US-INdia nuclear deal

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by Imran Siddiqui
Pakistan was a strong ally of the US during the Cold War while India was playing both sides. When the US froze a sale of F-15s for the nuke program, Pakistanis, including moderates, felt betrayed. They feel even more betrayed today. Reward the country that played off both sides, and forget the former close ally. As AH said, it accomplished little and may have made things worse.

Not that Mr Bush hasn't done, um, interesting things before. Right after Musharraf had come out on the "anti-terrorist" side the sanction (arms sanction IIRC) was immediately lifted.

[Alexander's Horse]

okay I now have instructions and I take back everything I said - this deal has my full and fearful support

[Sikander]

Originally posted by Alexander's Horse
okay I now have instructions and I take back everything I said - this deal has my full and fearful support

Welcome aboard!

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Imran Siddiqui


Pakistan was a strong ally of the US during the Cold War while India was playing both sides. When the US froze a sale of F-15s for the nuke program, Pakistanis, including moderates, felt betrayed. They feel even more betrayed today. Reward the country that played off both sides, and forget the former close ally. As AH said, it accomplished little and may have made things worse.

Oh, youre talking about pre-91? Seems to me that that relationship was in Pakistans interest as much as it was in the US interest.

In any case the cold war ended. In '98 the US broke arms sales to both Paki and India. Pakistan not only developed nukes, but ran a nuke arms network, distributing the technology. Many here in the US feel betrayed by that.

[Imran Siddiqui]

Why? The US turned a blind eye to the Pakistani nuclear program for years. After the US cut off aid to Pakistan for actually getting close, they said screw you and went elsewhere and turned to China and North Korea for help in making the bomb. What, people in the US were betrayed when Pakistan went behind their backs after they were betrayed by the US?

[lord of the mark]

Originally posted by Imran Siddiqui
Why? The US turned a blind eye to the Pakistani nuclear program for years. After the US cut off aid to Pakistan for actually getting close, they said screw you and went elsewhere and turned to China and North Korea for help in making the bomb. What, people in the US were betrayed when Pakistan went behind their backs after they were betrayed by the US?

they were betrayed by this (from Globalsecurity.org)

"During the 1990s, there were intermittent clues from intelligence that AQ Khan was discussing the sale of nuclear technology to countries of concern. By early 2000, intelligence revealed that these were not isolated incidents. It became clear that Khan was at the centre of an international proliferation network. By April 2000, the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was noting that there was an evolving, and as yet incomplete, picture of the supply of uranium enrichment equipment to at least one customer in the Middle East, thought to be Libya, and evidence linking this activity to Khan.

A.Q. Khan's official career came to an abrupt end in March 2001, when he was suddenly was forced out as director of the nuclear lab by order of President Pervez Musharraf. Though Kahn was made a special adviser to the government, the reason for his dismissal reportedly coincided with concerns about financial improprieties at the lab as well as general warnings from the United States to the Musharraf about Khan’s proliferation activities. Musharraf's restraint in dealing with A.Q. Khan has been said to have resulted from the lack of incontrovertible evidence of proliferation activities. Nonetheless, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in an article which appeared in the Financial Times on 01 June 2001, expressed concern that, "people who were employed by the nuclear agency and have retired" may be assisting North Korea with its nuclear program.

The change in position for A.Q. Khan did not necessarily end proliferation concerns. Indeed, while in Pakistan in October 2003, a US delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage reportedly briefed Gen. Musharraf on A.Q. Khan activities. Gen. Abizaid, then head of US Central Command, repotedly conducted similar concerns to Pakistani political and military leaders.

With the international inspections of Iran's nuclear operations and the October 2003 interception of a ship headed for Libya and carrying centrifuge parts, Pakistan began seriously investigating A.Q. Khan. The United Nation's International Atomic Energy Agency in November 2003 itself warned Pakistan of possible nuclear leaks. After two months of investigations, in late January 2004 Pakistani officials concluded that two of the country's most senior nuclear scientists had black market contacts that supplied sensitive technology to Iran and Libya. Pakistani intelligence officials said the scientists - A.Q. Khan and Mohammed Farooq - provided the help both directly and through a black market based in the Persian Gulf emirate of Dubai. Dr. Khan and Dr. Farooq were longtime colleagues at A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories. President Musharraf acknowledged that some scientists may have acted for their own personal gain, but he denied any government involvement and pledged harsh punishment for any person implicated in the scandal.

