Does "dictatorship of relativism" exist?

[Whaleboy]

so the problem is that in your opinion, the abstract concepts aren't descriptive enough to fully describe the nature of real objects, but are just models, approximations.

No. Physical models are both quantitative and testable... in other words they depend upon empirical evidence. Neither of those conditions apply in the case of morality, indeed nor does scientific method or any measure of what we might call "existence". We have varying essenses, with no existence... subjectivity if there ever was sucha thing.

[Bill3000]

<-- Moral relativist. Actually, that's really hard for me to say. I believe in the concept that moral relativity is true. However, at the same time, I realize that I am human and I can never actually "believe" in moral relativity. Why? Because it's a non-anthropocentric reasoning: While it may be true, it's hard to actually innately comprehend, because it's meant to not be able to innately comprehend. As an example - Quantum mechanics is probably the quintessence of non-anthropocentric reasoning; while someone can realize that it is true, as someone once said (forgot who), "No one can understand Quantum Mechanics." Moral relativity is meant to be a tool, not an inherit belief.

To explain this further - I have created my own personal belief system based on the fact that moral relativity is true. If this is all that there was, then it would be extremely hard to justify literally anything. But this is meant to be on a closed-system basis (e.g. the universe). Add a belief of est quis es - "be who you are", e.g. stay to your own inner self (What I call quintessential distribution), and moral relativity makes a lot more sense. A justification for bias is allowed while having a form of "evil" in the sense of hypocrisy or corruption - something analagous to a sin while allowing there to be moral relativity.

Thus, what effect does this have for me? It means that I should try to act like what I am, innately, without actually having to believe in moral relativity in its ultimate sense. But at the same time, moral relativity is realized by myself to be true, and is a useful tool when comparing to other people - especially different civilizations. Moral relativity is most useful when trying to understand other civilizations' cultures. (Actually, was that the original purpose for moral relativity, anyway?) For a simple example: Japan. Need I say more?

[Az]

No. Physical models are both quantitative and testable... in other words they depend upon empirical evidence. Neither of those conditions apply in the case of morality, indeed nor does scientific method or any measure of what we might call "existence". We have varying essenses, with no existence... subjectivity if there ever was sucha thing.

Not true. Happiness, in fact, is quantifiable. That's why my ethics work.

[Whaleboy]

Happiness, in fact, is quantifiable.

You're either mad, dumb, both, or incredibly clever. Do tell.

[Az]

You're either mad, dumb, both, or incredibly clever. Do tell.

biochemically.

[Whaleboy]

I tip my hat to thee

[grumbler]

Originally posted by Ben Kenobi
First of all 'resolution' of a moral problem is not necessarily the desired outcome. One can resolve the problem of pain by killing oneself, which is a resolution, but not necessarily the best option.

The purpose of moral reasoning is to resolve moral dilemmas. If one were faced by a "pain dilemma" (as in the case of, let's say, cancer victims whose pain cannot be relieved by anything but death) then one's reasoning could easily result in the decision to take one's life. If one's ONLY conceivable outcome of the dilemma was ending one's life, then one's "pain resolution reasonng" might be flawed. However, resolutioin is ALWAYS the desired outcome to any dilemma.

As for a convergence, even if everyone made the same decision at the same time, that does not necessarily mean that it is the highest good, or the right choice.

No, it would not. However, that is not the point. The point is that a convergence appears to be implied by the research. Remember that the research shows that moral reasoning follows stages, that everyone follows the same stages in the same order, and that one does not revert to a previous stage. The higher the stage of moral reasoning, the more like other people at the same stage (regardless of gender, nationality/ethnicity, etc) one's own moral reasoning is. Thus, if everyone were to make the same decision because they were all at the same stage of moral reasoning, they would be at a very high level of moral reasoning, one capable of resolving the most moral dilemmas (i.e. ones that could not be resolved at a lower stage).

[grumbler]

Originally posted by Whaleboy
No. Physical models are both quantitative and testable... in other words they depend upon empirical evidence. Neither of those conditions apply in the case of morality, indeed nor does scientific method or any measure of what we might call "existence". We have varying essenses, with no existence... subjectivity if there ever was sucha thing.

Not so in the case of moral reasoning, which can be (and has been) measured according to scientific principals. The theories of moral development are disprovable and so depend on empirical evidence just as does the theory of gravity.

Social science is less precise than physical science, but it is not less accurate. It is also far less mature, so we should not be surprised to find that it lacks precision, if for no other reason than that.

[Kuciwalker]

Or to put it more simply, an approximation.

No, that's something much different. An approximation is something that claims to be a useful tool but not fully descriptive and generally applying only to a limited set of cases while providing an inexact answer. Physics is an approximation, but the significant fact is not that it's inexact but that it makes no claim to describe how the world actually works but merely to be able to predict what will occur. Even if our physics was perfect, it would still be only a useful tool.

However, these models, even incomplete, are holding their water very well in their appropriate sircumstances, and thus they are more correct than other models. It's even possible that one model is simpler to understand, and easier for scientists to work with, but is less correct, and thus we must always remember that it is an approximation of a better, stronger model, almost an immensly strong "rule of thumb".

