...for letting us screw you guys over
America's nuclear deal with India
From bad to worse
Jul 20th 2006
From The Economist print edition
America's Congress is preparing to say yes. Others should say no
THE damage done by George Bush's proposed nuclear deal with India gets worse and worse. Already weakened by the nuclear antics of Iran and North Korea, the web of treaties and controls that seeks to halt the bomb's spread is starting to unravel. Congress, hitherto a staunch defender of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and all it stands for, is poised to allow America's laws to be amended to accommodate civilian nuclear trade with India, despite that country's bomb-building. There will then be pressure on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to carve an India-shaped hole in its global nuclear export restrictions, and on the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to agree to “India-specific” safeguards on any nuclear materials or technology sold.
The Bush administration defends its India deal as good for combating global warming, good for friendship with the world's biggest democracy and good for jobs in America. All that is debatable (see article). But its claim that the nuclear deal will be a net gain in the fight against proliferation is pure nonsense. The controversial deal is already undermining confidence in the world's anti-nuclear rules. The NPT, which has helped prevent a number of other capable states from going nuclear, and encouraged some which tried (Argentina and Brazil) and others which had succeeded (South Africa) to turn back, rests on a promise: that only those that renounce nuclear weapons qualify for civilian nuclear assistance. India deliberately stayed outside the treaty to build its bombs; America is now offering it nuclear help anyway. That won't encourage others to keep their non-nuclear promises.
Nor has India taken on any meaningful new non-proliferation obligations to lighten the blow to the treaty. The recognised nuclear powers—America, Russia, Britain, France and China—are committed under the NPT to curb their arsenals (four are shrinking, only China's bomb-pile is still growing) on the way to eventual disarmament; the deal with America lets India build as many bombs as it chooses. The five have at least all signed the treaty banning further nuclear tests and have stopped producing more highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons; India flatly refuses to do either.
The wrong sort of helping hand
By lifting restrictions on India's ability to buy nuclear technology and fuel from abroad, America will be helping it out of a uranium squeeze: its usable stocks of the enriched stuff (lower enriched for power generation, higher for weapons) have been dwindling fast. If the NSG goes along, and makes an exception to its rule that nuclear exports can go only to countries with all their nuclear facilities under safeguards, India will no longer have to eke out its nuclear materials. It will be able to accelerate its bomb-building while using foreign uranium for power generation. Russia has already jumped the gun, recently supplying fuel to two Indian reactors, citing “safety” concerns. That is disingenuous. A reactor running short of fuel can simply be shut down; Russia wanted to get to the front of the queue for future contracts. China, unhappy at America's India deal, could do the same for Pakistan.
India has agreed to separate its civilian nuclear reactors from its military ones, with IAEA safeguards on the civilian sort. But when the intent is bomb-building (and India has every intention of expanding its arsenal), technologies and skills imported for running “civilian” reactors can just as easily be put to military use. India used just such technologies and materials for its first nuclear explosion in 1974. Its civilian and military programmes are closely intertwined—which is why none of its uranium-enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing plants, or its planned plutonium-producing fast-breeder reactors, is on its civilian list. It is even pushing for minimal safeguards on reactors designated as civilian, with inspections only when foreign fuel is present.
Aiding India's nuclear weapons programme, as this deal inevitably will, offends the NPT, which bans such help, direct or indirect, to any country not recognised as a nuclear power by the treaty (and India isn't). Congress is anxious about this too, but uses weasel words that are likely to allow the deal to go forward. That leaves the NSG and the board of the IAEA to decide whether to uphold clear anti-nuclear rules, or be complicit in their further unravelling. Plenty of governments involved are unhappy at America's proposed nuclear agreement with India, but wary of offending either party. It is time they found the courage of their anti-proliferation convictions and blocked the deal, before even more damage is done.
From bad to worse
Jul 20th 2006
From The Economist print edition
America's Congress is preparing to say yes. Others should say no
THE damage done by George Bush's proposed nuclear deal with India gets worse and worse. Already weakened by the nuclear antics of Iran and North Korea, the web of treaties and controls that seeks to halt the bomb's spread is starting to unravel. Congress, hitherto a staunch defender of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and all it stands for, is poised to allow America's laws to be amended to accommodate civilian nuclear trade with India, despite that country's bomb-building. There will then be pressure on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to carve an India-shaped hole in its global nuclear export restrictions, and on the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to agree to “India-specific” safeguards on any nuclear materials or technology sold.
The Bush administration defends its India deal as good for combating global warming, good for friendship with the world's biggest democracy and good for jobs in America. All that is debatable (see article). But its claim that the nuclear deal will be a net gain in the fight against proliferation is pure nonsense. The controversial deal is already undermining confidence in the world's anti-nuclear rules. The NPT, which has helped prevent a number of other capable states from going nuclear, and encouraged some which tried (Argentina and Brazil) and others which had succeeded (South Africa) to turn back, rests on a promise: that only those that renounce nuclear weapons qualify for civilian nuclear assistance. India deliberately stayed outside the treaty to build its bombs; America is now offering it nuclear help anyway. That won't encourage others to keep their non-nuclear promises.
Nor has India taken on any meaningful new non-proliferation obligations to lighten the blow to the treaty. The recognised nuclear powers—America, Russia, Britain, France and China—are committed under the NPT to curb their arsenals (four are shrinking, only China's bomb-pile is still growing) on the way to eventual disarmament; the deal with America lets India build as many bombs as it chooses. The five have at least all signed the treaty banning further nuclear tests and have stopped producing more highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons; India flatly refuses to do either.
The wrong sort of helping hand
By lifting restrictions on India's ability to buy nuclear technology and fuel from abroad, America will be helping it out of a uranium squeeze: its usable stocks of the enriched stuff (lower enriched for power generation, higher for weapons) have been dwindling fast. If the NSG goes along, and makes an exception to its rule that nuclear exports can go only to countries with all their nuclear facilities under safeguards, India will no longer have to eke out its nuclear materials. It will be able to accelerate its bomb-building while using foreign uranium for power generation. Russia has already jumped the gun, recently supplying fuel to two Indian reactors, citing “safety” concerns. That is disingenuous. A reactor running short of fuel can simply be shut down; Russia wanted to get to the front of the queue for future contracts. China, unhappy at America's India deal, could do the same for Pakistan.
India has agreed to separate its civilian nuclear reactors from its military ones, with IAEA safeguards on the civilian sort. But when the intent is bomb-building (and India has every intention of expanding its arsenal), technologies and skills imported for running “civilian” reactors can just as easily be put to military use. India used just such technologies and materials for its first nuclear explosion in 1974. Its civilian and military programmes are closely intertwined—which is why none of its uranium-enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing plants, or its planned plutonium-producing fast-breeder reactors, is on its civilian list. It is even pushing for minimal safeguards on reactors designated as civilian, with inspections only when foreign fuel is present.
Aiding India's nuclear weapons programme, as this deal inevitably will, offends the NPT, which bans such help, direct or indirect, to any country not recognised as a nuclear power by the treaty (and India isn't). Congress is anxious about this too, but uses weasel words that are likely to allow the deal to go forward. That leaves the NSG and the board of the IAEA to decide whether to uphold clear anti-nuclear rules, or be complicit in their further unravelling. Plenty of governments involved are unhappy at America's proposed nuclear agreement with India, but wary of offending either party. It is time they found the courage of their anti-proliferation convictions and blocked the deal, before even more damage is done.
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