German cravings for Spanish posessions revealed

[Chris 62]

Well boys, it seems that your viewing 20th century events through 21st century eyes.

Let's start off with the simple political realities of pre-WW I.

ANY action taken by the great powers was subject to review by something called "The Congress of Europe", where the powers would vote on a given action, and all would abide by the decision, as the other powers would use force in needed.

An example of the power of the congress is a war that Russia fought against Turkey in the 1880s. The Turks were throughly defeated, and the Russians could have taken Istanbul, but the congress over-ruled the results of the war, and forced the Russians to accept lesser concessions.

The Congress was dominated by Britain and France, but Germany did have a say in matters. Think of it as a 19th century UN that worked!

The Germans wanted Morroco for strategic reasons, to provide a coaling base for the med, and a good place to blockade the Med in the event of war. Otherwise the place had no value to Germany.

German ambitions were to improve Germany's ability to project sea-power, as well as the normal benefits of colonization.

[Scott F]

The Congress of Europe effectively ended after 1878. Any further conferences afterwards are not generally attributed to the Concert or Congress of Europe and since the period under discussion is after 1878, the Congress no longer applies in affairs in any meaningful way.

And granted, the Germans had strategic interests in Morocco, but they had a far greater objective when they provoked two separate though sadly similar crises with similar outcomes concerning it. The objective in demanding concessions in Morocco was not to gain Morocco, but to terrify and bully France and to make England and France have a falling out. Of course the exact opposite occured. Holstein and Bulow never could fathom the British mind and historical British policies.

Sea power was secondary to the goals of the primary German policy-makers and diplomats during the period prior to the First World War.

[Chris 62]

A few corrections...

Originally posted by Scott F
The Congress of Europe effectively ended after 1878. Any further conferences afterwards are not generally attributed to the Concert or Congress of Europe and since the period under discussion is after 1878, the Congress no longer applies in affairs in any meaningful way.

Sorry, but this is flat out incorrect. The congress ceased to be ineffective in 1911, just before the first Balkan war, not in 1878, as I pointed out in the portion about the Russo-Turkish war, and the Congress also was the body that agreed to send forces to China to quell the Boxer rebellion of 1900, an event that would not be possible it your assertion was correct.

And granted, the Germans had strategic interests in Morocco, but they had a far greater objective when they provoked two separate though sadly similar crises with similar outcomes concerning it. The objective in demanding concessions in Morocco was not to gain Morocco, but to terrify and bully France and to make England and France have a falling out. Of course the exact opposite occured. Holstein and Bulow never could fathom the British mind and historical British policies.

The failure here is due to the anti-Bismarck faction having gained the upper hand. Bismarck favored the British alliance, his successors did not.

Sea power was secondary to the goals of the primary German policy-makers and diplomats during the period prior to the First World War.

Again, this is WAY off, all strategic decisions on overseas colonial policy were tied to seapower, which was the primary defense for such colonies. Steam warships ate coal at an astounding rate, and needed frequient refuelings in order to reach the objectives of their operations. Germany's african colonies, on the east and west African costs were first and foremost coaling stations, intended to aid Germany's primary colony, in China, and it's secondary colonies in Oceana.

They did not exist, as many people incorectly believe, to give Germany a "place in the sun", but rather, as jumping off places for bigger and better things. The Germans were fully aware that Britain and France would oppose a takeover of the resource rich Congo from Belgium. To think that these colonies existed for that reason is folly.

[Scott F]

The congress ceased to be ineffective in 1911, just before the first Balkan warm as I pointed out in the portion about the Russo-Turkish war

Perhaps that is because you confused the date of the Russo-Turkish War, which ended in 1878. It did not occur in the 1880s.

The last truly effective Congress was in 1878. Again, there are conferences afterwards, but they are not as effective, particularly at solving issues in Europe. Like the League of Nations kept on meeting until near the end of the Second World War, there were occasional great power conferences until the bitter end, despite the fact that the system was no longer effective to any real extent after 1878.

There are historians who like to say that the end of the Congress spelled war in Europe, that with the final disregard for the Congress war was inevitable, as the "next crisis" would not be resolved. This is not the case. If the Congress had been effective, there would not have been so many repeated crises in the first place.

the Congress also was the body that agreed to send forces to China to quell the Boxer rebellion of 1900, an event that would not be possible it your assertion was correct.

