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In Italy, Anger at U.S. Tactics Colors Spy Case
By STEPHEN GREY and DON VAN NATTA Jr.
Published: June 26, 2005
MILAN, June 25 - The extraordinary decision by an Italian judge to order the arrest of 13 people linked to the Central Intelligence Agency in the case of the kidnapping of a terrorism suspect dramatizes a growing rift between American counterterrorism officials and their counterparts in Europe.
The arrest warrants, requested by prosecutors and the police and signed Wednesday, accused the 13 of seizing an Egyptian cleric on a Milan street two years ago and flying him to Egypt for questioning. The whereabouts of the 13 are unknown, but the charges are criminal. If convicted, they face a maximum penalty of 10 years and 8 months in prison.
The C.I.A. has declined to comment, and officials at the American consulate in Milan and the American Embassy in Rome have also declined to talk about the case.
European frustration with American tactics focuses on two main points.
First, the United States has allowed the C.I.A. to pursue a policy of renditions - abducting terror suspects from foreign countries and taking them to third countries that are known to use torture. That has rankled senior European counterterrorism officials, who have continued to try to build criminal cases against terrorism suspects through surveillance, wiretaps, detective work and the criminal justice system.
European officials also partly blame a lack of access to terrorism suspects and information held by the United States for their failure to convict a number of their own high-profile terrorism suspects.
"The American system is of little use to us," said a senior Italian counterterrorism investigator. "It's a one-way street. We give them what we have, but we are given no useful information that can help us prosecute people."
He and other Italian officials were angry enough to answer detailed questions about the abduction of the Egyptian suspect, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, or Abu Omar, who led a militant mosque in Milan. These officials, insisting on anonymity because the investigation is continuing, are senior in police and prosecution offices in Milan.
At the time of Mr. Nasr's disappearance, Feb. 17, 2003, they said, the Italian secret police were aggressively pursuing a criminal terrorism case against him, and officers had been sharing information about that inquiry with the Americans based in Italy. Mr. Nasr's disappearance essentially ended their case, they said.
The Italians began an inquiry, and before long, realized that their C.I.A. investigating partners had become the leading suspects. They said Saturday that they felt deeply betrayed when they discovered that possibly as many as 19 C.I.A. officers and operatives had participated.
"This whole investigation has been very difficult because we've been using the same methods we used against organized crime to trace the activities of people we considered to be our friends and colleagues," a senior investigator said. "It has been quite a troubling affair."
The Italians said the C.I.A.'s top official at the United States consulate in Milan - a man accused in the arrest warrant of coordinating Mr. Nasr's abduction - had been one of their closest confidants as they pursued intensive investigations into Al Qaeda and other Islamic militant networks in Europe.
Italian investigators said they were startled to discover that he had placed a cellphone call to one of their own police officers not long after Mr. Nasr disappeared, but made no mention of what had happened, they said.
"We do feel quite betrayed that this operation was carried out in our city," the senior Italian investigator said. "We supplied them information about Abu Omar, and then they used that information against us, undermining an entire operation against his terrorist network."
Sharing access to suspects is another sore point. In Germany, counterterrorism officials were furious when a criminal trial against Mounir el-Montassadeq, a suspected associate of several Sept. 11 hijackers, crumbled and he was released.
They openly blamed American officials for failing to provide crucial evidence. And the Bush administration has refused to allow the Spanish authorities to interview Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a central Qaeda suspect, to bolster their case against two men on trial in Madrid on charges of helping to plan the 2001 attacks.
The rockiness is a relatively new development in the two countries' counterterrorism efforts. Beginning in 1998, the Italian police had worked closely with the F.B.I. in tracing Egypt's Gamaa Islamiya militant group within Europe when the two agencies jointly monitored the telephones of a key operative based in Milan, officials said.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, several F.B.I. agents arrived in Milan and established a close working relationship with the secret police, officials said.
