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Non-nuclear strike on distant target in 1 hour is goal, but some fear fatal misunderstanding
11:48 PM CDT on Sunday, May 28, 2006
By MICHAEL R. GORDON / The New York Times
WASHINGTON – The Pentagon is pressing Congress to approve the development of a new weapon that would enable the U.S. to carry out non-nuclear strikes against distant targets within an hour after a threat is detected.
The proposal has set off a complex debate about the best way to strengthen the military's conventional capabilities and reduce the risks of nuclear confrontation.
The Pentagon plan calls for deploying a non-nuclear version of the submarine-launched Trident II missile that could be used to attack terrorist camps, enemy missile sites, suspected caches of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons and other potentially urgent threats, military officials say.
If deployed, it would be the only non-nuclear weapon designed for rapid strikes against targets thousands of miles away and would add to the president's options when considering a pre-emptive attack.
Gen. James E. Cartwright, the chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, said that the system would enhance the Pentagon's ability to "pre-empt conventionally" and "pre-empt precisely," while limiting the "collateral damage." The program would cost an estimated $500 million over five years, and the Pentagon is seeking $127 million in its current spending request to Congress to begin work.
But the plan has run into resistance from lawmakers who are concerned that it may increase the risk of accidental nuclear war. The Trident II missile that would be used for the attacks is a system that has long been equipped with a nuclear payload. Both non-nuclear and nuclear-tipped variants of the Trident II missile would be loaded on the same submarines under the Pentagon plan.
"There is great concern this could be destabilizing in terms of deterrence and nuclear policy," said Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., who serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee. "It would be hard to determine if a missile coming out of a Trident submarine is conventional or nuclear."
Reflecting the worry that Russia and other nations might misinterpret the launch of a non-nuclear Trident as the opening salvo in a nuclear barrage, lawmakers have insisted that the Bush administration present a plan to minimize that risk before the new weapon is manufactured.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has supported the idea, and the Pentagon wants to field the system in two years.
In justifying the program to lawmakers, Gen. Cartwright outlined a number of potential situations. "The argument for doing it is that there are instances, fairly rare, when time is so critical that if you can't strike in an hour or so you are going to miss that opportunity," said Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., who chairs the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Projection Forces and who is still weighing whether to support the plan.
One possible situation, Mr. Bartlett said, would be "people putting together some terrorist weapon, and while they are putting it together we can take it out, and if we miss that opportunity, it may show up on the streets of New York City or Washington, D.C."
Still another might involve the need to destroy an enemy missile equipped with a chemical, biological or nuclear warhead before an adversary can launch it at the U.S. or its allies. Another would be fresh intelligence about a meeting of terrorists.
Given the considerable U.S. military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan and Korea, some critics say the circumstances in which a target may be beyond the reach of U.S. warplanes or armed Predator drones may be few. Acquiring the sort of precise intelligence that would give the president enough confidence to order the launch of a ballistic missile within an hour might also be a daunting proposition.
Under the Pentagon plan, each Trident submarine would carry two of the non-nuclear-armed Trident II missiles along with 22 nuclear-armed Trident missiles. Each of the non-nuclear missiles would carry four warheads.
Two types of warheads would be developed. One type would be a metal slug that would land with such tremendous force it could smash a building. The other type of warhead would disperse tungsten rods to destroy vehicles and less well-protected targets over a broader area.
As planned, the weapon would not have the capability to destroy facilities that were buried deeply underground. The system would use satellite tracking to improve its accuracy.
Arms control experts are divided over the plan. Steve Andreasen, a former defense specialist on the staff of National Security Council, said that the program would undermine U.S. security by eliminating the taboo about the use of long-range missiles and diverting funds from other pressing defense needs.
"Long-range ballistic missiles have never been used in combat in 50 years," Mr. Andreasen said. "Once the U.S. starts signaling that it views these missiles as no different than any other weapon, other nations will adopt the same logic."
Bruce Blair, the president of the World Security Institute and a former Minuteman missile launch control officer, said the weapon would continue a welcome trend toward substituting conventional weapons for nuclear systems, assuming that adequate safeguards can be worked out to avoid the risk of inadvertent nuclear war.
