Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement

[DinoDoc]

With the current Israeli actions in Gaza and Imran's recent thread that seems devoid of intelligent discussion, I went and found an article that seems to be on point with the current mood and how to achieve it in a manner that benefits the US. I'd like to hear the thoughts here on it:

[Guynemer]

Can't get it to open properly.

[Saras]

Interesting article. Got me thinking on the parralels between Spain 1808 and Germany 1945.

[GePap]

So so article. Not that I expect more from Luttwack.

[Ninot]

summary?

[DinoDoc]

Originally posted by Ninot
summary?

Given all that has happened in Iraq to date, the best strategy for the United States is disengagement. This would call for the careful planning and scheduling of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from much of the country—while making due provisions for sharp punitive strikes against any attempt to harass the withdrawing forces. But it would primarily require an intense diplomatic effort, to prepare and conduct parallel negotiations with several parties inside Iraq and out. All have much to lose or gain depending on exactly how the U.S. withdrawal is carried out, and this would give Washington a great deal of leverage that could be used to advance U.S. interests.

[Dr Strangelove]

His proposals that various factions be "engaged" to help relieve Iraq's distress are about as realisitic as Saudia Arabia's proposal that unspecified muslim troops be brought in to garrison Iraq. None of the parties mentioned have either the will, foresight or sanity to do what is necessary to foster restraint in Iraq. Let's face it, the muslim world is going to have to find its way into the 20th century the hard way.

[Berzerker]

or get bombed back to the Stone Age, even harder

[DanS]

Isn't this just another version of what is actually taking place? The U.S. will draw down its forces over time. Reasonably self-determinative governments will take our place. In the end, we will have a minor but powerful role to play.

Some criticisms of the article include the fact that he doesn't seem to describe the situation accurately, at least as things stand today. His descriptions are rather glib. Take, for instance...

Since the U.S. invasion in 2003, both Shiite and Sunni clerics have been repeating over and over again that the Americans and their mostly “Christian” allies are in Iraq to destroy Islam in its cultural heartland, as well as to steal the country’s oil. The clerics dismiss all talk of democracy and human rights by the invaders as mere hypocrisy—except for women’s rights, which are promoted in earnest, the clerics say, to induce Iraqi daughters and wives to dishonor their families by aping the shameless disobedience of Western women.

Rather, I have been surprised at the relatively good reception that the US has received and continues to receive in most Shiite and Kurd areas. Sadr's men are proving to be a small minority, which is why the Shiites were all too willing to give us intel on what they were doing. Further, Sistani, who seems to be the most respected Shiite religious leader, has had a mostly constructive role. It's of course true that a large minority of Sunnis are hostile. The problems are really from a small minority.

The vast majority of Iraqis, assiduous mosque-goers and semi-literate at best, naturally believe their religious leaders. The alternative would be to believe what for them is entirely incomprehensible: that foreigners have been unselfishly expending their own blood and treasure to help them. As opinion polls and countless incidents demonstrate, Americans and their allies are widely hated as the worst of invaders, out to rob Muslim Iraqis not only of their territory and oil, but also of their religion and family honor.

Again, the most respected religious leaders in the country, the Ayatollahs, have played ball with us and have mostly refrained from slagging us. In fact, when Lebanon's Hezbollah pocket Ayatolla started to slag what we were doing, Sistani told him to mind his own business.

The most direct and visible effects of these sentiments are the deadly attacks against the occupiers and their Iraqi auxiliaries, the aiding and abetting of such attacks, and their gleeful celebration by impromptu crowds of spectators. When the victims are members of the Iraqi police or National Guard, as is often the case these days, bystanders, family members, and local clerics routinely accuse the Americans of being the attackers—usually by missile strikes that cleverly simulate car bombs. As to why the Americans would want to kill Iraqis whom they are themselves recruiting, training, and paying, no explanation is oªered, because no obligation is felt to unravel each and every subplot of the dark Christian conspiracy against Iraq, the Arab world, and Islam.

I haven't heard of one of these scenes for an awful long time in any but the Sunni areas, and even then the celebrations have seemed to be few and far between. Furthermore, people seem to be blaming the US for the attacks indirectly, not directly (i.e., we are doing the wrong things, which is allowing the terrorists to strike).

[Rufus T. Firefly]

Any withdrawal is going to be perceived by the insurgents and their supporters worldwide as the US being defeated by terrorists. We can ill-afford such a perception, since it will only embolden terrorists worldwide. Any withdrawal at this point will also allow Iraq to become the new Afghanistan -- a chaotic nation with porous borders that will be a haven for terrorists and an epicenter for terrorist training.

Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld have made a spectacular mess of Iraq, but walking away from that mess will make everything 100 times worse. Powell was right to invoke Pottery Barn rules: they broke it; they have to own it.