The Congress was primarily an institution for resolving disputes between European powers. China is not a European power. The industrialized powers acted together in China because they were all attacked by the Boxers. Japan and American also participated in the international expedition. It was not a Congress of Europe venture.

The failure here is due to the anti-Bismarck faction having gained the upper hand. Bismarck favored the British alliance, his successors did not.

Um, no. Bismarck favored the Russian alliance. His successors, led principally by Holstein, did not.

Bismarck's successors tried to draw up an alliance with Great Britain (the frequent argument was that the navy would enable an alliance with Great Britain in some perverse way). The Kaiser desparately wanted an alliance with Britain, as long as he could look like he wasn't desparately interested in one (notably, the Moroccan crisis was provoked to show the British that the French were worthless as allies, and that the Germans were more worthy). As such, the Germans did not settle for mere "understandings" with the British on critical issues. The French were willing to settle for understandings, in the hope that the seeds of understanding would blossom into something more. The Germans weren't willing to wait. They wanted a full alliance immediately, and were not willing to cultivate and gradually establish the ties that were necessary to entice the British into an alliance.

If the Germans truly wanted a navy capable of defending colonies, they would have built a fleet of fast armored cruisers with long operational ranges, not a battle fleet of slow battleships that were built with ranges that enabled them to at most sail to the British coast and back. This is evident in the German naval battleship designs as well. The navy existed as a part of Tirpitz's risk theory. It did not (at least the battleship arm) exist to protect German colonies or to expand German colonial power.

Now if you will note carefully, I did not say that the Germans did not have naval ambitions or colonial ambitions. I said that colonial area of policy played a second fiddle, as it were, to the primary German foreign policy goals, the ones that they were willing to actually go to war over and not back down about.

They did not exist, as many people incorectly believe, to give Germany a "place in the sun", but rather, as jumping off places for bigger and better things. The Germans were fully aware that Britain and France would oppose a takeover of the resource rich Congo from Belgium. To think that these colonies existed for that reason is folly.

Colonies in Cameroon, Namibia, and Tanzania did not exist solely as for getting at the Congo. Bismarck, when he acquired them did not sit down in some prophetic moment and say, "Well, we must control land here, here, and here so that we can control the Congo basin." Bismarck picked what was left and was quite content with the domestic policy gains he reaped at home as a result. Those who followed him, looked at the map and said, "Well, since we have colonies here, here, and here, we should gradually work towards controlling areas here (in the Congo basin)."

So to review, the Moroccan Crises were not provoked to seize Morocco, but primarily to cause a falling out between Britain and France. The coaling station and strategic value of Morocco was a secondary benefit of the overall scheme. The Congress of Europe was not some sort of nineteenth century United Nations. After the Crimean War it was no longer effective and lingered around without any real purpose. Efforts to resurrect it in 1878 failed. It lingered, but as a shadow of a shadow of its once prominent position. German policy had colonial and naval ambitions, but these were secondary concerns. The Germans jockeyed over colonies to establish advantages in Europe. They did not jockey in Europe to establish advantages in the colonial arena.

[Chris 62]

Differing viewpoints...

Perhaps that is because you confused the date of the Russo-Turkish War, which ended in 1878. It did not occur in the 1880s.

The last truly effective Congress was in 1878. Again, there are conferences afterwards, but they are not as effective, particularly at solving issues in Europe. Like the League of Nations kept on meeting until near the end of the Second World War, there were occasional great power conferences until the bitter end, despite the fact that the system was no longer effective to any real extent after 1878.

There are historians who like to say that the end of the Congress spelled war in Europe, that with the final disregard for the Congress war was inevitable, as the "next crisis" would not be resolved. This is not the case. If the Congress had been effective, there would not have been so many repeated crises in the first place.

A poor choice of words on my part, I should have said it was resolved in the 1880s by the Congress, not fought in the 1880s. My mistake.

The Congress was primarily an institution for resolving disputes between European powers. China is not a European power. The industrialized powers acted together in China because they were all attacked by the Boxers. Japan and American also participated in the international expedition. It was not a Congress of Europe venture.

It was the body through which the great powers communicated, and as such, served as the major impetus towrd the boxer question.
The US and Japan had a say based on mutual interest in China, so it was of necessity that they be consulted in that matter, not due to a lessoning of it's influence. In fact, the man selected to lead the expidition was a German, but he didn't arrive in time to actually do it.

