balance of power vs bandwagon effects

[lord of the mark]

There is a widely held theory of international affairs going back to the late 18th century, that says states pursuing their national interests will naturally tend to balance the system, and prevent hegemony by any one actor, as competing states form balancing coalitions against states threatening hegemony. Thus France-Sweden-Netherland-OE balancing the Hapsburg drive for hegemony, Netherlands-Austria-England against France under Louis XIV, France, Spain, joining the new US and backed by the League of Armed Neutrality balancing a Britain dominant after 1763, various coalition against Napoleon, continental maneuvering against the UK in the late 19th c, the alliances against the German drive for hegemony in the 20th C, and finally the odd coalition of the US, West Europe, China, and the Muslim world that blocked what appeared to be a Soviet drive for hegemony (one could also discuss a current balancing coalition against the USA, but id prefer to stick to history, not current politics)

Some critics have suggested this theory misses the alternative approach of self interested to states to a would be hegemon - the possibilty to "get on the bandwagon" IE to join the hegemon, and try to share in the spoils. Think Bavaria helping Louis XIV, Russia helping Napoleon, various allies of Germany - IOW, there are factors that can defeat BOP diplomacy, and so the multiplicity of world powers is not necessarily stable. This would be especially true where the would be hegemon is diplomatically adept.

Please give examples in each direction, related anecdotes, opinions, etc.

[VetLegion]

Wellcome to the dark side

I've read something along those lines in Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy (a book so boring I would recommend only to my enemies).

I think that there is nothing self-balancing about any system of competing states. Our European perspective and history of shifting alliances you described can make one think so, but, wider historical evidence seems contrary.

Why haven't Warring States in China remained independent? Why hasn't Canada joined Mexico in 1848? Why did Germany unify? Why Argentina didn't attack Chile in 1879?

If we allow the scale to move, all today's states consist of territories previously claimed by some other political entity for whom the balancing thing obviously didn't work.

I think that in order to be correct, your opening definition has to be so specific as to become a description of a particular European situation, and thus can't be a general rule. And European states have generally been both similar in strength (at least no drastic differences) and different from each other so that permanent occupation of one by the other wouldn't ultimately be practical, which explains partially why they're "in the balance".

There are some interesting implications for diplomacy from game theory though:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory#Political_science

Research in political science has also used game theory. A game-theoretic explanation for the democratic peace is that the public and open debate in democracies send clear and reliable information regarding the intentions to other states. In contrast, it is difficult to know the intentions of nondemocratic leaders, what effect concessions will have, and if promises will be kept. Thus there will be mistrust and unwillingness to make concessions if at least one of the parties in a dispute is a nondemocracy.

Game theory also examines bargaining strategies and stuff like that. I don't think it can completely explain behaviour of countries, but it can be interesting.

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by VetLegion

Why haven't Warring States in China remained independent? Why hasn't Canada joined Mexico in 1848? Why did Germany unify? Why Argentina didn't attack Chile in 1879?

for at least two of those a BOP answer is easy. Canada in 1848 wasnt a state, it was under the rule of the UK. The UK didnt join Mexico, because from UKs point of view, which was global, US wasnt a threatening hegemon. UK itself was the number 1 power, and US was a rising power. It was risky to take on the US, given that this would confirm the US in any (Russian led?) anti UK coalition, and it would frighten other powers. This was especially salient in Palmerstons refusal to get involved in the American Civil war.

Similarly wrt Germany. Germay was not in isolation, but faced threats from France, Russia, etc. Of course the different stages of German unification present different issues. The final stage, when the southern German states joined the empire, after supporting it in war against France, was heavily influenced by domestic politics in the German states. In a pure state interest model Bavaria should have allied with France, not Prussia. That they did not was because the state faced revolution if it did so - NOT because of a bandwagon effect. Im trying to focus specifically on instance where a purely self interested state acts in ways opposite to BOP theory.

China i dont know much about - i suspect the communications and diplomacy left a lot to be desired - it simply wasnt possible for the small states to coordinate.

Argentina I dont know. But Id presume it had something to do with Chile not being a true hegemon - while Chile may have been the main threat to Bolivia and Peru, Argentina had to worry about balancing Brazil. Arg joining Brazil in attacking Paraguay could be seen as bandwagon, but its complicated by Paraguayan behavior.

[Bosh]

And then there's the third approach, the "gangbang" in which a declining hegemon gets hit from all sides by small powers tearing chunks off of it. Nobody bothers propping up the declining hegemon as everyone wants its slice of the pie even though the alternative to doing at least something to slow the hegemon's decline is chaos and bloodshed. See The Balkan Wars and many many many games of Diplomacy as examples.

[Blaupanzer]

BOP played an important role in Europe as recognized by Metternich and memorialized by Kissinger. However, other periods/places produced actual single powers whose enemies were weak or far away or both (e.g., Aztecs, Incas, China, Rome). Each may have had rivals as they rose or internal dissension at times, but were actually the only power in their known world for hundreds of years as well.

Nationalities appear to resent being dominated sufficiently to undermine the power of one of the hegemonies. Imposition from a world beyond their own can also have a very negative effect.

As to the bandwagon, I tend to agree with Bosh's implication that most of that is really "piling on." A given nation gets even with its former dominator or rival by joining the obviously winning side. That's how Cortez actually conquered Mexico City, allying with the formerly enslaved tribes against the Aztecs.

[snoopy369]

BOP and Bandwagon IMO are seperated by a narrow line. Up to a point, BOP is a good strategy. However, once the potential hegemon passes a certain relative size, Bandwagoning makes far more sense, both because the smaller state is more at risk, and because there is more to gain from the friendship.

There are a lot of other factors - like distance, potential other enemies, etc. that come into it. Honestly, Civ4:Warlords has a pretty good take on it- the AI will 'vassal' (bandwagon) if a) there's an enemy nearby it's scared of, b) you're very strong and nearby, or c) you've shown a strong military threat to it (capitulation).

[1889]

The Origins of Alliances by Stephen Walt examines the tendency of nations to balance or bandwagon. First off he states that nations don’t balance against power but against threats. Balancing is far more common because a nation that fails to stop an aggressive state places its survival at risk and by joining with the weaker side it can wield more influence within the alliance.

But bandwagoning may be an attractive alternative for weak states without potential allies or if it appears that the threatening state can be appeased. Jordan’s half hearted involvement in the Six Day war is one example of bandwagoning.