11:48 PM CDT on Sunday, May 28, 2006
By MICHAEL R. GORDON / The New York Times
WASHINGTON – The Pentagon is pressing Congress to approve the development of a new weapon that would enable the U.S. to carry out non-nuclear strikes against distant targets within an hour after a threat is detected.
The proposal has set off a complex debate about the best way to strengthen the military's conventional capabilities and reduce the risks of nuclear confrontation.
The Pentagon plan calls for deploying a non-nuclear version of the submarine-launched Trident II missile that could be used to attack terrorist camps, enemy missile sites, suspected caches of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons and other potentially urgent threats, military officials say.
If deployed, it would be the only non-nuclear weapon designed for rapid strikes against targets thousands of miles away and would add to the president's options when considering a pre-emptive attack.
Gen. James E. Cartwright, the chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, said that the system would enhance the Pentagon's ability to "pre-empt conventionally" and "pre-empt precisely," while limiting the "collateral damage." The program would cost an estimated $500 million over five years, and the Pentagon is seeking $127 million in its current spending request to Congress to begin work.
But the plan has run into resistance from lawmakers who are concerned that it may increase the risk of accidental nuclear war. The Trident II missile that would be used for the attacks is a system that has long been equipped with a nuclear payload. Both non-nuclear and nuclear-tipped variants of the Trident II missile would be loaded on the same submarines under the Pentagon plan.
"There is great concern this could be destabilizing in terms of deterrence and nuclear policy," said Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., who serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee. "It would be hard to determine if a missile coming out of a Trident submarine is conventional or nuclear."
Reflecting the worry that Russia and other nations might misinterpret the launch of a non-nuclear Trident as the opening salvo in a nuclear barrage, lawmakers have insisted that the Bush administration present a plan to minimize that risk before the new weapon is manufactured.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has supported the idea, and the Pentagon wants to field the system in two years.
In justifying the program to lawmakers, Gen. Cartwright outlined a number of potential situations. "The argument for doing it is that there are instances, fairly rare, when time is so critical that if you can't strike in an hour or so you are going to miss that opportunity," said Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., who chairs the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Projection Forces and who is still weighing whether to support the plan.
One possible situation, Mr. Bartlett said, would be "people putting together some terrorist weapon, and while they are putting it together we can take it out, and if we miss that opportunity, it may show up on the streets of New York City or Washington, D.C."
Still another might involve the need to destroy an enemy missile equipped with a chemical, biological or nuclear warhead before an adversary can launch it at the U.S. or its allies. Another would be fresh intelligence about a meeting of terrorists.
Given the considerable U.S. military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan and Korea, some critics say the circumstances in which a target may be beyond the reach of U.S. warplanes or armed Predator drones may be few. Acquiring the sort of precise intelligence that would give the president enough confidence to order the launch of a ballistic missile within an hour might also be a daunting proposition.
Under the Pentagon plan, each Trident submarine would carry two of the non-nuclear-armed Trident II missiles along with 22 nuclear-armed Trident missiles. Each of the non-nuclear missiles would carry four warheads.
Two types of warheads would be developed. One type would be a metal slug that would land with such tremendous force it could smash a building. The other type of warhead would disperse tungsten rods to destroy vehicles and less well-protected targets over a broader area.
As planned, the weapon would not have the capability to destroy facilities that were buried deeply underground. The system would use satellite tracking to improve its accuracy.
Arms control experts are divided over the plan. Steve Andreasen, a former defense specialist on the staff of National Security Council, said that the program would undermine U.S. security by eliminating the taboo about the use of long-range missiles and diverting funds from other pressing defense needs.
"Long-range ballistic missiles have never been used in combat in 50 years," Mr. Andreasen said. "Once the U.S. starts signaling that it views these missiles as no different than any other weapon, other nations will adopt the same logic."
Bruce Blair, the president of the World Security Institute and a former Minuteman missile launch control officer, said the weapon would continue a welcome trend toward substituting conventional weapons for nuclear systems, assuming that adequate safeguards can be worked out to avoid the risk of inadvertent nuclear war.
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