Um, no. Bismarck favored the Russian alliance. His successors, led principally by Holstein, did not.

No, he havored an Anglo-allliance as a means on neutralizing and isolating France, his principle aim. The Russian alliance was seen as a means of securing Imperial Germany's back door, not as a means unto itself.
Bismark fully understood that Britain and Germany had strong ties, and emphasized the relationship between Victoria and the Kaiser.

In fact it was the Kaiser that destroyed any chance of a British alliance with his insistance on a real sea going navy, and refused to listen to his advisors on this, not vise versa.

If the Germans truly wanted a navy capable of defending colonies, they would have built a fleet of fast armored cruisers with long operational ranges, not a battle fleet of slow battleships that were built with ranges that enabled them to at most sail to the British coast and back. This is evident in the German naval battleship designs as well. The navy existed as a part of Tirpitz's risk theory. It did not (at least the battleship arm) exist to protect German colonies or to expand German colonial power.

I'm afraid you have a poor understanding of ships of this era.
First, battle fleets were an ENORMUS drain on a national econmy, next, battlecruisers as such, were hotly debated in effectivness, and would have been useless in real war, as the British learned at Jutland.
Plus navel technology was in a state of flux at this point, and the Kaiser favorved the theris of AT Mahan, and constructed his navy accordingly.
The powers did not envision a long drawn out war, but a sharp and violent war.
As for speed issues, most vessels of the period 1900-1914 could make a max 21 knots, with battle cruisers pushing the speed into the 25+ plus range. Add to it that Germany could not produce navel guns of equal caliber to the British (it took as long to make the guns of a battleship as to build the ship itself!). Plus the Germans subsribed to the "armor everythig" approah, as opposed to the British and US approch of "all or Nothing", meaning that only the VITAL parts of the ships where heavily armored. Both navies took the wrong lesson from Tushima, thinking that future engagments would be fought at close range, when in fact future engagments would be fought at long range, where plunging shot would be more effective, and thus, deck armor would be of greater importance then belt armor.
Let's take a look at the Dreadnaught:
Max speed: 21 knots
Belt armor: 11 in
Deck armor: 4 in max
Main Armorment:
10 12in (5x2)
As can be seen, the deck armor is almost three times thiner then the side armor.
Now let's look at Nassau/Westfalen class, the first German Dreadnaughts
Max speed: 19.5 knots
Belt Armor: 11.5 in
Deck Armor: 4 in Max
Main Armorment:
12 11in (6x2)
As can be seen, slightly inferior, but not slow by any means, and hardly useless, as Battlecruisers like HMS Lion found at Jutland.
Germany's BCs were tougher then the British versions, but were under-armed for there size, as was shown at Dogger bank.
The German high seas fleet was constructed to directly challenge Britain, it's BC fleet to protect long range interests, and it's coaling colonies to facilitate it's movements around the world to confront possible colonial enemies such as France.

Colonies in Cameroon, Namibia, and Tanzania did not exist solely as for getting at the Congo. Bismarck, when he acquired them did not sit down in some prophetic moment and say, "Well, we must control land here, here, and here so that we can control the Congo basin." Bismarck picked what was left and was quite content with the domestic policy gains he reaped at home as a result. Those who followed him, looked at the map and said, "Well, since we have colonies here, here, and here, we should gradually work towards controlling areas here (in the Congo basin)."

Who said he did? But everything that Imperial Germany did was with a purpose. All three sat astride the sea routes Britain and France must use if the Suez cannel was blocked.

So to review, the Moroccan Crises were not provoked to seize Morocco, but primarily to cause a falling out between Britain and France. The coaling station and strategic value of Morocco was a secondary benefit of the overall scheme. The Congress of Europe was not some sort of nineteenth century United Nations. After the Crimean War it was no longer effective and lingered around without any real purpose. Efforts to resurrect it in 1878 failed. It lingered, but as a shadow of a shadow of its once prominent position. German policy had colonial and naval ambitions, but these were secondary concerns. The Germans jockeyed over colonies to establish advantages in Europe. They did not jockey in Europe to establish advantages in the colonial arena.