As early as the spring of 2002, the Italians tipped off the Americans about Mr. Nasr's activities, Italian investigators said. Methodically, using a mixture of electronic surveillance, wiretaps and surveillance, the Italian police collected evidence that Mr. Nasr was trying to build a jihadist recruitment network with tentacles spreading throughout Europe.
The police and investigators said they had evidence that Mr. Nasr's anti-American rants and calls to jihad were resonating with young Muslim men who were attending his Islamic center here. Secret listening devices had been placed in Mr. Nasr's home and inside several mosques, officials said.
According to court records, this exchange occurred in one eavesdropped conversation at a Milan mosque, recorded by the Italian secret police:
Unidentified speaker: "We must find money because our objective is to form an Islamic army, which will be known as Force 9."
Mr. Nasr: "How are things going in Germany?"
Unidentified speaker: "We can't complain. There are already 10 of us, and we are also concentrating our efforts on Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Egypt and Turkey. But the hub of the organization remains London."
The Italian investigators shared a transcript of this conversation and others with the Americans, who were growing more concerned about Mr. Nasr's openly militant remarks, investigators said. By early 2003, the Italians told their American counterparts they had strong evidence that Mr. Nasr was trying to build a terror recruitment network, possibly aimed for Iraq if the United States went forward with plans to topple Saddam Hussein, investigators said.
At first, the Italian investigators said they had suspected that Mr. Nasr was kidnapped by the Egyptians, possibly with the complicity of the Italians. "It's a serious reach of Italian law; it's absolutely illegal," said Armando Spataro, Milan's deputy chief prosecutor who led the investigation of Mr. Nasr and the kidnapping inquiry.
Mr. Spataro said it was decided to investigate the kidnapping like any other crime - by the book.
It took more than two years, but all the evidence, through cellphone use and the timing of the American officials' arrival and their movements, led the Italians to conclude the kidnapping operation was conducted by the 13 Americans.
Mr. Spataro applied for the arrest warrants last March, and they were signed this week by Judge Chiara Nobili.
Some former American intelligence officials said in interviews that there might be political motivations behind the warrants. Mr. Spataro on Saturday declined to comment on any accusations of political bias. But an Italian judicial official pointed out that Mr. Spataro, 56, is not a member of any political party.
He had previously faced accusations of right-wing bias when he led prosecutions of the Red Brigade terrorist organization in the late 1970's and 1980's. Two of his colleagues, the official said, were killed by the Red Brigades.
"I think people in Washington may not understand that in Italy a prosecutor does not choose what to investigate," the official said. "He has a legal obligation to investigate any crime."
Mr. Spataro, in a recent interview, expressed his disdain for the Americans' use of rendition, though he denied that he was motivated by that when he asked a judge to sign the arrest warrants against the C.I.A. officials.
"I feel the international community must struggle against terrorism and international terrorist groups in accordance with international laws and the rights of the defendant," Mr. Spataro said. "Otherwise, we are giving victory to the terrorists."
The United States flew Mr. Nasr through Germany to Egypt, where he told his family and friends, during phone calls in April 2004, that he was subjected to electroshock treatment and that he had lost the hearing in one ear, according to the warrant documents obtained by The New York Times.
The Italians said their anger and disappointment with the Americans did not end there. They said that when they later asked the Americans about Mr. Nasr's whereabouts, they were told that American intelligence had discovered that he had surfaced somewhere in the Balkans.
On Monday, Judge Nobili is expected to appoint public defenders to represent each of the accused C.I.A. officers and operatives. Under the Italian legal system, it is normal to appoint lawyers for accused criminals, even before they have requested legal assistance.
Once these lawyers are appointed, the judge's 230-page arrest warrant, which includes a full investigative report and the names and personal details of the accused, will become public.
Warrants for the arrest of the 13 C.I.A. agents will also be passed on to Interpol, effectively requiring countries around the world to assist the Italian investigation.
