not having depth perception".
Blind people do not have depth perception.
Therefore, blind people are exluded.
You didn't explicitly exclude them, because such would not be necessary: It is an inherent part of the logic that you are excluding people without depth perception.
This is what you are postulating, that in order to define a subset of "rational people" I must do it in such a way as to exclude "people that would defend Ted Bundy"
I'm not saying this at all. Rather, what I'm saying is that if you do NOT define it in such a way, then that means that there is the possibility that a rational person could defend Ted Bundy. Thus, if there is that possibility, then "rational people" and "Ted Bundy" are not mutually exclusive.
In your above example, if we were to say "Only those having depth perception play volleyball", then that would mean that there is some contradiction between "not having depth perception" and "volleyball". If theoretically a one eyed person or a blind person played volleyball, then that would indicate that there is *not* a contradiction between "not having depth perceotion" and volleyball.
But this is all a tangent. If you would please, then, define "rational person", since that is what this debate is about.
You can't honestly believe that skill has nothing to do with the outcome of a debate. Especially a philisophical one.
The debate comes down to what arguments are made, not how pretty they look. Now, if I'm making better arguments than you are...that is an entirely different matter.
Originally posted by Tacc
Hmm.
The thing is that you are unable to respond without simply assuming your position in the first place.
Unable, but not incapable. I'm sure there is someone that has the capabilities to refute your arguments within your requirements, just not me. You seem to assume that because I, personally, can't present this argument to you the argument must fail. Is this the same type of ad homenim you accused me of earlier? Just wondering.
Or do you honestly find me to be the perfect opponent?
Then, despite my knowledge to the contrary, I thank you.
Your unwillingness to continue with this most central aspect of the debate, especially given that you generally had trouble creating warrants for your statements anyway, is telling.
Yes, it's telling you that I don't have the resources to defend my argument against you given the circumstances of the debate. (and what do you mean "had trouble creating warrants for your statements anyway"? I'm not being contradictory, I don't understand that statement.)
This is what philosophy means to me.
Then you really ought to study it more.
No amount of future study will change the impact philosophy has had on me in the past. I have little or no ability to attach philisophical meanderings to real world situations.
At no point, during the electrocution of Timothy McViegh, if the jailer stopped and wondered "But what if he could be included in a definition of 'rational person'? " would it have an impact. It doesn't matter to reality. You have pretty much said it yourself - After all this debate "No one is right and no one is wrong - Do it my way anyway". How does understanding the philisophical impact change the outcome of that statement?
Our experience has shown that I need not give it considerable weight when deciding how to act. There is a big difference This experience in no way would justify the statement "This phenomenon is impossible".
Exactly, you discount (or reduce) the importance of this particular possibility. You have the innate faculties to understand the real-world applications vs. the "theoretical" implications. I have seen no evidence that Philosophy, in general, cares at all about real world application. (Linguistic Philosophy is apparently concerned with the definition of words and was developed to help general philosophy have a useful impact by attempting to bring concreteness to a debate.)
You didn't explicitly exclude them, because such would not be necessary: It is an inherent part of the logic that you are excluding people without depth perception.
Then you are right again - I cannot define a group without defining a group. Very good, philosophy has allowed you to illuminate the blatantly obvious. Wow, what a feat. Now I see what a big help philosophy can be.
Rather, what I'm saying is that if you do NOT define it in such a way, then that means that there is the possibility that a rational person could defend Ted Bundy.
I still do not adhear to this postulate. It is possible to define a group so as not to explicitly or implicitly exclude a set and still have that set not allowed in the group by factors outside the definition of the set. Whereas I can understand this as apriori fact I, unfortunately, (and this is where your skill level comes in) do not have the resources to display the situation and, thus, prove my point.
But this is all a tangent. If you would please, then, define "rational person", since that is what this debate is about.
Heck, I posted the definition of "rational person" back in the "Heros" thread. And it's not my definition, it's the legal systems. The M'Naghten rules state:
A person is legaly insane if:
1) They do not know what they are doing.
** They may think they have a squirt gun not a pistol.
2) They do not understand the diference between right and wrong.
** As you postulated earlier, if they don't believe other people exist then they don't believe killing them is wrong.
Also, there's an entire branch of science called Psychiatry that occupies itself with defining terms like "rational person".
BTW, the very existence of the second rule supports my theory. The legal definition of insanity depends on a person being able to differentiate right from wrong by themselves. It therefore falls that this determination is something inherent in human nature or it's absence would be excusable.
The debate comes down to what arguments are made, not how pretty they look. Now, if I'm making better arguments than you are...that is an entirely different matter.