Not so. The added benefit was a hoped for split of a possible anglo-french alliance, not the other way around.
The Congress' effectiveness ended by the Powers lining up into the entante and alliance powers, an event that did not happen till the 20th century, not before.

[Dr. Nick]

Chris, the Germans didn't have a shipbuilding plan until after a couple of attempts of alliance with Great Britain, post Bismarck (Holstein in fact) failed.

Bismarck was more bent on not being allied with anyone. He favored good relations with everyone, but he didn't mind his own dash of "splendid isolation", as long as the balance in power tipped towards Germany and isolated France. The only real attempts to secure an alliance with Britain were in the post-Bismarck years, and these were attempted when the Dreikaiserbund began to fail through disparities between the Austrians and Russians, the Germans obviously favoring the Russians, and due to the close relations between the Russians and the French. The alliances were never formed because both Britain and Germany thought that if they bought more time, the other party would make more concessions. Which failed miserably.

On another hand, the navies became stressingly important, if though a strain, because of the naval race between Britain and Germany started by Tirpitz. It was British policy to supercede the next 2 largest navies in numbers, and when the Germans started laying down all those ships towards 1898 (I think) the British decided that they would continue to pursue their policy and began laying down their own ships.

Also, I do believe that Bismarck set out to aquire colonies to appease a portion of the Reichstag mainly. Bismarckian policy was not 'let's aquire this in case of war', it was more a "let's avoid war'.

[Scott F]

A poor choice of words on my part, I should have said it was resolved in the 1880s by the Congress, not fought in the 1880s. My mistake.

The conference was conducted and concluded in 1878. Of course it resolved very little, only to make the Russians resentful.

It was the body through which the great powers communicated, and as such, served as the major impetus towrd the boxer question.

It wasn't a body at all, merely a series of formal conferences and meetings between foreign ministers that are lumped together and termed as Congresses. There was no Congress of Europe building. No special representatives. None of the trappings associated with later organizations for collective security, to which you liken it. Communications were done privately between powers, save for the occasional conference at which bold statements and ideas were proclaimed for essentially no reason. There was no conference, to my knowledge, between the European powers on the matter, but rather a series of diplomatic communiques and lower scale meetings that resulted in collective action.

No, he havored an Anglo-allliance as a means on neutralizing and isolating France, his principle aim.

Bismarck favors everyone except France, but he went above and beyond more to maintain relations with the Russians than with the British. There are no records of Bismarck proposing an alliance with the British, or even undertaking talks on the matter. The actions of his successors are quite different in that respect.

Bismark fully understood that Britain and Germany had strong ties, and emphasized the relationship between Victoria and the Kaiser.

Bismarck's interest in Anglo-German relations pales in comparison to the efforts expended by those who followed him.

In fact it was the Kaiser that destroyed any chance of a British alliance with his insistance on a real sea going navy, and refused to listen to his advisors on this, not vise versa.

Yes, ironically his desire to have a battle fleet conflicted with his desire to have an alliance with the British. This did not, however, stop him from trying and alliance talks were held off and on from 1900 to 1904, when the British got fed up, decided that the Germans would be no help to them against Russia, particularly in Asia, and signed an alliance with Japan.

Every historian will admit that the Kaiser had a conflicted love-hate relationship with Great Britain. He admired them. He loved his grandmother. He despised his Uncle. He blamed his mother for his father's death to throat cancer. He relished wearing the uniform of a British fleet admiral. Oh yes, he wanted an alliance. He was drawn in, however, by people like Tirpitz and theories like those of Mahan.

I'm afraid you have a poor understanding of ships of this era.

No, I am merely pointing out the theories that were held at the time. German and British leaders did not have the benefit of hindsight in matters like that. Theories for the period held that battle fleets would be used to smash other battle fleets. Colonies would be defended by armored cruisers (I don't know where your argument about dreadnought armor or comments about battlecruisers come from). Armored cruisers would also function as commerce raiders. Battleships fulfilled none of these roles. This is further reinforced by the slow nature of the German battle fleet, which was monumentally unsuited for the purposes you give.

as opposed to the British and US approch of "all or Nothing", meaning that only the VITAL parts of the ships where heavily armored

The all or nothing approach was not developed until the interwar period, as I recall. Its discussion here is moot anyway
.