By STEPHEN GREY and DON VAN NATTA Jr.
Published: June 26, 2005
MILAN, June 25 - The extraordinary decision by an Italian judge to order the arrest of 13 people linked to the Central Intelligence Agency in the case of the kidnapping of a terrorism suspect dramatizes a growing rift between American counterterrorism officials and their counterparts in Europe.
The arrest warrants, requested by prosecutors and the police and signed Wednesday, accused the 13 of seizing an Egyptian cleric on a Milan street two years ago and flying him to Egypt for questioning. The whereabouts of the 13 are unknown, but the charges are criminal. If convicted, they face a maximum penalty of 10 years and 8 months in prison.
The C.I.A. has declined to comment, and officials at the American consulate in Milan and the American Embassy in Rome have also declined to talk about the case.
European frustration with American tactics focuses on two main points.
First, the United States has allowed the C.I.A. to pursue a policy of renditions - abducting terror suspects from foreign countries and taking them to third countries that are known to use torture. That has rankled senior European counterterrorism officials, who have continued to try to build criminal cases against terrorism suspects through surveillance, wiretaps, detective work and the criminal justice system.
European officials also partly blame a lack of access to terrorism suspects and information held by the United States for their failure to convict a number of their own high-profile terrorism suspects.
"The American system is of little use to us," said a senior Italian counterterrorism investigator. "It's a one-way street. We give them what we have, but we are given no useful information that can help us prosecute people."
He and other Italian officials were angry enough to answer detailed questions about the abduction of the Egyptian suspect, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, or Abu Omar, who led a militant mosque in Milan. These officials, insisting on anonymity because the investigation is continuing, are senior in police and prosecution offices in Milan.
At the time of Mr. Nasr's disappearance, Feb. 17, 2003, they said, the Italian secret police were aggressively pursuing a criminal terrorism case against him, and officers had been sharing information about that inquiry with the Americans based in Italy. Mr. Nasr's disappearance essentially ended their case, they said.
The Italians began an inquiry, and before long, realized that their C.I.A. investigating partners had become the leading suspects. They said Saturday that they felt deeply betrayed when they discovered that possibly as many as 19 C.I.A. officers and operatives had participated.
"This whole investigation has been very difficult because we've been using the same methods we used against organized crime to trace the activities of people we considered to be our friends and colleagues," a senior investigator said. "It has been quite a troubling affair."
The Italians said the C.I.A.'s top official at the United States consulate in Milan - a man accused in the arrest warrant of coordinating Mr. Nasr's abduction - had been one of their closest confidants as they pursued intensive investigations into Al Qaeda and other Islamic militant networks in Europe.
Italian investigators said they were startled to discover that he had placed a cellphone call to one of their own police officers not long after Mr. Nasr disappeared, but made no mention of what had happened, they said.
"We do feel quite betrayed that this operation was carried out in our city," the senior Italian investigator said. "We supplied them information about Abu Omar, and then they used that information against us, undermining an entire operation against his terrorist network."
Sharing access to suspects is another sore point. In Germany, counterterrorism officials were furious when a criminal trial against Mounir el-Montassadeq, a suspected associate of several Sept. 11 hijackers, crumbled and he was released.
They openly blamed American officials for failing to provide crucial evidence. And the Bush administration has refused to allow the Spanish authorities to interview Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a central Qaeda suspect, to bolster their case against two men on trial in Madrid on charges of helping to plan the 2001 attacks.
The rockiness is a relatively new development in the two countries' counterterrorism efforts. Beginning in 1998, the Italian police had worked closely with the F.B.I. in tracing Egypt's Gamaa Islamiya militant group within Europe when the two agencies jointly monitored the telephones of a key operative based in Milan, officials said.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, several F.B.I. agents arrived in Milan and established a close working relationship with the secret police, officials said.
