Gorbachev hates children.

[Nubclear]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15306580/site/newsweek/

We saw setbacks toward democracy because the socioeconomic issues were not being properly addressed. People did not see any improvement and in many countries they said “We need not so much democracy, but we need to feed our children.” I cannot agree with that, but I can understand.

Well, it does explain many of his actions while leader of the Soviet Union

[Gangerolf]

Hey, you've got to break some eggs to make an omelette.

[Gangerolf]

the full quote:

In the final decades of the 20th century, in over 100 countries, dictatorial and authoritarian regimes were swept aside. The democratic process spread to every continent. But the feast was over soon. You can proclaim the democratic institutions but it is not easy to learn to live in a democracy. We saw setbacks toward democracy because the socioeconomic issues were not being properly addressed. People did not see any improvement and in many countries they said “We need not so much democracy, but we need to feed our children.” I cannot agree with that, but I can understand. Unless poverty and backwardness are addressed, democracy is worthless. You cannot impose democracy by using tanks and missiles. Democracy is not an instant package. Democracy should grow on national soil. It depends very much on the development level of the country on the culture and mindset of the people. The principles are the same but every nation develops its own model of democracy. Our friends in America do not fully understand that yet.

Gorbachev

[Gangerolf]

double gorbie

[Proteus_MST]

Well, Gorbachev may hate children,
but Putin loves them (remembering him when he was kissing the belly of this little child )

[Ogie Oglethorpe]

He was simply seeing if the child was tender enough for consumption.

[Arrian]

Unless poverty and backwardness are addressed, democracy is worthless. You cannot impose democracy by using tanks and missiles. Democracy is not an instant package. Democracy should grow on national soil. It depends very much on the development level of the country on the culture and mindset of the people.

-Arrian

[LordShiva]

Originally posted by Gangerolf
Hey, you've got to break some eggs to make an omelette.

The trick isn't to break some eggs to make an omlette [sic.], it's convincing the eggs to break themselves in order to aspire to omlettehood [sic.].

[lord of the mark]

"You cannot impose democracy by using tanks and missiles. Democracy is not an instant package. Democracy should grow on national soil. It depends very much on the development level of the country on the culture and mindset of the people. The principles are the same but every nation develops its own model of democracy. Our friends in America do not fully understand that yet."


Iraq in the 1950s was closer in many ways to a democratic mindset than was the USSR. Its literacy rates, levels of urbanization in circa 2003 were not unfavorable compared to other LDCs that have democratized. Democracy in Iraq, if it is failing, is doing do because A. the specific historical events from the Baathist takeover to the Saddam takeover, to the sanctions, changed things. Thus history matters, as much as "levels of development" B. Because of specific errors made by the US occupation, especially in the crucial months of spring and summer 2003. If those mistakes lead us to a too narrow view of where and under what circumstances democratization is possible, that will be perhaps the greatest crime of those who made those mistakes.

[Arrian]

The culture and mindset of the people... comes from that people's history, does it not? That's how I read it.

-Arrian

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Arrian
The culture and mindset of the people... comes from that people's history, does it not? That's how I read it.

-Arrian

theres long history and short history. The difference between saying "Democracy wont work in Russia in 2006 because Yeltsin and his advisors, both Russian and Western, made mistakes in the early 90s by implementing a shock therapy that worked for Poland but that Russian society circa 1992 wasnt able to adjust to, and also cause of Yeltsins personal weaknesses, and the accident that Yeltsins rule coincided with a period of low hydrocarbon prices" and saying "Democracy wont work in Russia in 2006 cause the in 1000 CE Kievan Rus adopted Orthodoxy instead of Catholicsm, and the Orthodox civ is less inclined to democracy, and cause the mongol rule left a legacy of authoritarianism in the Russian soul, and Russia, if it ever gets to democracy, can only do so after generations of cultural change"

The latter kind of analysis is, of course "historical" but it also implies the essentialism found in the clash of civs school. The former kind of analysis relates to the specific recent political history of the state in question, and is what I meant. They have profoundly different policy implications, I think.

[Arrian]

Ok. Obviously the current situation is more relevant than what happened 1000 years ago (though that 1000-year-old event may resonate to the present day).

-Arrian

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Arrian
Ok. Obviously the current situation is more relevant than what happened 1000 years ago (though that 1000-year-old event may resonate to the present day).

-Arrian

Unfortunately its not at all obvious. Not with respect to Iraq, not wrt to Egypt, not wrt a bunch of other places. Theres a very good chance that bush and neoconism will be succeeded in US for policy by a "realism" that whispers "the wogs cant handle democracy anyway, lets keep supporting Mubarak, Perv, Ben Ali, like we did the Shah, Saddam, and the House of Saud" (of course they wont put it in those terms -theyll use nicer language, like Gorbies above) I can see a Jim Baker, for ex, or a Brezinski supporting that - there are elements in both parties eager for it, and eager to see Iraq as proof.

If we are going to go down that road, lets at least be cognizent of the alternative explanations, of the counterexamples, of the historical and policy complexities.

[Arrian]

Um, hows about a policy that neither specifically supports such regimes, nor advocates the use of US military force to remove such regimes and replace them with democracies?

How freaking hard is that sort of realism? Support for democratization doesn't have to mean tanks & bombs. Until rather recently, such a thing was a radical theory. Sure, without the tanks & bombs, progress is slower - the regimes will remain in place. At the same time, you don't end up being responsible (in whole or in part) for the type of cluster**** currently happening in Iraq.

-Arrian

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Arrian
Um, hows about a policy that neither specifically supports such regimes, nor advocates the use of US military force to remove such regimes and replace them with democracies?

How freaking hard is that sort of realism? Support for democratization doesn't have to mean tanks & bombs. Until rather recently, such a thing was a radical theory. Sure, without the tanks & bombs, progress is slower - the regimes will remain in place. At the same time, you don't end up being responsible (in whole or in part) for the type of cluster**** currently happening in Iraq.

-Arrian

As ive said often, Iraq was not a template for the replacement of regimes purely to expand democracy. It was sui generis, due to its legal situation under post gulf war ceasefire, its strategic position, the fact that it really WAS believed by the admin (And by many of the admins opponents) that they had WMD, etc, etc. However the question has repeatedly come up (and still does) as to how much we should attempt to promote democracy in Iraq now that were there. And whether, in the case of regimes where we have OTHER issues - should we be inclined for pro-democracy regime change. For example right now in Syria we can encourage the pursuit of the Hariri investigation, while trying to isolate Syria, in the hope the regime falls. There are many folks there, from Kurds, to Muslim Brotherhood, to other dissidents, whod like to see that. Or we could cut a deal with them, and drop the Hariri thing, in return for some moderation from them on the Iraq and Israel fronts. The latter is quite tempting. The question of whether a heterogeneous arab state necessarily falls into civil war when the tyranny falls, or whether democracy is possible, is crucial to that decision. The question of whether Iraq failed (if it did) cause democracy needed to grow on native soil (how that was to occur is not made clear) or whether it was due to specific mistakes during the occupation is also crucial.