Both navies took the wrong lesson from Tushima, thinking that future engagments would be fought at close range, when in fact future engagments would be fought at long range, where plunging shot would be more effective, and thus, deck armor would be of greater importance then belt armor.

Your assertion is very interesting given that Tsushima was won by gunnery of longer ranges than naval planners prior to 1905 had envisioned. The engagement ranges were around ten thousand yards, extremely long ranges for the time. These of course pale in comparison to the twenty-five thousand yards at which Bismarck engaged Hood thirty five years later. Notably the battlecruiser squadrons at Jutland duked it out at ranges of around thirteen thousand yards, with initial battle fleet fighting occuring at twelve thousand yards. Dogger Bank was fought at ranges of roughly twenty thousand yards.

As can be seen, slightly inferior, but not slow by any means, and hardly useless, as Battlecruisers like HMS Lion found at Jutland.

Lion was not sunk at Jutland. Queen Mary, Indefatigable, and Invincible were.

Germany's BCs were tougher then the British versions, but were under-armed for there size, as was shown at Dogger bank.

The only German ship sunk at Dogger Bank was Blucher, which was not a battlecruiser, but the point is generally well said.

The German high seas fleet was constructed to directly challenge Britain, it's BC fleet to protect long range interests, and it's coaling colonies to facilitate it's movements around the world to confront possible colonial enemies such as France.

The German battlecruiser fleet was constructed mostly in reply to the British battlecruiser construction program. The Germans didn't subscribe to Fischer's initial battlecruiser doctrine (that they were armored cruiser killers). The built them because the British did.

The coaling facilities were a useful addition. Little more. Again, building a huge fleet of battleships doesn't meet the plan that you say that the Germans were following.

Who said he did? But everything that Imperial Germany did was with a purpose. All three sat astride the sea routes Britain and France must use if the Suez cannel was blocked.

So did a lot of worthless islands that no one wanted or claimed. Bismarck's purpose with the colonial ventures was twofold. First, he sought to create support in the Reichstag and win support from the emerging business factions that favored such things. Second, he sought to "remind" the British that German support (even tacit support) in Britain's endless quarrels with France and Russia had a price and German support could not be taken for granted. Numerous historians, from Henry Kissinger to Robert Massie to Gordon Craig all agree with that.

Not so. The added benefit was a hoped for split of a possible anglo-french alliance, not the other way around.

Not so. If you read the memos and proposals by Holstein and Bulow, the Moroccan crisis was provoked to shatter the infant entente before it became more substantial. Holstein is recorded on many occasions of saying things like "before the ring of the other powers tightens around us, we must attempt with all our energies and with a determination that will not shrink from the utmost to break that ring. Hence the Tangier trip of the Emperor!" (the Tangier trip provoked the Moroccan crisis, quote is taken from Gordon Craig's Germany 1866-1945). Such statements dash the argument of provoking the crisis to get Morocco with other benefits. The goal was to provoke the crisis and reap the other benefits. Getting Morocco was not the overall objective. It was an added benefit.

The Congress' effectiveness ended by the Powers lining up into the entante and alliance powers, an event that did not happen till the 20th century, not before.

Russia sided with France long before the turn of the century. Hence an alliance and an entente. Again, not so. The congress system effectively died in 1878. Like all such ideas (the League of Nations being an example) it lingers after its time has passed, and its time passed by 1880.

[Chris 62]

Here we go again....

This is the last time I will go with this...

The conference was conducted and concluded in 1878. Of course it resolved very little, only to make the Russians resentful.

And this argument continued through 1880, as I have said repeatedly.

It wasn't a body at all, merely a series of formal conferences and meetings between foreign ministers that are lumped together and termed as Congresses. There was no Congress of Europe building. No special representatives. None of the trappings associated with later organizations for collective security, to which you liken it. Communications were done privately between powers, save for the occasional conference at which bold statements and ideas were proclaimed for essentially no reason. There was no conference, to my knowledge, between the European powers on the matter, but rather a series of diplomatic communiques and lower scale meetings that resulted in collective action.

I really dislike people who try to split hairs in phrasolgy. By is what is was, as body, by definition, is a gathering of people. Are you saying they did not gather?
It is obvious we do not agree on the point of the congress, but I am correct in this, you may choose to believe what you like.

