Agathon

[Provost Harrison]

Originally posted by cronos_qc
Pornography (seriously)

I've made that my special life project

[Apocalypse]

Originally posted by Agathon


There's literally thousands of things you could do. That topic seems a particularly good one because it is of contemporary relevance and people will want to talk about it.

A boring way of doing it would be to do a study of philosopher X, or some hackneyed topic like mind-brain identity, anti-realism or scepticism. The meme topic would enable you to apply lessons from philosophy of mind and philosophy of science to something that people other than philosophers actually care about.

If you did a good job of it, it would certainly help in applying to grad school. If you aren't applying to do philosophy it would be a good idea to do a topic like memes or the failure of intelligent design theories because these things are more likely to interest the sort of people who will be reading your application.

Well, I'm just seeing if something interests me at the moment. In a few years I'll probably apply to either a theological studies degree or get an MPA. With either one, philosophy is somewhat helpful. I'm not sure how much I like the memes idea anyway. I was just wondering if there were any other major controveries right now that are interesting. Have you done any major research projects lately?

[Sandman]

Originally posted by Agathon
I don't think that there's a doubt that memes exist in some sense or other. Darwin's theory of evolution and other theories share features with memes. The controversy seems to revolve around whether memes have causal powers.

Again, there isn't much doubt that thoughts have causal powers. My belief in the theory of evolution causes me to say and do certain things, and it is a token of a particular type. Whether the type has any existence independent of the token is another thing entirely. That is something I am comfortable talking about given my background in Greek philosophy, but the modern causal stuff is not something I have done a lot of.

How would one go about proving (or disproving) the existence of memes?

The whole 'discipline' seems to consist of nothing but terminology borrowed and adapted from genetics, justified by supposed similarities between evolution and the behaviour of ideas.

Why, for example, could I not create a social theory that was derived from plate tectonics? Social tectonics. There are surely enough similarities between the behaviour of societies and geophysics to lay down a superficially compelling discipline - social strata, etc.

[Apocalypse]

Anyway....another thing that has been on my mind is possibly crime of thought and how it effects work environments or whatnot. Like how much should certain thoughts be discouraged in workplaces as opposed to just trying to eliminate actions from thoughts.

[Fake Boris]

Hmmm... WTF is a meme?

[CrONoS]

@Oncle

Wiki:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meme

[monolith94]

Originally posted by Agathon

A boring way of doing it would be to do a study of philosopher X, or some hackneyed topic like mind-brain identity, anti-realism or scepticism. The meme topic would enable you to apply lessons from philosophy of mind and philosophy of science to something that people other than philosophers actually care about.

I wrote my philosophy paper of skepticism...

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Apocalypse
Anyway....another thing that has been on my mind is possibly crime of thought and how it effects work environments or whatnot. Like how much should certain thoughts be discouraged in workplaces as opposed to just trying to eliminate actions from thoughts.

The meme one is better.

The only research project I have completed recently: my dissertation on Plato.

[Fake Boris]

Yes, memes sound interesting. Cronos, I didn't know you were a philo dude. Where do you study?

edit: the thread starter isn't cronos

[Apocalypse]

Any other ideas though?

[Agathon]

Originally posted by Apocalypse
Any other ideas though?

Work out a consistent and coherent interpretation of the second part of Plato's dialogue Parmenides.

That should keep you busy for a few years.

Tell us what you are interested in. Just asking for suggestions is like asking us to suggest what woman you should screw - there are millions of good ones each with their own personal charm. I'd suggest Lindsay Lohan, but I don't know if you are down with bags of antlers.

[Agathon]

Here's some of the Parmenides to get you started.

And who will answer me? he said. Shall I propose the youngest? He will not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what he thinks; and his answers will give me time to breathe.

I am the one whom you mean, Parmenides, said Aristoteles; for I am the youngest and at your service. Ask, and I will answer.

Parmenides proceeded: If one is, he said, the one cannot be many?
Impossible.
Then the one cannot have parts, and cannot be a whole?
Why not?
Because every part is part of a whole; is it not?
Yes.
And what is a whole? would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole?

Certainly.
Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a whole, and also as having parts?

To be sure.
And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?
True.
But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?
It ought.
Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not have parts?

No.
But if it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle, nor end; for these would of course be parts of it.

Right.
But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything?

Certainly.
Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited?
Yes, unlimited.
And therefore formless; for it cannot partake either of round or straight.

But why?
Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are equidistant from the centre?

Yes.
And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the extremes?

True.
Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of a straight or of a circular form?

Assuredly.
But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?
Right.
And, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it cannot be either in another or in itself.

How so?
Because if it were in another, it would be encircled by that in which it was, and would touch it at many places and with many parts; but that which is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a circular nature, cannot be touched all round in many places.

Certainly not.
But if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be contained by nothing else but itself; that is to say, if it were really in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it.

Impossible.
But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained? for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will be no longer one, but two?

True.
Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?
No.
Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have either rest or motion.

Why not?
Why, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in place or changed in nature; for these are the only kinds of motion.

Yes.
And the one, when it changes and ceases to be itself, cannot be any longer one.

It cannot.
It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of nature?

Clearly not.
Then can the motion of the one be in place?
Perhaps.
But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another?

It must.
And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre; and that which goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different from the centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be carried round upon a centre?

Impossible.
But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place?
Perhaps so, if it moves at all.
And have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything?
Yes.
Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not?

I do not see why.
Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, can neither as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor be altogether out of it, if already coming into being in it.

Certainly not.
And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and then one part may be in, and another part out of that other; but that which has no parts can never be at one and the same time neither wholly within nor wholly without anything.

True.
And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has no parts, and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, since it cannot come into being either as a part or as a whole?

Clearly.
Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, not by going somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by change in itself?

Very true.
Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable?
Immoveable.
But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm.
Yes, we said so.
Then it is never in the same?
Why not?
Because if it were in the same it would be in something.
Certainly.
And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other?

True.
Then one is never in the same place?
It would seem not.
But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?
Never.
One then, as would seem, is neither rest nor in motion?
It certainly appears so.
Neither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than itself or other.

How is that?
If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one.

True.
And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so that upon this supposition too, it would not have the nature of one, but would be other than one?

It would.
Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?
It will not.
Neither will it be other than other, while it remains one; for not one, but only other, can be other than other, and nothing else.

True.
Then not by virtue of being one will it be other?
Certainly not.
But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will not be other than anything?

Right.
Neither will one be the same with itself.
How not?
Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same.
Why not?
It is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it becomes one.

What of that?
Anything which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes many and not one.

True.
But, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a thing became the same, it would always become one; and when it became one, the same?

Certainly.
And, therefore, if one be the same with itself, it is not one with itself, and will therefore be one and also not one.

Surely that is impossible.
And therefore the one can neither be other than other, nor the same with itself.

[Apocalypse]

Well like I said, I might be going for some theological studies degree. More likely I'll go for an MPA with maybe a concentration in Human Resources. Basically something that will look good for that.

[OzzyKP]

Originally posted by BlackCat
biased or unbiased ?

selfbiased