Tweet
An interesting paper from Congressional Research Service about the organization
They present Al Q as an political organization with a tiered goal which is roughly:
#1. being expelling US/other foreign forces from Muslim lands
#2. Creating one Muslim state with Sharia law
#3. Wiping out Israel
#4. Dealing with Shia Muslims
Luckily this is really a long shot and they have no chance really to get it all together, however they got a head start as after 9-11 US+allies are at least doing what they wanted - which is they have given them a front to fight.
One in Afghanistan, but more importantly another one in Iraq. One can just assume, given the constant level of violence in Iraq that this unstable situation is perfect for preaching of such extremist idealogy in the region, especially in Sunni area, as the Al Q as an organization do not really "support" Shia version of Islam, and their version of the Islamic society is uniform and principally "sunni".
In any case Bush did give the organization a life saver card, and true ground on which to "breed" their supporters.
The assesment finishes with this
Overall, Al Qaeda leaders have displayed a pragmatic willingness to adapt the
strategic and tactical content of their statements to changing circumstances while
retaining a messianic commitment to their broader ideological agenda. Although Bin
Laden’s self-professed goal is to “move, incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] nation”43
until it reaches a revolutionary “ignition point,”44 Al Qaeda leaders’ statements and
Al Qaeda’s attacks largely have failed to effectively mobilize widespread Muslim
support for their agenda thus far.
Since late 2001, however, public opinion polling and media monitoring in the Middle East and broader Islamic world indicate that
dissatisfaction with the United States and its foreign policy has grown significantly
within many Muslim societies.
In light of this trend, Al Qaeda leaders’ shift toward more explicitly political and
ideological rhetoric seems to signal a direct attempt to broaden the movement’s
appeal, solicit greater financial and material support, and possibly inspire new and
more systematically devastating attacks. Some experts have argued however, that the
uncompromising, anti-democratic tone of some public statements by Bin Laden, Al
Zawahiri, and Al Zarqawi may alienate Muslims who oppose theocracy or who
support secular or representative government.
Experience suggests that Al Qaeda’s leaders believe that regular attempts to
characterize Al Qaeda’s actions as defensive and religiously sanctioned will increase
tolerance of and support for their broader ideological program. The identification of
limited political objectives and the implication that their fulfilment will resolve
broader grievances may generate broader appeal than the group’s underlying
ideological agenda. Osama Bin Laden’s truce proposals addressed to citizens of the
United States and its European allies illustrate this trend, but the proposals’ validity
has been questioned due to ongoing attacks and continuing threats.
One can only hope that this “ignition point,” will never be reached, but in a strange twist the possible "nuclear row with Al Q enemy Iran could provide that “ignition point,”. One can surely hope for that not to happen, but overall the US actions after 9-11 really played on Al Q cards. The assesment mentiones as well that Al Q leadership was not satisfied with the level of "damage" they inflicted to US at home, but were happy that even what they achieved was enough to get the US act as they wanted
The third and “ultimate objective,” according to Al Adl, “was to
prompt [the United States] to come out of its hole.” Al Adl claims that Al Qaeda
wanted to provoke the United States into attacking areas of the Islamic world
associated with the organization and its affiliates. In doing so, Al Adl claims, Al
Qaeda hoped to make it easier to attack elements of U.S. power and to build its
“credibility in front of [the Islamic] nation and the beleaguered people of the world.”
They present Al Q as an political organization with a tiered goal which is roughly:
#1. being expelling US/other foreign forces from Muslim lands
#2. Creating one Muslim state with Sharia law
#3. Wiping out Israel
#4. Dealing with Shia Muslims
Luckily this is really a long shot and they have no chance really to get it all together, however they got a head start as after 9-11 US+allies are at least doing what they wanted - which is they have given them a front to fight.
One in Afghanistan, but more importantly another one in Iraq. One can just assume, given the constant level of violence in Iraq that this unstable situation is perfect for preaching of such extremist idealogy in the region, especially in Sunni area, as the Al Q as an organization do not really "support" Shia version of Islam, and their version of the Islamic society is uniform and principally "sunni".
In any case Bush did give the organization a life saver card, and true ground on which to "breed" their supporters.
The assesment finishes with this
Overall, Al Qaeda leaders have displayed a pragmatic willingness to adapt the
strategic and tactical content of their statements to changing circumstances while
retaining a messianic commitment to their broader ideological agenda. Although Bin
Laden’s self-professed goal is to “move, incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] nation”43
until it reaches a revolutionary “ignition point,”44 Al Qaeda leaders’ statements and
Al Qaeda’s attacks largely have failed to effectively mobilize widespread Muslim
support for their agenda thus far.
Since late 2001, however, public opinion polling and media monitoring in the Middle East and broader Islamic world indicate that
dissatisfaction with the United States and its foreign policy has grown significantly
within many Muslim societies.
In light of this trend, Al Qaeda leaders’ shift toward more explicitly political and
ideological rhetoric seems to signal a direct attempt to broaden the movement’s
appeal, solicit greater financial and material support, and possibly inspire new and
more systematically devastating attacks. Some experts have argued however, that the
uncompromising, anti-democratic tone of some public statements by Bin Laden, Al
Zawahiri, and Al Zarqawi may alienate Muslims who oppose theocracy or who
support secular or representative government.
Experience suggests that Al Qaeda’s leaders believe that regular attempts to
characterize Al Qaeda’s actions as defensive and religiously sanctioned will increase
tolerance of and support for their broader ideological program. The identification of
limited political objectives and the implication that their fulfilment will resolve
broader grievances may generate broader appeal than the group’s underlying
ideological agenda. Osama Bin Laden’s truce proposals addressed to citizens of the
United States and its European allies illustrate this trend, but the proposals’ validity
has been questioned due to ongoing attacks and continuing threats.
One can only hope that this “ignition point,” will never be reached, but in a strange twist the possible "nuclear row with Al Q enemy Iran could provide that “ignition point,”. One can surely hope for that not to happen, but overall the US actions after 9-11 really played on Al Q cards. The assesment mentiones as well that Al Q leadership was not satisfied with the level of "damage" they inflicted to US at home, but were happy that even what they achieved was enough to get the US act as they wanted
The third and “ultimate objective,” according to Al Adl, “was to
prompt [the United States] to come out of its hole.” Al Adl claims that Al Qaeda
wanted to provoke the United States into attacking areas of the Islamic world
associated with the organization and its affiliates. In doing so, Al Adl claims, Al
Qaeda hoped to make it easier to attack elements of U.S. power and to build its
“credibility in front of [the Islamic] nation and the beleaguered people of the world.”
Comment