Bismarck favors everyone except France, but he went above and beyond more to maintain relations with the Russians than with the British. There are no records of Bismarck proposing an alliance with the British, or even undertaking talks on the matter. The actions of his successors are quite different in that respect.

Read his corospondense, it shows a quite different picture.

Bismarck's interest in Anglo-German relations pales in comparison to the efforts expended by those who followed him.

This is a moot point, as the Kaiser embarked by ship building campaign in the early 1900s, ending any such hopes.

The all or nothing approach was not developed until the interwar period, as I recall. Its discussion here is moot anyway

Totally incorrect. The princple was first applied to the "Iron Duke" class, circa 1912, and was continued in the Queen Elizabeth and R classes.
It is also on point as to the discussion on battlecruisers.

Your assertion is very interesting given that Tsushima was won by gunnery of longer ranges than naval planners prior to 1905 had envisioned. The engagement ranges were around ten thousand yards, extremely long ranges for the time. These of course pale in comparison to the twenty-five thousand yards at which Bismarck engaged Hood thirty five years later. Notably the battlecruiser squadrons at Jutland duked it out at ranges of around thirteen thousand yards, with initial battle fleet fighting occuring at twelve thousand yards. Dogger Bank was fought at ranges of roughly twenty thousand yards.

The engagement was fought between 6,000 and 10,000 maximum range. Navel gunnery made some dramatic leaps in this period, increasing to 18-20,000 yard range.

Lion was not sunk at Jutland. Queen Mary, Indefatigable, and Invincible were.

I was referring to the class, not the ship itself

The only German ship sunk at Dogger Bank was Blucher, which was not a battlecruiser, but the point is generally well said.

Incorrect. Blucher was indeed a battlecruiser. By latter standards, it would be considered a heavy cruiser, but it was indeed a BC, not as effective as the larger Von Der Tann class, but a BC nontheless.

The German battlecruiser fleet was constructed mostly in reply to the British battlecruiser construction program. The Germans didn't subscribe to Fischer's initial battlecruiser doctrine (that they were armored cruiser killers). The built them because the British did.

The coaling facilities were a useful addition. Little more. Again, building a huge fleet of battleships doesn't meet the plan that you say that the Germans were following.

No nation built BC like the British versions, with big guns and little amor. The German system had more protection, scarificing gun power for increased protection.
And it certainly does, the fleet was intended to challenge the British at sea.

So did a lot of worthless islands that no one wanted or claimed. Bismarck's purpose with the colonial ventures was twofold. First, he sought to create support in the Reichstag and win support from the emerging business factions that favored such things. Second, he sought to "remind" the British that German support (even tacit support) in Britain's endless quarrels with France and Russia had a price and German support could not be taken for granted. Numerous historians, from Henry Kissinger to Robert Massie to Gordon Craig all agree with that.

Did I say I didn't?

Not so. If you read the memos and proposals by Holstein and Bulow, the Moroccan crisis was provoked to shatter the infant entente before it became more substantial. Holstein is recorded on many occasions of saying things like "before the ring of the other powers tightens around us, we must attempt with all our energies and with a determination that will not shrink from the utmost to break that ring. Hence the Tangier trip of the Emperor!" (the Tangier trip provoked the Moroccan crisis, quote is taken from Gordon Craig's Germany 1866-1945). Such statements dash the argument of provoking the crisis to get Morocco with other benefits. The goal was to provoke the crisis and reap the other benefits. Getting Morocco was not the overall objective. It was an added benefit.

I continue to disagree here, the objective was to get a foothold on northern Africa, at the expense of a weak colonial power. Splitting the nacent alliance was the side benfit.

Russia sided with France long before the turn of the century. Hence an alliance and an entente. Again, not so. The congress system effectively died in 1878. Like all such ideas (the League of Nations being an example) it lingers after its time has passed, and its time passed by 1880.

Which continues to bring us round and round.
I disagree, and have said so repeatedly. and that will not change, nor will your position either, so this is pointless.
The facts remain, let others draw their own conclusions.

[Scott F]

And this argument continued through 1880, as I have said repeatedly.

Which argument? The conference itself or the disputes in the Balkans? The conference ended in 1878. The disputes in the Balkans are still going on.

I really dislike people who try to split hairs in phrasolgy. By is what is was, as body, by definition, is a gathering of people. Are you saying they did not gather?