Now, let's carry back the discussion to ethics and morals:

One could claim that we haven't reached the end of ethical discussion, and/or haven't reached the complete truth about it. One could even claim that to reach such a truth is impossible: still, our best models are to be followed when we make decisions on ethical questions. We shouldn't descend into the ethical equivalent of the amish just because we don't find the perfect answers.[/q]

[Whaleboy]

Not so in the case of moral reasoning, which can be (and has been) measured according to scientific principals. The theories of moral development are disprovable and so depend on empirical evidence just as does the theory of gravity.

But only as an economic principle which itself admits moral relativism, since morality would be relative to the existence (and morality) of other people. You could call it consequent morality which is a piss-poor attempt at an absolute holism.

Social science is less precise than physical science, but it is not less accurate. It is also far less mature, so we should not be surprised to find that it lacks precision, if for no other reason than that.

It's a science only upon certain conditions since conceptual relationships in the humanities are often mitigated by other factors making observation inherently subjective. Unlike our minds however, the real:WORLDTM is governed by physical laws that are quantifiable and transparent so physical laws while still dependent upon context (and thus scientific method and progress can occur), are not internally fallible once they are verified. With "morality", that is not the case.

[Az]

No, that's something much different. An approximation is something that claims to be a useful tool but not fully descriptive and generally applying only to a limited set of cases while providing an inexact answer. Physics is an approximation, but the significant fact is not that it's inexact but that it makes no claim to describe how the world actually works but merely to be able to predict what will occur. Even if our physics was perfect, it would still be only a useful tool.

What's the substantial difference?

[Kidlicious]

Originally posted by Whaleboy


No, because of the argument in the above post:

"
Subjectivism. The difference, in other words, between "I", and "is". I have an emotive repugnance to, say, murder. I can say that I find murder immoral, which is to say that my logic and emotions find it wrong, but that does not necessitate my consequent claim that "murder is wrong". Put simply, one can make statements about oneself that apply for oneself, but you accept that they needn't necessarily apply to others, thus no absolutism, thus relativism.

Kant would call it a hypothetical imperative, as opposed to the categorical imperative.

All of this renders morality as the same level as ones emotions like anger or love, or art... as if to say "this is moral", "I like Dali", but then that's part of the existential beauty of relativism imo. There are few concepts who's very logical form can be described as "beautiful".... evolution is one, relativity and relativism are others."

I don't have much more time for this. This is why moral relativism doesn't make a lick of sense to me. Deciding whether a claim or act is morally correct or not is not like deciding whether to have fries with your Big Mac. I think that's pretty obvious and common sense. There's a lot of reasons for it. I'll just say that one reason is that no one cares if you have fries with your Big Mac except for Ronald maybe. Whether or no you are moral or not is of concern to society however, because it's important to moral people to have a civilized society.

I'm not suprised that people would want to compare moral decisions to decisions about taste though. But you don't get to have your own little correct morality that suits you. Morality is concern for others besides yourself. People don't just act morally because they have a taste to do so. They do so for morality's sake.

[Kuciwalker]

I'm not suprised that people would want to compare moral decisions to decisions about taste though. But you don't get to have your own little correct morality that suits you. Morality is concern for others besides yourself. People don't just act morally because they have a taste to do so. They do so for morality's sake.

They do so because they have a taste for morality.

Everone acts as they would prefer. Else preference has no meaning. Everyone is, in the end, a machine that asks the question "what should I do next", assigns a value ot each possible action, and chooses the one with the highest value.

[Kuciwalker]

What's the substantial difference?

That the inexactitude is irrelevent; it's the claim NOT to describe how reality "actually works" that's important, and what makes relativism about physics as pointless as mathematical relativism.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by Whaleboy But only as an economic principle which itself admits moral relativism, since morality would be relative to the existence (and morality) of other people. You could call it consequent morality which is a piss-poor attempt at an absolute holism.

You have lost me here. Moral reasoning is not an economic principal, and moral reasoning dopes not always even acknowledge the existance of other people (in Stage One morality, for instance). I have no idea even what color an absolute holism is, so i cannot say whether moral reasoning is a piss-poor attempt at one or not.

It's a science only upon certain conditions since conceptual relationships in the humanities are often mitigated by other factors making observation inherently subjective. Unlike our minds however, the real:WORLDTM is governed by physical laws that are quantifiable and transparent so physical laws while still dependent upon context (and thus scientific method and progress can occur), are not internally fallible once they are verified. With "morality", that is not the case.

I have no idea what you are talking about here, since your "real:WORLDTM" is only observable via subjective senses. The scientific principal is a tool, no more limited to examining the physical laws than Sherlock Holme's magnifying glass was limited to looking at footprints.

It is possible, I suppose, that you simply do not understand behavioral science, and so have confused it with psychiatry (I am guesing this based on your refence to "our minds"). Otherwise, your attempts to distinguish between the "quantification' and "transparency" of behavioral science and other sciences make no sense. Behavioral science is very "real world(TM)." It is simply less precise - it is not less accurate.