The lack of of strict oversight over Pakistan's nuclear weapons program has been blamed with a brigadier general in charge of security for Dr. Khan's top-secret laboratory never having reported anything. Doubts remain, however, about the lack of governmental approval/supervision of A.Q. Kahn's proliferation activities; some of which were conspicuously advertised. Indeed, one of A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories' sales brochure promoted the sale of components derived from Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and critical to the making of centrifuges. The Pakistani government istelf published in 2000 an advertisement regarding procedures to be followed for the exports of nuclear material according to a Congressional Research Service report dated May 2003. Moreover, Khan and colleagues of his had published numerous scientific papers internationally on the making and testing of uranium centrifuges, including one dated from 1991 which detailed the methodology to be followed in ecthing grooves on the bottom of a centrifuge to aid the flow of lubricants and thus aid in the centrifuge's spinning speed.

Some questions have been raised over the idea that even someone as prominent as Khan could have delivered such sensitive material without approval from higher authorities, and that at the very least the leadership of Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment must have sanctioned the transfers. The extent of previous Pakistani civilian governments' involvement is unclear, even if the military knew and approved the transfers. This is partly a result of the distrust by the army of civilian politicians. Such was the case with former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.

Many Pakistanis have felt that President Pervez Musharraf succumbed to US pressure in moving against A.Q. Khan, the latter's stature as a national hero. However, given the scope of the problem and the fact taht the three intended recipients of nuclear transfers are on the list of countries the United States is most anxious to keep away from weapons of mass destruction, Musharraf may not have had a choice other than act on A.Q. Khan. Still, the government of Pakistan is likely not to be eager to give the United States any more information than it has to as to the whereabouts and/or security arrangements of its nuclear arsenal.

In his startling televised confession Wednesday, Abdul Qadeer Khan insisted he acted without authorization in selling nuclear technology to other governments. A.Q. Khan admitted selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. A.Q. Khan asked for clemency, but the Pakistani government made no public announcement about whether he is to be prosecuted. The confessed proliferation took place between 1989 and 2000, though it is suspected that proliferation activities to North Korea continued after that date. The network used to supply these activities is global in scope, stretching from Germany to Dubai and from China to South Asia, and involves numerous middlemen and suppliers. "

[Imran Siddiqui]

You realize that the US originally terminated aid to Pakistan in 1990 (that's when the F-15s were prevented from being sent)? They reinstated it later (the next year, IIRC). Then terminated aid again when they actually tested the weapons.

But during the 70s and 80s, the US could hardly care less about these things (and not like it was hidden), but suddenly the Cold War was coming a close and bam!

[lord of the mark]

india, china, and SE Asia

http://www.mizzima.com/archives/news-in-2004/news-in-october/15-Octob04-07.htm

it seems there have been some elements in the Indian govt that are inclined to a pro-democracy perspective. However they must balance this against India's other interests. This seems a sensible approach.

[lord of the mark]

asia times, 2002

India/Pakistan

India plays it both ways with Myanmar
By Sudha Ramachandran

BANGALORE - A longtime supporter of Myanmar's pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, India has welcomed her release from detention as a concrete step by the Myanmar government toward achieving lasting peace and tranquility in the country. India has consistently advocated reconciliation and moves toward restoration of democracy, a spokesperson from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said last week.

Indeed, India has extended moral support and more to the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. Especially in the 1988-92 period, New Delhi was vocal in its backing of Suu Kyi, calling on the junta to recognize the people's unambiguous mandate in the 1990 election in favor of her National League for Democracy (NLD). Signaling its support for Suu Kyi, the Indian government even awarded her the prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding in 1995.

Several pro-democracy Myanmar activists have taken refuge in India and the exiles are known to be in close touch with its defense minister, George Fernandes. For several years, the government-controlled All India Radio's Myanmar service relayed pro-democracy propaganda.

India has traditionally supported pro-democracy movements in its neighborhood - its backing of the Nepalese Congress in its struggle against the monarchy is an example. Besides, the close relationship between the leaders of the two newly independent countries - India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Myanmar's independence hero Aung San (father of Suu Kyi) and Suu Kyi's ties with India (she received her university education in New Delhi) - are still recalled here with fondness.

However, India, which has supported Suu Kyi largely on a matter of principle and for sentimental reasons, has found that the policy is not pragmatic and did not serve India's security interests. Around 1992-93, New Delhi realized that its policy of backing Suu Kyi against the generals was proving counter-productive as it had left the door open for the blossoming of ties between Myanmar's junta and the Chinese government.

Incidentally, relations between Myanmar and China had been steadily improving from the late 1970s. Bilateral visits at the highest level, China's distancing itself from the Burmese Communist Party and Yangon's (then Rangoon) endorsement of China's policy toward Kampuchea (support to the Khmer Rouge), among other things, brought the two countries closer.

