A question too unimportant for any place other than 'poly OT

[Geronimo]

If some arbitrarily technologically advanced civilization decided it would be a cool idea to put you under, freeze you to absurdly cold temperatures, cut you in half [edit...cut into left and right halves right down the midline] and then exactly duplicate and attach each original half to it's opposing duplicate so that there were now two of you who were then thawed and revived in a non destructive manner would you be both people even though "you" would in that case now constitute two completely separate persons?

If we say "you" would instead now be dead does that mean that someone who suffers extensive brain damage (perhaps limited to one hemisphere) is also dead?

Is there any limit to the number of times a person could be split?

Suppose a person were 'duplicated' millions of times and one of those persons lived long enough to have their life extended and their body artificially repaired in such a way that they lived for thousands even millions of years, would the person who was born those million years ago have both died almost a million times and also lived to be a million of years old?

Is it possible that an "individual" "dies" essentially every time their mindstate changes in any way whatsoever so that a single person is in fact zillions of discrete people over their lifetimes who remain oblivious to their infintesimaly short lifetimes due to the illusion of perfect continuity that memory provides?

final "death" then is just the point at which new fools who still think they are "you" stop being generated?

I suppose I should read some philosophy book if I really care about these immensely weighty issues but I honestly ascribe about as much value to the drunken thoughts of a bar fly and the collective musings of polytubbies as I would to such philosophical tomes.

[FrostyBoy]

interesting


i have no answers

[Aeson]

Each copy would think it was "you", but would be independent of each other's consciousness, and become different people from that point on.

It doesn't really matter if you are the same "you" continuously. What matters is what you are thinks "you" are. If you woke up tomorrow remembering a totally different life than what you remember now, that different life would be "yours" until you were given reason to identify with your old (or some other) life instead. Would it be your current "you", or would that "you" instead have been replaced with a new version?

Given the way we identify ourselves, I would say it's the current "you" still. Whether it's you still experiencing life, or someone else who just thinks they are you, really doesn't matter at all. Whatever identifies themselves as "you" would think they are you, and if you truely don't exist anymore, it doesn't matter to you.

Now if you were to wake up and have had your brain swapped with someone else's... it would matter to both of you.

[Geronimo]

Originally posted by Aeson
Each copy would think it was "you", but would be independent of each other's consciousness, and become different people from that point on.

It doesn't really matter if you are the same "you" continuously. What matters is what you are thinks "you" are. If you woke up tomorrow remembering a totally different life than what you remember now, that different life would be "yours" until you were given reason to identify with your old (or some other) life instead. Would it be your current "you", or would that "you" instead have been replaced with a new version?

Given the way we identify ourselves, I would say it's the current "you" still. Whether it's you still experiencing life, or someone else who just thinks they are you, really doesn't matter at all. Whatever identifies themselves as "you" would think they are you, and if you truely don't exist anymore, it doesn't matter to you.

Now if you were to wake up and have had your brain swapped with someone else's... it would matter to both of you.

it seems to me that if I woke up remembering a different life I'd be dead and someone else would be using my brain to continue living their (wholly fabricated) life.

Certainly I would be dead to everybody around me and they would now be strangers to the occupant of my brain.

If we claim that we have existance outside of our memories then who is to say we aren't in our own brain one second and in someone else's brain the next? Are we claiming the physical brain is who we really are?

Then we must mean the connections within it because the brain itself undergoes continuous metabolic turnover that rebuilds every cell molecule by molecule apart from the DNA every couple of days and even the DNA gets rebuilt via enzymatic repair processes every few months or so.

If we mean the connections within the brain those are essentially the memories. In that case we agree that we are our memories.

[germanos]

just like identical twins aren't twice the same person, so wouldn't there be two 'me's' in this case.

Arguebly at the moment of 'waking up' there would be two me's, but in the split second thereafter the two lifes, and thus persons/me's would start to diverge and develop independently and thus differently.

[Geronimo]

Originally posted by germanos
just like identical twins aren't twice the same person, so wouldn't there be two 'me's' in this case.

Arguebly at the moment of 'waking up' there would be two me's, but in the split second thereafter the two lifes, and thus persons/me's would start to diverge and develop independently and thus differently.

so did you live through the operation or are you now dead and two people neither of which is really you (since they have both diverged from you) have taken your place?