As early as the spring of 2002, the Italians tipped off the Americans about Mr. Nasr's activities, Italian investigators said. Methodically, using a mixture of electronic surveillance, wiretaps and surveillance, the Italian police collected evidence that Mr. Nasr was trying to build a jihadist recruitment network with tentacles spreading throughout Europe.
The police and investigators said they had evidence that Mr. Nasr's anti-American rants and calls to jihad were resonating with young Muslim men who were attending his Islamic center here. Secret listening devices had been placed in Mr. Nasr's home and inside several mosques, officials said.
According to court records, this exchange occurred in one eavesdropped conversation at a Milan mosque, recorded by the Italian secret police:
Unidentified speaker: "We must find money because our objective is to form an Islamic army, which will be known as Force 9."
Mr. Nasr: "How are things going in Germany?"
Unidentified speaker: "We can't complain. There are already 10 of us, and we are also concentrating our efforts on Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Egypt and Turkey. But the hub of the organization remains London."
The Italian investigators shared a transcript of this conversation and others with the Americans, who were growing more concerned about Mr. Nasr's openly militant remarks, investigators said. By early 2003, the Italians told their American counterparts they had strong evidence that Mr. Nasr was trying to build a terror recruitment network, possibly aimed for Iraq if the United States went forward with plans to topple Saddam Hussein, investigators said.
At first, the Italian investigators said they had suspected that Mr. Nasr was kidnapped by the Egyptians, possibly with the complicity of the Italians. "It's a serious reach of Italian law; it's absolutely illegal," said Armando Spataro, Milan's deputy chief prosecutor who led the investigation of Mr. Nasr and the kidnapping inquiry.
Mr. Spataro said it was decided to investigate the kidnapping like any other crime - by the book.
It took more than two years, but all the evidence, through cellphone use and the timing of the American officials' arrival and their movements, led the Italians to conclude the kidnapping operation was conducted by the 13 Americans.
Mr. Spataro applied for the arrest warrants last March, and they were signed this week by Judge Chiara Nobili.
Some former American intelligence officials said in interviews that there might be political motivations behind the warrants. Mr. Spataro on Saturday declined to comment on any accusations of political bias. But an Italian judicial official pointed out that Mr. Spataro, 56, is not a member of any political party.
He had previously faced accusations of right-wing bias when he led prosecutions of the Red Brigade terrorist organization in the late 1970's and 1980's. Two of his colleagues, the official said, were killed by the Red Brigades.
"I think people in Washington may not understand that in Italy a prosecutor does not choose what to investigate," the official said. "He has a legal obligation to investigate any crime."
Mr. Spataro, in a recent interview, expressed his disdain for the Americans' use of rendition, though he denied that he was motivated by that when he asked a judge to sign the arrest warrants against the C.I.A. officials.
"I feel the international community must struggle against terrorism and international terrorist groups in accordance with international laws and the rights of the defendant," Mr. Spataro said. "Otherwise, we are giving victory to the terrorists."
The United States flew Mr. Nasr through Germany to Egypt, where he told his family and friends, during phone calls in April 2004, that he was subjected to electroshock treatment and that he had lost the hearing in one ear, according to the warrant documents obtained by The New York Times.
The Italians said their anger and disappointment with the Americans did not end there. They said that when they later asked the Americans about Mr. Nasr's whereabouts, they were told that American intelligence had discovered that he had surfaced somewhere in the Balkans.
On Monday, Judge Nobili is expected to appoint public defenders to represent each of the accused C.I.A. officers and operatives. Under the Italian legal system, it is normal to appoint lawyers for accused criminals, even before they have requested legal assistance.
Once these lawyers are appointed, the judge's 230-page arrest warrant, which includes a full investigative report and the names and personal details of the accused, will become public.
Warrants for the arrest of the 13 C.I.A. agents will also be passed on to Interpol, effectively requiring countries around the world to assist the Italian investigation.
to Italy. This is the kind of **** we don't want here. Keep your abductions to the Middle East and to your own territory, and leave our secret services work.
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