Yes, it is a matter of knowing the type and manner of arguments to make and presenting them in a fasion that reduces the opponents ability ot rebut. Have you never taken debate? If I knew what I was doing do you think it would have taken me this long to see the support I mentioned earlier in the M'Naghten rules? I quoted those rules days ago, so I obviously knew of them. I rephrased them, so I obviously understood them. But I didn't realise and apply their impact until now because I'm just not that good.
OK, try this. If I were to present my arguments (as flawed as they obviously are ) in Portuguese you would have little to no ability to rebut them would you? (would you??) Does this make my arguments valid because you can't rebut them? No, it makes the debate uneven and the continuation biased.
I believe there is a basic morality outside of personal definition, it is inherent in nature (it's alluded to in the U.S. Bill of Rights - "...all men are created equal, with certain, inalienable rights..."). Animals follow it - they don't just kill whatever they want, they kill to eat and to defend (except in rare, abnormal instances). I also believe the human conscience is more evidence of there being a general, basic guidance for our more elaborate moral judgements.
How to communicate that effectivley, I have no idea.
You seem to assume that because I, personally, can't present this argument to you the argument must fail.
No, I'm merely saying that it reduces the credibility of your position.
(and what do you mean "had trouble creating warrants for your statements anyway"? I'm not being contradictory, I don't understand that statement.)
You seemed to have trouble providing an overall logical superstructure to support the argument.
That might be because you are wrong
"But what if he could be included in a definition of 'rational person'? " would it have an impact.
If the jailer had a system that said "you can't do this to rational people", then he would have to seriously ponder whether what he was doing was right or wrong.
How does understanding the philisophical impact change the outcome of that statement?
In this case it wouldn't so much the philosophical impact as it would be the logical impact. Since the Jailer's moral system would in this case result in a contradiction, one part of his thinking process would have to be false: Either he can do this to rational people, or Mr. McViegh is not rational.
I have seen no evidence that Philosophy, in general, cares at all about real world application.
See: Applied ethics.
It is possible to define a group so as not to explicitly or implicitly exclude a set and still have that set not allowed in the group by factors outside the definition of the set.
No If some group of people cannot be a part of the group, then by definition they are excluded (explicitly or otherwise)
1) They do not know what they are doing.
This is fine...
2) They do not understand the diference between right and wrong.
This isn't, because it implies the existence of some moral "truth" that the insane person is "not understanding" - since ther isn't moral truth, though, the statement can be reduced to "They do not subscribe to our moral system".
This may be useful in many cases, but as a general concept, one has to wonder if this is the "right" way to go about things.
** As you postulated earlier, if they don't believe other people exist then they don't believe killing them is wrong.
And this is a moral system: It demonstrates a differentiation between "right" and "wrong".
BTW, the very existence of the second rule supports my theory. The legal definition of insanity depends on a person being able to differentiate right from wrong by themselves. It therefore falls that this determination is something inherent in human nature or it's absence would be excusable.
Yes, morality is an inherent part of human nature - it comes with being able to reason using highly abstract concepts.
Whether any *specific* morality is an inherent part of human nature (and whether it really matters) is another argument
People who "fit" under 2) have moral systems. They simpy do not have the same moral systems.
I rephrased them, so I obviously understood them. But I didn't realise and apply their impact until now because I'm just not that good.
You have such a low view of yourself In any arguments there are going to be a great many ways to present it and tie everything up together...
Maybe, again, it isn't so much "Padillah is a bad debater" as it is "Padillah is wrong"?
in Portuguese you would have little to no ability to rebut them would you? (would you??) Does this make my arguments valid because you can't rebut them?
Indeed, one can never say "You cannot defend position X, therefore I am absolutely correct in what I say."
But if you "win" a debate in this manner, it does strengthen your own case.
it is inherent in nature
Morality is inherent to the human experience, yes.
Animals follow it - they don't just kill whatever they want, they kill to eat and to defend
The "morality" of animals (and there is a debate to be had about whether animals act on instinct vs. have actual moral systems, and whether one can differentiate between the two ) is probably not in any way similar to what you might consider to be "moral". Animals, for instance, do not care for things like autonomy or quality of life or equality...If a person walks down the street and another person kills them and eats their brain, we would say this is an immoral thing. An animal wouldn't care
I also believe the human conscience is more evidence of there being a general, basic guidance for our more elaborate moral judgements.
It provides support for the existence of morality, but not for the existence of "moral truths"
), but rather because of the arguments I have raised.
This experience in no way would justify the statement "This phenomenon is impossible". 
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