[germanos]

I did not die, and both will say 'I'

[Meticulous Man]

The consciousnesses would be separate, of course, but I'd wager they would both be "you". I think this question actually is very close to the question "why am I just I and not somebody else?" All we actually can say is that something exists and that there is a subject and an object. You can't say whether I, for example, really experience phenomena the way you do and am not some kind of NPC. So maybe there really exists only one "ultimate subject" which is split into separate consciousnesses, in which case we would all one but still different in a paradoxical way. This kind of stuff, of course, is really beyond human comprehension.

[Geronimo]

Originally posted by germanos
just like identical twins aren't twice the same person, so wouldn't there be two 'me's' in this case.

So there would in fact be two 'you's'. They would just be increasingly different from each other right?

[Geronimo]

Originally posted by Aivo½so
The consciousnesses would be separate, of course, but I'd wager they would both be "you". I think this question actually is very close to the question "why am I just I and not somebody else?" All we actually can say is that something exists and that there is a subject and an object. You can't say whether I, for example, really experience phenomena the way you do and am not some kind of NPC. So maybe there really exists only one "ultimate subject" which is split into separate consciousnesses, in which case we would all one but still different in a paradoxical way. This kind of stuff, of course, is really beyond human comprehension.

I've figured that's probably the case.


There's really just one observer. One consciousness or ghost in the machine or whatever that experiences everything. A bit tragic if every single one of us (and everybody anywhere anywhen) is the same person treating it's other selves so poorly.

It's such a simple step from the notion of reincarnation really since the lack of a means to share memory from one incarnation to the next means that it's no more difficult to go back in time to (or effectively just simultaneously) experience the other lives than it would be to experience a chronologically later life.

[germanos]

Originally posted by Geronimo


So there would in fact be two 'you's'. They would just be increasingly different from each other right?

Difference being the key here (as well as in defining a person), I would argue that there's not two ' me's '.

Since you are in a philisophical mood, let's get into semantics as well:
Offcourse there would be two you's, as both person would call (and view) eachother as YOU. They would not see the other as another ME.
So there would be two you's, but not two me's or I's

[Aeson]

Originally posted by Geronimo
it seems to me that if I woke up remembering a different life I'd be dead and someone else would be using my brain to continue living their (wholly fabricated) life.

Semantically... when you say "I woke up", you are identifying with whoever is actually waking up, and thus it is "you". While it might not be the same "you" as whoever went to sleep, it would still be "you".

I understand what you are saying though. Just the phrase "I woke up" wouldn't be applicable in the way you used it, since it wouldn't be "I" at all, it would be "someone else".

Certainly I would be dead to everybody around me and they would now be strangers to the occupant of my brain.

Not necessarily. Amnesia cases show that other people may very well still identify with you just given physical appearances or the chance that their concept of "you" would return to your prior mental state.

The person you think "you" have replaced would be dead (or similarly displaced if you have reason to suspect it) to "you".

If we claim that we have existance outside of our memories then who is to say we aren't in our own brain one second and in someone else's brain the next? Are we claiming the physical brain is who we really are?

Definitely not claiming that the physical brain is who we really are. We are the "software" state currently operating on it.

If we mean the connections within the brain those are essentially the memories. In that case we agree that we are our memories.

"You" are your memories. Those memories may or may not be what you have (or have not) actually been through.

You (without quotes) are the actual state of your consciousness at the moment. Outside that I don't see any way to determine whether that you has existed consistant to the "you" you identify with or not.

So I'd say it really doesn't matter what you actually are, just what "you" you identify with. If you cease to exist and someone else identifies with "you" in your stead, then for "you" it's just as well, and for you it doesn't matter.

[Geronimo]

We need to understand that semantics obviously won't lend itself well at all to this sort of conversation however it is used.

So there's probably some need for extra effort to consider multiple ways of interpreting what is said.

[Will9]

Re: A question too unimportant for any place other than 'poly OT

Originally posted by Geronimo
If some arbitrarily technologically advanced civilization decided it would be a cool idea to put you under, freeze you to absurdly cold temperatures, cut you in half and then exactly duplicate and attach each original half to it's opposing duplicate so that there were now two of you who were then thawed and revived in a non destructive manner would you be both people even though "you" would in that case now constitute two completely separate persons?

You would be the one with orriginal upper half of the body, while one with the duplicated upper half would be someone different.

[SlowwHand]

Geronimo, you have WAY too much time on your hands.