You continually assert in your phrasing that the Congress of Europe is a nineteenth century United Nations ("The Congress was dominated by Britain and France, but Germany did have a say in matters. Think of it as a 19th century UN that worked!"). That it is a sort of permanent body and the main means by which great powers communicate ("It was the body through which the great powers communicated"). It is blatantly obvious that neither of those assertions are true.

Read his corospondense, it shows a quite different picture.

No, it doesn't. Examine, for example, his well-known support for the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia (which he later wrote frequent letters and editorials about). The Kaiser, Holstein, and others who followed him thought that the Reinsurance Treaty was an obstacle to their preferred course of forging an alliance with Great Britain and stronger ties to Austria-Hungary. They axed the treaty as a result.

Totally incorrect. The princple was first applied to the "Iron Duke" class, circa 1912, and was continued in the Queen Elizabeth and R classes.

Prove it. There is no mention of Iron Duke fitting the first all or nothing armor scheme in Jane's Battleships of the 20th Century or here: http://warships1.com/BRbb11_IDuke.htm

It is also on point as to the discussion on battlecruisers.

I didn't mention battlecruisers until after you went off about them for no reason.

The engagement was fought between 6,000 and 10,000 maximum range.

From Jane's... "the Japanese successfully engaged the Russans at about 10,000 yards, while the Japanese flagship had sustained a hit at over 14,000 yards." Again, most naval theorists prior to Tsushima believed that engagements would occur at far less ranges (well less than five thousand yards and half of the distance that the battle was fought at). For the time, the ranges were extremely long.

Incorrect. Blucher was indeed a battlecruiser. By latter standards, it would be considered a heavy cruiser, but it was indeed a BC, not as effective as the larger Von Der Tann class, but a BC nontheless.

From Jane's... "Beatty, with five battlecruisers, surprised a powerful German force near the Dogger Bank. Good intelligence indicated an enemy sweep which, in fact, comprised three battlecruisers of Hipper's group, supported by the armored cruiser Blucher. Another source: http://warships1.com/GERcp10_Blucher_specs.htm "Blücher Armored Cruiser." Also from Jane's... "Germany's first battlecruiser, Von Der Tann was ordered under the 1907-8 programme in response to the British Invincible class.

The German system had more protection, scarificing gun power for increased protection.

That is true of all German ships.

And it certainly does, the fleet was intended to challenge the British at sea.

Yet you claim that the navy existed to do so and to serve a colonial purposes?

Did I say I didn't?

Yes, you did. "everything that Imperial Germany did was with a purpose. All three sat astride the sea routes Britain and France must use if the Suez cannel was blocked." So you claimed that the purpose was to control sea lanes.

I continue to disagree here, the objective was to get a foothold on northern Africa, at the expense of a weak colonial power. Splitting the nacent alliance was the side benfit.

Documentation from the period and later historical analysis disagrees with you, and even the Germans would not characterize France as a weak colonial power.

From Kissinger... "German's opportunity to test the strength of the Entente presented itself in Morocco, where French designs were in violation of a treaty affirming Morocco's independence, and where Germany had substantial commercial interests. The Kaiser chose to make his point while on a cruise in March 1905. Landing at Tangier, he declared Germany's resolve to uphold the independence of Morocco." If they wanted to get Morocco as a colony out of the crisis, they would not have gone into it declaring their support for Morocco's independence. The Germans also assumed that their open door policy in Morocco would be supported by the United States and other great powers.

[Chris 62]

I'm tired of argueing this in circles, as I said before.

I also spent six years studing this for my history masters, so I know what I'm talking about. You can believe as you wish, and who knows? You may be right indeed, but I beg to differ.

[Scott F]

Out of curiosity, what did your masters specialize in?

If you do not wish to debate it further, for whatever reason, that's fine. For my part, I intend to dig out a couple of my books about that period and check on the Congress of Europe matter further.

[Chris 62]

Europe in the modern era, 1900-1945.

I only care to debate these things so far, and you brought up many fine points, and reminded me too look up dates, instead of posting off the top of my head!

[Scott F]

And they say that the internet isn't educational.

You wouldn't happen to be able to recommend any books about the Congress of Europe by any chance, would you? There are a number of good books about the origins of the war that cover the various crises, but I think that the accounts in Gordon Craig and Robert Massie's Dreadnought are by far the best.