China's ties were on a firm footing by the mid-1980s. When the rest of the world ostracized the junta for the brutal crackdown in 1988, Beijing extended a supportive hand to the generals. When the rest of the world criticized the generals for human-rights violations and were reluctant to trade with Myanmar, China was ready to engage in diverse forms of cooperation, including sale and supply of military equipment, trade in consumer goods, building Myanmar's infrastructure and so on.

This prompted India to re-evaluate its strategy of vocal and open support for the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. Several factors have contributed to a change in strategy from one of criticizing the generals for their refusal to heed the democratic mandate to that of doing business with them.

The most important has been the significant and growing military cooperation between Myanmar and China, with grave implications for India's security. The most worrying for India has been growing Chinese naval presence in the Bay of Bengal. According to Indian intelligence reports, the Chinese-built radar facility on Myanmar's Coco Islands (near India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands) provides Beijing with input on India's missile-testing facilities in its east-coast state of Orissa.

Then, several insurgent groups active in India's strife-torn northeastern states operate from sanctuaries in Myanmar. India has realized it needs Myanmar's cooperation to crack down on the insurgents and break their supply lines. There is also the booming drug trade that India cannot tackle without support from Myanmar's military.

India is also keen to reap the considerable potential that exists in cooperation in the economic and energy fields. Besides, Myanmar is India's stepping stone to Southeast Asia. India's "Look East" policy "could not have acquired momentum if we continued to ignore the junta in Myanmar", a Ministry of External Affairs official pointed out to Asia Times Online. India's heart might beat for the pro-democracy movement, but its head has directed it to improve ties with the generals.

In the guise of non-interference in the internal affairs of Myanmar, India changed tack in the early 1990s. Vocal support for the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar was toned down.

Strategic calculations prompted India to initiate a policy of "strategic Engagement" with the generals in 1991. At the Jakarta summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1992, India did not block Myanmar's re-admission into the grouping. High-level visits between diplomats of the two countries followed.

In 1994, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed to increase cooperation between the civilian border authorities of the two countries to prevent "illegal and insurgent activities". Another bilateral agreement was signed to regularize and promote border trade.

It was only post-1998 that India's ties with the generals received a significant boost. India under a government that was pursuing a "muscular foreign policy" aimed at beefing up its defense and security interests went all out to woo Yangon.

In November 2000, the vice chairman of Myanmar's ruling State Peace and Development Council, General Maung Aye, visited India. Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh has visited Yangon twice since then. India now supplies military equipment to Myanmar and is said to have leased helicopters to its army.

However, it is a road project that is the most visible and positive evidence of India-Myanmar cooperation. The road linking Moreh in India's northeastern state of Manipur with Kalewa on the Chindwin River in Myanmar is expected to transform trade between the two countries radically. Last month, India, Myanmar and Thailand reached agreement on a road connecting the three countries. The stepping-stone provided by improving ties with Myanmar is helping India reach out to Southeast Asia.

How successful has India been in deepening engagement with Myanmar? In the early 1990s, India's castigation of the generals did adversely affect relations. Today, however, while New Delhi has not completely succeeded in wiping out the perception that it empathizes with Suu Kyi's struggle, it avoids commenting on the situation in Myanmar beyond mouthing such terms as reconciliation and peace. That is something the generals are willing to live with. Doing business with each other is in the mutual interest of India and the generals. Their interaction might not be close but it is correct. "Unlike the general to our west [President General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan], the generals to our east [the junta in Myanmar] do not undermine our security interests and are willing to cooperate on an array of issues," says the External Affairs Ministry official.

The time-tested ties that the junta has with China stand in the way of India's closer cooperation with Myanmar. But there are issues with regard to China that trouble Yangon - the growing influx of Chinese into Myanmar that has in the past triggered violent clashes between the immigrants and locals, is one - and should these differences deepen, New Delhi can expect an improved relationship with Myanmar.

The junta is said to be uncomfortable with its overwhelming dependence on China and there is a possibility that India could gain should it decide to reduce that reliance.

Last week's statement on Suu Kyi's release is yet another example of India's tightrope walk in Myanmar. It made clear its position of support to restoration of democracy in Myanmar - a tilt in favor of Suu Kyi. It corrected that tilt by giving the generals a pat on the back for their "concrete steps" toward lasting peace.

[GePap]

That is some very intersting selective bolding there.

But at least the Indians are not ideologues like the whackjobs in the Bush admin.